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Nigeria has a complex ethno-religious profile. Thanks to the British colonial 
administration, a myriad o f individual groups professing various faiths and belonging 
to different ethnicities have found themselves in a tense, unsettled and competitive 
political system. Unsurprisingly, there have been several attempts to undermine the 
profile o f the state. In spite o f these consistent challenges, what is striking, however, is 
that the Nigerian state has not disintegrated. What explains the persistence o f the 
Nigerian state on the face o f these assaults?
Traditionally, critics have suggested that the federal structure in Nigeria is responsible 
for deflating some o f the attacks against the state. I, however, propose that the success 
o f the Nigerian state is not only due to the prevalence o f a federal structure of 
governance but also due to the inclusive identity provided by religion. In particular, I 
explore the role o f Islam in an ethnically charged context such as northern Nigeria.
While making a cross-regional study o f conflict behaviour spanning over the past 60 
years in northern Nigeria, I underscore that while primordial identities are key factors 
responsible for violent upsurge, in those areas where people are bound together by 
Islam the conflict is less likely to occur. Furthermore, this study showcases that Islam 
in northern Nigeria acts as a double edged sword as it unites and divides in equal 
measures.
From this particular standpoint, this thesis explains and evaluates the symbiotic 
relationship between Islam and conflict-prevention. This study argues that the variant 
o f Islam in northern Nigeria is unique as it has become a source for communal unity 
rather than a source for conflict amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria. In particular, it 
analyses the conflict behaviour o f Muslims and their pursuance o f the concept of 
religious nationalism within a deeply divided and (dis-)united society. This thesis 
attempts to explore the position o f Islam in the conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria.
The backbone o f this thesis is derived mainly from primary sources through extensive 
field work, sample questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, participant observation,
4
focus group discussions (FGDs) and interaction with the actual actors in the research 
arena.
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INTRODUCTION
Nigeria, A frica’s largest state in terms o f population (about 140 million people), has 
had an uneasy nation-building process ever since its independence in 1960. Shortly 
after its independence it encountered a bloody civil war that led to thousands o f 
civilian deaths and a yet-to-heal division in the federal structure. Amongst its uneasy 
national process, the state has witnessed the collapse o f 3 republics, 6 military coups 
and a tense political system.
N igeria consists o f diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religious affiliations with multi­
dimensional interests. However, the main ethnic groups in the state are the Igbo, the 
Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba. It is important to stress that in Nigeria, ethnic and 
religious division provides some sort o f geographical convergence. The Hausa-Fulani 
in the north are primarily Muslims; the Igbos in the south are generally Christians; and 
the Yoruba in the west are divided into both Muslims and Christians.
M ost multi-national states in the non-western context are political inventions 
(Anderson, 1991). Given this political inheritance, many states such as Nigeria have 
fallen prey to forms o f violence originating in sectarian, religious, regional, cultural 
and economic differences. In terms o f violence, religious division appears to be the 
foremost and greatest cause o f conflict in Nigeria.
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T he P ro b lem -R elig io u s  C onflicts
The distinctiveness and the uniqueness o f  religious conflict is that it has no formal 
beginning and no formal or ceremonial ending. There is no declaration o f  war nor is 
there any treaty o f  peace (Faris, 1935:208). This makes the study o f  religious conflicts 
exigent and problem atic.1 From 1945 to 1960 ethnic and religious conflicts constituted 
more than half  o f  the w orld’s civil wars. From 1960 to 1990, this increased to three 
quarters and has further accelerated since the end o f  the Cold War (Appleby, 2000).
Perhaps a fundamental observation is that, with the dawn o f  modernity, it was 
envisaged that religious conflicts would wither away. However, the impact o f  
modernity has failed to curtail this quagmire. Conceivably, with this in mind, Eagleton
' For instance, the age long conflict in Northern Ireland b etw een  1974 until 1994, there w ere seven attem pts to  
reach a political and constitutional settlem ent. All foundered in the face o f  local opposition. See Barnes, (20 0 5 ).
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(2005:11) perceives that: “If civilization and barbarism are near neighbours as well as 
sworn antagonists, it is partly because the evolution o f humanity brings with it more 
sophisticated techniques o f savagery.” What this suggests is that the ushering in of 
modernity has brought an increased amount o f religious warfare and conflict in the 
world (see table below). The intensification o f conflict, predominantly religious in 
nature, is evidently prevalent in northern Nigeria. This has clearly hampered N igeria’s 
prospects for nation-building.
Table 0.1: R elig ious Warfare & C onflict in th e W orld







Perhaps even more fundamental, theories on conflicts are usually confusing and all 
together complex. Traditionally, conflicts have generally been explained on one or a 
melange o f political theories such as: clashes o f political ideologies; communism and 
capitalism, on the struggle between class systems; the bourgeois and the proletariat, 
identity conflicts; ethnic groups competing for dominance and amongst others 
economic conflicts, such as the competition for economic resources and petrol dollars. 
However, it seems that modem theoretical and political explanations have avoided 
religions conflicts.
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However, beyond the scope o f the aforementioned problems associated with 
understanding religious conflicts, there is a limited knowledge o f the peace dynamics 
o f religion within multi-cultural societies. This, then, is my theory: That from the 
foregoing, religion has conflict-generating potential (Gurr, 1993; Smith, 1991; 
Huntington, 1996; Juergensmeyer 1993). However, in those societies that are divided 
along ethnic lines, religion may act as a social-bonding and conflict-reduction 
mechanism. In particular, I examine the role o f Islam in an ethnically charged society 
such as northern Nigeria and show this to be the case.
A dvent o f  Islam in Nigeria
Mazrui (1985: 819) correctly notes that: “religious explosions in Nigeria tend to be 
located in the North among the Hausa and their neighbours, rather than in the South 
among the Yoruba.” Thus, there is no doubt, therefore, that politics in the north are 
walking on a ‘delicate tightrope’ between secularism and religion (Miles, 1989: 326). 
The point to bear in mind, is that a non-western state, such as Nigeria, is a secular 
state constitutionally, but this ideology is rejected due to divisions in religious 
identities and the primordial attachment to religion by the individuals, especially 
Muslims from northern Nigeria. It will readily be seen that Nigeria is divided along 
religious lines by 50% Muslim, 40% Christian and 10% animist o f African Traditional 
Religion (ATR). These divisions have made it seemingly difficulty to find a balance 
between religious identities.
Nigeria is arguably the most populous Islamic state in Africa. It has more Muslims 
than any Arab state (Ahmed, 2007:107). Beyond its demographic prominence, the 
nation’s abundance in oil and gas reserves makes her a player o f strategic importance
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in global political institutions. Since it gained independence from British colonial rule, 
N igeria has experienced monumental social, economic and political problems that 
have made the dreams o f the nation’s founding fathers, and the hopes pinned on the 
nation by black people globally, unrealizable. It is no exaggeration that Nigeria 
represents a typical example o f a troubled state.
The first record o f Islam in Nigeria was in the Bornu region (the oldest Islamic 
community in Nigeria), situated in northern Nigeria in 1096 before the arrival o f the 
colonialists. The spread here was attributed to the mass trading and commercial 
activities during the reign o f Mai Idris Alooma (1570-1603), the king o f the Kanem- 
Bomu Empire. Islam became more widespread amongst the natives due to Aloom a’s 
political reforms, based on Islamic traditions and the introduction o f Sharia. Islam 
emerged into main Hausa land during the reign o f Ali Yaji (1349-1385), ruler o f the 
Kano Empire. It became institutionalized in 1500. However, it was not generally 
accepted by the Hausa people during this period. Islam was introduced to Yoruba land 
by commercial activities during the reign o f Mansa Musa (1312-1337) o f the Mali 
Empire. Islam was introduced in Igbo land in the 1930s, notably in Nsukka.
Islam in northern Nigeria is characterized mainly by the Sunni (orthodox Islam) 
tradition o f the Prophet o f Islam, Muhammad. Sunnis are also referred to as Ahl ul- 
Sunna wa-l-Jam a’ah, which is the largest sect in Nigeria. The other Islamic sect, the 
Shi’a,2 adhere to what they consider to be the teachings o f the Muhammad and the
2 The Shi'ite, (Yan Shia) otherw ise know n as the M uslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), was founded by M u’allim Ibrahim 
Al-Zakzaky, an Islamic fascist. Al-Zakzaky started his radical id eologies w hilst a student at the Ahmadu Bello 
U niversity, Zaria. H e was a leader o f  the radical M uslim Students Society (M SS). It is through the MSS that the 
Islamic id eo log ies o f  Al-Zakzaky b ecom e prom inent am ong M uslim students in the N orthern universities o f  Bayero 
U niversity in Kano, the Uthm an dan Fodio U niversity, Sokoto and Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. Al-Zakzaky 
acquired his Islamic sectarian and religious m otivation from the Iranian revolution o f  1979 and from the Mujahidin
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religious guidance o f his family, whom they refer to as the Ahlul Bayt (people o f the 
House ot the Prophet). Nigeria has a small Shi’a population in the north o f the 
country. Shi’a gained popularity in Nigeria in the 1970s after the Iranian revolution. 
The main difference between the Shi’a Muslim and the Sunni Muslim is that to the 
former, leadership (Imam) is vested in the direct descendant o f Muhammad, whilst to 
the latter leadership is vested in the elected selector o f the prophet Muhammad, thus 
Imam verses Caliphate ( Esposito, 1998:21).
The advent o f Islam to northern Nigeria, mainly in the Hausa Kingdoms, was initiated 
by Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, a celebrated Fulani Islamic teacher and established 
‘Sufi.’ Fodio instigated the Jihad in his hometown o f Gobir, located in the 
northwestern part o f Nigeria. In 1804 Shaikh Uthman, a Sunni Muslim, launched a 
successful holy crusade in present-day northern Nigeria. Fodio’s justification for the 
war was the vast charges o f oppression and corrupt practices levied against the people 
by the Habe (Hausa rulers) (Markovitz, 1977:44). Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, in his 
manifesto known as the ‘Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan wan an sha’ Allah min al-ikhwan’ (a 
letter to the people o f Sudan and who so ever Allah wished among the brothers), 
incited a Jihad on the grounds that it is justifiable for a Muslim to take over the reins 
o f power from a government that practices an adulterated form o f Islam -  even by a 
Muslim.
resistance in Afghanistan. An act o f  notoriety  com m itted  by the sect was in D ecem b er 1994 , w hen the 'Shiites' 
beheaded an Igbo Christian trader named G ideon Akaluka2 for desecrating a page from  the H oly Q u r’an. The 
Shi'ites broke into prison to carry out this horrific act. G ideon Akaluka had been detained for his safety and for the 
prevention  o f  another round o f  religious conflict in the state. G ideon Akaluka’s severed  head was carried around on 
a spike through the streets w ith the jubilant Shi'ite crow d chanting religious songs. Although the culprits w ere  
never brought to justice, extra-judicial killings o f  the suspected culprits w ere carried out by the Kano state 
governm ent. Although no conflict occurred, this incident created religious tensions in Kano.
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Muslims in Nigeria and West Africa embrace Middle Eastern types o f Islamic 
education associated with Sufism. The Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya Islamic sects are 
the only important Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria (Loimeier, 1997:19). The Sokoto 
Caliphate, due to the influence o f Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, was responsible for the 
rise of Sufism in the region. The Qadiriyya brotherhood, which had its spiritual 
origins in Iraq and spread into northern Nigeria through the Wangarawa group from 
Mali. The Tijaniyya brotherhood, founded by Sheikh Ahmad Tijani in the eighteenth 
century (originated in North Africa), has a large followership in Kano. The Tijaniyya 
brotherhood had a radical character as it was more accessible to membership by the 
common masses.
W hy N orthern Nigeria?
N igeria is an enormous country. Northern Nigeria is particularly vast in landmass and 
demographic constitution with geopolitical importance. It has a large grouping of 
ethnic and religious groups with an overlapping history than other parts o f Nigeria and 
Africa. Interestingly, it has over 50% of N igeria’s population. Northern Nigeria is also 
famously known as “the Giant in the Sun” and as “an awaking Giant” due to its multi­
cultural diversity and multi-cultural identities, a diversity o f individual identity 
groups, human resources and vast potential (Farrington, 1963). There are about 250 
distinct ethno-linguistic groups in northern Nigeria (Whitaker, 1970:17). As a result o f 
the plurality o f ethnic and religious groups, Islam is seen as being conflictive with 
other cultures. In the core northern states, Muslim identity groups are dominant whilst 
the lower part o f the north, the Middle Belt, has a majority o f non-Muslim identity 
groups.
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The link between Islam and politics and the effects o f the colonial indirect rule make 
this study conducive to seek the relevance o f Islam and identity groups within a 
pluralistic society. The foregoing factors and funding imposed serious limitations on 
obtaining representative sample for the research. In order to overcome these problems 
three major locations known for their histories o f religious conflicts and have a high- 
density o f diverse ethnic populations: Kano, Kaduna, and Jos were selected for this 
study.
Consequently in the last three decades o f N igeria’s national life, the harvest o f 
religious conflicts has become a constant decimal in the northern parts o f the country.3 
Given the pervasiveness and recurrence o f these religious conflicts in this region, life 
in the area can be likened to the Hobbesian state where life is nasty, brutish and short. 
The complexity o f these conflicts in parts o f northern Nigeria, such as Kano, Kaduna 
and Jos, which, as a result o f their cosmopolitan nature, were hitherto considered to be 
havens o f peace and tranquility, have been violated severally by the volcano o f 
religious conflicts.
Often times there were reprisal attacks on northerners in other parts o f Nigeria 
following the incorrigible carnage and death o f people from other parts o f the country 
by their kin. These conflicts have a serious multiplier effect throughout Nigeria 
creating a state that is usually at war with itself. The most disturbing outcome o f this, 
aside from loss o f life and property, are that people are displaced from their homes,
3 In northern N igeria, there are intra religious conflicts as w ell as inter-religious conflicts. H ow ever, inter-religious 
conflicts are m ore reoccurring than intra-religious conflicts. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish betw een  conflicts 
that arise exclusively  on inter or intra religious grounds; otherw ise it w ill be difficult to determ ine the causality o f  
the conflict. In N igeria, religion exists independently from ethnicity. A conflict that arises out o f  ethnic grounds is 
not a religious conflict per se, but it m ust be noted that intense religious conflict is in terw oven w ith  ethnicity  
because there is a convergence of both ethnicity and religion in Nigeria.
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students are absent from schools and the wheel o f commercial activities are usually 
grounded to a halt.
Drawing from the work o f Weber (1947), all societies are built on a religious 
foundation. This study intends to illustrate that northern Nigeria is built upon an 
Islamic foundation. However, the endemic spates o f religious conflicts are dividing 
the north and weakening its Muslim and non-Muslim partnership. To add to a cautious 
cautionary note, these endemic religious conflicts have become serious problems for 
social, political and economic harmonization. Given the serious vast implications of 
social harmony, economic development, political stability and the international 
standing o f Nigeria in the comity o f states, the records o f religious conflicts in 
northern Nigeria commend it as a serious concern for a study as this.
Ethnic & R eligious C om position o f  N orthern Nigeria
The Muslim faith is largely practiced in the northern region o f Nigeria in 16 states: 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Bomu, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, 
Jigawa, Nassarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara and Yobe. Three states, Benue, Plateau 
and Taraba, have a Muslim minority. Other non-Muslims are found on the boundaries 
between the major Islamic emirates o f Sokoto and Katsina, Katsina and Kano, Kano 
and Zaria. Furthermore, Kano, Kastina and Sokoto are historically centers o f Islamic 
education and missionary activities.
25
M ap 0.2
MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS, LANGUAGES & RELIGION
S o u r c e s .
It is important to note that commercial activities and the existence o f  profitable 
opportunities in agriculture and trade, including the railway system and the 
establishment o f  federal institutions across the north, especially during the military 
rule that favours the north above other parts o f  the country, led to the increased influx 
o f  other ethnic groups from other parts o f  Nigeria in to the north. However, the 
separate settlements o f  the immigrants in Sabon Gari quarters (strange quarters)4 
across the North were by no means a sufficient protection for the clash o f  identities 
between the indigenous Muslim population and the immigrant populations, especially 
those that belong to non-Islamic faiths.
4 Similarly, in southern Nigeria M uslim s from the north mainly reside in designated areas known as Sabo. These 
areas are carved out by N orthern M uslim s to create a d istinctive socio-political and religious identity. These 
residential and com m ercial areas are used as a distinguishing mark o f  identity betw een  N orthern M uslim s and other  
religious groups. The head o f  such quarters is know n as the Sarkin Hausawa.
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A tla s  o f  N igeria .
l e s  E d i t i o n s  j  a .
E th n ic  C ro u p s Relictions
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Aim s and O bjectives
The core o f this thesis is to enquire into the following: Firstly, to analyze the capacity 
and function o f Islam as a basis o f an overarching solidarity and unity amongst 
different ethnic groups professing Islam in northern Nigeria. Secondly, to examine the 
role o f Islamic identity as a credible factor for engendering unity amongst Muslims of 
different ethnic groups in northern Nigeria. Thirdly, to determine the potential o f 
Islam as a mechanism for political mobilization in the northern parts o f Nigeria. 
Fourthly, to determine if  most conflicts that arise in northern Nigeria involve 
individuals who belong to a non-Islamic faith. And lastly, to explicate how religious 
tolerance and peaceful co-existence amongst the different religious and ethnic 
components o f northern Nigeria can be engendered among its people.
R esearch Q uestions
Given the above aims and objectives, the research questions that will be examined in 
this thesis are: Under what conditions are ethnic/tribal/regional identities subsumed 
under the banner o f a common religion? Secondly, is Islam a credible factor for 
engendering unity between Muslims o f different ethnic origins in northern Nigeria? 
Thirdly, why and how is Islam deployed as a mechanism for political mobilization in 
the northern parts o f Nigeria? Fourthly, in northern Nigeria do most conflicts arise 
when an individual belongs to a non-Islamic faith? Finally, how can harmonious and 
peaceful existence between different Nigerian nationals o f different faiths be 
engendered in northern Nigeria?
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R esearch H yp oth esis/P rop osition s
Underlying the thesis aims, its objectives and the research questions, it is in order, 
therefore to raise the following research propositions:-
1. Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian 
divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety 
mechanism to deflate conflicts in times o f crises.
2. Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity 
among seemingly similar cultural groups in northern Nigeria.
3. In those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common 
ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.
4. Religion when used for ethnic and political manipulations tends to generate 
conflicts in northern Nigeria.
5. The more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it has to feed into religious 
crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for personal and group 
interests.
R esearch Constraints
Before delving into research constraints, it is necessary to explore' what motivated the 
researcher to embark on this study. The motivation for this study is two-fold. Firstly, I 
am concerned about the plight o f religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. This enquiry 
started when I coordinated a National Seminar entitled ‘Programme for a Peaceful 
Nigeria: M aking Ethnicity and Interfaith Harmony W ork’, which took place in Abuja, 
Nigeria from the 27th -  29th October 2004.5 The Seminar revealed gaps in the
5 A Seminar organised by the African Centre for Contem porary Studies (A C C S). See
h ttp : / / w w w .a c c s .o r g .u k /past.htm 1. 1 have my educational in Law. I was called to the Nigerian bar as an advocate
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knowledge about conflict in northern Nigeria, which had not been researched into by 
academics. The crucial dormant factor was the tendency for Islam in northern Nigeria 
to act as a social glue to different cultural groups.
Secondly, I am desirous o f acquiring a better understanding o f conflicts within the 
region, as a prerequisite for seeking conflict resolutions. Perhaps, this can only be 
achieved by critically observing inter-religious, inter-ethnic relations and conflict in 
northern Nigeria to establish ‘truths’.
The use o f two methodologies to establish ‘truths’ was indeed a daunting challenge, as 
it required greater effort and time consuming experience. However, this knowledge 
gained by the researcher at qualitative and quantitative course modules at Lancaster 
University proved to be advantageous. Limitations encountered in this study were 
mainly centered on communication problems and the fear o f persecution. However, 
the use o f an interpreter assisted in resolving the former problem to a large extent, but 
the latter problem was a recurring decimal all through the field research with people 
refusing to volunteer opinions despite repeated assurances o f confidentiality. There 
were situations in which the research team faced actual danger to their persons, in the 
sense o f hostile reactions from individuals.
Another major constraint all through the research was that o f paucity o f funds to 
prosecute the research. The research was funded through the limited personal finances 
available to the researcher. With better funding, much more in-depth research on this 
all-important problem would have been done. That being said, this did not in any way
& solicitor o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f  N igeria. After som e years o f  practice, I founded a research organisation called  
the African C entre for C ontem porary Studies.
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affect the outcome o f the research negatively. The only difference is that with more 
funding, more samples would have been obtained for the research and the possibilities 
o f generalization o f the result enhanced. Perhaps, another major limitation in this 
study was the lack o f data from government parastatals.
It was a daunting task collating information from the field. There were all sorts o f 
nuances either cautioning respondents or restraining them altogether. Depending on 
their levels o f belief, the issue o f discourse could be volatile and occasionally 
tempers flared. When this occurred, we (research assistants and myself) were 
susceptible to attack, either in defense o f a northern political philosophy or in 
defense o f the provisions o f Islam.
I also observed that due to the cultural restriction placed on women, either as a result 
o f domestic norms or Islamic interpretations, it was not easy to get women to 
express their views and a few who we were able to talk declined our invitation rather 
sharply. While on some occasions the Muslims or indigenes (males) could easily be 
approached to participate in the discourse, especially in Kano and Jos, the non­
indigenes were careful not to be seen talking about the issues or heard. In a few 
instances they politely declined as if under some unforeseen warning. Only two non- 
Muslim women (Kaduna) were interviewed and this was achieved once they were 
reassured that we were researchers. However, they answered the questions in a 
distant and cautious manner. This is in contrast with the women who volunteered to 
answer the sample questionnaire. However, women were eager to fill out the sample 
questionnaire than to be interviewed on tape/participate in Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs).
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It is necessary to mention that we were easily noticed as visitors by our clothing, 
which was largely European, and easily put people on guard as we went about 
seeking respondents. Once we were able to win one, it became easy to get the 
others.
The main challenge on the field was organizing the FGDs. I had to approach an 
agency to assist in interviewing and selecting participants for the discussion. These 
tasks proved too difficult as individuals were sensitive about religious issues 
because these locations (Kano, Kaduna, & Jos) were hot beds for religious conflicts. 
Because o f this, I had to organize the FGDs when we arrived at these locations.
It took a few attempts to organize a FGD in Kano. Earlier on, I had met with some 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Sabon Gari in Kano to convene in an open space. A 
local non-Muslim religious leader offered his place o f worship to us; however, the 
Muslims we approached refused to meet in this venue. The Muslims also refused to 
meet in our make-shift hotel in Sabon Gari, given the fact that alcoholic beverages 
were sold there. It took us one week to convene for discussion. On the appointed 
day, the participants gathered at the appointed venue -  a derelict building, which I 
gathered was destroyed in one o f the riots. We requested all participants to introduce 
themselves. After these somewhat solemn formalities, a non-Muslim chanted: 
‘Praise the Lord.’ As soon this was recited, the Muslims left immediately. It took a 
week to organize another discussion. This time I approached and interviewed 
individuals randomly. I collated contact details o f those who agreed to participate 
and streamlined potential participants, on grounds o f a libertine, objective and
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unbiased outlook towards religious conflicts. Eventually, 10 proactive participants 
and two women were readily available.
Jos in Plateau State was under curfew as a result o f the November 28, 2008 religious 
riot. (See the table & narrative in Chapter 5). Due to this tense atmosphere, people 
were not willing to express their views to us and we were treated with suspicion. 
Some people thought we were agents o f the state. This state o f mind is evident in the 
first FGD, where participants were not willing to discuss openly among each other. 
The discussion was centered amongst three members out o f a group o f 12 (one 
woman and two men). In such a situation, adequate data may not be forthcoming. In 
addition, the proactive participants were likely to sway the course o f the study to suit 
their own reasoning and sentiments. I observed that in such a state, it was best to 
formally discontinue the discussion. With the kind assistance o f a local NGO, I was 
able to gather 12 participants for the second FGD. This group was proactive and 
fostered open conversation and explored arguments amongst the participants.
As we explored the neighborhoods in Jos conducting interviews with people willing 
to converse with us, we (research assistants and myself) were accosted and arrested 
by the State Security Service (SSS). The SSS was desirous o f establishing our 
intention for conducting these interviews. We were scrutinized and after explaining 
our purpose and providing adequate identification we were released.
By this point, I had learned a few lessons in organizing FGDs. In Kaduna, under the 
auspices o f local NGOs, a FGD was organized consisting o f 13 participants, including 
one woman who was very observant but did not contribute in the discussion. The FGD
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was quite stimulating as it unearthed many unforeseen factors. It also reflected the 
diversity o f not only Kaduna State but also o f different ethnic groups residing in 
Kaduna. Overall, the FGD provided an ‘overheard every day talk’ that was essential 
for validating the research.
Basic T heoretical Parameters: Group Theory, Invented  Tradition, 
G rievance & Prim ordialism
To understand the significance o f the problem and analyses o f this study, I need to 
anchor my study on group theory, invented tradition, grievance and primordialism. 
These theories that I have highlighted are crucial in terms o f understanding inter­
group conflict in northern Nigeria.
Group Theory
This thesis examines group behaviour within a civilization. It studies the causal links 
between northern Nigerian Muslims and conflict behaviour. The group theory 
explicates the dynamics o f human relations in society. It argues that given the 
gregarious nature o f man, his actions are better understood in the context o f the group 
relations in which people are involved.
According to this perspective, what underscores every society is the organic interest 
that binds people together in groups and conditions the pressures, stress and 
dynamism o f social life. Individuals within the group consider themselves as having a 
‘w e’ awareness o f belonging (Smith, 1979:1). Society is a pluralist social 
configuration oriented towards the achievement o f diverse interests. According to 
Macridis (1964:139), it is the organic interests amongst group membership that act as
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the binding element o f group relationship and thus provides the power o f a group as a 
deterministic social construct either for good or evil. Clearly, an individual must be 
accepted in a social group before he is deemed a member. Notably, acceptance which 
may be an imagined consciousness is about sharing in a common identity, such as 
ethnicity or religion. Thus, striking questions which this study addresses is how is a 
group constituted for mobilization? How does an individual choose a group identity? 
Does group accord identity to individuals or otherwise?
One may safely suggest that religion as the primordial identity o f an individual is 
formed by the construction o f his/her group’s identity. This being so, it may be clear 
that in northern Nigeria, that Islamic identity is shared symbolically, but aggregates 
differences when individuals are not part o f the community of Islam. This acceptance 
o f common interests and identity provides the sentiments o f a ‘we-group.’ Inherent in 
the explication o f the different group interests is the desire o f groups to gain advantage 
over others and to institute their group hegemony in state affairs through the 
domination o f political structures. This is often met with resistance and counter- 
resistant which usually engenders conflicts.
Bentley (1908) laid the intellectual foundation for the group theory. Rather than a 
collection o f individuals, Bentley asserted that a group is a mass o f activity (Varma, 
2001:163). Thus, all groups must have an interest. He also affirmed, that “when the 
group is adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything I mean 
everything” (Bentley, 1908:209). Contrary to Bentley’s obsession with procedures in 
his conceptualization of groups, Truman (1951:37) notes that “an interest group is a 
share-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in society. If  and
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when it makes its claims through or upon any o f the institutions o f government, it 
becomes a political interests group.” This conceptualizes groups to include those 
stable social groups, which do not necessarily have continuing policy goals, but can 
suddenly intervene in policy process (Greenstone, 1975:265).
It is worth stressing at this point that a major critique o f the group theory is its loose 
definition o f groups, implying that the theory may not be a rigorous theory for social 
analysis. Group theory admits the possibilities o f multiple group membership but it 
fails to inform us o f the contextual implications o f this criss-crossing group 
membership on the dynamics o f social relations. A major shortcoming o f the theory is 
its dissolution o f individuals in the acidic current o f group relations. This denies the 
reality that each member o f a group is first and foremost a private individual and can 
exercise the freedom to exist in any group whenever they deemed fit to do so.
In spite o f the above limitations, one might argue that an individual’s sociological 
make-up favours group existence. The importance o f groups could be understood as 
the foundation o f the formation o f the personality and opinions o f people. Thus, an 
individual removed from its group relations would be ill-at-ease and less efficacious. 
Within the context o f my research questions and the political dynamics o f northern 
Nigeria, the failure to engender Nigerian nationalist sentiments in the citizens has 
made group associations such as ethnic associations and religious loyalties the 
primary defining elements o f social existence and, consequently, the root o f ethnic, 
religious and political violence. To adequately understand the dynamics o f groups in 
Nigeria, social formations is a veritable tool for the analysis and explication o f the
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problems o f nationhood, ethnic and religious conflicts and the desire to promote social 
harmony, peaceful co-existence and national development.
Invented  Tradition
To guide the research study, I draw on the concept o f ‘invented tradition' to explain 
and determine the link between N igeria’s historical trajectories o f nationhood and the 
emergence o f a tense and competitive political system. More important still, the 
invented tradition seeks to elucidate the dynamics o f the formation o f nationalism in 
non-western states. Hobsbawm (1983), persuasively and significantly shows that 
nationalism is based on invented traditions that are either forced by the intellectuals or 
developed within the ambits o f social construction. Hobsbawm strongly affirms that 
‘national cultures’, especially in non-western states, are recent inventions by the elites. 
Hobsbawm argues that invented tradition is a set o f practices normally governed by 
clearly accepted rules and o f a custom or representative nature, which connects with 
continuity with the past.
Notwithstanding the above definition, the analytical significance o f invented tradition 
theory within this study is based on Anderson’s (1991) arguments in his acclaimed 
book ‘Imagined Communities.’ Nations, according to Anderson, are ‘imagined 
com munities.’ Anderson’s theory, based on a modernist perception, suggests that the 
nation is a recent creation and, therefore, is a political invention constructed by print 
technologies with the emergence o f modernity. To Anderson, nationalism invents 
nations where they have not previously existed. He further points out that people 
within a nation did not accede to be part o f the nation, but only found themselves 
within the nation as a result o f a metamorphosis o f historical and political trajectories.
The historic and political trajectories, in most cases, lie within the colonial invention 
o f nations.
In the context o f this thesis, Anderson’s concept o f nationhood may be suitable as an 
approach for explaining Nigeria’s history o f nationhood and the formation o f new 
political identities. The image o f a united northern Nigeria may be explained as 
political project rather than an act o f history. It could be argued that colonialism was a 
strong factor that formed Islamic identity in northern Nigeria by the system o f indirect 
rule in the region. These formations by the colonialists created a flaccid coalition of 
communities and ethnic groups, which had little or nothing in common, with a hopeful 
reverie o f creating nationhood. Perhaps, this is largely why there is a conceived 
perception o f people viewing one another as belonging to a larger family and viewing 
outsiders as separate and distinct from perceived historical affiliations. This political 
invention offers a satisfactory rationalization o f the problems associated with pre­
colonial institutionalism, the myriad o f individual groups, deep divisions among the 
people, people o f multiple identities professing various faiths and individuals 
belonging to different ethnic groups.
In examining the origin o f Nigeria, its historical trajectories cannot be overlooked due 
to its formative history. N igeria’s well-defined geographical framework, in regards to 
the inherited and invented traditions o f the colonialists, poses several problems. These 
problems are connected to the plethora o f communities that have differentiating 
culture and national identities, which were fused as a result o f N igeria’s colonial past. 
A feature o f Anderson’s study relevant to this thesis is that communities in the 
‘geographical expression’ o f Nigeria were fabricated into a nation. The creation o f the
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nation-state Nigeria was part o f the invention o f the British colonialists who wanted to 
create a family o f nations in the modern world. Notably, the artificial partitioning o f 
land and merging o f different communities, all with different cultures, gave rise to 
‘N igeria’, a geo-political label that was suggested by Dame Flora Louisa Shaw.6 
Hence, it could be argued that individuals are capable o f imagining themselves as part 
o f wider national group (Anderson, 1991).
It is trite to reiterate that the main political identities in Nigeria consist o f the Hausa- 
Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba. These political identities were conceived under the 
notion that a balance o f political power would be distributed amongst these groups. I 
will illustrate and argue that the Hausa-Fulani ethnie7 has, over the years, attained a 
supra-political national identity in Nigeria through the channel o f a religious identity 
(Islam), wherein its people imagine that they are an exclusive nation within the state.
W hat this amounts to is that there is a strong understanding that there exist imagined 
identities, such as northern Nigerian Muslims, whom are bound together as an identity 
group due to a common religious identity. The concept o f identity is a complicated 
construction in northern Nigeria due to the fact that there are different ethnic groups 
within the region. My intention in this thesis is to illustrate that the construction o f 
these differences is imagined or, in other words, a mental impression due to the fact 
that different people grew up in similar communities and partake in community 
activities together but are imagined differently due to an exclusive religious identity.
6 She becam e the w ife o f  Lord Frederick Lugard (N igeria’s first G overnor-G eneral) in 1902, and suggested the 
nam e in The Times on the 8 l1' o f  January 1897. H ow ever, the polity  know n as N igeria cam e in ex istence into 1914  
after the am algamation o f  the Northern and Southern territories.
7 This term  habitually used by A .D . Smith, captures a broader m eaning. Ethnics connote a w ider structure o f  
groups and extends into a w ider con text.
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However, Anderson’s definition of nations could be criticized for connoting that 
nations are not real. Assuming this, but not conceding that they are non-existent or are 
in a state o f apparition, then, it may be argued that nations exist only in a state o f 
utopianism and are mere illusory or are ‘Alice in W onderland’ fairy tales. Anderson’s 
socially constructed world may be seen as viewing nations not as they are but how we 
want nations to be seen. However, Anderson’s theory o f invented traditions remains a 
useful guide in understanding the trajectories o f N igeria’s complex history and 
explaining how and why individuals and groups see the other as being different.
G rievance
This thesis provides evidence that most inter-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria 
are caused by collective grievance between groups. Gurr (1970) argues that increased 
expectations when equaled with increased frustrations, due to the failure in 
expectation realizations, are responsible for the instigation o f social conflicts. The 
condition o f rising expectation and rising frustration is directly related to relative 
deprivation. Relative deprivation is used to explain the social and psychological 
generative mechanisms that lead to political violence. Gurr’s theory is relevant to this 
thesis because it attributes aggression to behaviourist constructions in conflict in 
northern Nigeria. In this sense, any grievance by perceived by a religious group in the 
region may lead to the use o f religion by that group as a tool for conflict or for stoking 
ethnic hatred.
It is possible to speculate that a causal explanation o f religious conflicts is due to 
perceptions o f deprivation in terms o f socio-economic, psychological needs and 
resource control. However, the study and understanding o f grievance is based on
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G urr’s (1970:13) definition o f relative deprivation. Gurr defines relative deprivation 
as a “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.” In 
other words, relative deprivation is connected with the individual or a group to 
perceived social injustices such as racism or discrimination. It can be seen in a 
contrast o f what an individual needs and what the individual gets. These perceived 
social inequalities and injustices are the causal links to individuals or groups 
experiencing relative deprivation. Therefore, it becomes easy to understand that “the 
frustration-aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law o f gravity: Men 
who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion 
to the intensity o f their frustration” (Gurr, 1970: 37).
An important aspect o f this thesis is that groups are predisposed to recognize that their 
group’s identity is threatened by or suffers from deprivation o f socio-economic 
conditions. Socio-economic conditions such as the dearth o f basic needs, resource 
distribution, economic wealth, social well-being and education are connected to the 
realization o f the suffering o f an individual from the group. These sentiments of 
suffering lead to the sense o f frustration amongst the group and may be the causal link 
to violent conflict. Perhaps, this theory is best suited to explain religious conflicts in 
northern Nigeria due to the dearth o f socio-economic development in the region.
G urr’s seminal work is subject to limitations in analyzing the psychological dimension 
to conflicts. His work rests on a single foundation: Frustration-aggression. Some o f 
the ambiguity stems from the tenuous methods in measuring psychological variables 
in the context o f conflicts and others from the non-linear relationship between conflict 
and violence. One may argue that frustration is not always the causal link to violence.
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Certainly, not all grievances lead to violence in order to engender a change in value 
capabilities and or value expectations (Gupta, 1990). One objection to the grievance 
theory in explaining the causal link o f conflicts is the deterministic factors o f financial 
potentials o f instigating the conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). However, groups are 
very unlikely to admit economic factors or greed as the cause o f conflict. Usually, 
groups attribute the causal link to sentiments o f grievance (Collier, 2000:92). 
Notwithstanding its limitations, certainly Misra (2008:11) is precise when he suggests 
that it is a “useful framework to explain the dynamics o f internal violence in some 
societies” and indeed, northern Nigeria is a worthy illustration.
Prim ordialism
Primordialism is based on a permanent and essential condition, a trait that lays 
emphasis on history for the reason that existing notions o f ethnicity, culture, national 
identity and religious beliefs are constructed by past memories, myths and common 
cultural backgrounds in northern Nigeria. This implies that a common history is the 
foundation o f a common identity.
Primordialism contends that nations are pre-modem ethnic identities. The emphasis on 
primordialism is a distinctive and definitive characteristic o f establishing national 
identity in Nigeria, as perhaps in most non-western societies. This thesis argues that 
the concept o f religion is primordial mainly in some non-westem societies. Although, 
the primordial attachment to religion may be argued to be a sufficient causal 
explanation o f religion’s significant cultural marker to the individual, this may not be 
conclusive as one may wonder if the type o f society plays a role in explaining 
religion’s primordial identity to the individual.
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More to the point, Haugaard (2006:351) boldly observes that primordialism is “the 
naturalness o f nations by indefinite extension into past.” Smith (1998:152) brings us 
closer to the viewpoint o f primordialism by citing Clifford Geertz’s persuasive 
definition o f primordialism:
Primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’-or, 
more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the 
assumed ‘gives’-of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them ‘givenness* that stems from being 
bom into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect o f a language, and following particular social 
practices.
From the above excerpt, primordialism differentiates an individual and a group from 
the other just as nationality, language and race and, therefore, connects to the origins 
and history o f an individual/group.
Before delving further, let me put forward Smith’s (1991) approach. Smith (1991:40) 
suggests that a nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common and 
common legal rights and duties for all members.” This definition and approach is 
relevant to this study because it focuses on the construction o f an identity on 
primordialism. Smith’s (1991:14) examination is significant to this thesis because 
Smith lists primordial features o f national identity as “a historic territory or homeland; 
common myths and historic memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal 
rights and duties for all members; and a common economy with territorial mobility for 
members.” Smith also recognizes clearly that “nations exist from time immemorial” 
(Smith, 1999:19). It is important to note that Smith (1991:6) states that religious 
identity is distinct from national identity and suggests that a religious identity
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originates from ‘communication and socialization’ based on values, symbols, myths 
and traditions. In this sense, it is acceptable that “religion then may preserve a sense o f 
common ethnicity as if in chrysalis” (Smith, 1991:35). In this study, I illustrate that 
the Hausa-Fulani ethnie and other ethnic groups professing Islam in northern Nigeria 
merged under a common religious identity due to ‘communication and socialization’ 
o f Islam in the region.
Furthermore, Smith (1991:7) argues that the “twin circles o f religious and ethnic 
identity have been very close, if not identical” and one may add that the construction 
o f religion as a discursive link to the concept o f a nation is pivotal in this study. In this 
sense, I underscore Smith’s (1981:64) argument that religion may be a distinctive 
cultural characteristic and an attribute o f a nation. I argue that national identity 
connects with a past and shared cultural values through a process o f socialization. 
Clearly, this suggests that an individual has a sentiment o f belonging and ties o f 
kinship to an extended family or a group.
Furthermore, I succor to Smith’s (1991:21) explicit and succinct definition o f an 
ethnic group as a “a type o f cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role o f myths 
o f descent and historical memories and that is recognized by one or more cultural 
difference like religion, customs, language or institutions.” Smith divides ethnic 
groups into two: Ethnic categories and ethnic communities. Ethnic categories are a 
wider term for ethnic groups, as it signifies a ‘separate cultural and historical 
grouping’ (Smith, 1991:20-21) that possesses different national identities. An 
illustration o f this group is the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria, which is also found in
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the neighbouring state o f the Republic o f Benin. The two, however, do not share in a 
common national heritage.
Ethnic communities (ethnie), on the other hand, according to Smith, possess a 
collective proper name, a myth o f common ancestry, shared historical memories, one 
or more differentiating elements o f common culture, an association with a specific 
homeland and a sense o f solidarity for significant sectors o f the population. This aptly 
describes the Hausa-Fulani. Thus, it may now be clear that religious identity and 
ethnicity are closely related as both identities are culturally determined, possess 
common characteristics and are building blocks for each other. Accordingly, it could 
be safely suggested that for Smith, religion is a significant building block for both 
national identities and ethnicity.
The conceptualization o f primordialism is useful in understanding the construction of 
religion as the main identity marker o f northern Nigerian Muslims as opposed to 
ethnicity. I argue that this identity describes the bond and overarching solidarity o f 
northern Nigerian Muslims, which is based on historical trajectories. Although, it has 
been argued that primordial attachments will wither with modernity (Connor, 1994), 
in societies such as Nigeria, and mostly in non-western societies, primordial life styles 
and ideology form the basis o f their national identity. The argument supporting 
primordialism in northern Nigeria is due to the fact that primordial attachment to 
ethnicity, the nation and religion preceded the formation o f state organization (Smith, 
1986:12). Moreover, I contend that for Muslims, in northern Nigeria, Islam acts as an 
identity and spiritual status o f culture and values.
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Critics o f the primordialism theory assert that identities are socially constructed 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966; Anderson, 1991). Arguments against primordialism 
suggest that individuals are considered as the agents who socially construct identities 
(Fearon & Latin, 2000). It is argued by Fearon & Latin (2000) that identities are 
socially constructed by the way and manner individuals categorize/label other 
individuals. This categorization/label according to Fearon & Latin is the product o f 
human action and communication.
In support o f an ideal description o f how society is viewed in the eyes o f a social 
constructionist, perhaps the words o f Schutz are a point o f reference: “The vernacular 
o f everyday life is primarily a language o f named things and events, and any name 
includes typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in 
the linguistic in-group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a 
separate term for it” (Embree, 2009:133). This would infer that all structures in 
society cannot be defined by historical determinism. In this sense, society is 
determined by the way people see the world and not by deeds o f the past. It is argued 
that the world cannot be observed entirely from social prisms as most societies are 
constructed by historical trajectories. Thus, social constructionism removes the 
adequacy o f past memories in understanding society. It is in this light that Motyl 
(2010:63) notes that: “People may believe all sorts o f things about their beliefs and 
behaviours, but there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that they are self-consciously 
engaging in “social construction.”” But, the question remains against what 
categorizations/labels are identities considered? Why do some societies have a certain 
peculiar attribute? One cannot pretend that the social construction o f an individual’s
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identity in some societies is culturally and historically determined. It is determined by 
how the individual makes sense o f his/her past.
However, in spite o f Smith’s emphasis on primordial arguments, Smith is caught in 
two minds. Smith argues that nations are modem but their origins are prehistoric. 
Balancing the two concepts, the key to understanding Smith’s arguments lies in what 
he considers as ethno-symbolism (Smith, 1998).
Having discussed the different theoretical frameworks that are relevant to this study, 
the theory that rigorously fits best in explaining the conflict dynamics in northern 
Nigeria is the primordialism theory. Islam in northern Nigeria has a strong connection 
to the past. The essence o f historical and cultural determinism is strong factor that 
explains the identity o f Muslims in northern Nigeria and illustrates the power o f Islam 
in northern Nigeria. It may then have an overarching attribute by its power to 
collectively invoke people from different ethnic groups together under a similar 
cultural and identity marker.
Chapter Schem e
The need to facilitate a logical and clear argument in the spirit o f fairness and 
integrity8 is what informs the structure and depth o f this thesis. Thus, the plan and 
argument o f this thesis is structured on the following basis:
Chapter 1 provides a framework for explaining the primordial identity o f religion in 
society. It explores why religion is a strong primordial identity in a non-westem
8 T he researcher is a non-M uslim .
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society and to some extent in a western society. It also explores religion’s link with 
the concepts o f ethnicity, the nation, e/7wo-nationalism9 and secularization. 
Furthermore, the chapter explores the concept o f religious identity before narrowing 
down to northern Nigeria.
Chapter 2 is central to understanding conflicts generally. This chapter is a 
comprehensive review o f the literature on conflicts. It overviews the literature where 
religion is a variable in explaining conflict and where ethnic conflicts are inextricably 
interwoven with religion. It also explores other significant theories on conflicts. The 
essence o f this Chapter is to provide an understanding o f  clashes o f identities. A 
crucial dimension to this chapter is that it explores political Islam in the global sense. 
It argues that different cultures are modeled and impacted in varying degrees by Islam.
Chapter 3 rationalizes on whether Islam is a positive and/or negative force in northern 
Nigeria. It closely examines how Islam has evolved and is exploited as a basis for 
political mobilization. It explores the politicization o f Islam in northern Nigeria from 
the colonial era to the present time. It also examines the symbiotic relationship 
between religion and politics, whilst shedding light on the quest for Sharia in the 
region.
9 Ethno-nationalism  m eans one and the same thing as nationalism . Nationalism  has been used w rongly to refer to  
the state. 1 prefer to use this term  which was form ed by W alker C onnor, (1 9 9 4 ). The term  ethno-nationalism is 
best suited as a term  for nationalism as ethno (ethnic) is not “defined by their exoticism  or m arginality, but rather 
by characteristics ( i.e . popular nam e, m yth o f  shared ancestry, concept o f  hom eland, e th n o -h isto ry ).. . ” See Eric 
Kaufmann & O liver Z im m er, (2004: 65 ). In addition, ethno-nationalism  is used as aptly put by W alker Connor in 
S.A. Giannakos, e d ., (2 0 0 2 :2 4 ) “to make certain that that what is being referred to is not loyalty to the state but to 
the exten d ed  fam ily.”
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Chapter 4 closely outlines the methodology used in collating data from the field. The 
main concern o f the chapter is that it seeks to explain the qualitative and quantitative 
data used to explore and evaluate the research questions.
Chapter 5 is central to understanding conflicts in Nigeria in general and in northern 
Nigeria in particular. It highlights generally N igeria’s obstacles o f nation-building 
before narrowing down more specifically the problem o f religious division in northern 
Nigeria. The chapter also charts and analyses the major religious crises in northern 
Nigeria from 1945-2010.
Chapter 6 exclusively examines and analyses the field work. It informs the reader on 
the data derived from the qualitative strand o f investigation used in this study.
Chapter 7 focuses on recommendations for peace and conflict resolutions which are 
drawn from the fieldwork. The chapter draws on policy issues for consideration at the 
central, state and local governments in Nigeria in order to bridge the divide on 
religious divisions.
By way o f conclusion, the chapter draws a summary and links all the arguments 
presented in preceding chapters and makes a few remarks on the research questions 
and infers a few conclusions from the various chapters. Finally, it unearths the 
phenomenology o f religious conflicts and re-evaluates religion in northern Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 1
THEORIZING PRIMORDILALISM  
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF RELIGION
Both state and religion are models o f authority, imaginations o f  an 
ordering power, and understandings o f how one should relate to those 
who control forces upon which one depends, but over which one does 
not exercise control.
Roger Friedland (2001: 127)10
1.1: Introd u ction
Most developing and non-western societies have a form o f identity that can be 
described as primordial in contrast to the secular heterogeneous identity that marks the 
ideology and way o f life in the western world. The primordial factors such as religion, 
race, nation, language and ethnicity in non-western societies are greatly associated 
with nationalistic orientation within developing and non-western societies. Why are 
these societies committed to forms o f primordial lifestyles and ideology, as opposed to 
a secular or liberal view or lifestyle?
In this chapter, I explore that the basis o f identity o f northern Nigeria or a non-western 
society is based on primordial factors and that the various dimensions that constitute 
and form the basis o f northern Nigeria’s overall identity are based on several
10 Friedland. R oger, 2 001 . Religious Nationalism  and the Problem  o f  C ollective R epresentation, Annua] Review o f  
Sociology, 27: 125-152 .
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primordial markers such as ethnicity, language, clan, inheritance, but most 
importantly, religion.
I demonstrate that religion is the main identity marker o f Muslims in northern Nigeria. 
I argue that Islam is a critical characteristic in identity politics and a strong 
determinant in conflict. Northern Nigeria is not unique in terms o f its people’s 
overwhelming dependence on religion to carve out a place in their society. I illustrate 
that religion has assumed a center stage in defining individual identity in various other 
non-western societies and to some extent in western societies.
1.2: M eaning and Nature o f  R eligion
The word ‘religion’ originates from the Latin word ‘re-’ (back) and ‘ligare-’ (to bind) 
meaning backing to bind people to a common belief. However, any attempt to define 
religion would definitely have gaps. Different definitions have been formulated by 
historians, religious scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. 
Yinger (Batson et al., 1993:6) rightly asserts that “any definition o f religion is likely to 
be satisfactory only to its author.”
Some societies are organized upon religious beliefs, making it possible for society to 
be administered, organized, developed and transformed in the context o f religious 
foundations. In this sense, Namier (Breuilly, 1993:81) argues that religion is a 
sixteenth-century word for <?/7w<9-nationalism. In short, one cannot deny the fact that 
religion, politics, empire building and state power are historically related and in some 
sense inseparable. Consequently, the politicization o f religion and the religionization 
o f politics are serious issues that cannot be ignored, especially given their implications
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and destructive potentials for human co-existence between and within national 
boundaries.
1.3: R elig ion  and Society
A discourse on religion and society will be inadequate without referring to the 
Durkheimian view on the subject. To Durkheim (1915), religion is a reflection o f 
m an’s representation o f society. What is important to observe in the work of 
Durkheim is that all forms o f thought and the structure o f a social commonality falls 
in the existence o f religion. Durkheim argues that religion is a foundation for 
individual identification within society and without religion a social system cannot 
function. These views are supported by modem scholars on the subject (Wilson, 
1982). Social harmony, according to Durkheim, is rooted in m an’s religion and 
religious obligations to God and the human community o f which he is a part.
There is little doubt that no phenomenon is caused by nothing. The aim in studying 
social phenomenon is to determine its primary cause. This first cause is not usually 
identifiable by empirical evidence but by careful causal analysis. An insight into 
religion and society is central in explaining the primordial nature o f religion in non- 
western societies and to some extent in western societies. An individual acquires an 
identity as a result o f his society. In a broader explanation, society is dependent on the 
social construction o f reality. A social construction o f reality, as observed in the 
introduction o f this study is the accumulation o f past events. What is real in one 
society is different in other societies. This is aptly captured by Berger & Luckman 
(1966:26): “The sociology o f knowledge must concern itself with everything that 
passes for ‘knowledge’ in society.” This perception in explaining the social
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constructionism o f society is what makes religion to be perceived differently in 
western and non-western societies. Thus, for Berger & Luckman (1966:1) “reality is 
socially constructed.” Therefore, one may safely assume that religion in society is 
culturally determined. Therefore, an individual or group with the same or with similar 
capacities and potentials can have different views o f themselves and life when placed 
in different societies (Mellor, 2004:4). In this way, the identity o f an individual within 
a group is a reaction o f the social experience an individual shares with other 
individuals in his society.
Now, it might be understood from the suggestion o f Berger & Luckman that the 
individual is a product o f society and society is a product o f history and customs. It is 
argued that since society is based on historical determinism, then, the foundation of 
society may lie in primordial markers. Thus, the way individuals’ construct society 
would depend on how such a society has been constructed by past memories. It 
explains that social world is understood by individual perception. It is suggested that 
individual perceptions o f society cannot stand in isolation -  it should connect to an 
evolving history. Nevertheless, the individual is a product o f society because society 
pre-exists the individual (Bhaskar, 1998). As aptly put by Archer (2000:86) “society 
itself is the aggregate consequence o f the actions o f these instrumentally rational 
individuals.” From this passage it can be induced that the individual accumulates 
his/her perceptions and experience about life from his/her society. This experience lies 
in the differences in cultural, historical and ethnological make-up o f the individual.
Society may be observed from an ontological dualism, achieved through focusing and 
analyzing different and opposing ideologies in order to find an explanation. There is
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perhaps no more befitting illustration, in respect o f this study, to focus and analyze 
how and why Islam in northern Nigeria unites different cultural groups and at the 
same time is prone to conflict. Ontological dualism, also referred to as analytical 
dualism ,11 states that individual and society are separate social entities but neither can 
exist in seclusion from the other. Carter (1998:6), in explaining analytical dualism, 
refers to Lockwood’s argument on the subject “how the parts o f a social system gelled 
together (system integration) was analytically distinct from how agents and actors 
living within that system made sense o f it (social integration).” Simply put, analytical 
dualism separates social structures (society) from culture and agency (the individual) 
(Porpora, 2001:265).
The ontological dualism o f religion is that religion is associated with existence as the 
primary requisite o f the individual is to live and exist. To enjoy life there is the need to 
exist (Ward, 1898:188). The core o f the matter is that religion to the individual is 
identical to existence. Using the words o f Tregenza (2003:155) “what religion offers 
is not a set o f timeless truths, the knowledge o f which leads to salvation, but a 
language o f self-enactment through which salvation is worked out in the present.” In 
this sense, religion can be an element that foments aesthetic happiness within groups 
and in society. Consequently, religion has been described as coming into existence 
due to an individual’s ability to reason. In seeking an answer to these questions, Fox 
& Sandler (2003:561) capture Andreas Osiander’s argument where he suggests that 
religion acts as a “political and psychological cement that binds society together.”
" Analytical D ualism ’, is a term  form ed by Archer. See Archer, Margaret Scotford, 2000 . Being Human: The Problem 
ojA gency. Cam bridge, U .K .; N ew  York: Cambridge University Press.
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Perhaps the attachment to religious beliefs is higher in societies where development in 
terms o f economic and social rewards is low. This suggests that an individual’s social 
condition determines his personal religion (Batson et al., 1993). Therefore, it may be 
widely accepted that the social background o f the individual determines an individual 
and his groups’ identity as a result o f his social experience (Batson et ah, 1993). A 
fitting illustration o f this observation is found in America where African-Americans 
are considered to feel stronger about their religious beliefs than other Americans. The 
foundation o f their strong belief in religion lies in history, in the era o f slavery where 
African-Americans were allowed to attend meetings if  and only if  such meetings were 
religious and based on Christian Fellowships (Batson et ah, 1993:38). This explains 
religion as an avenue for comfort and communal interaction. The experience here 
shows that slavery contributed or was an independent structure that contributed to this 
social conditioning.
It might be assumed that individual experience and perception arise from individual 
experience within their environment (Swanson, 1960). The environment or society 
determines the religion which an individual adopts. The adaptation o f the religion in 
an individual’s environment or society is explained as the internalization o f religion 
(Johnstone, 2007:106-107). It is internalized, given that it is integrated in the 
interaction o f all actors in the society and provides the individual with an identity. 
Religion has the propensity to influence the culture, habits, ideology and perceptions 
o f the individual. This perception is shared by Allawi, (2009:69) when he cites 
Bennabi: “All civilizations arise as a result o f a religious principle which articulates 
the contours o f the civilization.”
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The view then is that since society pre-exists the individual, the individual is attached 
to a religious identity group by being brought up in that society. As a result, he 
acquires a religious identity through society. This acquired identity is perhaps based 
on primordialism. In some sense, Dawkins (2006:3) explains the primordialism o f 
religion by noting that someone born in Arkansas who thinks that Christianity is true 
and Islam false would think otherwise if  he were born in Afghanistan. Dawkins tries 
to argue, perhaps based on Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalyst approach that the root of 
religion lies in the child brain. The child’s brain, to Dawkins (2006:177), is a 
receptacle to religious beliefs due to its vulnerable nature and as such other religious 
beliefs seem bizarre to people not brought up in them. In short, it might be argued that 
society is the root o f religion and religious identity groups. Therefore, society feeds 
the child’s brain with its victuals for social conditioning. The brain child is, therefore, 
perpetual in existence as it reverberates from one generation to the other. Is this where 
the search for primordialism o f religion is to be found?
1.4: R elig ion  and Ethnicity
To begin with, it has recently become common to argue that a common attribute 
between ethnicity and religion is that both are identity frames for individual and 
collective differentiation. Perhaps a useful starting point can be found in the words of 
Baker (2003:250) where he suggests that “the formation o f ‘ethnic groups” relies on 
shared cultural signifiers that have developed under specific historical, social and 
political contexts. They encourage a sense o f belonging based, at least in part, on a 
common mythological ancestry. Religious orientation is one o f the distinctive 
characteristics o f every ethnic group; therefore, it may be assumed that every ethnic 
group has its own religious orientation.
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The loyalty to religion in primordial societies is due to the cultural construction o f the 
ethnic group. Ethnic groups that have strong foundations in religion will have a 
similar strong belief in another religion, if and when converted to that religion. Before 
the introduction o f Christianity and Islam to the individual in most African cultures, 
there existed strong attachments towards their varied religious beliefs. The worship o f 
ancestors, spirituality and animism are the earliest known religion to Africa and 
perhaps the oldest religion known to mankind. Although most Africans are converted 
to Christianity or Islam, Africans still believe in the existence o f spirits and unforeseen 
forces. This is readily noticed even in entertainment videos, where the mysteries o f the 
spirit world are used to convey moral messages to its audience (Ellis & Haar, 2004: 
40-41). Africans who do not possess this belief in the spirit world are negligible.
The basis o f identifying an individual to an ethnic group, according to Gurr (1993:3), 
is “groups whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity 
based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they 
interact. People have many possible bases for communal identity: Shared historical 
experiences or m yths,12 religious beliefs, language, ethnicity, region o f residence, and, 
in caste-like systems, customary occupations.” Religion is a part o f that relevant 
attribute that determines a primordial identity o f the individual as ethnic identities are 
dependent on religion, language and culture. An important observation is that religion 
may be the exclusive factor that defines ethnic identity (Fox, 1999b:296). However, in 
certain circumstances, social constructionism may be used as a deviation to describe a 
religious identity. For instance, a religious identity can refer to a political ideology 
rather than to a religious affiliation. For instance, being an ‘Islam ist’ (Islamiyya) in
12 As an illustration the Jewish nation shares the com m on m yths o f  Ahraham as their ancestral Patriarch as w ell as 
the exodus from Israel. The Yoruba nation in Nigeria shares a com m on m yth that O duduw a is their ancestral 
Patriarch.
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Sudan is different from being a Muslim. An Islamist refers to the Northern Sudanese 
ethnic group’s determination to control the state (O'Fahey, 1996). Also, it is 
interesting to note that in the Balkans the term ‘M uslim’ refers to ethnicity rather than 
to a religious identity. These attributes indicate membership o f a closely knit group 
with common loyalties.
Horowitz (1985:52) argues that “ethnicity is based on a myth o f collective ancestry, 
which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.” It may well be that religion, 
to ethnic groups (such as the Yoruba), provides a belief in a common descent. Smith 
(1986:124) rightly argues that religious factors are central in “crystallizing and 
maintaining ethnic identity.” This perhaps informed Gordon’s (1964) and Suad’s 
(1982) definition o f ethnicity to include race, religion or national origin. Ethnic groups 
have a common history, ancestral linkage, common religious beliefs and the 
communal affiliation. This commonality fosters a religious identity group. The 
awareness o f an ethnic identity is ‘consciously fostered’ (Epstein, 1978: xiv) as it 
evolves out o f childhood into adulthood. Therefore, ethnicity can be understood to be 
a prominent identifier o f collectiveness as it is based on a ‘myth o f collective ancestry’ 
(Horowitz, 1985). Ethnicity signifies that groups and identities have developed within 
a shared and common environment differentiating between ‘us’ and ‘them ’ rather than 
in isolation (Eriksen, 1993:10).
1.5: R elig ion  and the Nation
Given the fact that a nation and an ethnic group may share similar features, difficulties 
arise in defining what a nation is, just as there is some confusion in distinguishing 
between a nation and a state. A concise definition o f a nation is provided by Connor
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(2004:37): “The nation is the largest group that shares a sense o f common ancestry.” 
Another precise definition is given by Renan (Berberoglu, 2004: 4): “A nation is a 
soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual 
principle.” One is in the past the other is in the present. Another useful definition o f 
‘nation’ is noted from Stalin (1972:60) as a “historically constituted, stable 
community o f people, formed on the basis o f a common language, territory, economic 
life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”
From these definitions what these scholars largely agree on is that a common history 
is closely linked to the concept o f a nation. Therefore, a nation exists by the collective 
will o f its individuals. In a similar trend, ethno-nationalism is closely interwoven with 
the ideals o f a nation as the awareness o f a past produces a national identity. “Nations 
must have a measure o f common culture and a civic ideology, a set o f common 
understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind the population together 
in their homeland” (Smith, 1991:11). An important appendage to the above definition, 
noted in the introduction, is provided by Smith (1981:64) who observes that religion is 
a feature o f a nation as it attaches to the history o f its people. Therefore, one may 
suggest that religion may have the capacity to bind a nation.
A primordialist views the nation as “the natural units o f history and integral elements 
o f human experience” (Smith, 1986:12). As Smith (1986:26) views it, a primordial 
structure o f a nation is based on a historical assumption o f a commonality in cultural 
identify, language and religion with the most common trait being the similarity in 
language and religion. Thus, what separates one nation from another is the difference 
in culture. In Ryan’s (1995:4) view, these cultural differences arise due to important
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factors such as language, religion, historical experience, geographical isolation, race 
and kinship.
Most non-western societies are usually products o f colonialization, with their borders 
structured without cognizance to ethnic and cultural affiliations. In order to determine 
a primordial culture or society it is necessary to look at the indigenous culture. 
Indigenous culture refers to the pre-colonial culture or traditional culture o f the 
society. This implies the intrusion o f another culture over a traditional culture that 
identifies with the identity and reality o f a people before the intrusion (Long, 2004). It 
is crucial to note that most traditional cultures considered religion as the foundation o f 
their society. In this sense, it is suggested that the variant o f Islam in northern Nigeria 
is borrowed from non-Islamic faiths. It could be argued that these indigenous faiths 
(animism) were exclusive as it welcomed those who were different (people from 
different indigenous cultures). Therefore, it seems likely that the consolidation o f 
Islamic identity amongst different ethnic groups could be explained in terms of 
historical determinism.
Attention must now be drawn on how nations come to existence. Anderson’s (1991) 
explanation lays emphasize on how a nation comes to be. Anderson states that the 
nations o f old came into existence through the dynamics o f “sacred imagined 
communities” tied together by a religious belief. The illustrations o f Anderson’s view 
can be found amongst nations such as the Jews and their religion Judaism; the Indians 
with the religion o f Hinduism; the Yoruba with the religion o f Olodumare and the 
Arabs as well as Hausa-Fulani with Islam.
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However, Andersons’ theorization o f nations suggests that pre-colonial nations are 
political inventions. This definition aptly describes mainly non-western societies, 
which came into existence by the merging o f communities, ethnic groups and tribes by 
the colonial institutions. After its amalgamation, these new supra-communities were 
labeled as states and the habitants had the ability to imagine that they belonged to a 
nation. Anderson’s definition o f pre-colonial nations criticizes the primordialism 
construction o f nations. However, it is strongly argued that in the context o f pre­
colonial nations, primordialism cannot be wished away for the reason that such 
societies are boldly constructed by tribal and ethnic identities.
1.6: B etw een  N ation and Ethnicity
W eber (1968:922) claims the term ‘nation’ is not identical with the “people o f a 
state.” He illustrates that the nation is centered on “prestige” interests o f a group 
(Weber, 1968:922). He states that “the significance o f the ‘nation’ is usually anchored 
in the superiority or at least the irreplaceability o f the culture values that are to be 
preserved and developed only through the cultivation o f the peculiarity o f the group” 
(Weber, 1968:925).
W eber views the nation as being superior to ethnicity due to the sentiments o f 
‘prestige’ that is attached to the nation. This sentiment is referred to as ethno- 
nationalism. Weber aptly describes this as “the human group that nurtures a subjective 
belief in the commonality o f its ancestry because o f similarities o f habits or customs 
or both, or because o f memories o f colonization and migration; this belief must be 
important for the propagation o f communal relationship; conversely, it does not matter 
whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (Weber, 1968:387).
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It is highly probable for a nation and an ethnic group to share similar features. 
However, Kellas (1991), in distinguishing ethnic groups from nations, argues that 
ethnic groups are smaller and are based on a common ancestral origin that has peculiar 
characteristics. For example, the Irish Americans or Jewish Americans may be termed 
as an ethnic group in America but they fall short o f being described as a nation.
To simplify what ethnicity and nations are, Nodia (1999:445) provides useful and 
pragmatic assumptions. According to Nodia, there are four differences: (1) Ethnicity 
is primordial (ahistorical), while that nation is modem (historical). (2) Ethnicity is 
natural while nationhood is man-made. (3) Ethnicity is impersonal, nationhood is 
personal. (4) Ethnicity is pluralistic, nationhood is universalistic. A more critical 
observation on N odia’s assumption is that religion is interwoven into the ambits of 
both ethnicity and the nation, as it possesses all the characteristics o f the above 
assumptions. Religion is both primeval and contemporary in nature. Religion relates 
to nature and it conditions society. Religion lacks human traits (it is divine/spiritual) 
and at the same time individualistic, it is plural in nature and universalistic in practice.
1.7: R elig ion  and Identity
Individuation is what makes a society exist. It makes the individual distinct and 
separate from another. Turner (1991:163) renders a practical definition o f 
individuation as “a set of practices by which individuals are identified and separated 
by marks, numbers, signs and codes.” Individuals are divided on sentiments such as 
ethnicity, linguistic and religious affiliations, which are all products o f perception and 
identity formations. It then appears that “the constitution o f identity is an elaborate 
and deadly serious game o f mirrors. It is a complex temporal interaction o f multiple
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practices o f identification external and internal to a subject or population” (Friedman, 
1992: 853).
The term ‘identity’ has been considered ambiguous in nature (Brubaker & Cooper, 
2000). However, identity has been used by political scientists to refer to race and 
ethno-nationality. Identity relates to a sense o f a community based on history and 
culture (Smith, 1986:14). If viewed as such, religion could be considered a part o f an 
idiosyncratic stamp o f a social system. It may be right to assert that primordial identity 
to the individual constitutes a loyalty that is based on blood, race, language, locality, 
religion or tradition (Miller, 1974:537).
As we have seen, a common culture tends to promote a shared identity with a common 
awareness. Religion has been viewed as an identity trait, which provides a common 
culture to both national identities (Smith, 2000), ethnic identities (Gurr, 1993) and to 
group identities (Voye, 1999). But the issue here is that religious identity separates an 
individual from another. It comprises distinguishable characteristics that are not 
prevalent in another individual or group. In this sense, a religious identity can be 
synonymous to a national identity. However, it is important to note that a national 
identity centers on a political community within a bordered terrain (Smith, 1991:9).
The other point to make here is that as an identity frame, religion, apart from having 
an overarching capacity across ethnic classifications, can separate people o f similar 
ethnic origins. This underscores the dynamic nature o f religion, which provokes its 
power to divide and integrate people within and across other types o f identities, is 
evident in the fact that there is a subconscious and conscious importance attached to
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religion by people. This explains why religion is a phenomenon that people are ready 
to die and kill for. It mirrors the notion o f ‘why men and women are willing to die for 
their nation’ (Smith, 1986). Put by Connor (1994: 206) “people do not die for things 
that are rational.” Religion is not a rational thing; it is a human phenomenon which is 
mystical in nature (Momen, 1999).
Arguing in this direction, West (1995:16) defines identity as “desire and death” -  a 
desire to die for one’s identity. The significance o f religion to the individual’s identity 
as observed by Juergensmeyer (2005:142) is that the smallest are families and clans 
followed by ethnic groups and nations. The largest and implicitly most important are 
religions. Religions, Juergensmeyer continues, are not only the doctrines o f groups o f 
believers but are common worldviews and cultural values.
The underlying significance o f religion to the individual is that, in some societies, it 
may be the most important cultural marker within an ethnic community or to the 
nation. Smith (1981:45-52), following Herder and Gellner, argues that language is the 
most significant cultural marker. Gellner argues that “linguistic culture is the chief 
bond between human beings” Smith (1981:48). Kedourie (1966:64) tells us that 
“language is the external and visible badge o f those differences which distinguish one 
nation from another; it is the most important criterion by which a nation is recognized 
to exist, and have the right to form a state on its own.” Horowitz, (1985:222), though 
stressing that language is a potent symbol in linking elite and the grass root people in a 
state, concedes that religion can serve the same purpose. In another dimension, 
Reicher & Hopkins (2001:8), in arguing that language is the most important feature of
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a nation, quoted Moldavian Dabija noting that “language is the soul o f the people. It 
resembles those who speak it.”
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2001) argue that religion has a stronger identity marker 
than social cleavages such as language, as it has the tendency to produce intense 
conflict. But, one recalls that the Bangladesh war o f 1971 is a contrary example o f 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol’s argument, here language created a conflict among 
people who shared the same religion (Islam). However, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol in 
arguing religions crucial identity marker note that the individual may speak more than 
one language but can have only one religion. An individual can have dual nationalities 
but not dual religions. Hence “you can be multicultural but you cannot be a multi­
religious person. Because religion is different than culture, the faith is a deep sense 
that is difficult to internalize” (Abu-Nimer, 2001:701). One may not pretend to deny 
that the search o f the soul o f the people must be sought not in language but in religion, 
as it reflects the soul o f the individual, people, groups and nationhood. Moreover, 
religion has the propensity to be personal unlike language where verbal 
communication must be recognized by at least two individuals.
Furthermore, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2001) note that religion can be used as a 
symbol o f identity, as an individual can be excluded or included from a religion. It is 
then true that religion is considered by the individual to be indivisible, absolute and 
predestined. Secondly, they aver that religion gives the individual different ways of 
‘looking’ at life. It regulates social relationships and promotes social bonding. In 
addition, H anf (1999:392) notes that religion is considerably rooted in the 
“socialisation processes o f early childhood” and it shapes and creates an emotional
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bond between individual within the group. H anf further illustrates his argument by 
showing that when minorities are given the option to choose between language and 
religion, they have opted for their religious beliefs.
A clearer perspective, illustrating the important cultural marker o f religion, is 
provided by Joseph (2004:173) where he notes that religion functioned as a 
“linguistically unifying force.” Joseph further notes that Christianity linked Latin to 
Europe whilst Islam linked Arabic to the Islamic world. Another useful comparison is 
found in northern Nigeria where the Hausa language, which has metamorphosed as 
the lingua franca o f diverse ethnic groups in the north, “causes speakers to refer to 
themselves and others within the context o f an Islamic cosmology” (Anthony, 
2002:104). One may agree that the basic precepts o f the Hausa society are Islamic 
(Adamu, 1978:9).
In line with these arguments, Abeysekara (2002: 68) cites Prakash’s useful
observation that “the intermingling o f religion and politics characterizes not only the
‘backward’ Third World but also the ‘advanced’ First W orld.” This may not be
surprising due to the fact that the individual searches for the meaning o f life through
1religion. It is suggested that Identity is more deeply rooted in religion than in history. 
It seems reasonable to agree with this when one listens to Pope John Paul II: “ ...the 
European identity is not understandable without Christianity and it is precisely in 
Christianity that are found these common roots by which the continent has seen its 
civilization mature...” (Forrester, 2005: 26).
13 The fundam ental origin o f  relig ion’s im portance in the w estern society  could be traced to the Papacy in the 
m edieval age. H istory recalls the ‘investiture con test’, w here in 1076, the German King; Henry IV cam e to seek  
favour to save his throne and re-establish favour from Pope G regory VII on account o f  the latter excom m unicating  
him.
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Perhaps even more fundamental, religious identities “are based on the alignments o f 
culture and its elements-values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in 
custom and ritual” (Smith, 1991:6). As such, religion provides ethno-nationalism with 
a greater sense o f collective identity. Ethno-nationalism based on a religious 
foundation provides a new construction within a state. In such a state religion becomes 
a strong primordial marker, given that it has the tendency to construct the individual 
under an umbrella o f ‘w e’ against ‘them ’ awareness.
Interestingly enough, it is suggested that the reason for this construction is that ethno- 
nationalism, based on religion, is a product o f our thoughts or subconscious. This 
reasoning perhaps informs Greenfeld (2005:333) to suggest that “ethno-nationalism 
inhibits the formation and normal functioning o f the human mind.” This suggestion is 
demonstrated when an individual views another individual, though o f the same culture 
and linguistic identity, as an outsider due to differences in religion. This sentiment is 
rightly noted to be a psychological condition o f belief (Rejai & Enloe, 1969:142). To a 
large extent, a religious belief affects the mind, which further extends to the 
subliminal state o f the individual. This concept is somewhat similar to an ‘imagined 
com munity’ wherein the individual finds him self tied to the loyalty o f a nation.
With these few observations, it is worthy to note that in some contemporary western 
societies, religion is still a very influential identity marker. In America, a Gallup Poll 
conducted a survey in 2006 discovered that 57% of Americans viewed religion as very 
important in their life; 27% viewed religion as fairly important whilst 16% viewed 
religion as not very important.14 The importance o f religion in American politics is
14 This is illustrated by the fact that a presidential candidate, John Kerry, a catholic, as result o f  his support o f  
abortion rights lost the catholic vote in the O hio state elections which eventually cost him the Presidential e lection .
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illustrated when President George Bush Sr. regularly consulted controversial preacher 
Billy Graham during the G ulf War, especially on the day he ordered the bombing o f 
Baghdad (Harding, 1994:58). In addition, at a meeting with the Palestinian leader, 
Abu Mazen on June 4, 2003, George Bush Jr. explained a religious sanction for the 
war on terror.15 Let me emphasize that it is not the intention to suggest that religion is 
a strong identity marker in western societies but to illustrate the influence o f religion 
in the western world.
1.8: The Form ation o f  N ational Identity
If  national identities are formed unlike ethnicity, the intriguing question then is when 
and how are they formed? Now an important point, is that Rejai & Enloe (1969) 
suggest that in developed countries (western societies), national identity evolved prior 
to the crystallization or mobilization o f the structures o f state and sovereignty. This 
spontaneous process gave rise to nation-states. However, in most o f the 
underdeveloped countries (non-western societies), this sequence is reversed: 
Sovereignty and the state existed before national identity and cultural integration 
developed. This gave rise to state-nations (Rejai & Enloe 1969:140). State-nations 
evolve through the process o f colonialization. At the period o f their colonialization, 
“they had no sovereignty, no autonomy, no embedding in society and remained 
appendages to powerful European military and administrative complexes” (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2001:12). Clearly, it would appear that the actualization o f a nation-state or 
a state-nation depends on whether political coercion is used to form the state.
See Am y Sullivan, in an article, ‘finding Their Faith’ T im e, February 2S'h, 2 0 0 8 , p 2 0 -2 1 . And a recent illustration  
in A m erican politics was the debate about President Barak O bam a’s association with R everend W right over the 
la tter’s, anti-patriotic com m ents that nearly prejudiced O bam a’s Presidential campaign.
15 “G od told  m e to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them , and then he instructed m e to strike at Saddam, which 1 did, 
and now  I am determ ined to solve the problem  in the M iddle East. If you help m e I will act, and if not, the 
election s will com e and I will have to focus on them ."h ttp :/ /delaw arcliberal. w ordpress. c o m / 2 0 0 7 /0 7 /2 3 /g o d -  
to ld-bush-to-attack-irac|/. accessed on the 22 ol Septem ber 2008 .
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There is then, an underlying question o f concern: When does a nation have the 
awareness o f a common identity? The main difference is that in a nation-state there is 
an absence o f a forceful crystallization o f a national identity into a state as is the case 
in most African and Asian states. The state-nation is crystallized by political 
intervention and different identities were forced to co-habit in the invented state. 
These identities formed along pre-existing structures, such as tribal, ethnic or religious 
identities -  forms o f identities that can be described as primordial markers. In the 
state-nation, ethno-nationalism is configured from a top-to-bottom approach to 
procure state loyalty as opposed to a bottom-to-top approach in the nation-state.
A crucial factor o f significant note is that in a state-nation, the awareness o f a national 
identity, religion, language and ethnicity are the most important primordial features o f 
the individual, unlike a nation-state. It is within this paradigm that in the Nigerian 
context primordialism is ubiquitous due to its pluralistic nature o f ethnic and religious 
groups and the affiliation o f different loyalties to these groups. Therefore, it is argued 
that there is a clear-eyed logic that the colonialists did not form nations to organize its 
society. What they formed were identities based on ethnic and tribal lines (Davidson, 
1992:10-11). It is argued that this is where the essence o f primordialism can be found.
1.9: C onstructing R eligious and National Identities
Now an important observation is that religion is closely attached to a nation’s identity 
because it existed before the emergence o f the nation. It is this unity o f faith that 
propounded religion and was a pre-cursor to the awareness o f a national identity. It is 
suggested that national identity consequently evolved by reason o f ethno-nationalism 
(Bruce, 2003:79). National identity could be comparable with religious identity due to
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the fact that they both exhibit an awareness o f a common cultural heritage. This 
constructs religion as a cohesive caliber to promote national unity. It is then safe to 
agree with the suggestion that “ethno-nationalism, like religion, is a set o f  beliefs o f 
common origins, specialness and destiny, and rituals, patriotic pledges, songs, 
anthems and celebrations that unite a ‘people’ into an identity granting ‘imagines 
(political) community’ that creates ‘citizens’” (Langman, 2006: 72).
It may now be apparent that ethno-nationalism is a vast, broad and huge concept. The 
complexity arises due to the fact that scholars define a nation, either from a modernist 
or primordialist perspective. Nations (nation-states) based in western societies 
comprise modernist structures. These structures are simply the development o f 
traditional institutions into complex systems o f modernity (Leftwich, 2000:33). Whilst 
in non-western societies, nations (state-nations) have primordial structures. However, 
some nations may have a blend o f both modernist and primordialist structures. In 
determining whether a state consists o f primordialist or modernized structures, it is 
necessary to look at the state in question and decipher their geographical make up. 
States with ethnic communities are primordial in nature. States such as India and 
Nigeria are contemporary examples (Smith, 1986).
In simpler terms, Rejai & Enloe (1969:141) suggest that ethno-nationalism is “an 
awareness o f membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a desire to 
achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity o f that nation.” 
In a different outlook “the nation (ethno-nationalism) may be in people unconsciously 
and may need to be brought forth or willed into consciousness” (Suny, 2001:870). 
Following this, it could be argued that one o f the striking and unique features of
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people having a primordial religious identity is that it can create an awareness o f 
ethno-nationalism.
Yet it is important to emphasize that, Gellner (1983) made an effort to expand the 
concept o f ethno-nationalism. He argues that ethno-nationalism engenders the nation 
to exist. Earlier, Gellner (1966:81) provided a functionalist definition o f ethno- 
nationalism. He argued that ethno-nationalism is an indispensable sociological 
building block o f the modern society (industrial society). However, Gellner (1997:7) 
later adopts an all-embracing approach -  ethno-nationalism is all about people 
wishing to live with their own kind and, therefore, they are unwilling to live with 
people o f a different culture and they abhor being governed by them. People who are 
desirous o f living together have ‘things’ in common. One o f the ‘things’ they have in 
common is religion. In this sense, as noted in the introduction o f this study, those 
having a primordial identity in religion may set boundaries to those professing other 
faiths.
According to Kedourie (1966:81), ethno-nationalism is concerned with the right o f 
self determination. It is "a method o f teaching the right determination o f the will." The 
right o f self determination connotes the will to be a separate sovereign state. But do 
the English or Scottish nations desire to be a separate state? The English and Scottish 
have sentimental attachment to their respective nations.
Kohn (1965:9) views ethno-nationalism as being a psychosomatic “ ...state o f mind in 
the supreme loyalty o f the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state.” This 
definition is complex because there are no methods o f measuring this state o f mind in
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the individual. Individual’s born and bred in their nation-states have sometimes 
exhibited disloyalty to their nation. However, a clearer definition can be attributed to 
Sm ith’s (1991:73) definition: “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf o f a population deemed by some o f its 
members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’” The thrust o f Sm ith’s definition 
illustrates an embracing concept, which can accommodate both national and religious 
loyalties.
One thing that is certain is that there is an overriding recognition that the concept o f 
ethno-nationalism within a nation-state or state-nation has not been considered wholly 
by scholars on the subject. Clearly, this is because they view ethno-nationalism as a 
simple concept and regard many states as homogenous (Connor, 1994:29). In addition, 
some scholars have viewed ethno-nationalism with a modernist/constructionist 
approach (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1996; Breuilly, 1993). Following these lines of 
argument, it seems safe to define ethno-nationalism as a people united by common 
language, history, culture and religious ties, with a political conscience, competing for 
international recognition and economic resources. Ethno-nationalism may consist o f a 
blend o f both traditional and modernists’ definition therefore leaning towards Smith’s 
(1999), theory o f ethno-symbolism, as seen in the introduction. Smith suggests that 
the ethnic composition o f a nation consists o f both ethnic categories and ethnic 
communities (ethnies). The former consisting o f a ‘shared cultural element’ and the 
latter focuses on a history o f a common myths and memories, and provides an 
understanding o f the dynamics between primordialistic and modernistic views on 
ethno-nationalism.
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As earlier noted, Anderson (1991), in his contribution to the meaning o f ethno- 
nationalism, does not consider the concept within the framework o f primordialism. 
According to Anderson, the social construction o f an identity evolved as a result o f 
social changes. To Anderson, ethno-nationalism evolved with new technology. 
Anderson makes it clear, that Information Technology played a significant role in 
embracing social and cultural communication for national identification. In addition, 
Anderson argues that the emergence o f ethno-nationalism depends on ‘capitalism and 
print technology’ and on the diversity o f a people’s language. Anderson further argues 
that print capitalism was a tool, which contributes to social mobilization.
A distinguished scholar on ethno-nationalism, Deutsch (1953:104), views ethno- 
nationalism as “people pressing to acquire a measure o f effective control over its 
members.” Deutsch further argues that a fundamental characteristic o f a nation is the 
existence o f social communication -  communicative symbols or a system of 
communication o f a group with a similar culture within a shared space facilitating 
e//z«0-nationalism.
For Deutsch, the modes o f effective communication within a group enable nation 
formation. The Deutschian treatise considers economic communication as a means of 
social mobilization as it braces the common identification o f a people to form a 
nation. Most importantly he perceives that the gradual process o f ‘social mobilization’ 
o f  people overtime would constitute a social and national assimilation o f people into 
one nation, thereby ending the cleavages o f ethnicity and ambits o f national and ethnic 
identities.
72
However, Deutsch contends that in Africa ‘social mobilization’ is difficult to be most 
effectively activated because o f the rapid political change from colonial rule to 
independence. Moreover, these new states consist o f ‘variegated tribal groups’ 
(Deutsch, 1969:73) who still owe allegiance to their tribal origins. This allegiance 
impedes the integration o f African states. One may agree to a large extent with the 
thesis o f Deutsch. Although, not founded totally on a primordial explanation, it is 
based on the cultural behaviour o f individuals and groups. When there is an allegiance 
to religion, tribal groups tend to assimilate and integrate into a common identity.
There is, o f course, in some sense an illustration o f the Deutschian theory in a non- 
western society. Social mobilization through sharing a common religion merged two 
major separate ethnic groups, the Hausa and Fulani, and other minority ethnic groups 
in northern Nigeria. What is suggested is that the Hausa and Fulani were two separate 
ethnic groups. However, they are now regarded as having a common ethnic and 
religious identity. Religion (Islam) was the vehicle that provided social mobilization 
between these separate groups and merged them not only as an ethnie but also as a 
nation.
Aligned with this argument, Adamu (1978:2-3) observes that “ ...the Hausa ethnic unit 
has shown itself as an assimilating ethnic entity and the Hausa language a colonizing 
one to the extent that many people who were not originally Hausa and did not use the 
Hausa language as their first language later became Hausa through assim ilation...” It 
deserves emphasis that this observation shows that most minority ethnic groups in 
northern Nigeria have assimilated into Hausa ethnicity. Individuals o f other minority
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groups accept Hausa as their ethnicity but may still lay claim to another ethnic group 
(Adamu, 1978:3).
At this point, it is important to note that the Deutschian theory is similar to the 
reasoning o f Connor (1972) where he suggests that with the ushering in o f modernity, 
the individual becomes more aware o f his ethnic heritage. Similarly, Horowitz (1985) 
suggests that as society becomes more modernized the sentiments o f national or ethnic 
identities become more structured and strengthened.
On a deeper level, religion and ethno-nationalism are features o f nation-building as 
they both generate a sense o f loyalty to a nation. Accordingly, one may argue that 
national identity is analogous with religious identity. Appleby (2000:59) succinctly 
notes that “like religion, ethnicity is a notoriously open-ended concept and lends itself 
more readily to the amassing o f nationalistic fervour than to the more disciplined and 
precise task o f building a state.” Furthermore, Smith (2000:792) views ethno- 
nationalism as form o f ‘political religion’ “whose tensions with traditional religions 
have led to a growing politicisation o f religion, as well as the messianisation o f 
politics and the elevation of the people” . Smith therefore views the nation as a ‘sacred 
communion o f citizens.’ But the crucial point, as Smith (1971:56-57) sees it, is that 
religion reinforces nationality and even preserves it and provides the sociological 
framework for ethno-nationalism to function with.
1.10: R elig ious Ethno-Nationalism
Let me start by suggesting most ethnic groups can trace their origins to a religious 
belief or a mythical order. While the practice o f religion is largely a reflection of
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peoples’ past, it expresses the identification o f an individual and society. It is argued 
that society evolved as a result o f religion. Even Europe had its foundations on 
religious ethno-nationalism. Hastings (1997:4) argues that religion provided the 
original ‘model o f the nation’ to the western world. Therefore, when France became 
the first European republic, it was understood as a usurpation o f God's sovereignty 
(Friedland, 2001:127).
Clearly, in some ways an individual may have more sentiments towards his religion 
than his nation. This is probably due to the fact that fundamentalism and ethno- 
nationalism are ideological opponents (Ruthven, 2004:132). The meeting point o f this 
link is where religious ethno-nationalism begins. To a large extent, religious ethno- 
nationalism seeks to establish the religion practiced by a nation as its foremost identity 
in the state.
Again, one must stress that the attachment to religious beliefs is an overwhelming 
sentiment and is perhaps influential more than ethnic sentiments. It seems quite 
possible; however, that religion could be intertwined with the ideal o f a nation. An 
illustration o f this notion is the call for a separate state in India in the 1930s. At the 
time, India consisted o f two nations, Muslims and Hindus, living in one state. As 
Nigam (2006:176-215) argues that Indian ethno-nationalism was impossible in India 
because it was impossible to have a common history. The separate religious identities 
o f  the Hindus and the Muslims in India gave rise to much religious violence that gave 
rise to the carnage o f partition in India in 1947. Furthermore, Pakistan emerged as an 
independent state from India in 1947, not on grounds o f cultural, linguistic or ethnic 
commonalities, but due to religious primordialism (Islam, 1981). What can be readily
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observed here is that religion has the capacity to create solidarity among people to 
form a nation at the same time as having the capacity to set a strong boundary 
amongst people belonging to another religious faith, which tends to generate religious 
conflicts.
Now an important observation is that people are more sentimentally attached to the 
national consciousness within their state than towards a similar ethnic and religious 
affiliation o f another state. Miles & Rochefort (1991) observe that Hausa communities 
in the frontiers o f the Nigerian and Niger borders place greater sentiments o f their 
identity towards their own state than to members o f the same Hausa ethnic group and 
similar religious identity across the border. This is also illustrated in sports, where 
members o f the same state recognize their common identity and bond to each other 
and do not exhibit transnational sentiments towards identical ethnic groups and similar 
religious identities across its border (King, 2006). The emphasis here is that the 
awareness o f a national identity is confined within a state -  it is not trans-national.
It must be understood that religious ethno-nationalism is interwoven with cultural and 
social factors which constitute a collective representation defending identity rather 
than interests (Friedland, 2001). A religious faith is comparable with ethno- 
nationalism (Kramer, 1997). Both are ideals which individuals possess strong 
sentimental attachment to as “the mysteries o f a nation thus resemble the mysteries of 
a religion” (Kramer, 1997:532). The ethno-nationalism o f religion exists in view o f 
the nation having its roots in sacred mysteries, which have been a cohesive structure 
in the history o f the nation. Renan (Kramer, 1997:532-533) explains that the historical 
ties to a nation cement a mystifying attachment to the religious beliefs o f that nation.
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Both are dependent on each other. Using these arguments, one can see that the 
individual has primordial ties to both his nation and religion, as his religion is a part o f 
the commemoration o f his nation.16
1.11: R elig ion  and Secularization
John Lennon’s dream for an imagined united world with no nations and religions exist 
only in utopianism or, better still, as an allegory. The argument for religion is that it is 
natural and not supernatural (i.e. that it grew out o f the nature o f the individual and 
was not given to the individual). In this light, it seems altogether probable that religion 
is mainly a product o f reason (Ward, 1898:180). Religion as a product o f reason is 
significant in culture, political thought and in explaining society. Moreover, with great 
technological advancement in the world, scientific reasoning o f thought has not 
replaced the dominance o f religion (Vyas & Vyas, 2000:20). The significance o f this 
is that religion and politics are both analytically and empirically related (Levine, 
1979:6). Scholars have argued that religion would wither away and be placed in the
17private sphere o f human relations.
In the age o f modernity, religion was presumed to wither away from the ambit o f the 
state and politics. However, this assumption has been proven to be fallible. The reason 
for this fallible speculation is that the political thinkers failed to realize that modernity 
is a label while religion is a practice (Mclnemy, 1994: ix). This is evident from the 
fact that even legislation cannot make religion. On the other hand, most laws are based
16 Turner (2 0 0 6 :2 0 8 ) defines com m em oration as “all those devices through w hich a nation recalls, marks, 
em bodies, discusses or argues about its past, and all those devices which are intended to create or sustain a sense o f  
belonging or 'w e  feeling’ in individuals w ho belong to it.
17 D obbelaere, (1 9 9 9 ), argues that secularisation asserts that religion ceases to be significant in the working o f  the 
social system . Lambert, (1999: 308), states that no new  w orld religion is spreading on a w ide scale and that the 
m ost obvious m odern sym bolic issues relate to secular thoughts based on sc ience, ideologies, ethics, human rights 
etc.
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on religious codes. Religion has not withered away with secular modernity; rather it 
has taken a center stage in world politics.
It is important to note that prior to 9/11/2001, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
proposal for the adequate study o f religion was vetoed as “mere sociology” 
(Micklethwait, 2007). With the increasing acceleration o f globalization, religion has 
gone beyond mere sociology. Is religion the hottest debate in political science since 
the fall o f communism? The pronged ideologies o f secularism and communism are 
quite analogous. To the former religion withers away, to the latter the state withers 
away. Indeed, they are both share similarities, as both theories have withered away 
and have not stood the test o f modernity. It was clearly erroneous for political 
scientists to posit in the 1950s and 1960s that the ideals o f ethnicity and religion 
would wither away with the inception o f modernity (Fox, 2001a). Others have argued 
that the resurgence o f religion would establish the era o f post-modernity, which is a 
rejection o f westernization (Hunt, 2002:37). From the point o f view o f secularists, 
religion was viewed as a “theological set o f issues rather than as a profoundly political 
influence in public life” (Rubin 1994:20).
On a crucial level Stark (1999) voices skepticism about the advent o f secularization. 
He notes that the ‘prophets o f secularization’ erred when they predicted the decline in 
religion at the onset o f modernity in the Western world. To such a degree, just as there 
is now greater attachment to ethnicity than in the past, (Smith, 1981) similar 
attachment has been attached with religion. One may argue that religious legitimacy is 
an important factor in politics, despite the overture o f modernity and the dawn o f post 
modernity (Williamson, 1990). An explanation for this revived attachment to both
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ethnicity and religion is that the individual tends not to forget his history, myths and 
memories.
For Lee & Ackerman (2002:5) secular society encapsulates the “retreat o f religion 
from all spheres o f society.” It is as noted by Bryan Wilson as “the sense o f the 
sacred, the sense o f the sanctity o f life, and deep religiosity are...absent” (Pratt, 
1970:3). It seems clear that the main characteristic o f a secular society is that it 
curtails religion in the domain o f the individual. However, where the western world 
has precepts based on secular ethno-nationalism, there has been argument that secular 
ethno-nationalism has been an instrument in the collapse o f morality in the western 
states. Juergensmeyer (1993) argues that secularism has failed western society due to 
its inability to prevent a moral decay thus enabling the birth o f a ‘new cold w ar.’ 
Juergensmeyer argues that the loss o f faith in secular nationalism is as a result o f the 
breakdown o f social order in society. Juergensmeyer explains that this would lead to a 
religious nationalism emerging in the western world. However, Chaves (1994) tells us 
that secularization may be viewed in social theory as a decline in religious authority 
and not in the decline o f religion, while Bruce (2002:3) says that secularization may 
be viewed as the decline o f the importance o f religion for the function o f non-religious 
institutions.
It is argued that secularization does not imply that religion has withered away. It 
implies that the individual has greater freedoms -  freedom o f expression, freedom of 
behaviour and religious tolerance, which exist in liberal democracies. Perhaps a 
befitting example is that a Gay parade would be tolerated in a liberal democratic
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society (secular society), but not in a non-western society, especially where religion is 
its first mark o f identity.
An intriguing question is: When do we determine whether or not religion is a 
primordial identity in non-western society? Some useful illustrations may provide 
adequate answers to this. Firstly, the planned hosting o f a Miss World beauty pageant 
in November 2002 in Kaduna, northern Nigeria resulted in a catastrophic religious 
riot, which left 220 people dead. This can be explained by the fact that religion (Islam) 
in the region is positioned differently in a non-western society. Secondly, a beauty 
contest in Turkey, which predominantly has a Muslim population, did not generate
1 Rreligious conflicts. This can be explained from the perception that Turkey to some 
extent is a liberalized western society. Moreover, “Kemalist secularism...firmly 
subordinated religion to Turkish nationalism” (Zubaida, 2004:413). It may be helpful, 
at this point, to note an important angle to this phenomenon provided by Steinglass 
(2002), who commenting on the Kaduna riots:
Sokode, a Muslim city in Togo, 500 miles southeast o f here, was host in 
August to a round o f the Miss Togo contest, swimsuits and all. But there 
was no protest. ... But only Nigeria struggles with a strong radical 
Islamist movement, and only Nigeria has Shariah, the strict rule o f law 
based on the Koran, in certain states.
He then asks the intriguing question: What makes northern Nigeria so different? 
Clearly, to this question, there can be only one answer -  to Muslims in northern 
Nigeria, religion, not ethnicity, is their first and foremost identity. The integrative 
dilemma o f post colonialism in most non-western societies and the absence o f a 
gradual social mobilization of people (Deutsch, 1953) are factors that engender
lx Miss Turkey pageant started on the 22n<l o f  Septem ber 1929. Ironically, Miss Turkey, Azra Akin, w on the Miss 
W orld  2002  con test after the beauty pageant was m oved from Nigeria to London, England.
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primordialism in non-western states. Geertz (1963) identifies the fact that primordial 
ties exist mainly in the ‘new states’ o f Africa and Asia. Similarly, Horowitz (1985) 
argues that in plural societies such as in Africa, Asia and the West Indies, political 
parties tend to be organized along ethnic lines.
The question then arises: Has the wind o f modernity changed the individuals’ and 
societies’ outlook to religion in western societies? In answering this question, 
Armstrong (2000:369) argues that religiosity has not disappeared in western societies. 
Armstrong suggests that religious fundamentalism plays a vital role in American 
politics. In addition she tells us that religion has assisted people to adjust to modernity 
and perceptively notes that “fundamentalism is just one o f these modem religious 
experiences, and ... it has enjoyed a certain success in putting religion squarely back 
on the international agenda...” (Armstrong, 2000:366).
1.12: C onflict Potential o f  R eligion
It certainly needs to be emphasized that religious primordialism may create a tendency 
in the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on religious beliefs and 
religious identity. This form o f loyalty could be understood as an attempt at protecting 
one’s identity, which is imagined to be threatened by other religious identities. This 
imagined threat produces a personalized religious identity. Personalization o f religion 
augments ethno-nationalism for the reason that they both convey an identity to the 
individual.
Another equally important point is that religiosity transcends territorial borders. All 
religions are prone to exhibit traits o f fundamentalism. However, the religious
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fundamentalist is common in non-western societies because ethnicity and religion play 
dominant roles in the individual’s primordial identity. The fundamentalist views one’s 
own religious identity as the only pure truth (McGuire, 1992: 190). Juergensmeyer 
(1993:4) adopts an excellent definition o f fundamentalism. Juergensmeyer views it as 
“an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism.” 
Furthermore, another exemplary definition is provided by Lee & Ackerman, (2002:51) 
who adopt Giddens’ ‘doctrinal purity’ o f fundamentalism as “ ...nothing other than 
tradition defended in the traditional way-but where that mode o f defense has become 
widely called into question....” But the question about what is wrong in being 
fundamentalist remains unanswered. To abide by the laws o f any profession or trade, 
an individual must abide by its fundamental doctrines, rules or guidelines. Thus, being 
fundamentalist about a religious belief may be insinuated to mean the correct doctrinal 
practices o f that religion. Clearly then, one may assert that a Muslim fundamentalist, 
abiding by Islam’s fundamental doctrines, would not profane the religions o f others 
(Qur’an 6:108).
Yet as one might expect, an underlying key problem in being fundamentalist in 
respect o f religion is that the fundamentalist believes that his own religion is the only 
right way whilst others are unfounded. Fundamentalism, then, can be described as a 
rebellion against conservative ecclesiastic authority. Kimball (2002:27) suggests that 
many devout people see religion as the problem; the religions o f others are considered 
false. Therefore, the love for one’s religion facilitates the dislike o f another, just as the 
love for one’s nation means a dislike for another nation. Fundamentalism empowers 
the individual to connect himself to the myth o f a “divine election” (Cauthen, 2004).
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At this point one must emphasize that religious fundamentalism has given rise to 
groups, such as the Hamas suicide bombers. The antecedent o f these thoughts may be 
found in religion. For instance, the Bible and Q ur’an base their foundations on 
victorious warfare. The wandering tribe o f Israel had to utterly destroy desert tribes on 
their journey to the Promised Land. This is perhaps one o f the reasons why Dawkins 
(2006:31) in his book titled ‘The God Delusion’, views the God o f the Old Testament 
as “arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction, jealous and proud o f it; a 
petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a 
misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, capriciously malevolent 
bully.” However, Dawkins prevaricated the definition o f religion, avoided explaining 
its complex nature and ignored what it means to the individual. Perhaps, if  Dawkins 
attempted to explain the multifaceted nature o f religion, he would understand why 
religion may generate solidarity among people. This conceivably informed McGrath 
(McGrath & McGrath, 2007: xi) to note that “religion to Dawkins is like a red rag to a 
bull-evoking not merely an aggressive response, but one that throws normal scholarly 
conventions about scrupulous accuracy and fairness to the winds.”
1.13: C onstructing Identities in N orthern Nigeria
The construction o f an identity is taking a new dimension in Nigeria. An individual 
may be identified first by his religion then by his nation. In a research conducted by 
Micklethwait (2007), individuals in Nigeria primarily identify themselves by their 
religion and secondly as Nigerians. However, it is argued that this finding is contrary 
to the reality o f Nigeria as a whole. Nigeria is constituted o f many nations and, as 
such, ‘identity’ has different meanings to different ethnic groups. In a diverging 
analysis, O ’Connell (1989:197) suggests that religion has not been a serious factor in
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Nigerian politics; rather the dominant factor is attributed to ethnicity. Perhaps, his 
argument is based on the assumption that ethnic boundaries create conditions for 
group conflict. Indeed, ethnicity plays a dominant role in the socio-political 
constitution o f Nigeria.
However, the affectation o f religion cannot be sidelined. Both are necessary 
compliments in Nigerian politics. Where there exists a coincidence o f ethnic identities 
between political contestants, religion is given primacy especially in the north, unlike 
in the south-west Yoruba land and the eastern Igbo land (an overwhelming majority 
are non-Muslims), where ethnic consideration takes precedence as a basis for political 
mobilization. In northern Nigeria, religion serves as the purveyor o f popular 
consciousness amongst different ethnic groups from northern Nigeria professing 
Islam. Islam is an important political instrument amongst the Yoruba, but is not 
considered a hegemonic political institution (Kukah & Falola, 1996:2). Similarly, 
Aguwa (1997:336) echoes that the Yoruba ethnic group accommodates African 
Traditional Religion, Christianity and Islam. Notably, Mazrui (1985:819) influentially 
illustrates this analysis by stating:
The links between religion and politics among the Muslims o f northern 
Nigeria are deeper and more durable than such links among the 
Muslim Yoruba of southern N igeria....Yoruba Muslims have 
sometimes been regarded as Yoruba first and Muslim second - while 
Hausa Muslims have been perceived as the reverse.
In order to forge a path, and to shed more light on the above, I encountered a similar 
illustration by Norimitsu (2000):
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In Lagos, the commercial capital in the Yoruba southwest, deadly clashes 
between Yoruba and Hausa have occurred in recent months. But in the 
recent riots in the northern city o f Kaduna, some Yoruba seemed to have 
escaped injury because o f their religion or ethnicity. Suraj Najimu, an 18- 
year-old student and a Yoruba Muslim, said he was surrounded by a group 
o f Hausa youths ready to assault him ‘But after I recited some Koranic 
passages, they let me go’, he said...O n a Muslim street in the 
predominantly Christian slum of Kaduna, Christians destroyed all the 
houses except a few belonging to Yoruba. Most o f the Yoruba were 
Christian. But even one who is Muslim, Shehu Garba, was spared, 
apparently because in this particular instance, ethnicity was more 
important than religion.
From the above excerpt, it can readily be seen that Islam has an overarching trans­
ethnic identity to create solidarity among cultural groups in northern Nigeria. 
Furthermore, to demonstrate that to the Igbo ethnic group ethnicity, as opposed to 
religion, is regarded as a mark o f identity, Akinwumi (2004:153) notes that in 1949, 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe expressed that “the God o f Africa has specifically created the 
Ibo nation to lead the children o f Africa...” and in a similar statement, Alhaji Tafawa 
Balewa comments that the northerners had to realize their mission o f “dipping the 
Quran in the sea,” 19 in other words, demonstrating that religion rather than ethnicity is 
the mark o f identity in the North. This is clearly, affirmed by Liman Ciroma, when he 
states that: “What the Sardauna and his colleagues tried to do was to create a new tribe 
o f ‘the Northerner” (Anthony, 2002:64).
Furthermore, Miles (2000: 230) notes that the expression ‘Nigerian Islam’ is 
understood to refer to the religious practices and political solidarity o f northern 
Nigeria. Thus, one may suggest that Islam has developed into a civilizational social 
structure, which consists of socio-political, economic and religious facets (Kimball, 
2002:19). From a populist view, southern Islam is not the same as Islam practiced in
19 This precept literary m eans spreading Islam to Southern Nigeria which is adjoined by the Atlantic O cean.
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the North. However, the impact o f the Islamization o f northern Nigeria has a 
reverberative effect on other dominant ethnic groups such as the Yoruba. This is 
illustrated in the northern town o f Yoruba land, Ilorin, where the Emir o f Ilorin, who 
is considered to be part o f the royal house o f the Fulani Caliphate, refuses to address 
his Yoruba subjects in Yoruba language but in Hausa. Furthermore, a Yoruba-Muslim 
from Ilorin is considered to be Hausa-Fulani. This identity is attributed to the 
conquering o f Ilorin by the Jihadists led by Uthman dan Fodio in 1804.
These perceptions are noted by Tukur (Bugage, 1986) where he argues: “The basis of 
solidarity or identity in the caliphate was, therefore, brotherhood in Islam. It had
nothing to do with ethnicity or territorial nationalism.” Bugaje (1986) further claims
that because the northern region is based on an Islamic ideological platform to the 
exception o f ethnicity, to attain recognition o f the state, the acceptance o f the belief 
system (Islam) and its ideological foundation is a prerequisite for individual to claim 
group membership. It is not uncommon that even enlightened commentators to refer 
to Hausa-Fulani as if  they are natural and organic social entity.
At first glance the distinguishing feature o f the Hausa-Fulani ethnie, which is different 
to the other ethnic groups, is “a deep and diffuse faith in Islam, and a tradition o f 
large-scale rule through centralized authoritarian states” (Diamond, 1988: 21). 
Arguing in a similar vein, Hamischfeger (2004:452), notes that Islam facilitates an 
overarching solidarity among people divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
differences, when he cites a Sheik from the north:
The idolatrous tribes to the south (northern tribes) ...are vastly
superior in numbers to the Muslims, and it is surprising that they do 
not overwhelm them. The explanation may be found in the spirit of
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brotherhood which unites the Muslims.
1.14: Conclusion
The significance o f this chapter is that it shows the dynamics o f religious identity in 
both western and non-western societies, with particular reference to northern Nigeria. 
Four precise conclusions can be observed. Firstly, is to provide a clear picture o f 
religion as a strong identity marker to the individual; a second, closely connected 
observation, is to understand that religion is a strong and critical characteristic in 
primordial identity; a third point is that religion has a overarching solidarity among 
people divided on ethnic grounds; a final pivotal observation is the exploration o f the 
rationale behind how religion has assumed the center stage o f the modem world. We 
have seen that religion affects everyday life and political legitimacy o f governments in 
non-western societies and, to some extent, in western societies.
In short, the crux o f this chapter is that it provides a well-informed foundation on the 
complexity o f religion in society and, in particular, searches in some ways, religion’s 
role as an unsolved element in political thought in northern Nigeria. The chapter 
explores universal issues from a new dimension and gives serious attention to religion 
in the social context. It is contended that religion is a decisive variant in the primordial 
construction o f northern Nigeria and it may continue to be a critical part o f a 
continuous process in everyday life in the region. Perhaps one needs to state that, 
given the crucial role o f religion amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria, it may be 
crucially difficult to maintain a society entirely free from religious conflicts, 
especially when perceptions o f threats to identities are imagined. But who can 
adequately predict a continuous clash o f faiths in the future?
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In order to understand literature pertaining to clash o f faiths and threats to identities, 
the following chapter discusses the cultural, sociological, psychological, biological, 
economic and historico-political as factors influencing conflict. In addition, the 
chapter will explore the phenomenon o f Islam as constructed in western societies in an 
attempt to connect it with emerging misconceptions in scholarly literature.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
And do not dispute with the followers o f the Book except by what is 
best, except those o f them who act unjustly, and say: We believe in that 
which has been revealed to us and revealed to you, and our Allah and 
your Allah is One, and to Him do we submit.
The Q ur’an 29:46 
(Shakir’s Translation)
2.1: Introd u ction
In the previous chapter, I explored the primordial aspect o f religion in non-western 
societies, and to some extent in western societies. I argued that religion subsumes all 
other forms o f division and assumes the centre stage with particular emphasis with 
northern Nigeria as my case in point. It was noted that aside from the bonding 
potentials o f religion, religious identities and collective differentiation is a cause- 
effect for conflict behaviour.
A significant body o f literature has been developed over the last several years 
explaining sources o f conflict behaviour. I propose to limit this review on the 
gargantuan collection o f literature dealing exclusively with ethnic and political 
conflicts. I confine the review to useful classical and contemporary theories explaining 
conflict. And, I attempt to review the literature where religion is a variable in 
explaining conflict and where ethnic conflicts are inextricably interwoven with 
religion, as the most common form o f religious conflict is ethno-religious (Fox, 
2004b).
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In determining the causal factors advanced for the explication o f conflicts in societies 
in the literature review are categorized under the following headings: Cultural, 
sociological, psychological, biological, economic and historico-political. After this, it 
explicates specifically to conflicts in northern Nigeria. It must be noted that no single 
factor can explain any and every conflict. In addition, this chapter explores political 
Islam in the global context. It also seeks to clear some misunderstandings o f Islam as 
perceived by western literature. The essence o f this concern is to analytically 
determine the place and position o f Islam in the socio-political society in the global 
context before assessing political Islam in northern Nigeria in the subsequent chapter.
Quite clearly, while some o f these factors may be dominant causal links o f a particular 
conflict, a whole lot o f other factors often combine to facilitate the breakout of 
conflict and provide it with the destructive sustenance. The theories o f conflict below 
are inexhaustible; however, popular theories rest on the following broad assumptions. 
Although these theories are contrasting they are nevertheless complementary in nature 
and, to some extent, overlap.
2.2: Cultural Factors: Clash o f  C ivilizations’ Theory
It is a paradox that religious conflicts have not been adequately addressed in politics 
and international relations. Well-known scholars, such as Geertz (1966), rejected 
religion in international debates, political thought and conflict analyses. This 
rejectionism was due to the international debates and the attention on the Cold War 
(Fox, 2001c). However, secularization theorists are now turning a new leaf. They 
suggest that there is a religious resurgence (Berger, 1999; Cox, 1984). At the collapse 
o f bipolarism, the revival of religion in politics and international relations precipitated
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with Lewis (1990). Lewis was the first to highlight and identify the conflict potential 
o f religion as the ‘clash of civilizations.’ Lewis suggests that this clash would be 
between Islam and the West. Again, Lewis (1995) notes that during the medieval ages, 
Christian Europe and Islam set the distant foundation in identifying each other as 
rivals. Similarly, a renowned journalist, Pipes (1990) in an article entitled ‘The 
Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!’ notes that “the fear o f Islam has 
some basis in reality” and consequently Pipes envisioned a clash between the West 
and Islam.
Well-known scholars Huntington (1996) and Juergensmeyer (1993) provide a key 
reference point for an elaboration of the ‘clash o f civilizations’ and the purported 
rivalry between secularization and religious secularization. They argue that religion 
would take a confrontational stage in world politics and that post-Cold War conflict 
would occur most frequently and violently along cultural lines as opposed to 
ideological lines.
At this point, while concurring with the imperative o f religion occupying a central 
place in international politics, it must be emphasized that religion preceded political 
theories as a platform for human identity and consciousness. Particularly, 
Huntington’s thesis has stirred several scholarly debates by political scientists (Ajami, 
1993; Heilbrunn, 1997; Hessner, 1997; Tariq; Anwar, 1998) in determining whether 
religion can lead to a new civilizational conflict after the Cold War.
Two major implications o f Huntington’s position especially within the parameter o f 
his civilization clash thesis between Islamic worldview and the western worldview are
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(i) the existence o f an homogenous Islamism and (ii) the idea that Islam in totality is a 
negation o f peace and democracy; the political and market rooted project o f neoliberal 
globalization. These assertions are so weighty and have serious implications for my 
research problematic such that they need to be contextualized and problematized 
historically and empirically in the light o f contemporary realities.20
Notable critics o f Huntington’s theory are Senghaas (1998) and Tusicisny (2004). 
Senghaas observes that Huntington, in explaining the concept o f a clash of 
civilizations at the macro level, focuses mainly on western civilization and does not 
provide any useful insights into what is understood as Islamic civilization. One might 
insist, at this point, that the weakness o f Huntington’s suggestion is his account that 
Islam is a threat to western civilization. In other words, Huntington associates Islam 
with terrorism. Huntington’s argument is similar to an incomprehensible argument 
that suggests that western civilization is a threat to world peace, due to the fact that it 
instigated two catastrophic World Wars, which left 55 million people dead. 
Constructively criticizing Huntington’s theory, Tusicisny (2004) observes that 
Huntington uses civilization as an umbrella for religion, ethnicity and language. 
Huntington does not differentiate between religion, ethnicity and language as well as 
explain why he terms them within the context o f a civilization.
Perhaps the most serious objection to Huntington’s hypothesis is that he is indirectly 
labeling Muslims as Islamic terrorists. Perhaps, Huntington’s thoughts may have been 
influenced by the misconceived speculation that not all Muslims are terrorists but all
20 Samuel H untington, (1 9 9 7 :1 4 1 ) responding to the criticism s pertaining to his ‘clash o f  civilizations’ theory, 
argues that people are now  identifying their identity in term s o f  ancestry, religion, language, history, values, 
custom s and institutions. He further argues that countries possessing similar identities are rallying together due to 
notions o f  trust and understanding.
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terrorists are Muslims. More to the point, Huntington does not distinguish Islamic 
fundamentalists from Islamic civilization.
Another critic o f Huntington’s theory is Fox (2000d), who used qualitative analyses 
o f 105 ethno-religious minorities with data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 
(MAR3) dataset.21 Fox discovered that Islamic ethno-religious groups were not more 
conflict prone than other religious groups during the 1990s. However, he notes that 
religion is an important factor in conflicts within Islamic groups. In addition, Fox 
(2002) discovered that civilizational conflicts represent a minority o f ethnic conflicts 
that occurred during and after the Cold War. Fox (2007) demonstrates that 
Huntington’s prediction o f a civilizational conflict has not come to pass as o f 2004 
(after 9/11). Fox further demonstrates that there has been a greater tendency for 
religious conflicts (Islamic) to occur within a religion (intra-religious) in a state and 
not with other civilizations. Consequently, most conflicts by Muslims were with 
Muslims and most conflicts by non-Muslims were with non-Muslims (Fox, 
2007:365).
It is possible to suggest that the assumption that Islamic groups are more prone to 
violence than other religious groups poses particular problems and confusion. 
However, an insight provided by Fox (2007) is that the reason for this misleading 
assumption is due to the separation o f religion from the state. An ostensibly 
compelling study provided by Fox (2001c), which he provides evidence through a 
quantitative study, is that since 1945 until the end o f the Cold War, there has been a
21 This dataset was form ed by Gurr (1993).
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rise in ethnic conflicts. But, there has not been any significant change in the types of 
ethnic conflict.
Arguments similar to Fox’s have been noted by Russett, et al. (2000: 585), who argue 
that Huntington’s theory o f a clash o f civilizations does not offer a sound guide to the 
future and that the measure for positioning states to civilizations are obscure. Another 
equally important observation, showing difficulties in Huntington’s theory observed 
by Russett et al. (2000), is that intra-civilizational conflicts are more common than 
inter-civilizational conflicts and those inter-civilizational conflicts have reduced since 
the demise o f the Cold War. A further line o f criticism stems from Rosel (1999:65), 
who notes that most protracted conflicts involve parties, nations and ethnic groups 
who belong to the same civilization. Similarly, Gurr (1994) observes that there is a 
lack o f evidence to assert that inter-civilizational conflicts are not more intense than 
other ethno-political conflicts. Arguing along similar lines, Gartzke & Gleditsch, 
(2006) observe that conflicts are more frequent within civilizations than conflicts 
between civilizations. Roeder (2003), in line with the Gartzke & Gleditsch, note that 
inter-civilizational conflicts often occur in states with minorities.
From the above, what is perceptively clear in the ‘clash o f civilizations’ theory is that 
it may be at best be described as hyperbolic in concurrence with Sen’s (2008:6) 
remarks:
What is perhaps the most limiting feature o f the civilizational 
approach...is the mind-boggling shortcut it takes in trying to understand 
our sense o f identity. Ignoring the immense richness o f the multiple 
identities that human beings have, given their diversity o f affiliations, 
attachments and affinities the civilizational approach attempts to put
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each o f us into a little box of a single sense o f belonging, to wit, our 
alleged perception o f oneness with our respective ‘civilization.’
It is, however, important not to underemphasize Huntington’s theory. Fox and 
Sandler (2004:132), in their use o f quantitative analyses, show Huntington was 
correct in suggesting that Islamic civilization would experience more violent 
conflicts after the Cold War but was wrong in forecasting that this violence would 
involve Islam and other civilizations. It is important to note, however, that the 
clash o f civilizations (West and Islam), is prevalent and interwoven in the 
conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. Although, this study notes the 
importance o f the clash o f civilizations, the study has deliberately adopted the 
social bonding o f religion within a society for a more concise focus.
2.3: S ocio log ica l Factors
W eber (1947) makes it clear that conflict is part o f society. He views conflict within 
the paradigm o f power and authority. Weber further notes that peace occurs when 
there is a change in the form o f conflict. To Weber, man is a social being, hence his 
associational existence. Although Weber is clear about the interrelatedness o f society 
and conflict, Weber plainly states that conflict is a societal characteristic. A missing 
link is that his explanation neglects causation o f conflict in society. However, one may 
concede that conflict is “...an inevitable aspect o f human interaction and an 
unavoidable concomitant o f choices and decisions” (Zartman, 1991: 299).
In a bold attempt to explain the causal relations between conflict and society, Galtung 
(1969) contends that social structures have the tendency to systematically obstruct 
other people from enjoying their basic needs. In conceptualizing human needs with
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religious violence, Galtung (1990; 1996) bases these concepts on the ‘Chosen’ and the 
‘Unchosen.’ Galtung illustrates this by showing that people believe they are chosen by 
God (true believers), whilst others are heretics or unbelievers. The sentiments o f being 
‘Chosen’ produce sentiments o f specialness amongst a religious group, such as 
Muslims in northern Nigeria. To Galtung, the ‘Unchosen’ are deemed ordinary and 
sub-human. The supposition ofG altung’s theory is useful to some extent in explaining 
religious conflicts. Religious conflicts generate the notion o f ‘w e’ as against ‘others’, 
which is the causal link to structural violence and has the tendency to transform into 
cultural violence. However, this causal explanation is complicated by failing to 
explain how we can socially construct notions o f ‘we-ness.’ Thus, a separate 
understanding and analyses of cultural characteristics and social structure is required. 
But how precisely, it may be asked, does one ascertain notions o f ‘we-ness’?
Conceivably, the best known answer may be provided by Connor (2002). Connor 
suggests that in order to understand the distinctive character o f ethnic conflicts, 
insights into facts as perceived by the people (the notions o f ‘w e’) and not outsiders 
are to be taken into consideration. O f course, the notions o f ‘we-ness’ must be taken 
into account in analyzing conflicts but the weakness here is that there may be 
discomfitures and conflicting notions o f ‘we-ness’ and how it is interwoven with 
conflict.
Perhaps, it is for this reason that Kriesberg (1998) searches into a sociological conflict 
theory. He considers conflicts to occur when there are incompatible objectives 
between parties. These incompatible objectives may occur when there are ethnic 
boundaries or a clash o f religious identities in a state. The sociological conflict theory
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provides valuable literature in studying contemporary conflict as it is useful in 
explaining the complex system o f society and its actors. The key issue, however, is 
that one may argue that notions o f incompatible objectives between parties may not 
always lead to conflict. There are no clear guidelines on the particular conditions for 
conflict, moreover there are other causal explanations o f conflict.
In searching for other causal explanations o f conflict, Bartos & Wehr (2002) present 
an important suggestion by attributing conflict to different hostile parties having 
incompatible goals. Thus, conflict may be explained as a form o f action used to 
address the perceived incompatible goals. For instance, where Muslims attempt to 
introduce Sharia, non-Muslims may regard such an act as hostile, and thus, as 
incompatible. This point shows that religious violence could be understood within the 
needs o f identity in the pursuit o f social goals (Burton, 1997). However, it is
suggested that there is a non-existent consensus on a single theory o f conflict in
respect o f explaining hostilities between parties.
Using a structuralist paradigm, Jabri (1996) argues that violence is as a result o f the 
breakdown o f social order. To Jabri, this breakdown o f order is understood as 
separating the outsiders and insiders, which revolves around identity conflict. 
Although, this assists in explaining the causal patterns o f conflict, it is, however, 
unlikely that conflicts are generated strictly by a breakdown o f social order. A notable 
feature o f conflict is that sometimes there are no early warning signs o f societal chaos. 
Although, Jabri provides an illustrative and pragmatic analysis, its applicability in
explaining conflicts has to be treated with caution.
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It is worth mentioning that social heterogeneity o f societies has been implicated as 
casual factors o f conflicts among identity groups, occurring where one group 
dominates the other and there exists the perception o f differences amongst people in 
the same social system. However, Osaghae & Suberu (2005: 4-5) illustrate with 
empirical evidence that division and conflict are not dependent on the number o f 
differences or degree o f diversity. This is because some o f the most diverse countries 
enjoy relative peace and stability, while some o f the least diverse are the most divided.
Presumably, in terms o f propensity for conflicts, religious reformism and 
fundamentalist religious orientations are highly culpable. In line with this suggestion, 
Gopin (2000) proposes that the rise in religious warfare is due to the rise in religious 
revivalism. G opin’s position is that religious revivalism has dual potentials. Firstly, it 
has a basis o f social harmony; secondly, a generator o f conflicts within and between 
religions. From the former perspective, Fox (2004a) and Pearce (2005) draw on 
several different studies to establish that faith-based conflicts are more intense and 
destructive as opposed to other types o f conflicts. G opin’s argument in many ways 
explains the social construction o f Islam in northern Nigeria, which acts as a double 
edged sword -  it promotes social harmony among its adherents and at the same time 
generates conflict with non-members of its faith.
In explaining how identity and religion interrelate, Kakar (1996) tells us that identity 
threats are the root cause o f religious conflict and that these threats may arise as a 
result o f economic interests, a perceived discrimination by the state or a change o f a 
political regime. In explaining how identity threats cause conflict, Sen (2006) argues 
that the root is found in the ‘miniaturization’ o f individuals or the ‘solitarist belittling’
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o f individuals’ by others possessing a different identity. There is a perceived 
perception o f viewing the individual as different. On religious identity Sen (2006:13) 
notes that the world is “not seen as a collection o f people but as a federation of 
religions and civilizations.” In articulating Sen’s position, his arguments indeed are 
useful in explaining differences in cultural identities, in northern Nigeria, between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. However, Sen fails to mention some critical issues o f 
religions overarching ability to create solidarity amongst different identities within 
certain social constructions.
Hasenclever & Rittberger (2000) who offer three theoretical perspectives on the role 
o f religion in conflict: Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. On 
primordialism, Hasenclever & Rittberger underscore Huntington’s suggestion that 
nations will be divided along civilizational lines; therefore, conflicts between nations 
will be based on religious civilizations. On instrumentalism, they argue that religion is 
invoked in conflicts when variables such as economic, social and political inequalities 
are experienced by an identity group. And on constructivism, they explicate that social 
conflicts are socially constructed and interconnected with group identities and 
loyalties such as nationalism, ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, Hasenclever & 
Rittberger argue that the likelihood o f religion being interwoven in conflict is as a 
result o f the sacred sanction given in support o f the conflict by the elites and 
effectiveness o f group mobilization for supporting the conflict. Although one must 
concede that group mobilization and the manipulation o f religion by the elites are 
variables that incite religious conflict, it is vital to explore other important variables 
such as perceived or imagined threats to a religious identity.
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Further, Little (1996) provides an intriguing analysis o f religious militancy. He views 
culture or civilization as determinants o f religious militancy. One crucial factor noted 
by Little’s determinants o f religious is the use o f ‘violent tolerance’, where militants 
uphold violence to demonstrate a sacred obligation to terminate the perceived 
religious injustice. In line with Little’s ‘sacred obligation’ as a factor that inspires 
religious violence, Nelson-Pallmeyer (2003), drawing on the suggestions of 
Juergensmeyer (1991) and Rene Girard (1977), argues eloquently that religious 
justified violence is first and foremost a problem o f sacred texts and not a problem of 
misinterpretation o f the texts. If  it is assumed that religion sanctions the use of 
violence, then does religion sanction the use o f terrorism? This obscures the division 
between terrorism and religious violence.
On one important issue Stem (2003) explains that religious terrorism is attained by 
spiritual leaders harnessing grievances and mystifying spiritual texts to support 
conflict or a Holy War. In a similar fashion, Pearlstein (2004) argues that one o f the 
factors that influence violent ethnic conflicts is religious conflicts that are manipulated 
by religious fundamentalists. However, Munson (2005) argues that although 
monotheistic religions have sacred texts justifying violence, religious practices 
changes with the society and as society changes, tolerance o f other religions is 
replaced by these sacred texts legitimising violence. M unson’s view appears to be 
logical and persuasive, but Munson fails to discuss the legitimacy o f religious 
violence used in the international world. Religion as a causal variable to violence may 
not have changed with modernity as religion is still a strong primordial identity 
marker in the contemporary world, especially in non-westem societies.
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Jenkins (2002) presents an argument that suggests that the mechanism o f religious 
conversion has the capability to promote rivalry and shift the demographic balance 
between adherents o f different religions within a state. Therefore, where elite 
fragmentation, intra-class, intra- and inter-group discords are pronounced by a 
religious change, a fertile ground for conflict may be sown. Similarly, Kimball (2002) 
argues that religious violence exists due to the failure o f religious accommodation, 
which is often associated with monotheism. Here, it becomes necessary to point out 
that unlike the African social set-up with polytheism as the religious outlook with 
different gods existing side-by-side with one another and with an understanding 
amongst believers, the imported religions in Africa foreclosed these accommodative 
religious tendencies. Perhaps, it could then be argued that religious intolerance was 
imported by the two Abrahamic faiths. And that before these faiths were introduced, 
Africans did not wage wars over religion. Therefore, it could be further argued that an 
unspoken truth o f the Puritanism o f these foreign religions is that it encourages 
conflicts, as adherents o f other religions are demonized.
In an attempt to illustrate the non-accommodative tendencies o f Abrahamic faiths, 
Rieffer (2003) suggests that religious nationalism, while advancing the conception o f 
a nation conveys religious exclusivity leads to intolerance o f other religions. This 
intolerance transforms into violence (Faris 1935). Rieffer argues that the development 
o f a religious identity leads to the birth o f an ‘alien other.’ This suggestion in some 
sense aptly describes Islam in northern Nigeria, where Islam unites and divides in 
equal measures -  it is tolerant to those who are part o f it and intolerant to those not 
part o f it. Perhaps, then, Ryan (1995:89-90) is not incorrect when he famously argues 
that religious conflicts are causally linked by the concepts o f ‘demonization’ and
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‘sanctification’, which are inextricably interwoven and do generate Holy Wars 
(religious conflicts).
2.4: Psychological Factors
Indeed, by way o f an introduction, Burton (1990) provides a powerful and persuasive 
study covering basic human needs theory, which is similar to Galtung’s arguments 
discussed above. Burton argues that social conflict often occurs when there is a 
frustration o f needs, such as security and identity. Hence, if  an individual’s security is 
threatened, his or her basic human needs are not being met. He argues that individuals 
will pursue their basic needs at any cost. Subsequently, whenever the system 
suppresses a people the end result is social conflict. Within this framework, the theory 
poses a problem in the sense that human needs are not universal, as they are 
historically and culturally determined. Therefore, human needs which tend to generate 
conflict must be identified. However, it may be a complex effort to attempt to identify 
these needs as the list is unlimited.
As Rickman (1950) writes, aggression is a part o f mankind’s natural make-up, as 
mankind strives to dominate others. Galtung (1971:272) defines aggression as “drives 
towards change, even against the will o f others.” In consonance with Rickman’s view 
point, De Bono (1985) informs us that the root o f conflicts is the fact that people see 
things differently. In explaining his suggestion, De Bono attempts to define beliefs to 
include perceptions, behaviour, values and principles. These beliefs are based on the 
perceptions o f the mind. The premise o f these arguments is on the notion o f ‘w ant’ as 
a variable factor o f  conflict. Thus, a methodical causal pattern o f conflicts arises 
where a belief is coerced in a system against others beliefs.
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In relating violent conflict to psychological explanations, Rapoport (1995) attempts to 
find an answer to violence in human nature. Rapoport concedes that it is not human to 
be violent, rather violence is attributed to circumstances human beings find 
themselves in. On the theory that frustration leads to aggression, he argues that every 
frustrating experience does not lead to aggression. However, he concedes that there is 
a link between frustration and aggression and ultimately violence.
In their psychological explanation o f conflict, Vyas & Vyas (2000) argue that all 
groups desire cultural esteem or revered self image, and such sentiments o f loyalty 
have the tendency to produce cultural aspirations o f the individual, which in turn 
produce a coalition based on common interests. This image, Vyas & Vyas argue, is 
instinctual. Consequently, it is clear that that the “greatest need o f all the needs is the 
preservation o f the self (self interest)...” (Vyas & Vyas, 2000:19). When self-esteem 
and self-interest are threatened, the result is conflict. The difficulty arises when one 
looks into what determines self-esteem and self-interest. Moreover one might argue 
that the emergence o f self-esteem and self interest are, to some degree, more prevalent 
to the individual than to the group.
2.5: B iological Factors
Lorenz (1968) applies a biological approach to conflicts (cf.Davies, 1980). Lorenz 
considers violent conflicts not within the paradigm of the human mind, but as an 
innate characteristic o f human nature and the animal kingdom. Lorenz built his 
argument on the earlier work of Sigmund Freud. Freud (Freud, Gay & Strachey, 1989) 
suggested that mankind has innate conflicting needs. To him, this centered on libido 
and an aggressive constitution, which he termed as Thanato. Freud made an attempt to
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argue that m an’s violent behaviour is similar to animal behaviour. The main drawback 
o f Lorenz’s argument is that conflict cannot be deemed to hereditary or part o f the 
psychological reality o f humans. Such an argument clearly implies that humans and 
animals have identical thinking patterns. As mentioned earlier, there are different 
incidences o f conflict. Conflicts may be culturally determined and its causality varies 
from one culture to the other. However, the natural biological make-up o f man can be 
understood to be within expressive traits such as hunger, thirst, laughing, etc. Traits 
such as aggression or drunkenness are self induced.
2.6: E conom ic Factors
The Marxian economic theory o f conflict remains influential and persuasive. Marx 
and Engels (1964) provide a socio-economic explanation that economic inequities are 
the causal link to class conflict. The intellectual influence o f Marxism is that the 
forces o f production produce conflict by two classes -  the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. The end result is a class struggle, which leads to a revolution. This social 
inequality may create either a stable environment or cause a revolution that would 
lead to social change.
The Marxian economic theory informed early scholars on religion and conflict such as 
Mathews (1918), who, in a conservative analysis, suggests that religious conflict was 
an option o f increasing the wealth and the land o f the state. Mathews argues that 
economic development during the ancient world was warranted by war and 
consecrated by religion. On the contrary, Ballentine (2003:274), in a broader analysis, 
perceptively argues that economic incentives for conflicts is lacking in ethnic and 
religious conflicts because it involves non-divisible values. This may indeed be
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correct as religion is based on a system o f thought. Ballentine further suggests that 
ideologies in respect o f identity and belongings are distinct from economic incentives.
In another study, Senghaas (2000) observes that at the initial stages o f a crisis, issues 
o f culture and religion are usually not o f primary importance. One o f the central issues 
raised by Senghaas’ analysis is the ‘distribution conflict.’ This conflict is the main 
instigator o f conflicts, with religion being deployed in furtherance o f socio-economic 
agenda, privileging the instrumentalization o f religion. In a similar sense, Jeong 
(2000) argues that cultural violence based on hatred, fear and suspicion, is conveyed 
by uneven distribution of wealth or political control and incompatible religious 
conditions which threaten the identity o f a group. In line with this suggestion, Azam & 
Hoeffler (2001) tell us that the distribution o f resources plays a vital role in bonding a 
group’s identity. The distribution o f resources can financially empower a group and 
equip it for the purpose o f instigating conflict. The lack o f resources, on the other 
hand, can cause grievance amongst a group and this may also lead to violence.
Furthering our understanding o f economic conflict, Keen’s (1998) suggests two forms 
o f economic violence. First, is the ‘top-down’ category, in which politicians and the 
elites mobilize the grass-root people to carry out acts o f violence in order to achieve 
political currencies. Keen notes that a pre-condition for this conflict is that there must 
be state weakness. Alternatively, is the ‘bottom-up’ category. Here the grass-roots 
people mobilize themselves to instigate conflict because they perceive that they 
relatively deprived o f political, social or economic participation. This perception is a 
link to frustration which emanates into conflict (Gurr, 1970). The question then arises: 
How is economic violence associated with religious violence in northern Nigeria?
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How is economic violence incited by politicians and the elites using religion as a 
mobilization tool or instigated by the grass-root people when there is a perceived 
threat to the primordial identity of Islam in northern Nigeria?
It is crucial to note that the economic variable or the modernist approach rejects the 
traditionalist approach expounded by Gurr (1970) as being over-simplified in 
explaining causal patterns of conflicts. The greed theory is useful in explaining the 
causal link o f civil wars in states that are non-developed or developing states, which 
are characterized by poverty, economic exploitation, uneven distribution o f resources 
and lack o f provision o f basic needs. However, the theory o f greed is not the only 
causal explanation for conflict as other inherent dynamics exist. Thus, Collier & 
Hoeffler’s views on conflicts based on economic perceptions fail to present a wider 
framework for conflict dynamics because they appear to offer a single level o f 
analysis.
Yet, an intriguing scholarly contribution by Haynes (2007) laments in detail and 
provides a satisfactory rational explanation on the causal patterns o f conflict, 
especially in Africa. Haynes argues that civil wars in Africa are as a result o f political 
and economic factors caused by ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in society. 
Haynes provides a useful guide and reasoning -  that states such as Cameroun, Malawi 
and Tanzania, having high levels of ethnic and religious groups, have limited and 
contained ethnic and religious conflict, because the state has, to some extent, dealt 
with major public and economic concerns. This is in striking contrast with Somalia 
which is largely homogeneous, but suffers from incessant conflicts due to a poor 
functional economic system. The critical aspect o f these analyses shows that
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perceptions o f greed by one group can be limited to a certain degree when there is an 
even distribution o f wealth in a state.
2.7: H istorico-P olitica l Factors
Ethnic boundaries create conditions for group conflict in divided societies (Horowitz, 
1985; Connor, 1994). Most crucially it is the most important dimension in explaining 
social conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). In substantiating this, Azar (1984:90) argues 
that group identity formations such as ethnicity are wedded to protracted social 
conflicts in a state. At this point it is ripe to mention that this study is in some way 
contradicts A zar’s position.
However, what is crucial about A zar’s (1990) argument is that the dearth o f human 
needs is a causal link to protracted social conflicts. Azar notes that developing 
countries are more prone to experience protracted social conflicts due to weaknesses 
in political institutions and the presence o f a fragile economy. A weak state is 
characterized by poor democratic systems and resource distribution. Poor democracies 
are more prone to civil war than liberal democracies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; 
Ellingsen, 2000).
More fundamental and therefore more important, however is that ethnicity is not 
usually the causal link to social conflicts but merely is the form in which they exist. 
What exists is the linkage o f social, political and economic conflicts among people of 
different ethnic groups (Ryan, 1995:23). For instance, self determination and 
grievances have been identified as the leading causes o f protracted social conflicts 
(Fox, 2004b; Gurr, 1993). Likewise, it could be argued that religion exists
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independently from ethnicity, but its distinctiveness can form an element in ethnic 
identity and can converge with ethnicity in times o f conflict. Furthermore, the 
discovery o f Fox & Squires (2001) that nationalism is a more significant influence on 
ethnic conflict than religion is very informative. The authors suggest that ethno- 
nationalist ambitions are more common than religious ones.
Social conflicts have also been attributed to the complications arising from 
democracy. During the initial stages o f establishing a democratic order, heterogeneous 
states are likely to produce ethnic and religious conflicts (Wimmer, 2003; Fox, 2000b; 
Gurr 1993). The large scale o f ethnic and religious conflicts following from the return 
to civil rule and its new democratization in Nigeria on May 1999 provides empirical 
justification to the above assertion. Nigeria has witnessed more ethnic and religious 
conflicts from 1999 since her independence.
Arendt (1970) provides an influential account o f conflict. Arendt considers violence to 
be interrelated with the struggle for power and domination o f one group or state over 
another. This suggestion is observed when members o f different faiths use violence to 
achieve domination over members of another faith, solely to achieve power. Arendt’s 
suggestion is rather complex and unduly restricting due to the fact that violence and 
power may not always be interrelated. In this context, different groups yearning for 
power may not use violence as a last resort to achieve dominance.
From Lincoln’s (2003) point o f view, in what may be termed as a hegemonic 
discourse on violence, religious conflict arises when the ‘religion o f the status- quo’ is 
used as a source o f domination over ‘religions o f resistance.’ This, in the long-run, can
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result in religious conflict between the dominant majority and the dominated religious 
minorities. Religious abhorrence to other religious adherents and its antecedent 
competition o f interests are found in the histories o f conflict between these groups 
(Sullivan, 1988). This analysis in many ways describes ‘Islam as the status quo’ in 
northern Nigeria. However, a missing link is perhaps that the ‘religion o f the status 
quo’ might be an ideological tool to unite minorities or people o f different ethnic 
groups in the region.
Gurr (1993), in his treatise on ‘Minorities at Risk’, argues that discrimination against 
an ethnic minority provides the basis for the minority to form an opposition to protest 
and terminate the perceived discrimination. Fox (2000c) shares a similar view with 
Gurr and argues that religious factors are capable o f giving rise to discrimination and 
grievances, which can give rise to ethnic and religious conflicts. Fox argues that the 
causes o f religious discrimination are different from other types o f causes o f 
discrimination. Discrimination is usually seen as an act committed by a dominant 
group over a minority group. Thus, where religious issues are prevalent in ethnic, 
political, economic and cultural ideologies discrimination and conflict have the 
tendency to escalate. Fox (1997) argues that religion has a distinct difference from 
culture and as such is a distinct and separate feature from ethnic conflicts, 
notwithstanding the fact that religion is an element o f the conflict. Yet, the religious 
causes o f discrimination arise where the minority group believes that the majority 
group is threatening their religious identity, where religious legitimacy has been 
summoned by religious groups and the relevance o f the emotiveness or sentiment o f 
religion to the conflict (Fox, 1999b).
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O f central importance is Fox’s (1999a, 2000c & 2004b) concept o f the leading 
religious causes o f ethnic conflicts. To Fox, these causes are influenced by four 
functions:
(1) Religious demands: Religion provides a foundation for understanding the world. 
When these foundations are attacked, the consequence is a conflictive response.
(2) Religious grievances: Religion provides a link for the individual to a greater 
whole. Thus, any grievance by a group can lead to the use o f religion by that group as 
a tool for conflict.
(3) Religious legitimacy: Religion has the potential to legitimize actions and conflict.
(4) Religious institutions: Religion can be used to rally support from the masses in 
order to mobilize the masses for political action and ethnic conflict.
A notable problem in Fox’s research is that it is scarcely developed, as it does not 
focus on the rigorous causal patterns o f religious conflicts but only on the conditions 
that make them exist. However, as previously noted, Collier & Hoeffler (2007) have 
suggested that the conditions that determine conflict (civil war) to exist (for instance 
greed) are more important than the causal motives o f the conflict.
However, Fox (2000a) argues causes of conflicts between different ethnic groups with 
different religious affiliations are more often ethnic than religious. Fox observed that 
religion was a primary factor in only 12 out o f 105 cases. In addition Fox observes 
that ethnic minorities are not usually the instigators o f religious conflicts rather it is 
the ethnic majority that is most likely to instigate conflict.
110
Leatherman et al. (1999) express that the melange o f nationalism and religious 
nationalism have the tendency to promote political desires by a group, which gives 
rise to ‘negative emotions.’ These emotions generate violence in the execution o f a 
seemingly just cause. Similarly, in a persuasive analysis, Kunovich & Hodson (1999) 
argue that ‘diverging interests’ are the causation o f religious conflicts. They illustrate 
their argument with the diverging interests o f the Roman Catholics, the Eastern 
Orthodox and the Muslim faiths, coupled with the policies o f the Communist regime, 
the deeds o f various churches during World War II and the dissolution o f Yugoslavia, 
which led to the search for religious and ethnic identities among its people.
Drawing on these theories, it is clear that most conflicts in Africa, and, more 
specifically Nigeria, have a historical foundation due to the invented traditions o f the 
colonialists. M azrui’s (2001) view is that the incessant conflicts across the continent 
are as a result o f the pluralistic nature o f African countries (cf. Ndula 2002:143). 
Mazrui raises the idea that the root causes o f conflicts may be as a result o f the ‘forces 
o f decolonization.’ In addition, Mazrui asserts that the source o f conflicts in Africa 
may be as a result o f Africa’s previous history o f colonization. Mazrui suggests that 
Africa is going through socio-political transformation, from the pre-colonial period 
into a new birth. The osmosis of colonialization shows that it may be a link to 
conflicts due to the invented traditions by the British colonialists as explained above. 
However, it does not recognize that colonialization may be an indirect link in bringing 
different ethnic groups together, in some societies, who became united under the 
umbrella o f religion. The Hausa-Fulani and the old Kanem-Bomu Empire in northern 
Nigeria are useful illustrations o f the impact o f colonialization which merged different 
groups together by indirect rule.
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In this context, it may be constructive to note Englebert’s et al. (2002) arguments, 
which are similar to M azrui’s. Englebert et al. posit that the partitioning o f pre­
existing homogenous African societies, (dismemberment) have led to incessant 
conflicts. Englebert’s et al argue that the dismemberment o f African societies forced 
people with different history, languages, culture and religion under the same political 
systems which are highly autocratic.
These analyses are susceptible to ceaseless interpretations, as conflicts in Africa have 
different causal explanations and analysis. It is possible that conflicts may exist where 
there exists a common language, common culture and a common ethnicity. As earlier 
noted, ethnic homogeneity failed to serve as a check to the conflict in Somalia exposes 
the inadequacy o f the foregoing position.
2.8: N eed  o f  Supplem enting Literature
In linking the above literature to northern Nigeria, scholars from Nigeria have not 
identified the peace and conflict dynamics o f Islam. The predominant intellectual 
response is that they particularly focus on the conflict potential o f the religion and the 
politicization o f religion (Ibrahim, 1991; Falola, 1998; Aguwa, 1997). In attempting to 
explain religious violence in northern Nigeria, scholars use a multi-causal analysis to 
explain religious conflicts-on historical, economic, political and/or social variables. 
Similarly, conflicts in northern Nigeria in general and Kaduna State in particular are 
explained in the context o f a clash o f values and competition over scarce resources, 
power and status (Yusuf, 2007).
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As Kting (2007:590) reminds us, religion has existed since the existence o f human 
beings and from the time o f this existence there has been violence. Kting argues that 
religions, especially monotheistic religions, are prone to violence. “Holy wars are 
understood to be wars o f aggression, waged with a missionary claim at the command 
o f a deity” (Kting, 2007:592). Kting further points out that the use o f aggression was 
officially allowed during the Christian crusades. On the other hand, he asserts that 
Jihad was a policy for Islamic imperialism. Kting’s explanation o f the genesis of 
religious violence is then a powerful reminder o f the historical and inherent conflict 
generative mechanism o f religion.
A point to be introduced in connection with Kiing’s reminder is provided by Fox 
(2001b), where he demonstrates through quantitative testing that religious differences 
make conflict more likely and more intense in a given geographical area. Fox posits 
that varied religious beliefs in a country promote religious conflicts. In addition, Fox 
asserts that religious sentiments can escalate into ethnic conflicts, but such conflicts 
are easily controlled without the existence o f religious sentiments.
From these points o f view, the key problem has to do with faith-based differences. 
While religion is not necessarily conflicting, the individual’s intolerance o f other 
people’s belief system and the desire to use religion as a platform for political 
domination and economic advantage makes religion a veritable conflict generating 
potential.
Vastly important, and vastly ignored in the preceding literature, is that most scholars 
do not view religion, Islam as our case in point, as having the potential to generate
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social bonding between different identity groups. Religious identification is 
considered as having the potential to create group division, which leads to segregation 
and violence. Linking this discourse to this analysis, one may argue that it would be 
erroneous to apply such analyses within the context o f a civilization in a non-western 
society, such as northern Nigeria. Western literature may be argued to be inconsistent 
with the internal dynamics o f a non-western society. This misinformation led Roy 
(1994) to argue that Islam is limited in its cultural sphere and has failed to act as an 
egalitarian religion to achieve unity because it has not significantly transformed the 
Middle East. It was used as an oppressive tool in Iraq; it could not prevent the 
Americanization o f the Gulf after the Gulf War and the prevalence o f inter-Islamic 
wars in the Middle East. He further argues that western domination is ubiquitous in 
Islamic societies due to the fact that their intellectuals are educated in westernized 
environments. Furthermore, Pipes (1995) notes that this pattern points to a paradox 
where intellectuals who want to reposition the Islamic world back to the seventh 
century practice western traditions and appear to appreciate westernized ways o f life. 
But, as interesting as such explanations may be it must be remembered that Islam is 
understood, practiced and perceived differently in different societies.
A pointer to the misconceived political culture o f Islam is explained by Price 
(1999:16) where he notes that “the west has always approached the study o f Islam 
from a position o f power and dominance, the colonizer and the hegemony, which has 
prevented western scholars from gaining an accurate understanding o f Islam and 
Islamic societies.”
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2.9: M isconcep tion s in W estern Literature
Islam, more than any other religion, has been accused o f propensity for violence. 
Given its orientation and the contemporary assertiveness, if  not defensive disposition, 
Islam has come to be seen as fundamentalist, violent and undemocratic. In the light o f 
this, Carapico (1997:29-31) perceptively notes that:
In Orientalist depiction, Islam is often seen as the antithesis o f tolerance, 
social justice, individualism, and legal-rationality. Jihad (often 
erroneously understood as “holy war”) appears more central to this great 
religion than prayer or charity.
While widespread evidence of violence traceable to Islamists abound globally, to 
uncritically generalize that Islamic is prone to violence is an over-generalization that 
demands serious contextual analysis.
Now it is important, that what needs to be recognized here is that the community of 
Islam is theocratic in nature. An illustration o f the Umma is best put by Bernard Lewis 
(Midlarsky, 1998:486):
The Umma thus expressed, from its inception, the fusion o f politics and 
religion characteristic of the later Islamic states. . . .  In the Islamic 
world, therefore, there could be no conflict between Pope and Emperor, 
for the powers which these two represented were one and the same.
This above assertion explains the phrase ‘hukm ilia lillahi’ (No rule but that o f God 
alone). This effectively divides the world between the House o f Muslims (dar al- 
Islam) and the House of non-believers (dar al-Harb) due to the interwoveness o f 
Islam with politics. In the light o f the above, Islam has been misconceived as 
unconstructively related to democracy and is effectively at variance with western
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forms o f governess.22 As captured by Brenner (2000:144): “Islamic religious culture is 
a much broader and more inclusive conceptual frame o f reference than 'Islam' and 
includes all cultural manifestations and social or political institutions that are defined 
as Islamic by Muslims themselves in any given social context.” It should be noted that 
the Q ur’an has 6,348 verses and covers all aspects o f social life, such as civil law, 
marriage, international law and economic affairs. (Salmi et al., 1998:33). In this 
respect, Islam could have different meanings to an individual. Thus, Klausen 
(2005:81) rightly observes that “for some, Islam is a source o f identity and family 
tradition. For others, it is a source of intense spiritual commitment. And yet others 
think o f faith as a practical problem for Muslims and a source o f bias, but not o f great 
personal relevance.”
Furthermore, the Umma provides religious solidarity among its adherents and 
sanctions the communal system o f praying and fasting together as opposed to non- 
Islamic faiths, which permits these practices in the private realm o f the individual. 
Thus, Gellner (1981:1) rightly points out that “Islam is the blueprint o f a social 
order... It holds that a set o f rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained and independent of 
the will o f m en...Judaism and Christianity are also blueprints o f a social order, but 
rather less so than Islam.” This practice enables Islam to operate under a rigid closed 
system. In this sense, Islamic civilization appears not to differentiate between religion 
and politics.
While it is inconceivable that Islamists have their share o f the blame in the incidence 
o f violence and the criminalization o f Islam, the issue needs deeper contextualization,
22 Manus I. Midlarsky (1 9 9 8 :4 9 2 ).
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especially in the context o f the political economy o f oil and the centrality o f the 
Middle East in the global energy politics. It is against this background that one o f the 
objectives o f the USA in relation to the Middle East according to Wanamaker 
(1964:199) is “to achieve sufficient stability to make possible orderly political and 
economic development and insure the continued flow o f Persian G ulf oil to Europe.” 
Flowing from this strategic consideration o f the capitalist high command, the region 
has never been free o f imperialist domination and manipulations, with its attendant 
violent conflicts, counter-hegemonic violence and even wars.
2.9.1: The O rigins o f  Islam ophobia
Lewis (1988:71) observes that “Islam is perceived from its inception, as a militant, 
indeed as a military religion and its followers as fanatical warriors, engaged in 
spreading their faith and law by armed might.” Ernest Renan’s (Kurzma, 1998:3) 
scathing comments on Islam are also informative:
Islam is the complete negation o f Europe ... Islam is the disdain o f science, 
the suppression o f civil society; it is the appalling simplicity of the Semitic 
spirit; restricting the human mind, closing it to all delicate ideas, to all 
refined sentiment, to all rational research, in order to keep it facing an 
eternal tautology: God is God.
Such views are prevalent not only amongst some academics but even amongst 
politicians such as Geert Wilders. The controversial Member o f Parliament in Holland 
made an insensitive statement when he said: “I don't hate Muslims. I hate Islam.” He 
further says that “Islam is not a religion; it's an ideology, 'the ideology o f a retarded 
culture.”23 Opinions such as those quoted above have led to a general linking o f all
23 'I don't hate M uslim s. I hate Islam’, says Holland's rising political star. Accessed on the 16'1' o f  O ctober 2009 at: 
http: /  /  w w w .gu ard ian .co .u k / world /  2008 /  l e h / 17 /n c th c i lands, isl am .
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religious militancy with Islam. Most recently in September 2010, plans by a 
controversial church (Dove World Outreach Center) in America, through the 
misguided thoughts o f its Pastor, Terry Jones, in an attempt to fan the flames o f 9/11 
planned to bum copies o f the Qur’an over protests against the construction o f an 
Islamic community centre close to the spot where the Trade Centre was destroyed by 
terrorists. This sort o f pronouncement by injudiciously minded people, which is not 
fairly accurate o f popular Islamic culture o f tolerance and peace, has enjoyed front 
page sensation in the hands o f western and international media and given rise to 
Islamophobia in western societies.
Clearly in many ways, Islam is going through a process o f resurgence in order to 
rediscover its nostalgic Golden Era and place in the sphere o f international glory it 
once enjoyed. As captured by Fuller, (2003:2) “ ...m any Muslims attribute the past 
achievements and durability o f Islamic civilization to the very message and 
implementation o f Islam itself. Logically then, any apparent straying from that faith 
might be perceived as a direct source o f decline and failure.” Islamic resurgence is 
often tagged as Islamic fundamentalism by western media. An illustration o f this label 
is provided by El Fadl (2001:135) that in Israel, religious parties practice politics, 
support and oppose candidates, lobby for laws, clash with secularities and worship 
God freely. But if  any Muslim group participates in politics they are recognized as 
political Islam or Islamism and thus establishing all political 'Islamists ‘extremist’ by 
definition. This misconception has prompted western governments to suggest that 
democratic ideals are contrary to Islamic cultures.
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The resurgence o f Islam is also attributable to the discontentment about the decline in 
the true practice o f Islam. This sentiment has induced radical thoughts about reviving 
Islam which in turn has the tendency to produce militant reactions. In this context, 
Piscatori (1986) identifies three rationales behind these views. First, he suggests that 
the practice o f orthodox Islam has been neglected. Second, that Muslims, especially in 
the Middle East, have not taken advantage o f new ideologies to enhance its industrial 
capabilities and he proposes that there should be a separation o f Islam from politics. 
Third, he suggests that the integration (mainly by western Muslims) o f destructive 
practices known as ‘westoxication’ poisons the Islamic community and pollutes 
Islamic practices.
Islam declined in the global scene after the fall o f the Ottoman Empire.24 Militant 
Islam started in the 18th century following the fall o f the Ottoman Empire (1299- 
1922), and waxed stronger in the 20th century. After the fall o f the Empire, western 
powers took control o f the old empire and much o f the Middle East. Consequently, the 
nationalistic sentiments were transformed into religious nationalism in the Arab 
world. This gave rise to reformers who sought to purify pristine Islam primarily in the 
struggle against oppression perceived as being sponsored by the West.
2.9.2: The O verarching Solidarity o f  Islam
Islam overlaps ethnic identities in certain societies. Religious identities were often 
synonymous with ethnic identities, for instance the Jews, the Armenians (Armenian 
Church) during the Ottoman Empire and the Coptics in Egypt. Islamic symbolism lies 
in the concept that an individual is a member o f the social order within society. Islam
24 Islam cam e to Europe (Spain) in 709 and declined finally in 1918 after the 1" W orld W ar.
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has been defined as an egalitarian religion as it brings a message o f equality and 
rejects social differentiation (Lewis, 2002:82). Lamenting along these lines, the 
Anglican Bishop o f the central Nigerian city o f Jos, Nigeria, Reverend Benjamin
25Kwashi, notes that “the Muslims are winning — they have won. Islam is growing 
very fast. For many Africans, it makes more sense to reject America and Europe's 
secular values, a culture of selfishness and half-naked women, by embracing Islam.” 
One may argue that Islamic ideology has a tendency to produce a sinewy primordial 
identity than ethnicity. As captured by Mazrui (1985:828) that “Islam envisaged itself 
as being a fusion o f three religions and ways o f life-Judaism, Christianity and the 
religion fostered by the Prophet M uham m ad...so doctrinally almost from the 
beginning Islam had the seeds o f multiculturalism ....” .
2.9.3: Islam ic Culture as H om ogenous
Different cultures are modeled and impacted in varying degrees by Islam and as a 
result Islam has many faces. Price (1999:24) points out that the varied characteristic of 
political Islam is that it is characterized by a deficiency in political agenda, in the 
sense that its values and laws were adopted by a society that existed over 1,000 years 
ago. In some cultures Islam is interwoven with pre-existing cultural identities such as 
language and indigenous lifestyles. For instance, in the majority o f the Islamic 
population in African states, women are not accorded political roles. However, in 
Islamic states such as Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, (a female) was elected as Prime 
Minster from 1988—1990 and from 1993—1996.
25 O nishi, N orim itsu . ‘Rising M uslim Pow er in Africa Causing U nrest in Nigeria and E lsew here’, New York Times 
N ovem b er 1, 2001 cited by Karecm M. Kamel in an article: ‘Beyond Miss W orld: M uslim Protest in N igeria’, 
accessed on the on the 30'1' ol March 2008 at:
h ttp : //w w w .id a m o n lin e .n e t /e n g lis h /V ie w s /2 00 3 /0 2 /a rtic lc .0 4 -sh tm L
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Contrary to the universalization o f Islam, the dynamism of Islamic political odyssey 
globally has been innately contingent on situational variables informed by prevailing 
socio-economic, cultural and political conditions. In this context, history also plays 
important role. It is to this extent that it becomes an empirically invalid generalization 
to presuppose a universally correct Islamic culture o f violence and anti-democratic 
disposition.
The denial o f a universal Islamic tradition was supported by El-Zein (1977). In 
arguing the dynamics o f different facets o f Islam across the globe, El-Zein (1977:232) 
notes that Islam finds unity o f meaning through the expressions o f a particular religion 
and as a continuous tradition throughout generations. El-Zein (1977), also 
demonstrates empirically how contextual variables condition the different Islamic 
cultures that underscore politics and power contestations in Morocco and Indonesia. 
For instance, while the nuances of the warrior personalities that introduced Islam in 
Morocco predisposed the country to belligerent political interaction, the introduction 
o f Islam by traders resulted in the direct opposite o f the Islamic culture in Indonesia. 
Contrary to these empirically valid propositions, Orientalist scholars such as Carapico 
(1997: 30) argue that:
The Orientalist mind-set attributes political struggles in the Middle East to 
culture, not social, economic, or individual factors. For instance, while 
lynchings, hate crimes, and family violence in America are but individual 
exceptions to a sound social ethic, “Islamic terrorism” is portrayed as if it 
were a religious expression.
Thus, it can be safely suggested that the facts on the ground illustrate that in Islamic 
nations, peculiar dynamics are sometimes ignored rather than analyzed and 
understood. In the light of this, Ahamed & Nazneem (1990: 804-805) argue that:
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As a social force, Islam is dynamic; in critical times it has served as a 
rallying point in an environment where political institutions and 
organizations are very strong and political processes are free. Where these 
processes are closed and where democratic institutions are weak, the social 
force o f Islam, mixed up with political activities, strengthens the forces o f 
conservatism.
What is incontestable is that violence attributed to Islam, rather than being the dictates 
o f  Islamic orthodoxy should be understood as a fallout o f conservatism that is 
engendered in the first instance by authoritarian political systems. It may be safe to 
submit that violence as a strategy is thus a means to an end and does not enjoy any 
primacy that should warrant a philosophy o f sanctioning violence or any pre-eminence 
that would according to Burgat permit the “over-ideologiz(ing)” o f political 
aggression (Langohr, 2001: 594).
Arguing against the criminalization o f Islam and Islamists on the ground o f charges o f 
violent disposition, Burgat (Langohr, 2001:591) notes that “any western political party 
could be turned into Armed Islamic Group in weeks if  it were subjected to the same 
repression Islamists had endured.” This point cannot be emphasized enough given the 
large-scale state-sponsored international violence and persecution against Islam by the 
western world under the leadership o f America, especially after the September 11, 
2001 attacks in the United States.
It is pertinent to note that a recent Gallup survey (2006) in 10 Islamic states, which 
represents more than 80% of the world’s Muslim population, provides sufficient 
evidence to the fact that different Islamic states are inclined to different socio-political 
orientations.
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G rap h  2.1: Gallup survey on Sharia in Islamic States (2006)
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2.9.4: P a rad o x  o f  th e  C om m unity  o f  Islam
At this point one must acknowledge that the Umma has been subjected to criticism. 
Eickelm an & Piscatori (1996: 56) proffered three argum ents against the concept o f  din 
wa-dawla (Islam is both state and religion). Firstly, Eickelm an & Piscatori argue that 
the blend o f  Islam and politics is often exaggerated, as religion is often central to 
peop le’s lives. Eickelman & Piscatori illustrate this by contending that religion is 
interwoven with politics with the Pope’s (Pope John Paul II) political inclinations in 
Poland and in South Africa with Bishop Desm ond T u tu ’s influence in the politics. 
Secondly, Eickelman & Piscatori argue that politics is guided by ‘rational interests’ 
and argum ents supporting Islam and politics are stereotypical in nature. Thirdly, 
Eickelm an & s Piscatori argue that since it is presum ed that Islam incorporates both
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religion and politics and establishes a social structure in society, this assumption 
presumes that everything is assumed to be political. Eickelman & s Piscatori argue 
that all Islamic structures are not political in nature as they overlap with each other.
Now, we come to a central point in understanding the Umma. The Islamic community 
{Umma) plays an integrative role in uniting different cultures and people under the 
same umbrella. But there is still a paradoxical and mystifying issue -  different 
prevailing social conditions either facilitate the Umma or undermine it. Different 
ethno-nationalities can either be a source o f division among Muslims in a state or it 
can facilitate an overarching solidarity among different ethnic identities.
In some contemporary Islamic states, the Umma has failed in uniting different identity 
groups. In states such as Afghanistan there are ethnic contentions between the 
Pashtuns, Tajiks and the Hazara. In Pakistan ethnic conflict exists within the Baluch, 
Sindhis, Punjabi and the Pashtun. In Iran conflict subsists amongst the Kurds, Baluch 
and Azeri, and in Somalia, despite being a homogenous nation-state, the Umma could 
not resolve incessant political conflicts. But, this does not help us in understanding the 
Umma. The interesting questions then are: Why are there different interpretations and 
contradictions in the Ummal In what sense, then, may we understand the Umma?
When the questions are phrased in this way, answers may be found in Fuller’s (2003) 
thoughts, where he notes that the primary explanation for this intractable social 
phenomenon is reflected in the state’s constitution o f Muslims. Thus, the intriguing 
and compelling questions should be: Are such Islamic states sectarian or fragmented 
in composition? In Islamic states such as Pakistan, Iran and Iraq there are sectarian
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divisions between the Shi'as and the Sunnis. These differences have given rise to 
conflicts within the state. This conflict is mainly centred on power struggle and 
resource control. Second, are the Muslims the ethnic minority in a non-Muslim state? 
Where Muslims constitute an ethnic minority within a state, the Umma tends to create 
an overarching solidarity amongst the Muslims. Here, Muslims are associated with a 
religious identity. In this state o f affairs, Islam defines their ethnic identity (for 
example the Tatars in Russia). Third, are there Muslims o f a minority ethnic group 
within a Muslim State? Where such a state exists, there is a tendency o f conflicts 
generating in such a state. Here, Muslims o f the ethnic minority group tend to foster 
for self-determination. The Kurds in Iraq and in Iran are contemporary examples. 
Fourth, are Muslims the majority ethnic group in a state? Where such exists, the 
minorities are excluded from the public sphere o f governance and tend to be 
discriminated against due to their social status o f ‘dhimmis’ (non-Muslims). Finally, 
are Muslims living in a state where there is a converging division on ethnicity and 
religion? Where Muslims are in a state where religion has provided some sort of 
geographical convergence, Islam provides a religious identity to Muslims in such 
state. Typical illustrations of such states are Nigeria and Sudan.
2.9.5: Islam and Dem ocracy: A C onvergence
To a large extent, the ideology that Islam is totally theocratic may be doubtful as the 
Q ur’an does permit its members to protest against the politicization o f Islam as it 
instructs that “their affairs are determined by mutual consultation” (Qur’an 42:38). 
The Q ur’an makes this clear in Chapter 4:58: “Surely Allah commands that you vest 
authority into the hands o f those who are best suited for it.” Again the Qur’an in 
Chapter 4:59 states: “O you who believe, you shall obey GOD, and you shall obey the
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messenger, and those in charge among you. If you dispute in any matter, you shall
refer it to GOD and the messenger, if you do believe in GOD and the Last Day. This is
better for you, and provides you with the best solution.” This excerpt shows that Islam
is not against democratic principles o f governance. Yet, varying degrees o f democratic
principles are practiced in Islamic societies. Some shift towards secular democratic
governments as in the case in Turkey, while some others shift towards religious
nationalism and fundamentalism, such as in Iran (a democratic state) and Saudi-
Arabia (a non-democratic state). As aptly put by Iran’s President Mohammad 
26 •Khatami, "the existing democracies do not necessarily follow one formula or aspect. 
It is possible that democracy may lead to a socialist system. Or it is possible that 
democracy may lead to a liberal system. Or it may be a democracy with the inclusion 
o f religious norms in the government. We have accepted the third option.”
The observation above may have informed Hunter (1998:15) to note that:
During the years immediately following the Iranian revolution, the 
division o f Islam into good and bad versions took on a distinct and ethnic 
and sectarian coloring. Shi’a Islam and Persian traditions o f Iran were said 
to be responsible for the excesses o f its new Islamist ideology...Sunni 
Islam was said to be more democratic and egalitarian.
Similarly, Esposito & Voll (1996:6) caution that Islamic traditions should not be 
viewed in isolation, as Islamic cultures experience different socio-political 
developments. For the purpose o f this discussion “democracy is identified as a 
cornerstone o f western civilization and it is strongly prescribed for the rest o f the 
world and humanity.”27 Western democracy has been argued to be the end o f m an’s
26Esposito and Voll ‘Islam and D em ocracy’, accessed on the 1st o f  N ovem ber 2008 at: 
http: /  /  w w w . n eh .p ov /n ew s/h u m an ities /  2 0 0 1 -1 1 / islam .html
27 Farooq, ‘Islam and Dem ocracy: Perceptions and M isperceptions’, accessed on the 4th o f  N ovem ber, 2008 at:
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evolution and a supreme universalistic ideology since it triumphed over Communism 
during the Cold War (Fukuyama, 1992). It is not surprising that some Islamic 
ideologies consider democracy as antagonistic to Islamic culture.
Another misconception in western literature is the view that Islamic culture is 
homogenous. As pointed out by Esposito & Voll (1998:13) “democratization is the 
demand for empowerment in government and politics made by a growing portion of 
populations around the world.” Yet, Esposito & Voll argue that some Islamic states 
desire democratic governance modeled on Islamic culture as opposed to a westernized 
democratic model. In some societies democratic governance is tolerated. For instance, 
in Turkey there are democratic elections, a liberalized market economy, largely 
modeled on westernization. Other Islamic states such as Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Algeria practice democracy, with Islam as the state religion. But other Islamic 
societies, such as Saudi-Arabia, have an authoritarian regime.
It is important to note that the Qur’an does not specify any theory o f political
governance (Caha, 2003:40). Scholars have argued that Islam as sanctioned by the
28Q ur’an accommodates democratic principles. This is perhaps a truism, as Islam 
allows the popular rule of its citizens as vetoed by the community o f Islam. The 
community o f Islam endorses that all individuals within the community are equal. The 
significant difference is that popular sovereignty lies in the power o f the people but in 
Islam power lies in God. God’s sovereignty has been suggested to mean “expressions 
o f G od’s creative role in the entire universe” (Caha, 2003: 46). Thus Islam curtails the
http: /  /  w w w .g lo h a lw eb p o st.co m /farooc|m /w ritin g s/is la m ic /d em o cra cy  .htiri 
2i! Khan, ‘Islam and D em ocracy’, accessed on the 4th of 
N ovem b er, 2008 at:
http://www.geocities.com/sunrisinginwest/dcmocracy.html
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rights o f the people to demand for that which is contrary to the Q ur’an, Sunnah and 
Sharia law. This in some sense curtails human rights in most Islamic states 
(curtailment o f human rights from a westernized point o f view). One may argue that 
Islam does condone democratic principles o f governance because it is a struggle 
against westernization, but not against modernization (Esposito, 1991:163). However, 
the Islamic injunction that power lies in God, has been used for hegemonic purposes 
and for ethnic and political manipulations. This meaning has been hijacked by 
fundamentalists and the elites/politicians who seek to politicize Islam. This is perhaps 
the reason that informs M anji’s (2004) calls for tolerance and the liberal reformation 
o f Islam.
2.9.6: Jihad and V iolence Nexus
Contrary to claims that Islam is a violent religion, the meaning o f Islam, 
paradoxically, is ‘Peace and Submission.’ Responsible for the association o f Islam 
with the pathology o f violence is the misconstruction and misrepresentation by 
fundamentalist Islamists and some people o f other faiths without the depth to 
understand the true meaning of Jihad as contextualized by the Holy Q ur’an.
While Jihad has been politicized by extremists and the popular western-based media 
as a reproach for violence, Jihad, however, in many quarters means “struggling in the 
way o f God.” It also means ‘striving’; that is, striving with God. The contextualization 
o f Jihad therefore is spiritual rather than military. When divorced o f its spiritual 
content and context and interpreted as a mechanism for mass political mobilization 
Jihad assumes the mantle o f sectarian militancy and becomes a crusade against 
oppression, that is, a fa rd  al-kifaya (a religious communal duty).
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Deployed in the context o f Islamic marginalization, persecution and oppression, and 
as a platform for the defense o f Islam, Jihad becomes a personal religious obligation 
for every Muslim to fight and defend the Umma. A further application o f Jihad is that 
an individual should fight against evil, a fight for justice and a fight against 
adversaries o f Islam. It is in this context that Jihad has been used as an instrument for 
spreading Islam, thus earning its unmerited violence and undemocratic epithet.
As shown above, in the course o f history the term Jihad has been understood to mean 
a ‘Holy W ar.’ This interpretation is not based on sacred texts but on the quest o f man 
to use religion as a tool for acquiring political power. Hence, a section o f Muslims 
have turned Jihad around to inculcate violence as a justification for non-religious 
purposes.
2.9.7: Q ur’an, Peace and V iolence
Concurring with T.W. Arnold, Ling (1968:228) states that “the Qur’an enjoins 
preaching and persuasion and discountenances force in the conversion o f non- 
Muslims, and for this reason the history o f expansion o f Islam is in fact very much 
more a history o f missions than a history o f violence or persecutions.” Again, Ling 
(1968:228) citing T.W. Arnold, further points out that the forced conversion to Islam 
was not a characteristic o f the Arabs early occupation o f Spain. Hence, he argues that 
“the tolerance o f Islam towards Christianity made possible the acquisition o f Spain.” 
Furthermore, to argue that Islam is militant may not be tenable because Christianity in 
the course o f  history has been more militant. The early crusades and European wars, 
such as the thirty-year’s war, illustrate this argument.
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At this point it is expedient to present some theological arguments. As a measure of 
peaceful disposition, Islam has great respect for people’s religious persuasions. The 
Holy Q ur’an 109:6 emphatically states that “To you your religion and to me mine.” 
Another verse in the Holy Qur’an unequivocally states that “You shall have your 
religion and I shall have my religion.” In addition, Q ur’an 2: 256 commands Islamic 
faithful “Let there be no compulsion in religion.” It cannot be over-emphasized that 
Islam is tolerant to other religions and it strives to promote peace amongst people. 
Although Islam, like many other religions, maintains a puritanical aloofness from 
other faiths, like Christianity, Judaism and paganism it requests o f its faithful that 
members o f other faiths should be treated with love as opposed to hostilities. Though 
Islam allows the use o f force in defense o f the religion and the faithful, force must be 
limited to the attack imposed on the Muslim.
While one must bear in mind that most religious crises have been caused by feelings 
o f self-righteousness flowing from denigration o f some religion and religious practices 
as ‘kaferi’ (non-Muslims in northern Nigeria), the Q ur’an 6:108 warns that “And do 
not abuse those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest exceeding the limits they 
should abuse Allah out of ignorance.” To safeguard peace and harmony amongst its 
adherents and those of other faiths even in times o f crisis, the Qur’an 8:61 enjoins 
Muslims that once the enemy inclines towards peaceful resolution, the Muslim is 
obliged to incline towards peace as well: “But if  the enemy incline towards peace, do 
thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is One that heareth and 
knoweth (all things).”
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Obviously, suicide bombing is a loud violation o f the ecclesiastical dictates o f the 
Holy Q ur’an, but this has paradoxically become the defining character o f Islamism 
especially in the Middle East and in particular in Iraq and Palestine. In this regard, the 
Holy Q ur’an 2:195 commands: “And spend your wealth for the cause o f Allah, and 
make not your own hands contribute to your destruction; but do good, for Allah loveth 
those who do good.” If violence with which Islam has come to be associated violates 
Islamic tenets, where then does militant Islam get its cradle from?
Given the totalizing orientation o f Islam, as not just a religion, but a way o f life and its 
disposition for a theocratic order, Islamists within different national borders, even 
where they are not majorities, often strive to engender the convocation o f an Islamic 
order. It is argued that this is as far as it goes. On the contrary to a unifying and 
homogenous dominant Islamic culture o f violence, I argue that the dynamism of 
Islamic political odyssey globally has been highly contingent on situational variables. 
This is informed by prevailing socio-cultural and political conditions. In this context, 
history also plays an important role. I contend that it is an empirically invalid 
generalization to presuppose a universally correct Islamic culture o f violence and anti­
democratic disposition. I argue and demonstrate with textual and empirical evidence 
that the different violence blamed on Islam, rather than being the dictates o f Islamic 
orthodoxy, should be understood as fallout o f conservatism that is engendered in the 
first instance by authoritarian political systems. Furthermore, with extensive reliance 
on the Islamic holy book, the Holy Qur’an, I argue in favour o f the peaceful 
orientation o f Islam and that interpretatively Islam is a religion o f peace.29
29 An illustration o f  this can be seen in the life o f  Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a M uslim Pushtun, in form er India now  in 
Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan m obilized 100 ,000  nonviolent Muslim soldiers w ho through patience and non violent 
action w ere one o f  the factors instrumental to achieving India’s independence. See M oham m ed Abu N im er, 
"Nonviolence in the Islamic C ontext. Accessed on the 4  of August, 2007  at:
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It is argues that global Islamic violence, rather than being inherently Islamic, is a 
function o f the dialectic o f resistance and repression that privilege the oppressive and 
exploitative relations between Islam and the new global imperialist power with the 
logic o f transnational capital accumulation from the oil-rich Arab peninsula in the 
Middle East. In concurrence, Bienin & Stork (1997:10) perceptively argue that 
important Islamic movements now are revolutionary movements that challenge 
political regimes that have served western interests.
2.10: C onclusion
Altogether, then, little scholarly attempts has been made in seeking an enquiry into the 
peace dynamics o f Islam. This is the gap this thesis intends to fill. In responding to 
these gaps in the scholarly literature, the significance o f this thesis is that it seeks to 
account for the internal dynamics and tensions within a civilization in a non-western 
society (northern Nigeria). It sheds light on how religion has assumed a centre stage in 
defining individual identity in various non-western societies and it supplements the 
conspicuously parochial literature on the peace dynamics o f Islam in a deeply divided 
society.
A striking observation is that it is only relatively recently that there has been some 
recognition o f the peace dynamics o f religion between different groups. In this light, 
Clark (1990) rightly points out the bonding potentials o f religion, especially the 
capacity o f Islam to create solidarity among groups. Clark notes that people desire to
h t t p : / /w w w  fo rn sa .o rp /fe llow sh ip /sep t-oc t-04 /ab u -n im er.h tm l. See also Johansen, Robert, C ., 1997. Radical 
Islam and N onviolence: A Case Study o f  Religious Em pow erm ent and Constraint am ong Pashtuns, Journal o f  Peace 
Research, 34 (1): 53 -71 .
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belong to social structures and are opposed to conflict. Clark argues that in this regard 
(Clark, 1990:51):
The major religions o f the world, o f course, come first to mind. It is no 
accident that they arose in parallel with the earliest civilizations, largely to 
ameliorate some o f their worst excesses, and even today they represent 
important sources of sacred social meaning for tens o f millions o f people.
Islam is perhaps the chief contemporary example.
From the above discussion, there is a need for a sympathetic understanding and 
analysis o f the Islamic within civilizations such as northern Nigeria. Therefore, it is in 
order that the next chapter discusses political Islam in the northern part o f Nigeria.
133
CHAPTER 3
EXPLAINING POLITICAL ISLAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
In classical Islam there was no distinction between Church and State. In 
Christendom the existence of two authorities goes back to the founder, 
who enjoined his followers to render unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar’s and to God the things which are G od’s...In  pre-westemized 
Islam, there were not two powers but one, and the question o f separation, 
therefore, could not arise
Bernard Lewis (1988:2)30
3.1: Introduction
Political Islam in northern Nigeria has performed both functional and dysfunctional 
roles in nation building. It performs a functional role by bridging the gap between 
individuals divided on ethnicity and dysfunctional as it acts as counter force for inter­
religious harmony. It is a source for peace and a source for conflict. Another crucial 
dysfunctional role is that Islam in northern Nigeria has tendency to be manipulated by 
political elites seeking political capital for personal and group interests. This is 
perhaps one o f the many reasons why Tamuno (1970:564) states that it is “easier to 
establish the Nigerian state than to nourish the Nigerian nation.” It is important to 
stress that, at the same time, Islam has succeeded in uniting different ethnic groups 
under a system o f religious nationalism.
This chapter attempts to answer the intriguing question: Is Islam a positive or a 
negative force in northern Nigeria? It also seeks to explore the role o f Islam in 
northern Nigeria and its political system. The objective here is to profile, critically
50 Lew is, Bernard, 1988. T h e  P o l i t i c a l  Language o f  Islam . University o f Chicago Press.
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analyze and explain the interface between politics and Islam in conditioning the 
power struggles, crisis and conflicts among different political gladiators in 
northern Nigeria in particular and, by extension, in Nigeria in general, given the 
centrality o f the north to Nigerian politics.
3.2: Im pact o f  Islam ic C ivilization in N orthern Nigeria
Clearly in some ways there exists an international context favourable to the 
politicization o f Islam that was influential to the Islamization process in northern 
Nigeria. As noted by Olivier Roy (Pipes 1995), the process o f transforming Islam into 
a political ideology was rooted in the assumption by Islamic fundamentalists that the 
western scientific-technical advancement can be explained by its western ideologies. 
To advance and develop technology, the fundamentalists wanted to establish Islam as 
an ideology to draw a parallel level with western technology without losing its Islamic 
identify. Against this background, political Islam may be seen as an ideology o f 
power. Thus, Islam provides a broader geographic political culture and the foundation 
for a national identity for northern Nigeria.
It is here that the creation of religious hierarchies was a condition that not only 
engendered the politicization o f Islam but also set a standard for its manipulation for 
political advantages. As Detlev Khalid (Pipes, 1995) notes, concerning Saudi Arabia, 
a number o f religious appointments has transpired whose posts were previously 
absent, like the Secretary of the Muslim World League, the Secretary-General o f the 
Islamic Conference and the Rector of Islamic University in Medina. Khalid also notes 
that for the first time in history, the Imam o f the K a’ba was sent on tour on 
international tours as a priestly envoy.
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It is certainly true, as Pipes (1995) observes that the expansion o f Islam’s scope on 
politics and the decline o f secular law marked the beginning o f an Islamic political 
agenda, especially in the twentieth century, and it marked the consummation o f the 
marriage between politics and Islam. To Pipes, Islam is seen less as the structure in 
which individuals make their lives, but more as a creed for regulating societies so that 
for fundamentalists, Islam represents the path to power. He further argues that Islam is 
another ideology -  like capitalism, socialism and communism.
3.3: C ontextualizing Islam in Northern Nigeria
Religion plays an important role in the day-to-day existential conditions o f the average 
African. It is imperative to note that African culture, including the political sphere o f 
existence, is mainly based on religion. Crutcher (1966:436) writes that the traditional 
African notions o f reality are essentially religious in nature and the most developed 
African organizations are based in the existence o f a monarchical state. Crutcher 
further notes that the monarch’s authority lies in his intermediary position among the 
society as a whole and the ancestral and divine powers, through which he regularly 
secures and establishes the welfare of his people and the regulation o f society.
Crutcher (1966:437) argues that Africans traditionally experienced celestial and divine 
understanding primarily as a manifestation o f authority and effectiveness. The 
politicization o f religion, in particular the Islamization o f politics in what has become 
known as political Islam in northern Nigeria, makes sense in the context o f the 
important place Africans generally accord religion in the ordering o f interpersonal and 
social affairs. Any attempt to understand the social construction o f African life,
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politics inclusive, which fails to take into account the religious context, is bound to be 
very fruitless and deficient.
In northern Nigeria, Islam is the foundation o f political power. Therefore, the 
perceived proximity to the religion is highly advantageous in power contestation. 
According to Kukah (1993: x), “The tripodal structure o f power in northern Nigeria 
which is rooted in the Islamic world is ‘the fear o f God, being a Bawan Allah (God’s 
servant), trust in Ikon Allah (the will o f God).’” As he further observes, Islam 
w as...the foundation on which the authority o f the Caliphate rested (Kukah, 1993:13). 
As explored in Chapter 1, the political currency and utility to which Islam is put in the 
north can only be matched and understood in the context o f the instrumentalization of 
ethnicity in the southern part o f the country. Islam in the north and ethnicity in the 
south serve the objective of the different factions o f the Nigerian ruling elite that are 
rooted in the regional geography o f the country and to help to gain the upper hand in 
the power struggle and control o f the instrumentalities o f state power.
Perhaps the image o f a united and homogeneous northern Nigeria is more o f a 
political project rather than an act o f history as previously argued. There exists serious 
fragmentation and contestations amongst northern Islamists for position, prestige and 
power. The ruling class of northern Nigeria, the “ ...M asu Sarauta, were generally 
descendants o f the founders o f the Sokoto Caliphate and, like them, were Sufi 
Muslims who belonged to the Qadiriya brotherhood” (Reynolds, 2001:601). There 
were other minor Islamic sects, like the Mahdi and Sanusiyya, which co-existed with 
the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. The colonial authority in its politicization
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o f religion deliberately embarked on policies that privileged the Sarauta against other 
Islamic faithfuls which had been antagonistic to British imperialism.
3.4: Islam as an Element in Northern Nigeria
Given its political context, religion is a dominant element in both international and 
domestic politics. Fox (2001a) identifies three important characteristics o f what role 
religion plays in international and local politics. Firstly, foreign policies are based on 
religious views. Secondly, religion acts as a source for criticizing government 
decisions both internationally and locally. Thirdly, religious conflicts usually affect 
both local and international attention. Nations with religious identities have emerged 
in recent times and have been based on religious ethno-nationalism. This perhaps 
explains that states such as Nigeria, Iran, India, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Israel and 
Palestine are all interwoven with religious ethno-nationalism.
The relation between religion and politics or between religion and perceptions o f the 
state is rooted in history (Ellis & Flaar, 1998:188). In non-western societies, religion 
tends to have the capacity to be used as a political instrument. Islam plays this 
dominant role in some non-western societies because it is the building block of most 
societies. Therefore, it could be argued that the unification o f ethnic identities under 
one umbrella (religion) is a positive role o f Islam. For argument sake, supposing that 
the various ethnic identities (about 250) in the north o f Nigeria, by an act o f history, 
based their identities on ethnicity, as opposed to religion, this would have given rise to 
a plurality o f group formations within the region, which may have generated multiple 
ethnic conflicts. Thus, one may agree with Sani’s (2007: 41) observation: “This 
phenomenon unlike the Muslims of the northern states is informed partly by the fact
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that the Christians in the northern states had no historical foundation in terms o f 
seeing themselves as one big and inseparable family.”
Religion, especially Islam in non-western societies, is sometimes used as a salient 
economic tool o f control. “Psychologically the infusion o f faith into the public domain 
often functions to control thinking and stifle debate” (Spilka et al., 2003: 201). Here, it 
could be argued that religion could be used as a tool o f control over people. In the 
light o f this, Sanusi31 portrays the life in northern Nigeria by saying:
The poor peasant farmer in Zaria, condemned to life-long penury by 
the circumstances o f his birth, the inadequacy o f his education and the 
deprived state o f his general existence, feels a stronger bond with and 
affinity for his rich, capitalist Emir than his fellow farmer in W usasa...
In this sense, religion may be used to manipulate people to the wishes 
and whims o f the elites.
It is important to reiterate that in a non-western society, especially where religion 
happens to be a strong primordial identity marker, the perception o f religion is 
conceived with fear -  the fear o f the unknown. Hobbes (Mukerjee, 1929:11) notes that 
“the fear o f things invisible is the natural seed o f religion.” Man in his primordial 
nature is in awe o f nature because he lacks a scientific understanding about nature 
itself. This inability to explain natural phenomenon produced fear and the attachment 
o f the individual to religion. Religion was a reasoned force for every unexplained 
event. Religion was considered the “guardian o f order” (Ward, 1898:186). In this 
context, religion as an identity marker in a non-western society does not admit any 
form o f religious tolerance. The debate here is useful in understanding that the 
ambivalent relationship between Islam and the socio-political culture in northern
!l ‘R eligion, the Cabinet and a Political Econom y o f the ‘N orth ” , accessed at: 
http: /  /  w w w .n igerd eltacon p ress .com /rarticles/relig ion  1 .htm
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Nigeria is that religion may be used as a force for functional and dysfunctional 
purposes.
3.5: Integrative R ole o f  Islam in Northern Nigeria
Osaghae (1998b) provides a useful explanation and classification o f the constitution of 
identity groups in northern Nigeria. Osaghae explains that, northern Nigeria consists 
o f three culturally distinct components. Firstly the ‘Hausa-Fulani axis’ (Fulani 
Caliphate), that is those ethnic groups under the Fulani Empire which was founded by 
Uthman dan Fodio in 1804 through a Jihad. Secondly, the ‘Bomo (Kanuri) axis’ and 
thirdly the minority ethnic groups mainly located within the Middle Belt o f northern 
Nigeria. However, Osaghae notes that, the significant cultural group is the Fulani 
Caliphate, which has merged with the Hausa tribes. It is worthy to note that the 
Hausa-Fulani has been the curator o f Islam in the region. The Hausa-Fulani has been 
merged and assimilated into the same ethnic group. Ethnic assimilation is 
multidimensional and interactive, involving a process o f boarder reduction between 
the ethnic groups (Yinger, 1985:154).
The political advantage of majority vote and majority does not exist in the Muslim 
north, as ethnic groups professing Islam are unified under a common religion and 
identity. This provides a political unity o f all Muslims in northern Nigeria. The 
minorities in northern Nigeria are religious minorities as opposed to ethnic minorities 
in southern Nigeria. This unity is provided by the community o f Islam, where 
identical and equal membership in the community was bestowed on conquered people 
(ethnic minorities).
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The ‘Bomo (Kanuri) axis’ is centered on the Kanem-Bomu Empire (1396-1893). The 
Kanuri are a minority group and are separate and distinct from the Hausa-Fulani axis 
as they were under a separate political structure o f the old Kanem-Bomu Empire. The 
‘Kanem-Bornu axis’, the ‘oldest continuous Islamic state in Africa’ is not considered 
as a political minority, due to the fact that they are a seemingly similar cultural group 
with the Hausa-Fulani by being rooted in Islam and Sharia, long before the advent o f 
the British colonialists. The Kanuri people, known by the Hausa, as Beriberi, have 
adopted the Hausa language and culture. Despite this, it is interesting to note that the 
Kanem-Bornu axis have an alliance and strong solidarity with the Sokoto Caliphate, 
based on an overarching trans-ethnic identity provided by Islam.
The Middle-Belt Minorities (non-Muslims) and other non-Muslims living in the core 
northern Nigeria are considered a political minority. It is pertinent to note here that 
Islam in northern Nigeria unites ethnic identities, but builds boundaries between other 
faiths. Thus, in the exercise o f democratic values these ‘undersized’ or minority ethnic 
groups do not have the political prospects o f prevailing in democratic elections 
because they cannot achieve majority vote. In the practice o f true democracy, majority 
rule in perpetuity is not conceived as majority rule (Horowitz, 1985:86). The 
positioning o f this group as a political minority has generated conflicts with the 
Muslim groups. Historically, this group has attempted to resist the powerful Fulani- 
Hausa hegemony.
3.6: A C ritique o f  the Uthm an Dan Fodio Jihad
The perceptive analysis o f the Jihad reveals its political character, as it was primarily 
aimed at taking over the control of governance and reforming the state machinery
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under the banner o f Islam. This is especially so, given the precipitous nature o f inter- 
birni conflicts, which provided the “immediate background for the Jihad o f Uthman 
dan Fodio and the establishment o f the Sokoto Caliphate” (Shenton, 1986:3). The 
Jihad o f Uthman dan Fodio o f 1804 was far from being aimed at the elimination o f the 
remaining pockets of animists. On the contrary according to Kenny (1996:339), the 
Uthman dan Fodio 1804 Jihad in Hausa land “ ...w as not aiming so much at the 
conversion o f pagans as at the reform o f lax Muslims.” The need to fight corruption 
and end authoritarian governance o f the Sarakunas32 was, according to Ibrahim 
(1991:120), accountable for the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. The Jihad can be 
understood as a coup d ’etat against the Hausa kingdoms and the establishment o f a 
new economic and political kingdom.
A more subtle realization o f the principle o f Uthman dan Fodio’s Jihad, the tenet of 
brotherhood and the welfare, the class distinction and political race in reaction to the 
developmental and democratic trend in the country, is brigandage in the pursuit o f 
wealth. Wealth has assumed economic monsterism with which the cikin fada  (Muslim 
commoner class) attempts to challenge the authority o f the cikin gida (palace clique). 
Recognition and endorsement of the ruling class is ‘purchased’ with the acquisition 
and certification o f the people. Clearly recognizing that the ‘right’ to the Islamic 
collegiate and opinion was already founded by Uthman dan Fodio’s example -  which 
can challenge the religious adherence o f the rulers. This ideology led to the militancy 
o f the teacher and cleric -  Maitatsine in the 1980s and the Boko Haram Jihad o f 2009. 
These militant gestures are intertwined with political undertones.
32 The structure o f  the Emirate system  in Northern Nigeria consisted o f  the Sarakuna, (otherw ise known as the 
rulers sons o f  the Emirs, m em bers o f the royal family and other notable indigenes). It also consisted o f  the 
Talakawa, (otherw ise known as the com m oners). Thus, it affirmed that the Marxist form o f  class struggle had its 
foundation in the Fulani Jihad.
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The setting-up o f the Sokoto Caliphate by Uthman dan Fodio after the conquest o f the 
Hausaland was in conformity with an over-arching political agenda and imperative. 
As Bako (n.d:8) suggests “this Jihadist movement did not only reform and purify 
Islam, but it also erected a reformed and bigger Islamic polity called the Sokoto 
caliphate, which survived between 1803 and 1903, until it was conquered by the 
British colonial forces.” Shenton (1986:4) concludes that although the Jihad was 
justified in religious language, it was mainly concerned with the relationship o f ruler 
to those that were ruled and royalty demanded from commoners. In the light of this, 
Waldman (1965:334) argues that Uthman dan Fodio changed his goals and demanded 
for political overthrow o f the Flausa system instead o f its reform. The appeal o f his 
movement widened such that it constituted all o f those who had an interest in a change 
o f rulers for Hausa land. It is incontestable that, in terms o f objective, political rather 
than religious goals clearly conditioned the Jihad. Islam has historically been 
politicized in the affairs of northern Nigeria.
Although the Fulani conquest o f Hausa land was legitimized by the Fulani under the 
umbrella o f “the backsliding, syncretistic nature o f Hausa Islam” (Paden, 1973:45), 
what can be deduced from the above explication is that the Islamic project in Nigeria, 
by virtue o f the Uthman dan Fodio’s Jihad, is political and its objective transcends 
mere ecclesiastic goals. It was in this context that northern political Islam was bom.
Implicit, and most times explicit, apart from being descendants and flag bearers of 
Uthman dan Fodio, the Emirs in northern Nigeria are representatives o f the Islamic 
order. The period o f colonial rule in Nigeria not only promoted the influence o f the 
Emirs in the political affairs of the state, as earlier mentioned, it excessively protected
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the north and Islam from the missionary activities o f non-Muslims. The autocratic rule 
o f northern Emirs under colonial rule was possible given the importance and the 
position o f the Emirs not only as descendants o f Uthman dan Fodio but also their 
religious significance. Consequently, religion and religious positions were exploited 
by the Emirs for political advantages. Paden (2008:27) rightly notes that “the key to 
understanding Islam in Nigeria is to recognize the central place o f the Sokoto 
Caliphate, which serves as a frame work or model even today.” The system of 
‘Indirect Rule’ appointed the Emirs from the Hausa-Fulani ethnie to govern the 
minority ethnic groups. The Emirs were sequentially guaranteed the right to political 
rule as long as they conceded to the demands o f the British. This systematically 
enabled the Hausa-Fulani ethnie to form and gain a political advantage over political 
minority groups and set the causal link for political rivalry between Muslims and non- 
Muslims in the region.
3.7: The R ole o f  the British in Islamic Identity  Formation in N orthern  
Nigeria
The Sokoto Caliphate was conquered by the British on March 15, 1903. Although the 
Caliphate was overthrown, the same method o f authority and administration by the 
Caliphate and Emirs (who were known as Native Authorities) were still in place. This 
system o f governance became known as ‘indirect rule.’ This structure o f governance 
is similar to the present-day class systems o f governance in northern Nigeria. The 
ruling classes are known as the ‘Masu Sarauta’ (possessors o f governance); the 
descendants o f ‘Uthman dan Fodio and the common people or the peasants known as 
the ‘Talakawa.’33 The Sokoto Caliphate gained prominence through indirect rule and,
33 The Talakawa in Hausa connotes the grass-root people/peasants
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after independence, merged into party politics under the umbrella o f the Northern 
People’s Congress (NPC).34
The indirect rule form o f governance allowed the traditional Muslim rulers to rule as 
stooges o f the British imperialists. This system o f governance systematically 
established the ruling class as powerful elites and succeeded in “keeping Africans as 
far as possible in rural areas under their own traditional rulers” (Bayart, 1999:5). On 
the other hand, indirect rule may be seen in the context o f an Islamic reaction to the 
colonialists. Heussler (1968:173) notes that in 1900s the organization o f Islam had 
provided northern Nigeria with an advantage over tribal societies and its antecedent 
anarchy in the South o f Nigeria. The British, aware o f the overwhelming Islamic 
identity in northern Nigeria, had encountered difficulties in enforcing direct rule, 
illustrated by the constant warring between the British and the Hausa-Fulani and the
35minority tribes in the Middle Belt.
With the privileged access to power given to the Emirs, who personify Islamic 
rudimentary theocracy, the British policy o f indirect rule set the context for the 
modem politicization of Islam and the Islamization o f politics in the north. Under the 
indirect rule system, the Emirs were in political and economic control o f the Native 
Authority system, with responsibility to report to the colonial administration. The 
Chiefs functioned as modem ‘local government chairmen’ with very wide and 
excessive powers in their areas o f jurisdiction. As Miles (1987:241-2) argues, “ ...
34 Interestingly, the N PC  was founded in Zaria, Kaduna State by a northern Christian; Dr R. B. D ikko, w ho is the 
first N orthern medical doctor. The NPC was established as a cultural society. H ow ever, it was later hijacked from  
its cultural objectives and re-established as a political party with Sir Ahmadu Bello becom ing its president. O ne 
could  argue that the NPC was hijacked from its socio-cultural function and given the status o f  a political-religious 
party.
35 A notable battle w orthy to m ention is the popular reaction by Attahiru Ahmadu I. In the w ords o f  Frederick D. 
Lugard (1 9 0 4 :2 7 ) “a m ost sanguinary battle ensued, in which the tow n (Burmi) was captured, and the ex-sultan . . .  
with som e seven hundred ol the Burmi fanatics w e ic  killed.
145
chiefly pre-eminence was not restricted to local politics. Central bureaucracies as well 
as subordinate countries were heavily staffed and controlled by members o f the ruling 
dynasty.” Tibenderana (1988:86) argues that the Sultan was ineffective and a mere 
salaried agent o f the British, who ruled in name only. One may concede that the 
British pulled the wool over the eyes o f the northerners by making them believe that 
the Sultan was their ruler.
To a great extent, the British policy o f ‘divide and rule’ was a crucial factor in 
politicizing Islam in northern Nigeria. British politicization of religion during colonial 
rule took two dimensions. First was the protection o f Islam by the prevention of 
Christian missionary activities in the north. Second was the deliberate policy of 
privileging the Qadiriya brotherhood against the other competing Islamic sects in the 
north. As Reynolds (2001:601), notes that what was to be defined as a threat to ‘good 
order’ was any religious ideology that that was contrary to the tenets o f the Masu 
Sarauta. Through the use o f Indirect Rule the British were required to be 
accommodative towards the Caliphate and to curb those who were perceived to 
threaten the ‘good order.’ The British assisted with the politicization process o f Islam 
in northern Nigeria because the system o f indirect rule granted the Sokoto Caliphate 
powers over the vast region of the north. As noted by Sir Ahmadu Bello (1962:19), 
“ ...the British were the instrument o f destiny and were fulfilling the will of God.”
The romance o f the colonial authority with the Islamic ruling class, according to 
Reynolds (2001), follows from historical experience in India and Egypt. According to 
Reynolds, the British knew that Islam could not be considered as an insignificant 
element in the wake of their decades of experience with Islam in India and Egypt.
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They were conscious that political authority o f a government in a Muslim region was 
closely connected to the popular perception o f the rulers as pious Muslims (2001:604). 
Reynolds (2001:604) explains that to become legitimate, a Muslim government needs 
to uphold Islamic law and allow Muslims to have the freedom to practice the demands 
o f their religion. The colonial power consequently used the policy o f non-interference 
with Islam to legitimize their rule. It is interesting to note that Islam was regarded as a 
symbol o f traditional religion by the colonialists. In northern Nigeria, Islam had 
obtained a firm foundation and resisted Christianity from the colonialists and the 
missionaries. In order to achieve the unperturbed acquisition o f northern Nigeria and 
understand that Islam was the first identity o f its natives, the colonialists and the 
missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in the region (Haynes, 1998:106). As 
Reynolds (2001:605) further notes, the British used propaganda to present themselves 
as surrogate Muslims.
It is then safe to say that the indirect rule system introduced in northern Nigeria, 
coupled with the associated privileges and powers o f the Emirs and members of the 
northern ruling class, was the primacy o f political power and the centrality o f Islamic 
ideology as a platform for seeking, capturing, defending and retaining political power, 
especially given the socio-economic advantages that tagged along with it. The 
Caliphate was reconstituted in a well-organized administrative division. Sharia law 
was instituted by the Islamic courts and the status o f the Sultan was revered in the 
region. The general acceptance o f Islam in northern Nigeria by the Hausa and other 
pagan tribes was due to the ‘political prestige’ o f Britain’s support o f the authority of 
the Sokoto Caliphate (Yeld, 1960:113).
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3.8: P oliticization  o f  Islam in Northern Nigeria
This section explores how Islam has been politicized in northern Nigeria in particular 
and Nigeria in general. This section examines the utility o f Islam as a tool for popular 
political mobilization and the rationalization o f the status-quo in northern Nigeria. 
The essence o f this concern is to analytically determine the place and position of 
Islam in the socio-political society in northern Nigeria.
3.8.1: P oliticization  o f  Islam under the 1st R epublic (1960-1966)
In many ways Islam took a new dimension during the Islamization agenda o f Ahmadu 
Bello. Ahmadu Bello was a charismatic leader who engineered the popularity o f the 
Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) through Islam, by using propaganda that the NPC 
represents the consensus o f the society (Ijma) and not accepting the NPC amounts to 
‘B id’a ’ (a rebel from the community) (Dudley, 1968:143). The use o f Islam under 
colonial rule only became possible because o f the mutual reinforcing tendencies of 
both Islam and politics. Dickson36 notes that in exchange for British support, Ahmadu 
Bello insisted on the teaching and practice o f Islam in this region. Traditional Islamic 
clans coalesced into a northern party that effectively excluded westernized 
intellectuals and secularized non-Muslims.
The politicization o f Islam during the Nigerian First Republic attained it zenith in the 
policy o f Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, to Islamize Nigeria. According to 
John Paden, between 1963-1964 Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region, 
in his drive to achieve the Islamization project, also embarked on “conversion 
campaigns among the animists of the Middle Belt area and the Maguzawa, who are
56 D ickson David. ‘Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The N eed  for a N ew  Research and D iplom atic Agenda’, 
accessed on the 30th o f  N ovem ber, 2008 at: http: /  /  w w  w . usip. o r g / pubs /  special reports /s r  140, pdf.
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non-Muslims Hausa, and hoped to extend these campaigns to other areas o f Nigeria” 
(Hunwick, 1992:148).
Sir Ahmadu Bello engaged in Islamic missionary tours throughout northern Nigeria. 
The tours were intended to convert the minority ethnic groups to Islam. According to 
J.D. Hargreaves, during the 1964 missionary tour an estimated 100,000 people in 
Zaria and Niger converted to Islam (Clarke, 1982:222). Hunwick (1996:239) notes 
that an African leader who played a significant role in the institution o f this first new 
pan-Islamic body was the Sardauna o f Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (d. 1966), 
Premier o f the Northern Region o f Nigeria, and who was a prominent man in 
international Muslim diplomacy in the years following Nigerian independence. He 
was also actively promoting the cause of Islam within his own region o f Nigeria. The 
unity o f the north perhaps provoked some degree o f envy in the political leaders o f the 
west and eastern region. It was in this spirit that Ahmadu Bello said to Chief
*37Awolowo and Dr Azikiwe, “Don’t envy the unity o f the north but worry about the 
division in the south so that we can have a united south and a united north in a united 
Nigeria.”
Perhaps the most important achievement o f Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello was the
d o
founding o f an Islamic civil society, the Jama ’atu Nasr Islam (JNI) ‘the Society for 
Victory o f Islam’, which united the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. Equally 
important is that the JNI was and still is an umbrella for all Muslims in northern 
seeking to advance political, social and economic interests o f co-religionists in
37‘N as, W ada. ‘Sardauna: Political Legacies and Contemporary Politics’, accessed on O ctober 10, 2008 at: 
h ttp : //d a w o d u .c o m /n a s l  .h tm .
38 Jama’a m eaning com m unity or people is similar to the U m m a, the C om m unity o f  Islam.
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northern Nigeria.39 Sir Ahmadu Bello used the tool o f religion to legitimate most of 
his political agenda and rapid Islamization o f northern Nigeria, as religion had the 
persuasive capability to legitimize policies that politicians find impossible to 
implement. In 1962, Ahmadu Bello established the Jam a'atu Islam (Group for the 
Victory o f Islam) on the advice o f Abubakar Gunmi, the Grand Khadi o f northern 
Nigeria40was a political strategy o f gaining control o f popular consciousness 
(Hunwickl992: 151). The Jama'atu Nasil Islam , according to Kenny (1996:345), was 
a project to “harmonize Muslims representing a common voice in Nigeria and taking 
the mantle as the representation of all Muslims in the country.” As Kenny (1996:345) 
further notes, the organization was to serve as a channel o f contact with the 
government o f Nigeria on Islamic affairs and as the only channel o f  contact on Islamic 
matters. This is considered a social-political organization, made up o f the emirs, chiefs 
and the elites. The height of this attempt at politicization o f Islam is noted by the 
words o f Sir Ahmadu Bello,41 when he said:
This New Nation called Nigeria should be an estate o f our great 
grandfather, Uthman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of 
power. We use the minorities in the North as willing tools, and the South, 
as conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us, and never 
allow them to have control over their future.
The NPC was only open for members o f the northern region (both Muslims and non- 
Muslims). Southerners were excluded from membership. Thus the motto o f NPC was: 
‘One North, One People, Irrespective o f Religion, Rank or Tribe.’ In order to assert 
that the party is based on Islamic predisposition, the colour o f the party flag was green
i9 A similar political association, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) founded on March 7 , 2001 is a proactive 
N orthern political organization, how ever, it has not encapsulated all Northern M uslims under one umbrella.
4(1 H unw ick, in Charles E. Butterworth & I. W illiam Zartman, Ed, 1992: 151.
41 O yeyem i Remi: ‘The Northern Agenda: Reason for Political Liberation o f  N igeria’, accessed on the 7 lh o f  
January 2 0 0 8 -0 1 -0 8  at:
http://niperiaworld.com/columni.st/oyeyemi/102402.html,..
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the colour-symbol o f Islam. One may safely suggest that the politics in northern 
Nigeria in the First Republic could be regarded as religious.
The formation o f NPC in the march towards Nigeria to independence using Islamic 
ideographic contents is all part of the construction o f a hegemonic political 
architecture. According to Falola (1998:44), “The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) 
succeeded in building a strong party, solely limited to the north and united by Islam 
under Sardauna Alhaji Ahmadu Bello.” It goes without saying that the new leaders of 
modem Hausa societies are inheritors o f the religious legitimacy based on Islam and 
enjoyed by the emirs within the modern political order.
Paradoxically, the Mallam Aminu Kano42 led Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), a radical and anti-conservative political party o f northern Muslims, was 
similarly excluded from pow er- that anti-status quo parties and elements in the north 
are often excluded from power just like people from other religion in the north based 
on their perceived non-Islamic orthodoxy. This is not to suggest that Aminu Kano’s 
NEPU never profited from the Islamic currency in its politics. According to Whitaker 
(1967), NEPU despite its radical and anti-establishment stances employed religion in 
its ‘appeal and propaganda.’43
The strategy o f the NPC for gaining political currency involved the use o f 
“ ...traditional Hausa norms of barautaka (clientage)... to cultivate the support o f the
42 C om m enting on the radical politicization o f Islam by Aminu Kano, Paden, (19 8 1 :2 7 ) notes: “The political 
thought o f  Aminu Kano is firmly rooted in Islamic tradition but interprets that tradition to repose all trust in the 
ordinary citizens o f  the com m unity rather than in elites or traditional rulers. The principles o f  “equality before the 
law ” “redistribution o f  w ealth”’ and “progress and education” are all argued in term s o f  the moral tradition o f  the 
Sokoto C aliphate.”
43 This is illustrated by the fact that Malam Aminu Kano was one o f  the tw elve Northern delegates w ho advocated  
for Sharia in the 1979 C onstitution, and one o f those w ho boycotted  the Constitutional proceedings on April 6, 
1978.
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talakawa (commoners): Patronage, economic security and protection (were) 
exchanged for personal loyalty and obedience” (Miles, 1987:242). For Mallam Aminu 
Kano and his NEPU political party, Islam is in support o f the empowerment o f the 
people as against the prevailing cases o f mass poverty, diseases, injustices, 
unemployment, human rights violation and backwardness.
The NEPU leadership in the l sl Republic politics was drawn predominantly from the 
Tijanniya Islamic movement. According to Sabo Bako, (n.d:9) the Tijaniyya reformist 
movement popularized Islam among the grass-roots people by turning it into a power 
ideology for resisting oppression and also provided the movement as a tool against 
colonialism and northern feudalist hierarchy. He further notes that the Tijanniya 
movement contributed to the materialization of left wing politics through the NEPU, 
which popularized grass-root radicalism in West Africa. The Qadiriyya was linked 
with the NPC whilst the Tijanniya was closely linked with the NEPU and several 
clashes between the two movements were held in the past prior to independence. 
Before independence, NPC became the northern region party for the Nigerian 
election. The north rallied around the party, which provided its landslide victory in the 
federal elections. The party rivalry was suppressed, NEPU became localized mainly in 
Kano and by 1966 the separation between religion and politics in the north had 
completely vanished (Reynolds, 1999:194).
Despite the vast importance given to the identity o f ethnicity in northern Nigeria, as 
earlier explored in Chapter 1, it was difficult, if not impossible, for rallying the 
northerners under such identity, due to the vast amount o f ethnic groups and 
communities in the region. Islam had an appeal o f unity to bring these groups under
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one umbrella. Other political associations, such as the non-Muslim League o f 
Northern Nigeria (NML) founded in 1949 under the leadership o f Pastor David 
Obadiah Vrengkat Lot, were formed to counter the Islamic agenda o f the NPC. This 
attempt was met with failure due to its confinement to indigenes o f the Middle belt, 
which consisted o f diverse ethnic groups and also the NML lacked a definitive 
political strategy. Other political associations that tried to proceed with the objectives 
o f the NML were the Middle Zone League,44 established in 1950, and the United 
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).
Despite the political divisions between NPC and NEPU, and UMBC on the other 
hand, there was an absence o f serious disagreements on issues o f northern unity and 
solidarity. These structures were deeply rooted in the united interest o f northern unity. 
Through the charismatic efforts o f Sir Ahmadu Bello, the NPC used religion to 
facilitate an overarching solidarity among people o f the north, who were divided by 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. This sentiment provided an overwhelming 
appeal for northerners to remain a people and a nation -  ‘One north, one people.’
During the First Republic, power struggle was centered on the three dominant ethnic 
based regions: North (NPC), west (AG) and the east (NCNC). The regional-based 
nature o f the politics o f the First Republic was exemplified in the decision o f the 
“leaders o f the parties [NPC-NCNC) in coalition to remain in their regional seats of 
government” (Ekekwe, 1986:75), therefore, effectively promoting the Islamization of 
politics in the north.
44 Its leader Pastor Vrengkat Lot was elected  to the House o f  Representatives in 1951.
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3.8.1.1: The 1st M ilitary Coup (January 15, 1966)
The military intervened in Nigerian politics in the January 1966 coup. The coup was 
engineered by junior officers o f the Army, led by Major C.K. Nzeogwu. The officers 
were mainly from the Igbo ethnic group.45 Moreover, no political leaders from the 
East (Igbos) were killed in the coup. Despite the political “coalition o f convenience” 
(Horowitz, 1985:372) of 1959-1964 o f the northern political parties, the NPC and its 
eastern counterpart the NCNC, there were political agitations between the Hausa- 
Fulani ethnie and the Igbo ethnic group, who dominated the eastern region o f Nigeria. 
The coup had both ethnic and religious undertones as among those who were killed 
were mainly Muslims o f the Hausa-Fulani ethnie, which included Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, and the Premier o f the Northern Region, (the 
Sultan o f Sokoto) Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello.
The assassination o f the Sultan was considered an attack against the Islamic and 
political establishment in the north. Schacht (1957:125) aptly captures the political 
and religious significance of the Sultan:
The Fulanis did not succeed in conquering the state o f Bomu, and the 
rulers o f Bomu (Shehu = Shaykh), descendants o f Muhammad al-Amin al- 
Kanemi, have always considered themselves the equals o f the Fulani 
Sultans; nevertheless, a rigorist member o f the Council o f the Shehu did 
not hesitate to call the Sultan of Sokoto the spiritual head o f all Muslims in 
northern Nigeria.
The passage above sheds light on and articulates an important insight into the 
overarching solidarity provided by Islam in northern Nigeria. Although the coup was 
unsuccessful, an Igbo Head of State emerged -  Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi.
45 H ow ever a Yoruba; Major A dem oyega was the only non-Igbo o f  the plotters.
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This coup, viewed as a threat to political Islam to northern Muslims, laid the 
foundation of the events that followed and led to a bitter and catastrophic civil war.
3.8.1.2: N orthern Nigerian M ilitary Counter-C oup
In light o f the above contentions, a group o f northern military officers staged a 
counter-coup in July 28, 1966, killing the Head o f State and many Igbo officers in the 
Army. Northern soldiers acted out of a pre-emptive self-defense mechanism that the 
Igbos may strike again to forestall any opportunity of the northern soldiers daring to 
avenge the aborted coup o f Major CK Nzeogwu.46 Most importantly, the counter-coup 
could be viewed was a latent religious counter-coup as a reprisal and reaction for the 
killing o f the religious leader (Sir Ahmadu Bello) o f the northern region. Led by Lt- 
Col Murtala Mohammed, northern rebels instigated the counter-coup with the aim o f 
northern secession. However, Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a non-Muslim and the 
highest-ranking northern officer, became Head o f State. The 'Muslim North' was 
confounded by the fact that the Head of State was a northern non-Muslim, thus, there 
remained disgruntled Muslim elites in the region due to the fact that a non-Muslim 
had broken its reign o f power for the first time in hundred and sixty years (Hickey 
1984: 252).
In order to reflect N igeria’s ethnic plurality, Gowon on 5, May 1967, divided Nigeria 
into 12 states.47 This was applauded by the northern elites although the eastern region 
viewed this as an attempt to “balkanize the region and undermine its opposition to 
what it saw as a northern-dominated and anti-Igbo federal military government”
46 Siollun, Max. ‘The Northern C ounter-C oup O f 1966: The Full Story’, assessed at:
http://www.nigeriavillapesqiiarel.com/Articles/Siollun.html on December 21, 2006.
47 Lagos State, w estern state, m id-w est state, east-central state, Rivers State, south-eastern state, Benue-Plateau  
State north-central state, Kano State, north-eastern state, Kwara State and north-w estern state.
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(Suberu, 2001:86-87). During this period, ethnic tensions led to killings in the 
northern part o f Nigeria, especially in Kano. In retaliation, Igbo soldiers ventured into 
the massacre o f northerners in the eastern region o f Nigeria. After a breakdown o f a 
series o f peace conferences, including the Aburi Peace Accord held on January 4-5, 
1967 that proposed a Confederationist System o f Government, which was later 
rejected by the Federal Military Government. Lt. Col Ojukwu, the military governor 
o f the Eastern Region, declared the east as the new state o f Biafra, prompting the 
Nigerian-Biafran War o f July 6, 1967 -  January 13, 1970.
The war could be understood, to some extent, to be religious in orientation, as the 
causal link could be traced to the assassination o f Ahmadu Bello by the Igbo-led 
military coup o f January, 1966. Also, Colonel Ojukwu declared at the onset o f the war 
that “Biafra is a Christian country, we believe in the Almighty God to come to the aid 
o f the oppressed and give us victory as he gave victory to young David over Goliath” 
(Walls, 1978: 207). The victory of the war for Nigeria was regarded as a salient 
conquest by Muslim Hausa-Fulani under the religious identity provided by Islam over 
the south. Osaghae (1998a:66) clearly alludes to this suggestion as he remarks that 
“the war was presented as a genocidal one waged by the Muslims o f northern Nigeria 
who had declared a Jihad to exterminate Igbos from the face o f the earth.” Let us 
assume, but not concede that the war was genocidal, what is clear is that this victory 
laid the foundation o f the Flausa-Fulani hegemony, the control o f the military and the 
marginalization to some extent o f the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups due to the 
overarching solidarity o f Islam among Muslims people in northern Nigeria.
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It is not surprising that the north acquired and still maintains control of the armed 
forces, as Kaduna as well as the home of the Kaduna Mafia, has been the base o f most 
military equipments. In addition, the Arabic emblem o f Uthman dan Fodio for the 
Nigerian army is an indication that the north are in control o f the army (Kukah & 
Falola 1996:51). Again, Osaghae (1998b:8) notes that “for most southerners, every 
northerner is ‘Hausa’, a euphemism for the controllers o f federal power, whether he or 
she is a minority member or not.” Religion has transformed the Hausa ethnic group to 
be a social glue for other minority groups, especially those professing Islam in 
northern Nigeria.
After nine years o f General Gowon’s rule, on July 29, 1975, his deputy, Brigadier 
Murtala Mohammed, (the first Muslim military Head o f State) a Hausa-Fulani from 
Kano, staged a bloodless coup.48 However, M ohammed’s reign lasted until February 
1976, as he was ousted by an abortive military coup. The assassination of Murtala 
Mohammed had a religious dimension. Murtala was considered a Muslim martyr, 
whilst his assassins were considered Christian villains (Usman, 1987:12). General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, a non-Muslim from the Yoruba ethnic group and a former 
commander o f the 3rd Marine Commando Division, during the Biafran-Nigerian war 
became Head o f State. General Olusegun Obasanjo fulfilled his predecessor’s promise 
o f returning the country to democratic rule on October 1, 1979, which ushered in 
Shehu Shagari, a Fulani Muslim as the President of the ill-fated Second Republic. An 
interesting aspect on General Obasanjo assuming office was that Lt. Colonel Shehu
4S N o w  the paradox is that, it was General Murtala w ho sought the secession o f  N orthern Nigeria during the July 
29 , 1966 counter-coup that now attem pted to unify Nigeria-his regim e sought to bridge the divide in Nigerian 
ethnic diversity. He annulled the 1973 national census even though it favoured the north, his ow n ethnic group, 
and relocated the capital o f  Nigeria to a central location-Abuja. M ost im portantly, he instituted a transition 
program m e for the hand over to a civilian regim e scheduled for O ctober 1, 1979. H ow ever, his regim e was short 
lived, as he was ousted in an abortive bloody coup on February 1 3, 1976.
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Y ar’Adua, a northern Muslim, was promoted to Brigadier and appointed Chief o f 
Staff, Supreme Head Quarters. His promotion and elevation to office was to pacify the 
north, especially the Kaduna mafia (Osaghae, 1998b:89). In clear terms, Osaghae 
(1998b:89) commented that General Obasanjo had to visit the north on several 
occasions to assure the northern elites that their interests were protected. This, in 
Osaghae’s (1998b:89) view, established Obasanjo as “a ‘hostage head’ o f state whose 
degree o f freedom was limited.”
3.8.2: P oliticization  o f  Islam under the 2nd R epublic (1979-1983)
To a very large extent the politics o f the 1st Republic fed into the 2md Republic in all 
important ramifications. Islam helped to define the character and politics o f the 
political parties between 1979 and 1983. Thus, one will agree with Hunwick 
(1992:147) that, “During the periods o f civilian rule... dominance at the federal level, 
which was in the hands o f essentially northern-based Muslim-led parties, was 
considered to be the key to economic development.” Similarly, Miles (1989:326) 
notes that the “Islamic dimension to northern Nigerian politics did not dissipate with 
the Second Republic politics. In 1983, all political parties expressed affinity to the 
percepts and practice o f Islam.”
On October 1, 1979, the second civilian regime assumed office. The 2nd Republic in 
Nigeria had its religious baptism even before it was born. The Sharia controversy that 
preceded the inauguration of the Second Republic at the constitutional drafting stage, 
especially at the Constituent Assembly (CA), set the religious tone o f the short-lived 
experiment in civil democracy. The controversy centered on the inclusion and non­
inclusion o f the provision of the Federal Sharia Court o f Appeal in the 1979
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Constitution o f Nigeria. The controversy expectedly polarized the country along 
religious and ethnic divides. While northern politicians who were mostly Muslims 
advocated the inclusion o f Sharia in the Constitution, their southern non-Muslims 
counterparts saw it as a ploy to Islamize the country.
The striking out o f the provision of a Federal Sharia Court o f Appeal resulted in the 
withdrawal o f eighty-eight Muslim members from the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
until a compromise solution was achieved to make the Federal Sharia Court o f Appeal 
a chamber in the Federal Court o f Appeal (Kenny, 1996:348).
An interpretation o f Sharia acculturation could be understood as an attempt to gain 
advantage and determine the structure of society and its social relations in the context 
o f the new political system that was being constructed by the military after thirteen 
years o f military dictatorship and the exclusion o f politicians from power. Laitin 
(1982:413) perceptively captures the political undertones o f the Sharia controversy 
that preceded Nigerian Second Republic in the following words:
The North, with its political cohesiveness and large population had, in 
the First Republic, captured political power at the centre. Control over 
the government by the North was seen by northern interests as a 
counter-weight to southern control over the economy and the 
bureaucracy.
Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who was to become the nation’s first Executive President from 
October 1, 1979 under the auspices of the NPN,49argued that the inclusion o f Sharia in 
the nation’s Constitution was not too much o f a price for the unity o f the nation 
(Laitin, 1982:418). Shehu Shagari’s regime witnessed intense religious and political
49 The political party was founded by the North but later incorporated other ethnic groups.
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conflicts especially the 1980 Maitasine riots, which occurred in Maiduguri and spread 
to some northern cities in Nigeria. Before the Second Republic, the Sharia debate 
received limelight in the 1977 Constituent Assembly on the draft constitution o f the 
Second Republic. A Federal Sharia court o f Appeal and State Sharia Court was 
proposed by northern delegates of the Assembly.50 A number o f politicians o f 
northern extraction rationalized the inclusion o f the Sharia clause in the 1979 
Constitution in different way. There is ample evidence to support the assertion by 
Lucas (1984:24) that the manipulation of Islam for political gains is due to the fact 
that the consumption patterns of elite were subsidized through “inflated state 
contracts, low interest loans, government jobs and corrupt accumulation.” Similarly, 
Othman (1984: 442) correctly notes that commercial and business rewards were 
dependent on favourable decisions by the State because it was the main provider of 
capital and commercial opportunities.
It is significant to note that the NPN was projected as an Islamic party due to its 
northern roots (Kenny, 1996:342). Against this background, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
the presidential flag-bearer o f the Unity Party o f Nigeria (UPN) was forced to make 
“better promises in support o f Muslim interest” (Kenny, 1996:342). While the NPN 
had a seeming national character, it was essentially a party formed and controlled in 
the overall interest o f northern Islamic interests. According to Othman (1984:446):
It was true that real power within the NPN rested with the Party’s 
northern elements, who formed an unofficial organ called the northern 
caucus. Within this caucus, however, was a powerful clique officially 
called the Committee of Concerned Citizens, but best known as the 
Kaduna Mafia. The dispute between this group and other northern
50 A com prom ise was m et with the inclusion o f three judges versed in the Sharia w ould  sit in the Federal Court o f  
Appeal and decide cases sent by a state s Sharia Court.
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elements was to become NPN’s most serious internal rift, whose major 
significance...lay in provoking the collapse o f Shagari’s regime.
A further illustration ought to be made here, to reveal the political intention o f the 
northern caucus, Alhaji Maitama Sule, an ambassador to the United Nations, alleges 
that the easterners like the Igbos are the business entrepreneurs, the west, the Yoruba, 
make excellent administrators, civil servants and teachers, in the north, the Hausas are 
blessed with the gift o f leadership and must be accepted as such (Soyinka, 1996:107).
3.8.2.1: Islam ic Mafia in Northern Nigeria
The Kaduna Mafia is not a criminal organization. It refers to the effective efficiency at 
networking and achieving political and economic currencies (Loimeier, 
1997:123).The Kaduna Mafia, according to Othman (1984:448), constitutes “the 
sophisticated faction o f the northern political establishment.” He notes that the 
Kaduna Mafia have considerable success in providing a strong support base o f federal 
power and in influencing major national issues (1984: 448). He further argues that as a 
result o f the importance the Mafia in the Nigerian political economy, eminent 
southern elites sought to form an ‘entente ’ with the brotherhood. This argument is 
supported by the claim that General Obasanjo permitted representatives o f the Kaduna 
Mafia to hold key positions in his regime from 1976-1979 (Loimeier, 1997:165).
Osaghae (1998a:25) notes that the Kaduna Mafia consists o f northern elites, old and 
new intellectuals, serving and retired military officers and administrators, business 
men and politicians and its main object is to defend and support o f northern interests 
while sustaining northern political domination o f Nigeria. Therefore, in many ways,
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Islamic solidarity is used to achieve economic and political advantage by the Muslim 
elites (Uzoigwe, 1999:15).
The establishment o f the Kaduna Mafia can be linked to Mohammed Gumi and 
Isma il Idris founded Izala movement in Kaduna.51The services o f the movement, 
during the First Republic politics, were conducted at the Sultan Bello Mosque 
Kaduna, following the dominance o f Pro-NEPU Tijaniyya. As noted by Sabo Bako 
(n.d: 15): The emergence o f Izala was to emerge northern Nigeria civil servants, 
technocrats and well-informed politicians based in Kaduna, transformed into Kaduna 
Mafia to have their own movement separate from Quadiriyya, which represents the 
feudal upper classes and the Tijaniyya, which represented the commoners.
A major Islamic personage that has vigorously engaged Islam politically in 
confrontation with secular authorities in Nigeria is Sheikh El-Zakzaky and his Shiite 
reform movement. Sheik Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, leader o f the Shi’a Muslim 
brotherhood, has provoked controversy by calling for an Islamic state as opposed to a 
secular state. Zakzaky followed the radical teachings o f Sheik Abubakar Mahmoud
51 The Yan Izala m ovem ent was founded in 1978 was anti-brotherhood to the Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya 
brotherhoods. It professed reform ists religious doctrines o f  Abd al W ahhad. Gumi sought to purge Islam from all 
spheres o f  w esternization, especially in respect o f education. Izala sought to build a powerful Islamic identity. Jama 
at I/.a la tu l-B id’a wa Iqamat us Sunnu, (Society for the Eradication o f Evil Innovation and the Establishment o f  the 
Sunnah) know n as the Yan Izala m ovem ent51, a branch Wahhabism Islam was introduced in Nigeria by M oham m ed  
G um i, the former Arabic translator for Sir Ahamadu Bello and Isma'il Idris. Izala stressed im portance in the 
Qur'an and the Sunna as rock o f  Islamic faith, and it gained prom inence as a result o f  Saudi Arabia’s Islamic 
propagation activities. Izala is an anti-sufi m ovem ent. The m ovem ent founded in February 8, 1978, is constituted  
by many em inent Nigerian. The m ovem ent seeks only to reinstate traditional Islam in society. It therefore rejects 
the Quadiriyya and Tijanniyya sufi practices such as m ysticism . Izala abhors Sufi practices such as praising the saints, 
recognizing Islamic conciliators or intercessors, w ho claim absolute know ledge o f  the Hadiths (saying o f  the 
Prophet) and direct link to Allah. In addition, they reject praise songs to M uslim scholars. Aside from this, the Yan 
Izala is a peaceful and non-violent m ovem ent and is regarded as a reform ist m ovem ent. The Izala group eschew s  
violent conflict and reproves M uslims to up hold the rule o f law. It is concerned w ith enlightening M uslims o f  the 
need o f  establishing Sharia, Islamic reform and political change. H ow ever, the m ovem ent has been involved with  
m inor conflicts w ith the prom inent brotherhoods (Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhood). The main objective o f  
Izala was to put an end to these broherhoods by ul-'Aqiduh al-Sahihah bi-M uwufuqat ul-Shuri'uh (The Correct Faith 
A ccording to the Shari'ah). M em bers o f  Izala are m ostly drawn from the elites, educated M uslim s and from the 
civil service this selection  has transformed the sect into a non-violent sect. Thus, they do not conflict w ith other 
religious groups but only with Islamic groups not abiding by the true practice o f  Islam.
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Gumi, a reputable Islamic scholar whose rhetoric sought for the Islamization of 
Nigeria and the non-election of a non-Muslim in government. He proclaimed, ‘There 
is no government except that o f Islam.’ They made assertions that the Nigerian state is 
a fraud and only the Islamization of the government o f the country can bring peace, 
justice and development. These fundamentalist Islamic groups reject the Nigerian flag, 
legal institutions and constitution, accepting only Sharia (Kenny, 1996:344).
3.8.3: The M ilitary & the Politicization  o f  Islam (1984-1999)
The military intervention o f January 1, 1984 up until May 29, 1999 contributed its 
own fair share o f politicization of Islam. With the military rule, northern Islamic 
hegemony continued in the Nigerian polity. Islam was highly functional during the 
military regimes. Most o f the high ranking officers o f the military came from the 
north. This was solely because the British enlisted soldiers mostly from northern 
Nigeria and the officers from the Igbo ethnic group had lost their dominance due to 
the circumstances o f the Biafra war.
The failure o f the 2nd Republic paved way for successive military regimes o f Major 
General Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Fulani-Hausa Muslim from Daura, whose 
regime had an appalling record for human rights abuse.52 The General Mohammadu 
Buhari government was said to be “Islamic in its general sympathy, and was accused 
o f being the military arm of the ousted NPN government” (Kenny, 1996: 342). It was 
also said that its mission and policies were based on the 1980 NPN manifesto (Falola, 
1998:62). The coup, which brought the regime to power, was connected with re-
52An international highlight o f the regim e is the aborted attem pted to sm uggle Umaru D ikko, (a northerner and 
form er m inister in the Shagari regim e) out o f the U nited Kingdom on July 5, 1984. Dikko was believed to have 
fallen out w ith the Kaduna malia.
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establishing the interests of the Kaduna mafia (Osaghae, 1998b: 167). This was 
particularly true in the administration’s treatment o f politicians detained and jailed for 
their role in the defunct Second Republic.
Politicians from southern Nigeria, who were mostly non-Muslims, were sentenced to 
long-jail terms. Former Governor Bisi Onabanjo o f Ogun State was confined in jail, 
and denied medical attention, which ultimately lead to his death.53 However, Muslims 
from the north, with serious cases to answer to, were treated with leniency and in most 
cases they were allowed to escape justice (Osaghae, 1998b: 175).
Major General Ibrahim Babangida, a Nupe Muslim from the Middle Belt in the north, 
overthrew General Muhammadu Buhari’s regime on August 27, 1985. Major General 
Babangida was a stratocratic dictator who had a fist full o f economic failures and little 
or no regard for human rights. President Ibrahim Babangida overplayed the Islamic 
propaganda when he dragged Nigeria secretly into become member o f the 
Organization o f Islamic Conference (OIC)54 in January 1986 and imposed Nigeria’s 
full membership status in the organization. What is alarming is that overnight 
Nigerians woke up and found that they were in an international organization for 
Islamic countries.
Kenny (1996:360) acknowledges the paradox o f Nigeria’s membership o f the 
organization: “Before Nigeria joined the Organization o f Islamic Conference (OIC)
53 In addition, C hief Obafem i A w olow o was put under surveillance and his passport and personal docum ents w ere  
seized by the Buhari regim e. In addition, another form er civilian governor C hief M ichael Ajasin, though innocent o f  
corruption charges was left to  languish in prison. H ow ever, a strong political pow er broker o f  the north Alhaji Uba 
A hm ed, the Secretary-General o f  N PN  was arrested on the day o f  the coup, but later was alleged to have escaped  
but returned to his hom e in northern Nigeria during the tenure o f  the Buhari regim e. See W o le  Soyinka, 1996: 85- 
87 & 89.
54 Interestingly, Sir Ahmadu Bello and the late King Faisal o f  Saudi Arabia was one o f the founding m em bers o f the 
O IC. The OIC was conceived in 1964 and later established in 1971.
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hardly a Nigerian had heard o f it. Then it became another ‘right’ for Muslims, like 
government institutionalization of Shari'a.” By joining the OIC, the Babangida 
government committed Nigeria “directly to the advancement o f Islam” (Kenny, 
1996:351). It was argued by Muslims that since Nigeria has diplomatic relations with 
the Vatican, its membership in the OIC was not objectionable. The manipulation of 
religion by Babangida by committing Nigeria with the OIC further enhanced religious 
division in Nigeria. Furthermore, in showcasing Babangida’s Islamic agenda, he 
appointed an all-Muslim-service-chief, in furtherance o f his hidden political agenda of 
clinching to power under the regime’s transitional programme. In January 1990, nine 
out o f eleven ministerial positions were given to Muslims while the other two were 
non-Muslims.
3.8.3.1: The G ideon Orkar Coup
In an attempt to curb the politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria a military coup 
was attempted. The Major Orkar-attempted coup to oust the Babangida military 
administration on April 22, 1990 was as a result o f “deepening socio-economic and 
political contradictions arising from programmes which have increased divisions, 
conflicts, pressures and insecurity” (Ihonvbere, 1991:614). In some ways it was a 
coup based on religious grounds. In a national broadcast Orkar complained that “the 
northern aristocratic class [has a history] replete with numerous and uncontrollable 
instances o f callous and insensitive dominatory, repressive intrigues by those who 
think it is their birth-right to dominate till eternity the political and economic 
privileges o f  this great country to the exclusion o f the people o f the Middle Belt and 
the South” (Ihonvbere, 1991:616).
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Again, this issue can clearly be seen in the coup d ’etat speech by Major Okar, where 
he stated “well-meaning peoples o f the Middle Belt and the southern parts o f this 
county”55 and attempted oust core Muslim northern states from Nigeria, namely, 
Sokoto, Bomo, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi States.
The attempted coup was similar to the circumstances o f the January 1966 coup, as 
there was an attack on the Islamic and political establishment o f the north. If the Orkar 
coup had been successful, history may have repeated itself but with more severe 
consequences: A protracted religious war disguised as a civil war would have 
occurred.
3.8.4: Politicization  o f  Islam during the Transition to  the 3rd R epublic
A political bureau created by the Babangida military junta in 1986, attempted to 
provide a constitutional blueprint for the transition to civilian rule projected for 1990, 
which was subsequently changed to 1992 and again to 1993 -  thanks to the political 
ambitions o f Babangida. The constitutional exercise o f Third Republic was premature 
as General Ibrahim Babangida outrightly refused Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola 
the presidential seat after winning the Presidential Election on June 12, 1993. Abiola’s 
election was annulled on June 12, 1993. Babangida, in conjunction with some 
northern elites, desired that political power must remain within the northern Islamic 
hegemony. Although Abiola was a Muslim, he was forestalled from office because he 
was considered to be a second-class Muslim since he was not from northern Nigeria 
(Maier, 2000:170).56
“  April 1990 coup d ’etat speech accessed on Septem ber 12, 2007  at: 
h ttp : / /  wvvw .d a w o d u .co m / orkar.htm
56 Although Abiola was a M uslim , he was forestalled from office because he was considered to be a second-class 
M uslim since he was not a northerner (Maier, 2000:170). H ow ever, from another point o f  v iew , one could see
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General Babangida was forced out o f office by public opinion o f both civilians and the 
senior officers o f the military. After the demise o f Babangida’s regime, an interim 
government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan came into existence. His tenure was 
short lived as General Sani Abacha, a northern Muslim from the Kanuri ethnic group, 
assumed power via a coup d ’etat on November 17, 1993.
Both Babangida and Abacha regimes were “powerful and unapologetic 
representatives o f northern interests” (Falola, 1998:56). Nevertheless, the Abacha 
regime was laden with dictatorship, the abuse o f the rule o f law, political wrangling 
with some powerful northern elites, mass abuse o f human rights and a large scale of 
siphoning o f public funds.57 General Abacha died in office in the hands o f Indian 
prostitutes (Jackson, 2007:598) and was succeeded by General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar, a northern Muslim from Nupe, who handed over to a democratic elected 
president; Olusegun Obasanjo.
3.8.5: Politicization  o f  Islam under the 4th R epublic
It is pertinent to stress that before Obasanjo came into the realm o f power in 1999, 
Islam was the religion o f power in Nigeria (Maier, 2000:154). Obasanjo indirectly 
came into power due to the repeal of the 1993 election by General Babangida, which 
should have paved way for Abiola, a Yoruba man into office as President. The 
annulment cast distrust by Nigerians, especially those from the Yoruba nation. The
that Abiola w on  the majority o f  electoral votes, not only in southern Nigeria but even in northern Nigeria. After 15 
years, from the controversial annulm ent by Babangida in June 2008 , Professor H umphrey N w osu , the Chairman o f  
the then-electoral body, the National Electoral C om m ission (N EC ) claim ed that Abiola o f  the Social D em ocratic  
Party (SD P) amassed 8 ,3 2 3 ,3 0 5  o f the federation votes out o f  a total o f the 1 4 ,3 9 6 ,9 1 7 , a third o f  the votes in 28 
o f  30 states. Alhaji T ofa’s National Republican Convention (N R C ) amassed 7 ,0 7 6 ,6 1 2  votes, which was less than 
one-third o f  the votes in 15 states. See Junel2: I’ll unmask those behind annulm ent — N w osu , accessed on 
N ovem b er24 , 2008 at: h ttp : //w w w .p u n c h o n th e w e b .c o m /Articl.aspx?theartic:::::A rt2 0 0 806082585628  & N w osu  
on June 12, accessed on N ovem ber 24, 2008 at
: h ttp : /  /  w w w .punchng.com  /  Articl ,aspx?theartic—Art2 0 0 8 0 6 1 8 2 1 0 4 9 1 0 .
57 $600  m illion is alleged to be hidden in banks across Switzerland.
167
annulment o f this election gave both Obasanjo o f the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
and his political opponent, Chief Falae o f the Alliance for Democracy (AD), sympathy 
nominations because they were from the Yoruba ethnic group. Obasanjo won the 
presidential elections largely due to the immense support provided by the Muslim 
north. On the contrary, Obasanjo received little or no support from his ethnic group 
(Yoruba). The Yoruba had sentiments o f distrust for Obasanjo, as they considered him 
a political stooge for the north. Paradoxically, the north found trust in Obasanjo, due 
to the fact that he handed power over to a northern Muslim (Shehu Shagari) in 1979, 
when he was a military Head of State. This reassured the north o f Obasanjo’s loyalty 
to northern interests and a repeat of the same gesture o f 1979, o f transferring power 
back to the north after his tenure, which was anticipated to last for one term.
Before Obasanjo’s election, during the debate on the type o f constitution for N igeria‘s 
Fourth Republic, the Sharia controversy was exhumed by politicians from the north. 
The re-introduction o f the Sharia in some northern states did not receive popular 
support from other religious groups, especially non-Muslims. This adaptation led to 
severe conflicts in the northern region, between non-Muslims and Muslims leading to 
the destruction o f lives and property. Perhaps the main reason for the conflict was that 
northern state governments who adopted Sharia did not adequately enlighten non- 
Muslims about the tenets of Sharia law.
The return o f Nigeria to civil rule on May 29, 1999 provided a most recent platform 
for the explication o f Islamization o f politics not only in the north but in Nigeria as a 
whole. Dickson58 observes:
5ltD ickson David-Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The N eed  for a N ew  Research and D iplom atic Agenda, 
accessed on N ovem ber 30, 2008 at: h ttp : //w w w .u s ip .o r g /p u b s /sp e c ia lr e p o r ts /sr l4 0 .p d f .
168
Islamic fundamentalism acquired a more pronounced political edge as the 
national fortunes of the governing Muslim national elite declined 
dramatically with the election o f President Obasanjo, a born-again 
Christian from the South. After playing a major, often dominant role in 
the government and military for almost forty years, northern Muslims felt 
sidelined. Among the reasons for these sentiments was Obasanjo’s 
removal o f politicized military officers, who were disproportionately 
Muslim.
For the first time in the nation’s political history the issue o f Sharia moved from mere 
disagreements to implementation on September 19, 1999 in Zamfara State. Wole 
Soyinka, considered as N igeria’s moral voice, referred to implementation o f Sharia as 
a “virtual act o f secession.”59 The Zamfara State governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani 
Yarima, introduced the Sharia law in the state to take effect from January 27, 2000. 
Zamfara State was followed by seven northern states in Nigeria. This led to relentless 
opposition from non-Muslims and other political elites in Nigeria.60 Alhaji Ahmed 
Sani, the Governor of Zamfara State, declared Sharia in the state to what many 
considered as contrary the provisions forbidding any state religion in the 1999 
Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria. Ahmed Sani’s election as the 
Governor o f Zamfara state was conducted on the platform o f Sharia resurgence. 
Ahmed Sani’s argument for the implementation o f Sharia was that the Constitution 
guaranteed the right to freedom of religion. His introduction o f Islamic law in Zamfara 
state spread like wild fire to eleven other states with monumental political, social and 
economic problems in the country.
59 Guardian Thursday, N ovem ber 11, 1999, p. 8.
60 Buba Jangebe becam e the first individual to be convicted under Sharia law for stealing in Zamfara State. His right 
hand was am putated on March 22, 2000. On O ctober 19, 2001 , Safiya Hussaini Tungar-udu was convicted to the 
death penalty by stoning by the Shari’a court in Gwadabawa, Sokoto State, for being pregnant outside w edlock . 
H ow ever in March 2 002 , her conviction was overturned. In addition, the first death penalty im plem ented under 
the Sharia law in Katsina State was held on January 3, 2002; the culprit; Sani Yaku Rodi, was found guilty o f  
m urdering a w om an and her tw o children while robbing their hom e.
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) aptly 
commented that (Ukiwo, 2003:124): “The attempted introduction o f the Sharia legal 
system by some states in the federation might therefore be an attempt to checkmate 
what they consider to be a Christian threat.” Northern Muslims had sentiments o f their 
primordial identity was threatened by the southern non-Muslim president. In 
concurrence, Dickson6' rightly notes that to the political elite the spread o f Sharia was 
as a result o f Nigerian Muslims’ desire to re-emphasize their political prerogative in to 
what they perceived as a newfound southern non-Muslim political hegemony.
Beyond this there is the notion that the ideology o f implementing Sharia in the north 
can be understood as a political scheme by some northern elements. However, most of 
all, the actualization o f Sharia could be seen as a reassertion o f the primordial Islamic 
identity o f northerners in the face of a perceived threat o f a non-Muslim president.
3.9: B etw een  C onstitutionalism  and Shariazation
The contending issues of the implementation o f Sharia in northern Nigeria have 
prompted critics to ask the intriguing, fundamental and strategic question o f how to 
determine whether the Constitution or the implementation o f Sharia takes precedence. 
Despite the implementation of Sharia in 12 northern states,62 it could be argued that it 
contravenes the Nigerian 1999 Constitution; Section 10(3) o f the 1999, which states 
that: “No government in Nigeria shall adopt a law peculiar to any religion”. Moreover, 
Section 10 (7) states that, “Any State that breaches Section 10 o f the Constitution shall
61 D ickson, David-Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The N eed  for a N ew  Research and D iplom atic Agenda, 
accessed on N ovem ber 30, 2008 at: h t tp : //w w w .u s ip .o r g /p u b s/sp ec ia lrep orts /sr140 .p d f.
62 Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, N iger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa,
Bauchi, Y obe, G om be and Borno.
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be deemed to have withdrawn from the Federation and, therefore, shall, after due 
process, be denied Federal allocation o f funds until it purges itself o f its effrontery.”
However, it may be argued that the implementation o f Sharia is a declaration o f the 
rights o f a state under federal principles o f democratic governance, which seeks to 
balance ethnic and religious identities from being dominated by others. In addition, 
Sharia could be viewed as the establishment o f democratic governance, where the 
majorities are Muslims. Surely one may argue that the freedom of religion enshrined 
in the Constitution; Section 38 (1), “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion...” establishes the political will o f people to choose 
the religion they wish to adhere to. In adhering to Islam, its fundamental principles are 
the compliance with Sharia law. Furthermore, Governor Umar Musa Yar'Adua,63 the 
former governor o f Katsina State defended the implementation o f Sharia on April, 19, 
2000 by saying that it is the "collective will of the Muslims in the state."64 He further 
explained that: "It should be emphasized that the Sharia law applies only to the
ASMuslims in the state and would not apply to those o f other faiths or beliefs.” Thus, it 
should be noted that the northern states implementing Sharia respected constitutional 
prohibition o f a state religion by excluding their non-Muslims from the application o f 
Islamic law (Suberu, 2009: 553).
63 Um ar Yar’Adua becam e the President o f Nigeria on May 29, 2007 . It was during his regim e as governor o f  
Katsina State that in 2002 , Amina Lawal, received international attention, w hen she was sentenced by a Sharia 
court to  death by stoning for com m itting adultery due to the fact that she was pregnant but not married. H ow ever, 
her sentence was overruled follow ing an appeal.
64 Minchakpu, O bed ‘Christians and Islamic Law in Nigeria: An O verview  o f  the Situation Facing the Church in 
Northern N igeria’ , accessed Septem ber 1, 2008 at:
h ttp :/ /  www.w orthynew s.com  /  new s-features/compass-nigeria-shai ia-3._html.
65 accessed on Septem ber 1, 2008 at:
http: /  /  listserv .ep iscopalian  .org/ wa.exe?A2=indOOQ5c&L=virtuosity&D= 1 & H =  1 & 0  —D& Fir& S=& P-lr 2237.
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SHARIA STATES
u  SOKOTO m ZAMFARA H  KATSINA 3] KANO
[B JIGAWA IB VOBE m  BOItNO IB KEBBI
H] NIGER KADUNA IQ BAUCHI IEIGOMBE
Although one cannot pretend that there are no religious implications, the desire for 
Sharia, is more and primarily political rather than for the religious needs o f  the people 
of the north. According to Bienen (1986:50), it was necessary for northern leaders to 
emphasis Islam in order to maintain northern unity.
Bienen (1986:51) goes further to tell us that the dispute over the implementation o f  
Sharia was useful in determining its constitutional legitimacy. The debate was also a 
political struggle between elites from different regional and religious groups in 
Nigeria. Disputes over Sharia showcased the challenges o f  the Nigerian federalism, 
the might o f  the central government, the relationships between north and south divides 
and the relationships between the major and minority ethnic identities.
Map 3.1
Map o f  Nigeria showing the Sharia States
Courtesy: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/2632939.stm#map
3.10: Rationalization o f Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria
Sharia law was administered in the 12th and 15th Century in the Kanem Bomu Empire 
and Hausa regions before Nigeria was colonized by the British. Moreover, Sharia law 
was administered in northern Nigeria through the Native Authority in the 1950s until 
1960, just before independence.
The Native Courts Proclamation (1906)66 and the Native Courts Ordinance o f 1914, 
dispossessed the Sultan o f his judicial power as the final arbiter under the Sharia law. 
Sharia law was subject to the repugnancy test so far as the laws were not repugnant to 
equity and good conscience. Sharia law was subsequently administered in conjunction 
with the English common law. It should be noted that the Customary Courts 
entertained cases pertaining to minority ethnic groups.
Sharia law was substituted by the penal code on October 1, 1960 on the advice of the 
1957 Willinks Minority Commission. Sharia law became applicable to civil cases 
while the penal code was applied only to criminal cases. Another factor that that 
paved way for Sharia law to be substituted by the penal code was the concern by the 
non-Muslims in northern Nigeria (Reynolds, 1999:87). The resurgence o f Sharia is 
some northern states was as a result o f a willingness to revisit and recapture Islamic 
sensibilities, which had been in existence before the British conquered the region but 
deprived by the colonial advice of the 1957 Minority Commission. Naniya (2002: 26) 
argues that the colonial administration de-emphasized Sharia law for the penal code 
for economic reasons, especially on issues relating to banking and the charging of
66 It has been argued that this Ordinance is the origin o f religious conflicts in Nigeria as the northern M uslims w ere  
considered to identify w ith their culture through Islamic law whilst non-M uslim s w ere subjugated as not being  
equal w ith M uslims (Alabi, D . T .,2 0 0 2 ) .
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interest, which is contrary to Sharia law. This was imperative for protecting British 
interests and investments in northern Nigeria.
It is now understood that Islamic political thought is based on the concept o f a union 
o f religion and state. Understandably, an Islamic nation recognizes that Islam is its 
national religion and therefore must apply Sharia law. Sharia law is binding and 
remains in force until there is sufficient proof o f its revocation (Friedmann, 2003:22). 
Sharia mainly regulates the law and the relationship between Muslims and non- 
Muslims (dhimmis) or otherwise called ‘M agazawa’ (people whom it was acceptable 
to live along-side Muslims in peace) also referred to as ‘Kaferi’ in northern Nigeria. 
The continued debate and persistence about the implementation o f Sharia will 
continue to be a part o f the political debate in northern Nigeria as Sharia is considered 
by Islamic adherents as a core tenet. It is therefore not surprising that the Sharia has 
taken this position.
Thus, the attempt to Sharia-lize the north was an attempt at reviving previous religious 
traditions in order to check the corrupt practices o f politicians (Hamischfeger, 2004). 
The sentiment of reviving Islamic identity is noted by Sanusi (2005): “Unlike many of 
the groups in southern Nigeria where ethnic and tribal identities are primary to all 
others...M uslim  people in northern Nigeria have, starting from the 19th Century, seen 
themselves primarily as Muslim”.
Sharia is an important component of the primordial identity o f northern Muslims. 
Mazrui (Frieder, 2008:605) noted that, “Nigeria is the only African country outside
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Arab Africa which has seriously debated an alternative to the Western constitutional 
and legal option.”
The politicization o f Sharia does not enforce religion but creates an environment 
conducive to its development.67 The implementation o f Sharia without the 
manipulation o f the elites, but employed in truth and in the spirit o f Islam, then it can 
be stated in light of the spirit o f the Hadith that “Allah is beautiful and Allah loves all 
that is beautiful... since Shari’a is the way to God, it is o f necessity the way to beauty” 
(El Fadl, 2001: 114).
11: Islam ization o f  the Federal Capital
The Islamization o f the Federal Capital, Abuja was orchestrated by the Murtala 
Mohammed regime in 1976. The National Assembly is designed with a grand Islamic 
architectural design. In addition, the city gateways are designed with an Islamic-Arab 
architectural design and a notable architectural piece in the capital is the Central 
Mosque.
The western style o f dressing, which is considered too revealing for ‘morality’ and 
Islamic cultures, has been branded offensive and the police machinery aided by a task 
force ensures such compliance. Yet, there has not been a report o f any individual tried 
by the task force. Most culprits, especially women, are considered prostitutes, 
regardless if  they are found in the day or night. This also applies to the preferential 
location o f worship centers with Islamic bias. Though it is said that there are many 
non-Muslim sects jostling for space, the kind o f liberties enjoyed by worship locations
67 Sanusi L. Sanusi: ‘Betw een the Shariah and “Barbarism”’, accessed on the 30 ,h o f  N ovem ber, 2006 at:
http: /  /  w ' w w .  niperdeltacongress.com /barticle s /b c tw ec n —the—shariah—and.htm .
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that have noisy affectations give people the inclination to believe such. In the 
demolition exercises to harmonize the city plan, most non-Muslim worship centers 
were demolished.68
The non-Muslim delegates to the Constituent Assembly, headed by Justice A.N. 
Aniagolu, expressed their concerns amongst others that Abuja looks like a Muslim 
city with Muslim architectural designs, especially with the bus stops designed like 
mosques and the fact that the hospital in Abuja has no mortuary and coffins cannot be 
bought anywhere in Abuja (Falola, 1998:89).
3.12: Islam ization and Gender Politics
Islam acknowledges equality o f both sexes.69 The often-quoted Hadith o f Prophet 
Muhammad acknowledges Islam’s position: “All people are equal, as the teeth o f a 
comb. There is no claim to superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab or a white over a 
black or a male over a female. All God-fearing people merit a preference with God.”70
However a popular context of politicization of Islam, which most commentators fail to 
address, lies in the gender bias, in northern Nigeria. Given the Islamic culture, women 
were usually excluded from participation in public affairs. Women, while not in
68 ‘V iolent Protests Rock Abuja O ver Churches’ D em olition ’ , 27 Septem ber 2000 , accessed at:
h ttp ://w w w .u p an d aru ra lcom m u n itvsu p p ort.org /2000 /10 /02 /v io len t-p ro tests-rock -ab u ja -over-ch u rch es-
d cm o lit io n -2 7 -scp tem b er-2 0 0 0 -2 /.
See also ‘300 dem olished churches in Abuja’, accessed at: 
http: / / w w w .ou rch u rch .com /v iew /?p ageID = :3 0 9 5 2 2 .
69The ill treatm ent o f  w om en was practiced in the Arab nation. H ow ever, this practice is contrary to Islam. The 
Q u r’an (1 6 :5 8 -5 9 ) states emphatically that “And when the new s o f (the birth of) a female child is brought to any o f  
them  his face becom es dark, and he is filled with inward grief! He hides h im self from the people because o f  the 
evil o f  that w h ereo f he has been informed. Shall he keep her with dishonour or bury her in the earth? Certainly, 
evil is their decision .”
7(1 Malik Sardar Khan, ‘Tolerance and solidarity-II’, accessed on N ovem ber 20, 2008 at:
h ttp ://w w w .saiid igazette.m m .sa/indcx.cT m ?m ethod=hom e.regeqn& contentID =200806169392& archivcissucdat 
e = 1 6 /0 6 /2 0 0 8 .
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purdah, are only to be seen and not heard in northern Nigeria. The few women who 
dared to participate in politics were usually institutionally confronted by male 
candidates, making sure that they lose their deposits at the polls if  their political 
parties nominated them in the first place. The Chairman o f Bakori Local Government, 
Hajiya Mariya Abdullahi of the SDP, lamented that she was politically disadvantaged 
because her political opponents preached and campaigned in the mosque (Shettima, 
1995:77). In addition, she stressed that a large number o f women could not vote for 
her, mainly due to the fact that their marital status prevented them from voting for a 
candidate not sanctioned by their spouses.
3.13: C onclusion
I have examined the utility o f Islam as a veritable platform for power and economic 
advantages from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial politics o f northern 
Nigeria. The chapter argued that the Islamization o f politics by northern politicians 
gives these politicians advantages over and above their political rivals both within and 
outside o f the north. This over-arching political currency that is possible through the 
Islamization o f politics is a result o f the nature and character o f the Nigerian state.
The centrality of Islam in the society and politics o f northern Nigeria cannot be over­
emphasized. Johnson (Hackett, 2003:67), notes that in some non-western cultures, 
religion primarily motivates political action. Even though western policymakers 
dismissed its divisive influence, religion has significant potential for overcoming the 
impediments that lead to political and social collapse. Similarly, Ellis & Haar 
(1998:178) perceptively note that the fact that politics ought to be connected with the 
distribution o f power in society but when religious texts exploit this role they become
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political in nature. It is not surprising that politicians in northern Nigeria attempt to 
gain political currencies using the platform o f Islam.
More to the point, Falola (1998:44) emphasizes that “religion is used to consolidate 
existing identities and to forge a new one. In northern Nigeria, Islam successfully 
merges with ethnicity to create the political concept o f a united north.” Islam provides 
the context for the defining, conceptualizing, posing, arguing and resolving political 
questions even within a secular paradigm. It is futile to attempt to analyses and 
understand the politics of northern Nigeria without contextually situating the role of 
Islam in the region. This reveals the complexity and essential nature o f society, 
politics and power in northern Nigeria.
A potential observation from the foregoing is that northern Nigeria is synonymous 
with Islam, as Sanusi (2004) suggests with regards to Kano but with relevance to the 
whole o f northern Nigeria:
Islam remains a dominant force in the constitution o f the identity o f the 
people o f Kano [northern Nigeria]. A lot o f our attitudes to some o f the 
issues affecting our political econom y...are traceable in part to a 
wrapped and distorted understanding o f the Islamic religion, and its 
confusion with the traditional values o f Hausa society and feudal social 
formation, or the congealed history of medieval Arabia.
It is perhaps now clear why and how Islam acts as supra ethno-national identity to 
Muslims in northern Nigeria.
It has been argued that the northern elites have engineered Islam to provide northern 
harmony (Sanusi, 2001). Sanusi notes that the people answerable for the dilemma o f
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the Muslim northerner are the northern Muslim elite. Sanusi further states that the 
elites must be aware that the Muslim northerner can readily identity them as their true 
enemy -  it is not the Nigerian Constitution which guarantees them liberty and equal 
opportunity and not the poor southerner or non-Muslim but the rich northern Muslim 
who has subjected them to indigence and kept them in perpetual lack o f basic needs.
The ideal for the politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria ought to be for the 
sacrosanct purpose of eradicating social injustice and oppression and uplifting social 
and political rights, as championed by Sir Ahmadu Bello and Mallam Aminu Kano. 
The politicization of Islam, for un-Islamic purposes such as political repression, 
prebendalism, accumulation o f wealth by other leaders from the north and as a fog for 
conflict, is the pollutant that has partly corrupted the process o f politicization and 
political consolidation o f Islam and may have placed an indelible stain on Islam, 
thereby situating it as a museum piece in northern Nigeria.
The next chapter focuses on the research methodology used in this study. It explains 
the justification for both quantitative and qualitative data used as the backbone o f this 
thesis.
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C H A P T E R  4
M E T H O D O L O G Y
Things do not happen by chance or without a reason. Behind events 
and courses o f events there are powers generating them
Danermark, et al. (2002: 198)71
4.1: Introduction
This research uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. Within the framework of 
qualitative investigation, I used (a) semi-structured interviews and (b) FGDs. While 
semi structured interviews with individuals and groups provided part o f the narrative, 
the other part came from FGDs, where particular propositions/hypothesis were 
examined in order to pin down key arguments and their various strands. Crucially, 
these twin strands within the qualitative method were helpful in providing the basis 
for further explanation as to how the ‘us’ and ‘them ’ identification is established. 
Most crucially, a form o f target setting that identifies a Muslim from a non-Muslim by 
the use o f certain sets of codes becomes apparent while interrogated within the 
qualitative method.
While the qualitative method is important in this study, it is not exhaustive. The 
answers and findings of qualitative method were based on abstract reasoning. In order 
to provide a more scientific basis to the findings, I have triangulated it within a 
quantitative framework. Thus, causal explanations in the qualitative framework are
71 Danermark Berth; Ekstrom Matts; Jakobsen Liselotte & Jan Ch. Karlsson, 2002 . Explaining Society: Critical 
Realism in the Social Sciences. London: Rutledge.
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examined simultaneously with quantitative figures. This form o f interrogation has 
allowed me to verify an abstract response in a scientific context.
The use o f observation is a vital method in studying social groups. The 
methodological foundation of this thesis is the critical realist paradigm. The utility o f 
critical realism flows from its practical usefulness in resolving complex and intricate 
social problems. In line with the critical realist orientation, my effort at understanding 
the dialectic o f Islam and conflicts in northern Nigeria is highly pragmatic. While the 
research is conducted with clear-cut framework and pre-determined methodological 
constructs, my field-work activities are oriented by a critical realist practical 
disposition. In order to effectively use this method o f observation, I built my research 
on a grass-roots assessment as a mechanism o f understanding religious conflicts in 
northern Nigeria.
4.2: Causal Explanations
Qualitative method complements the critical realist framework o f analysis. It defers 
significantly from the positivists’ limited orientation and allows the research to be a 
real-life experience. From using the qualitative methods, I was able to generate 
categories based on the data collected from the field. With empirically based 
categories, I am able to better understand, investigate and analyze the dynamics of 
Islam and conflict in northern Nigeria, which would have otherwise been impossible. 
Qualitative methods provide a causal analysis o f what has been observed and 
demonstrate what affects and enables occurrences. The empirical methodology would 
depend on the object of study and the facts to be gathered from such study (Sayer, 
2000:19). For instance, the empiricist can discover patterns o f conflict behaviour that
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Muslims and non-Muslims possess in northern Nigeria. However, the critical realist 
will causally analyze the reasons for the conflicts and the salient and latent societal 
causes that facilitate these conflicts.
The use o f qualitative methods determines the theoretical aspect o f the research which 
will illustrate the ‘tendency’ of the theory. An ‘Intensive Research D esign’ (Sayer, 
2000) was adopted to explain the causality o f the theory. In seeking an Intensive 
Research Design (IRD), the analyses o f a social event is embedded in immense 
discourse not relatively statistical to the whole (theory) but related and participatory in 
a wider discourse. The IRD approach focuses on ‘conditions o f possibility’ or the 
‘generative mechanisms’ that explain a social phenomenon (Danermark et al., 
2002:166). In other words, in searching for the truth and the best explanation the 
research question seeks a practical adequacy on the discourse (Sayer, 1984:2000).
In utilizing the IRD qualitative method, I depended on historical experiences o f the 
people and areas under investigation as well as conducted semi-structured interviews 
and FGDs, which were complemented with content analysis o f government 
documents, newspapers, magazines and other publications, in order to fully capture all 
dimensions and all relevant data important to the research.
The design o f the research instruments is to enhance the possibility of obtaining 
reliable and maximum data for the research. Hence, semi-structured interviews and 
FGDs format is adopted given the advantage of the freedom it offers respondents and 
the control it imposes on respondents regarding the issues in focus. The advantage of 
oral testimony could be seen from the often quoted dictum o f Gardner (2003:187) that
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“the force o f the spoken word...always rests upon its intimacy, together with its 
rootedness in the local, the personal and the particular. It is this which gives to oral 
testimony its capacity for depth and authenticity.” Furthermore, it is an ideal 
instrument in the context of the critical realist framework as it gives room for going 
into important issues that came up during the interview. Such issues were in-depth as 
the respondents gave much more insights than would have otherwise been possible. 
The instrument also enriched the historical depth o f the research, just as the 
psychological dimensions of the issues as illustrated thorough the emotive reactions 
and body languages of the respondents especially when sensitive issues bordering on 
faith were discussed. Following the advice o f Krueger, (1998:3-5) questions were 
asked in a clear conversational manner, which allowed sufficient time for questions to 
be answered. Moreover, I took into consideration Holstin & Gubrium’s (2003:69) 
observation o f an effective interview technique o f a journalist that interview questions 
were “casual in nature...the kind you would ask while having a drink...in  short it was 
a conversation.” With this in mind, in each o f the study locations, I with my team of 
researchers interviewed 50 individuals in each o f the study locations in order to collate 
sufficient data for analysis.
On the analytical approach o f this study and its importance for evolving solutions, the 
research is grass-root oriented by connecting with the people who have first-hand 
experience in the impact o f conflict. The rationale here is borrowed from Albert 
Wendt (Friedman, 1992: 854) who argues that “a society is what it remembers; we are 
what we remember; I am what I remember; the self is a trick o f memory.”
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Apart from interviewing to collate historical perspectives, interviews were conducted 
from a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology is a philosophical concept 
founded by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who sought to describe experience not by 
subjective or objective methods but by the experience o f things the way they are as 
perceived by an observer or researcher. Phenomenology is the “study o f lived 
experiences and the ways we understand those experiences to develop a world view” 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 112).
The interviewees were able to relate their experiences o f religious conflicts and how 
Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity to reduce conflicts in Nigeria. 
Phenomenology provided us with the immediate experience o f religious conflicts as 
experienced by the observer as “the individual’s life is the vehicle o f historical 
experience” (Thompson, 2000:269). In addition, I took into consideration the 
importance and relevance o f oral history as noted in the dictum of Jan Vansina 
(Thompson, 1994: 6):
Yes, oral traditions are documents o f the present, because they are told in 
the present. Yet they also embody a message from the past, so they are 
expressions of the past at the same tim e... To attribute their whole content 
to the evanescent present as some sociologists do, is to mutilate tradition; 
it is reductionistic. To ignore the impact o f the present as some historians 
have done is equally reductionistic. Traditions must always be understood 
as reflecting both past and present in a single breath.
The primary function o f FGDs is to collect qualitative data to answer research 
questions (Morgan & Krueger 1993:11). In the FGDs about 12 to 13 people per 
location participated (Kano, Kaduna & Jos).72 The use o f FGDs enhanced observatory 
processes for searching for an explanation into the dynamics o f Islam and conflict in
72 12 participants in Kano; 12 Participants in Jos & 1 3 participants in Kaduna.
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northern Nigeria. Focus groups use discussions to “generate a rich understanding of 
participants’ experiences and beliefs” (Morgan, 1998:11). As rightly noted by 
Litosselti’s (2003:18) observation FGDs are useful for discovering new information, 
collating different perspectives on the same subject matter, gathering insights into the 
participants’ views, analyzing participants’ general understanding (probing) o f  the 
subject matter, engendering new suggestions from participants understanding group 
dynamics and discovering contentious issues.
With the use o f FGDs, social, economic, political and religious notables across ethnic 
divides were carefully selected based on their experience and possibilities o f adding 
value to the research outcome. There was one o f such FGD in each o f the three study 
locations. Open-ended questions were asked during the FGD. A key feature o f FGDs 
is to unravel the ‘internalized opinions’ o f the participants (Morgan, 1993:57). This 
was adopted to allow the participants to exhibit expressive freedom and prevent the 
use o f leading questions (Morgan, 1993:63). In addition, keeping questions open to 
the group stimulated useful “trains o f thought” from the participants (Knodel, 
1993:36). I maximized interaction among the participants by “challenging people's 
taken for granted reality and encouraging them to discuss the inconsistencies both 
between participants and within their own thinking” (Kitzinger, 1994: 106) that 
explain religious conflicts in the region. Individuals were asked to explain the 
reasoning behind their thoughts on diverse issues (Kitzinger, 1994:113). The FGDs 
were conducted in “pleasant, loving environment” (Ressel et al., 2002:3) in order to 
relax the participants to co-opt sufficient data for analysis. It is useful to note that 
bureaucratic permissions were not required for the use o f oral interviews and FGDs, as 
the targets of these twin strands of investigations were the grass-root people.
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The main attraction for using FGDs is to delve into the consciousness o f the 
individuals and unearth the underlying rationale for their actions in order to form 
unbiased impressions o f the subject matter (Goebert, 2001:5). The FGDs were highly 
enriching as the researcher was able to develop personal rapport with the audience and 
obtained information that would not otherwise be possible.
The use o f oral interviews and FGDs were useful qualitative methods to address all 
the salient issues in the research question. The use o f both methods enhanced 
observatory processes for searching for an explanation o f the dynamics o f religious 
conflicts in Nigeria.
The method o f seeking to authenticate this thesis is different from other enquires into 
natural science and indeed other patterns of social behaviour. Noting that any social 
system has a distinct and complex characteristic, the community as a reference point 
in gathering oral testimony via interviews and the use o f FGDs greatly enhanced the 
output o f the qualitative research and further validated the interviews. By applying 
random selection of the participants in the FGD, the incidence o f bias was limited 
(Krueger, 1993:71). Furthermore, interviews are central in creating new knowledge 
whilst FGDs discover innate traditions and the reality o f the people.
4.3: Sample Size and Sampling Procedure
An ‘Extensive Research D esign’ (ERD) was adopted to evaluate the theory and 
hypothesis. This method o f predictions and calculations is used to supplement causal 
explanations. Although, this method does not casually explain social phenomenon, it
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assisted the study to obtain results from its hypothesis and was quite useful, as it is not 
only a tool o f analysis, but also an element o f the object o f study (Sayer, 1992: 178).
After first determining their qualifications for inclusion into these predetermined 
research categories, respondents were distributed by faiths and ethnic origins and were 
randomly selected for measuring how quantities vary. All the respondents were 18 
years old or older. About 35% of the respondents per population were women. The 
greater percentage o f men is attributed to the fact that men are the primary actors in 
most o f the religious crises, just as they play dominant positions in issues of faith. 
Since religious conflicts are mostly between non-Muslims and Muslims, those 
selected on religious basis were limited to these two religions critical to my research. 
Quantitative models that formed the basis of 20 sample questionnaires are derived 
from the major variables of the research problematic (see Appendix A). Questions 
were systematically woven around these variables so that the responses to these 
questions were later coded for analysis. Emphasis was placed on how the questions 
were worded in order to impute adequate understanding and proper response (Clark & 
Schober, 1992). The researcher and his field assistants conducted a pre-test o f the 
research instruments in the study locations. This helped to determine the problems 
associated with the instrument, if any, possible ambiguities, and whether or not the 
instrument can assist in eliciting the desired responses from the respondents. After the 
pre-test, some modifications and corrections, for instance questions relating to ethnic 
diversity were made to the research instrument before actual fieldwork commenced.
Aside from the respondents selected for semi-structured interviews, separate and 
distinct respondents were selected to fill in a questionnaire. All the more important,
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however, respondents who filled in the questionnaire were usually those who declined 
to participate in semi-structured interviews. It is useful to note that respondents were 
sought in public places such as the town market, mosques and non-Muslim places o f 
worship, the post office vicinities which is usually an economic nerve centre in the 
North and other areas of commercial activity.
Furthermore, each respondent was independently selected to reduce the chances of 
external influences on the respondent. The respondents were assured o f the 
confidentiality o f their responses and guaranteed that the data are solely for academic 
purposes.
4.4: Data Gathering
Drawing on these diverse sources o f information, I developed a unique dataset based 
on the analytical categories on conflicts within the northern region. Keeping in mind 
that critical realist orientation allows research to be a product o f the empirical realities 
o f the research situation. Data obtained through primary sources are supplemented 
with secondary materials to increase the reliability of the research findings. Materials 
obtained through secondary sources are used as an evaluation tool for the data 
obtained from my primary sources to test their validity and reliability. Some o f the 
secondary materials used in the research are journals articles, books, periodicals, 
monographs, government publications and White Papers (scholarly work), both 
published and unpublished. Libraries both in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, as well 
as the Internet, are very rich sources o f most o f the materials used in gathering the 
secondary data used for the research.
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Data collection is a very important phase o f research projects because it refers to the 
obtaining o f relevant information regarding the major ideas o f the hypotheses o f the 
study for the purpose o f demonstrating their validity (Newman, 1998). The mode o f 
statistical technique depends on the nature o f data as the type and method o f data 
collected determines the quality of the research outcome. In the first section I 
explore the quantitative findings.
4.5: Data Analysis
Statistical analyses are evaluated from the responses from the sample questionnaires. 
This was preceded with the sorting and coding o f the responses in consonance with 
the core variables o f the research. The coded responses were subsequently subjected 
to frequency counts and percentages analysis to determine their weight and 
prevalence. Furthermore, descriptive analyses principles for causal explanations are 
applied in the data from the semi-structured interviews, FGDs and the open-ended 
interviews. These responses are both recorded in field notes and on tapes.
4.5.1: Role o f  Researcher Assistants
In order to carry out an adequate assessment o f the research questions, it was highly 
necessary to constitute a team of research assistants for the purpose o f assisting me in 
the study. This team constituted of five motivated and organized individuals, 
including one who was conversant with the Hausa language. The main role o f the 
team was to assist me to gather, analyze qualitative and quantitative data from the 
study locations. In addition, the research team assisted in the selection o f interviewees 




It is pertinent to note that in validating a hypothesis, the search to disprove the 
hypothesis must be adopted and only if  the search to disprove the hypothesis fails that 
the hypothesis becomes valid (Cashman 1993:7). The corroboration o f FGDs with 
interviews demonstrated a reliable test for validity and reliability for qualitative 
methods. In addition, the triangulation with quantitative methods further enhanced the 
validity o f the propositions and hypothesis. The triangulation with another method is 
not conclusive that the hypothesis is valid (Morgan, 1993:232), however, the 
differences in the data in both methods create an understanding o f the sources of these 
dissimilarities. The advantage of using both qualitative and quantitative methods is 
that the former entails that the knowledge about ‘truths’ can be substantiated through 
experimentation and observation (Philips & Burbules, 2000), whilst the latter entails 
that knowledge of ‘truths’ are obtained by the construction or observation by society 
being studied (Neuman, 2000). In addition, the use o f another researcher analyzing the 
information gathered and explaining the data enables corroboration of the methods 
and enhances reliability of the data (Golafshani, 2003:604).
Deliberate efforts were made all through the research process to ensure that 
compliance with the five counts o f establishing validity in qualitative research as 
advocated by Maxwell (1992) were achieved. The five validity tests to which the data 
for this research were exposed to are:
1. Descriptive Validity: Conscious efforts were made to ensure absolute factual 
accuracy in the research process.
2. Interpretative Validity: Researchers’ bias and personal opinions were totally 
eliminated from the research. Where there were noticeable ambiguities,
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respondents were asked to clarity what they actually meant by their statements. 
The use o f interpreters was engaged to eliminate the possibilities of 
misinterpretation due to communication problems.
3. Theoretical Validity: Careful efforts were taken to ensure that the theoretical 
framework adopted has the capacity to guide the research process and 
ultimately assist in the achievement o f the research objective.
4. Generalizations: Careful efforts were made to ensure that generalizations were 
informed by theoretically based observable regularities.
5. Evaluative Validity: The data gathered for the research were carefully coded 
and systematically analyzed.
4.7: Population  o f  Study
The northern states have increasingly become a hot-bed for religious crises in recent 
years. Some major results o f these crises are the massive dislocation o f citizens, loss 
o f life and property. Following these predicaments there is an increased segregation 
o f the population and masses along religious lines.
To conduct a complete enumeration or survey of all the states in the northern Nigeria 
is impossible for one obvious reason -  it is too enormous. To this end, the researcher 
committed the study to three states: Plateau, Kano and Kaduna in northern Nigeria. 
The rationale for selecting these locations is that Kaduna state seems to be the only 
state in northern Nigeria that is sharply divided along religious lines it has an equal 
divide o f Muslims and non-Muslims; A unique aspect o f Kano is it has a 
homogeneous Hausa population united also by the Islamic faith, there are more 
Muslims than non-Muslims and in Jos the majority of the people living in this location
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are non-Muslims (Christians). The sample study was conducted based on the 
assumption that all the states in the north possess identical administrative set ups, a 
common identity marker amongst Muslims and share similar social constructions.
4.7.1: P o p u la tio n  o f  S tudy: K aduna, K aduna S tate
M ap 4.1
K aduna State
Kaduna, meaning “crocodiles”, derives its name from the river that flows across the 
town (Isyaku, 2001). Unlike most other northern settlements that are predominantly 
Muslims o f  Hausa-Fulani extraction, Kaduna has a highly cosmopolitan character, 
evident in the ethnic and religious composition o f  the town. Kaduna is not only 
ethnically diverse, it is also religiously balanced, with an even distribution o f  Muslims 
and non-Muslims. Given the location o f  the town at the point o f  convergence o f  the 
railway line from Lagos to Kano its status as the political nerve center o f  the north, 
people from far and wide consider Kaduna to be ideal for professional, commercial 
and vocational interests.
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Am ong the different ethnic nationalities that are indigenous to Kaduna are: Hausa- 
Fulani, Kataf, Gwari, Baju, Kagoro, Jaba and M oro’a. According to Isyaku 
(2001:2 15), “Kaduna State seems to be the only state in Nigeria that is sharply divided 
along religious lines.” This is because Kaduna can easily be parallel into a 
Muslim/non-Muslim divide. In terms o f  the indigenous population, there exist the 
Hausa-Fulani populations, which are mostly Muslims, as well as the different ethnic 
nationalities in the southern Kaduna area, which are predominantly Christians and 
animists. Added to the latter groups are the ‘foreigners’, mostly the Christian Yoruba, 
Igbo and other people from the southern and Middle Belt ethnic regions o f  the 
country.
4.7.2: P o p u la tio n  o f  S tudy: K ano, K ano State
M ap 4.2
K ano State
The pre-colonial Kano was peopled by Muslim Hausa, Fulani, Tuareg, Arab and Nupe 
(Paden, 1973:22). With 20,760 square kilometres o f  land mass Kano occupies an 
important position in any discourse not only on northern Nigeria but on Islam and 
Nigeria as a whole. Historically, Kano is a center o f  commerce as well as an Islamic 
learning. It has recently added religious Puritanism and violence to its credentials.
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Kano is only next to Sokoto in the ranking o f importance o f northern cities religion- 
wise.
While there are many settlers from different parts o f Nigeria, such as Yoruba, Igbo, 
Edo, Tiv, Igala, Nupe, Idoma and Bachama, as well as many foreigners from Syria 
(Lebanese), Europe, India, Niger, Chad and Sudan living and doing businesses in 
Kano, the overwhelming population o f Kano is Hausa-Fulani. A unique aspect o f 
Kano is that the city has a primarily homogeneous Hausa population united also by the 
Islamic faith (Paden, 1973:14). Relying on the 1952 census, Paden (1973:44) noted 
that “Islamic affiliation in Kano State was 98% in 1952 and probably over 99% in 
1970.”
According to Paden, (1973:44) the city is divided into (1) Kano City, the old Kano 
city, which is populated mostly by Hausa-Fulani, (2) Waje -  “new town” -  made up 
o f Fagge, an Hausa settlement and commercial center, Sabon Gari where the Igbo and 
Yoruba have their residence and Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa for Muslims 
immigrants from other places in the north and (3) Township, the former Government 
Reserved Area (GRA), where Nigerian civil servants and foreigners live.
Located at the heart of northern Nigeria, Kano tastefully blends traditionalism and 
modernism. Given its love for political and social reformism, modem Kano provided 
the platform for Malam Aminu Kano radical talakawa politics that frontally 
challenged the oppressive and exploitative feudal order in the north.
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4.7.3: Population o f Study: Jos, Plateau State
M ap 4.3
P lateau  State
The capital o f  Plateau State, Jos, apart from its historic popularity as the Tin City, has 
a rather human-friendly climate, which makes it very attractive for migration and for 
tourists to Nigeria. Jos is located at the heart o f  Nigeria, and it is less than three 
hundred kilometres away from the nation’s capital, Abuja. Formed in 1915 as a camp 
for the transportation o f  tin, Jos is made up o f  about 54 ethnic-groups, some o f  whom 
are: Angas, Mupun, Amo, Bugi, Mujango, Flausa, Birom, Mwa gharul, Pyapun, Sha, 
Rukuba, Yashi, Taroh, Yeskwa and Geomai.
When Plateau State was created by the Murtala M ohammed/Obasanjo’s 
administration in 1976, Jos became the capital o f  the new state. As a result, the city 
has political, economic and commercial importance. Several mineral resources are 
found in the state, some o f  which are quartz, feldspar, mica, tin, talc, limestone, 
gemstone and dolomite.
Jos in particular, and Plateau State in general, is historically reputed as a very peaceful 
place, hence the reference to it as the “home o f  peace.” The different fratricidal
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religious wars that rocked the city and the state in 2001 dented this image. In a short 
span o f one year Jos and Plateau State witnessed at least seven gruesome religious 
riots. Some o f the riots experienced in 2001 are: Wase conflict, Shendam ethnic 
militia attack, Quaan Pan ethnic conflict, Quaan pan Local Government conflict, 
Langtang conflict (spill over of Wase conflict), Jos Jumaat prayer conflict and Jos 
North Local Government riots.
Given the conditions existing in Jos and other communities in Plateau State prior to 
the 2001 riots on the contentious issues o f settler/indigenes dichotomy, it was obvious 
that Jos and its surrounding state was sitting on a ‘keg o f gun powder.’ It was not 
surprising that two seemingly unrelated events provided the ignition for the 
combustion that almost destroyed the whole of Plateau State and threatened the 
stability o f Nigeria as a state-nation.
4.8: C onclusion
The use of the critical realist research method offered flexibility which provided 
unexpected but important issues and discoveries relevant to the research problematic. 
The need for this flexibility can be understood against the background that to the 
critical realist “our knowledge of reality is a result o f social conditioning and, thus, 
cannot be understood independently of the social factors involved in the knowledge
73derivation process” (Dobson, 2002).
73Page not num bered. A ccessed on the 3rd o f April 2007  at h ttp : //in fo r m a tio n r .n e t /ir /7 -2 /p a p g r l2 4 .h tm l
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Multi-disciplinary perspectives and diverse methods were used to generate the 
required data as well as explicit responses from those interviewed in order to 
adequately grasp the problematic o f the research. To the critical realist, the scientific 
and social worlds need a method or methodology o f observation to explain a tendency. 
However, one must note that it is complex using methods o f observation because 
predictions are fragile and variable in the social science.
The purpose in using critical realism as the springboard o f the methodology is that it 
allows one to transcend the common-place explanations o f the relations between Islam 
and conflict in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, it engages the substantive issues 
involved in the discovery of causal factors that are the generators o f the observable 
phenomenon o f religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. As aptly put by Wendt (Geller 
& Singer, 1998:18) “whereas the empiricist explains by generalizing about observable 
behaviour, the realist explains by showing how (often unobservable) causal 
mechanisms which make observable regularity possible work.”
Critical realism methodology is concerned with causation and causal analysis Sayer, 
1984). Consequently, the methodological focus o f the research empowers us to 
enquire into what makes something happen. In other words, I seek ‘causal analysis by 
‘explaining why what happens actually does happen’ (Danermark et al., 2002:52). The 
design o f my research instruments and empirical activities in the field were 
systematically structured to achieve this goal. The methodological mechanism for 
achieving the above is anchored on both qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
The research seeks a Kantian transcendental argument into “what is, why it came to be 
the way it is, and about how it ought to be” (Hammersley, 2002:35) in explaining the
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analyses o f the data collated from the field. The thesis seeks to search for that which is 
not known, to ask transcendental questions and answer them via internal critiques 
(Cruickshank, 2002:61).
The next chapter explores the conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria. It attempts to do 
this by highlighting crucial factors that influence conflict in Nigeria as a whole before 
narrowing down more specifically to religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION & CONFLICT IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
I make bold to say that violence is the creed o f no religion...I object to 
violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; 
the evil it does is permanent.
Mahatma Gandhi74
5.1: Introduction
One may begin with an important enquiry: If states such as Nigeria are sustained by 
an invented tradition o f unity (Anderson, 1991), then what are the factors hampering 
its nation-building efforts? In this part o f the study, I wish to chart the nature of 
Nigerian (dis)unity. I propose to do it in the following manner: Gurr’s (1970) relative 
deprivation thesis (Grievance) is used to highlight ethnic separatism; I underscore 
Anderson’s (1991) argument’s on invented tradition to pitch my questions on the 
north-south divide; I explore Collier’s & Hoeffler’s (2004) arguments on the 
perceptions o f greed and Juergensmeyer’s (1993) theory of religious divide to explain 
the growing sense o f divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.
The paradigm o f conflicts in any state consists o f complex determinants, such as 
historical, social, political and economical causal patterns (Braathen, Boas & Saether, 
2000). This categorization is consistent with Nigerian society, which is largely divided 
and disunited on ethnic and tribal differences but mostly on religious divides.
74 The Mind o f  Mahatma Gandhi’, com plete book accessed online on the Is' o f  March, 2008 at:
http: /  /  w w w .m k g a n d h i.o r g /m o m g a n d h i/m o m in d ix .
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In explaining conflict, it is crucial to understand how the conflict “fits together and 
interacts,” identifying the “dominant forces at a particular moment in time” and 
seeking a paradigm for resolving such conflict (Adedeji, 1999:10). In order to 
understand the myths and truths about the roots o f conflicts in Nigeria, clearly, her 
diversity in language, culture and religious faiths are key factors on what generates its 
causal patterns.
Conflict is inherent in all societies. Conflicts occur due to one or several factors either 
occurring as remote or immediate causal patterns; the failure to properly manage 
differences amongst cohabiting human beings, value disagreements, low level of 
tolerance, ideological contradictions, resource dominance, faith-based conflicts and 
hegemonic struggles over power. These pertinent factors constitute serious threats to 
the prospects o f peaceful living and development among human beings globally.
Still more strikingly, violent conflict is an old companion to Nigeria’s troubled 
history. What is the explanation for this incorrigible and systemic national culture of 
brutal behaviour? An important enquiry is to seek the main causal patterns that 
construct Nigeria as a state pregnant with trouble. It is pertinent at this point to dwell 
briefly on the various factors that hamper N igeria’s nation building and its democratic 
future and chart the deeply destructive forces affecting its unity, as a cursor to 
understanding conflicts in the region of northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general.
5.2: Ethnicity
The prevalent complexity of a multi-ethnic society in Nigeria is concisely and clearly 
noted by Saro-Wiwa (1995:63): “The ethnic nature o f Nigerian society is a real one. It
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cannot be prayed or wished aw ay....” Nigeria, a deeply divided country, is the most 
complex state in Africa and perhaps in the world. Nigeria’s most striking feature is 
that it is divided along the fault lines o f culture, language and religion. As previously 
noted, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous state and democracy is a divided house 
consisting o f 250-400 ethnic groups, with 140 million people, and is the tenth most 
populous state in the world. Since independence in 1960, these divisions may have led 
to propagation o f conflicts in the state.
As noted in the introduction, and in the body o f this study, Nigeria consists o f three 
dominant ethnic groups: The Hausa, Igbo and the Yoruba. These divisions are 
geographically known as the North, the East and the West respectively.75 The 
Nigerian state, which consists o f a complex relationship o f different group identities, 
has encountered a proliferation of intractable conflicts and political traumas ranging 
from a bloody civil war (which left two million dead) and a cocktail o f ethnic and 
religious conflicts. Some of the catastrophic conflicts that Nigeria has been confronted 
in her troubled history are within the paradigms o f ethnic conflicts. Misra (2008:13) 
categorizes four critical aspects of ethnicity within a deeply divided society. There 
must be (1) a real or imaginary homeland, (2) a shared body of cultural beliefs, (3) a 
historical consciousness and (4) and identification with a racial attachment. Clearly, 
these categories define Nigeria’s multi-cultured and divided society.
Despite attempts to create an equal derivation formula on revenue allocation, 
centralize and depoliticize politics from the ambits o f the three major regional ethnic 
groups, there still subsist ethnic conflicts and severe tensions within the polity. To
75 D espite this division, Nigeria has been divided along the North and Southern lines due to the differing so c io ­
econom ic developm ents of the regions.
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fully understand conflicts in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole, the study o f ethnicity 
cannot be avoided. As seen in Chapter 1, ethnicity is the construction o f people 
“formed along racial or cultural lines; its members allegedly possess common traits 
and customs” (Famen, 1994:47). In addition, it is equally clear that “ethnicity is based 
on a myth o f collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be 
innate” (Horowitz, 1985:52). It is perhaps for this characterization that nation- 
building, as opposed to state-building, is an inconceivable task for Nigeria. It bears 
emphasis that a nation should have the characteristic of a community of people with a 
common language, a common territory (Stalin, 1994). The profusion o f communities 
and nations has made it impossible to create a common political culture in Nigeria. 
Hence, it would be possible to justifiably term Nigeria as a ‘nation o f whiners.' 6
What is astoundingly striking is that a federal system o f governance was established in 
order to check the imbalance o f many ethnic groups and to prevent any ethnic group 
hegemony in the state’s affairs. Despite a federalist structure o f governance and the 
division o f Nigeria from three regions at independence and gradually metamorphosing 
into 36 states in 1996, the prevalence o f ethnic conflicts has not subsided.
5.2.1 Ethnic Variable in Conflicts in Northern Nigeria
In order to understand the dynamics of Islam and peace in northern Nigeria, one has to 
contextualize the problems of socio-cultural and political dynamics that privilege 
social relations and power context in Nigeria in general and northern Nigeria in 
particular, as a basis of analyzing, interrogating and understanding the Islam and 
peace/conflict nexus in northern Nigeria.
76 Characterization used by Senator Phil Gramm, (U .S .A  senator) in describing the American public in 
contradicting the prevailing American econom ic crisis.
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There has been a social pattern, particularly in the last decade, where differences in 
cultural motifs reflect the level of religious tolerance that exists in areas o f the north, 
for example in the central north o f the Jos plateau, southern Kaduna, the core Kanuri 
in the northeast and the Taraba axis just below it. While all these areas may not have 
experienced violence of ethnic and religious nature, the trend o f political dominance 
and resource exploitation has awakened the dire imperative for the grass-roots people 
to be intransigent towards fellow citizens o f differing faiths. This has made people to 
bind together in ethnic or religious groups rather than accepting a blanket nationality. 
In some ways, this renders individuals and groups to be subservient to the instrument 
o f a religious or ethnic imperative. Consequently, an individual develops an instinct 
for survival albeit championed by a religious cleric or a political statesman.
In this context, it is significant to note that ethnicity and religion could be deployed 
singularly. It is also possible to engage them profitably in political contests at the 
same time. The interesting thing about the deployment of ethnicity and religion in 
political contests is that they veil the actual political dimensions of conflicts, giving 
them different colorations, thereby making conflicts intractable and endemic. In this 
way, struggles for power for selfish interests are camouflaged as protection of 
collective survival or and the preservation of religious faith. An important fallout of 
this is the blurring o f class distinctions and class contradictions. The result is the 
obliteration o f class struggles and re-unification of ethnic and religious differences. 
The deployment o f ethnic and religious sentiments as a tool for the struggle for power 
and mobilization by elite elements could be better understood against the bifurcation 
o f the social sphere as noted by Ekeh (1975) into the civic public and primordial 
public in the course o f colonialism.
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Clearly, ethnicity does play a part in conflicts because ethnic affiliations often form 
the synthesis o f groups in conflict (Braathen & Sarther, 2000:13). In examining the 
centrality o f this argument, Azar (1984:90) explains that group identity formations 
such as ethnicity are linked to protracted social conflicts in a state. He notes that 
ethnicity indicates that there is a bond between people and interconnected with people 
sharing similar culture, language, religion, beliefs and other similar values.
It is useful to note Osaghae’s (1998:1b) suggestion that ethnic conflicts privilege 
conditions under which two or more ethnically distinct people are in conflict. Religion 
may or may not be an issue in ethnic conflicts, depending on whether or not the 
conflicting social formations are religiously homogeneous or heterogeneous. Ethnic 
groups are impacted upon by a number of variables, modifying their appearance and 
affecting their constitutions, conflicts and contestations. It is for these reasons that 
intra-ethnic crisis is as possible as are inter-ethnic crises. In spite o f these intervening 
variables, it is still possible to locate ethnic categories with respect to the parameters 
o f ‘we-ness’ that they set to distinguish their members from those outside the 
deliberately structured cultural boundaries that are erected. It must however be noted 
that these cultural barriers are not immutable.
Osaghae (1994) identifies variable factors as determinants o f ethnicity such as: The 
character o f ethnic demands and interest articulation; the extent o f legitimacy of 
ethnicity and quality o f management; the balance between economic and political 
control; the degree o f decentralization o f government structures; ethno-genesis within 
the democratic crucible, competition for scarce resources and the competition for state
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power, such as the Tiv and Jukun (non-Muslims) ethnic conflict in northern Nigeria 
in 2001.
Very close to Osaghae’s argument is a line o f reasoning earlier expounded by Ekeh 
(1975) who asserts that ethnicity has flourished because the African elite who 
inherited the colonial state has conceptualized development as transferring resources 
from the civic public to the primordial public. The civic public is a contested terrain 
where representatives of the primordial publics struggle for their share o f the ‘national 
cake.’ In this struggle, politics is amoral and the end justifies the means. The ease of 
deployment o f ethnicity instrumentally is the political and economic architecture o f 
patron-client exchanges that privilege a double coincidence o f ‘want’ between ethnic 
elites desperate for power in the civic public and the ethnic underdogs’ needs to be 
extricated from the grinding poverty of the primordial public.
It is necessary to stress that in explaining the logic o f the instrumentalization of 
ethnicity, and how ethnic boundaries create conditions for group conflict, Osaghae 
(1991:49) argues that the elites are aided in this process by the marked inequalities 
and grievances that exist among groups in terms o f development and opportunities of 
development. As explored in chapter 3, this makes the task o f ethnic entrepreneurs 
easier because, in the name of bettering the lot o f their ethnic groups and or catching 
up with others, the elite succeed in recruiting the masses for the promotion o f the 
particularistic and selfish agendas of the elites.
It would seem that one might want to inquire into an often ignored aspect o f the 
foregoing analysis, which is the fact that the elites have the propensity to mobilize co­
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ethnics for their individualistic agenda in Nigeria. This is an indication o f a wide 
citizen gulf and, more importantly, a crisis o f confidence between the citizens and the 
state on the one hand and the nations across the political terrain o f the country on the 
other. It is clear that the Nigerian state in terms o f enjoying the loyalty o f its citizens 
and ensuring its own stability and survival is not only in crisis but also in severe 
danger.
Clear from Osaghae’s analysis and the discussion above, is that ethnic boundary may 
be a causal explanation for conflict, thus it remains to be asked that why has northern 
Nigerian not had any significant ethnic/communal conflicts between different ethnic 
groups professing the same religious identity (Islam)? It may be fair to assume that the 
primordial sense o f Muslims in northern Nigeria is fostered by a religious identity. It 
may then be clear that Islam functions as a basis o f an overarching solidarity and unity 
amongst ethnic groups’ in northern Nigeria professing Islam. To list a few major 
ethnic groups living under the umbrella provided by Islam are the Gwari and Nupe in 
Niger State; the Teda, Fulani and Kanuri in Bornu state; the Kanuri, Kwanka, Paa, 
Seyawa and Warji in Bauchi state, the Eloyi, Gwandara, Gwari; Fulani, Hausa, Puku 
in Sokoto state.
Perhaps most crucially, placing this assumption in the above context and to further 
explore this point, an empirical illustration is provided by Anthony (2002:108) when 
depicting the civil unrests of 1966 pogrom against the Igbos:
In Kano, Yorubas had been among the safest migrant groups during the worst 
o f the rioting. In large part this was because most of the Yorubas in Kano were 
Muslims from the portion of Yorubaland in the Middle Belt. These Muslim 
Yoruba men and women tended to wear clothing distinctive from but similar to
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Hausa styles...and, if necessary, they could show that they were Muslims by 
reciting the Shahada or demonstrating other Islamic knowledge.
This explains the suggestion, that perhaps the Hausa-Fulani clash more with the Igbo, 
given that they are mostly non-Muslims, unlike the Yoruba who are equally divided 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.
During the Igbo pogrom in 1966 the same protection was bestowed upon Igbo 
Muslims. Anthony (2002:105) notes that “the few Igbo men known as Muslims were 
not threatened.” He further provides empirical evidence suggesting that the 
overarching solidarity of Islam acted as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts 
amongst co-religionists during ethnic pogrom:
Alhaji Sani, an Igbo Convert...assimilated to the point o f becoming 
H ausa...H e remained during 1966 and the war years despite widespread 
knowledge o f his Igbo origins.
5.3: Invented  Tradition
The scramble for Africa and the Berlin Conference o f 1884-1885 resulted in the 
abstruse quilt of borders and its artificial partitioning, stitching across the African 
continent and creating irrational demarcations. It seems relatively obvious that this 
gave rise to people of different civilizations, traditions, languages and religious 
loyalties co-habiting under tense political systems. However, Horowitz (1985:75) 
argues the arbitrary drawing up process is over exaggerated, as boundaries were 
drawn up in response to ethnic demands. At a closer look this argument is not all 
embracing. There are many examples of this such as the Yoruba-speaking people of 
Nigeria also exist in the neighbouring state o f the Republic o f Benin; and the Fulani 
people also subsist in Niger.
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This arbitrary portioning of land developed the states and nations unevenly and 
brought people together who shared nothing in common. Did post-colonial borders 
invoke conflicts by uniting peoples, distinct groups and identities which, had in the 
past, lived under diverse social structures? Commenting on postcolonial borders, 
Oliver & Fage (1969: 267) note that “statesmen and diplomats met in offices or 
country houses and drew lines across maps which themselves were usually 
inaccurate.” Consequently, the foundations o f conflict may have been laid.
The effect o f colonialism of Africa prevented self-realization o f its people “in every 
crucial field o f life, the British had frozen the indigenous institutions while at the same 
time robbed colonized people of every scope and freedom for self-development” 
(Davidson, 1992:72). Conflict, it would appear, is natural to the checkered history of 
the Nigerian state. As the first Prime Minister o f Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa
77Balewa in one o f his statements to the Parliament, suggested:
Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into 
one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different 
in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not 
show themselves any sign of willingness to unite... Nigerian unity is only a 
British intention for the country.
A striking similar observation during this period by another leading nationalist and 
leader o f the Action Group (AG), Chief Obafemi Awolowo, succinctly classifies 
Nigeria as a mere geographical expression. Awolowo noted that “Nigeria is merely a 
distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria 
from those who do not” (Awolowo 1947: 47-48). These mindsets o f leading political 
figures in Nigeria not only exacerbate ethnic differences, they nurture the ground for
77 Legislative Council D ebates, Nigeria, March 4  1948, p 227.
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their germination and transformation into intolerance and cataclysmic crises. From the 
foregoing, it is clear that what the people o f Nigeria have in common lies only in 
sharing an identical race and differs in historical, language, heritage, custom and 
religious backgrounds. In this sense, there is no realistic basis o f a common national 
identity. This construction o f the Nigerian society has impeded nation building and the 
search for a common identity.
In the light o f this discussion, one would like to agree with Chinua Achebe’s 
comments in his critically acclaimed book ‘Things Fall Apart’ where he attempted to 
make sense o f Nigeria’s national unity by noting the negative impact o f the political 
invention o f Nigeria and quoting W.B. Yeats: “Turning and turning in the widening 
gyre. The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world” (Achebe, 1958: introduction). This passage 
succinctly describes N igeria’s present predicament -  the fundamental rupture o f a 
state falling apart on the threshold of its inherited invention. This is clearly a causal 
link to ethnic and religious anarchy.
5.4: D eprivation
A few observers suggest various reasons for N igeria’s abundant political crises, 
secessionist and divisive forces (Diamond, 1988 on economic competition: Otite, 
1990 on ethnicity; Mahwood, 1983 on federalism and governance; Bayart, Ellis & 
Hibou, 1999 on prebendalism). However, others suggest that ethnic and religious 
diversity are not the causal links to these simmering conflicts but there are other 
inextricably interwoven conditions such as deep-rooted and widespread poverty, 
decadence, pandemonium, economic plunder and the lack o f an innovative economic
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base (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). If this suggestion is anywhere near correct then one may 
enquire: Has various religious and secular pronouncements by political leaders and the 
elitists (in order to gain an economic advantage) contributed to unnecessary conflicts, 
which are usually labeled as religious or ethnic in nature? Cramer (1999:15), perhaps 
in surmise to these comments, notes it is probable that conflicts in Nigeria and indeed 
Africa have led to a dearth in socio-economic resources on the continent. He further 
observes that from 1970-1997 sub-Saharan Africa lost $52bn from agricultural 
production due to armed conflict (Cramer 1999: 8).
In line with this, Oxfam78 reported that the cost o f conflict on African development 
was approximately $300bn between 1990 and 2000. This is equivalent to the amount 
o f money received in international aid during the same period. These problems have 
made Nigeria and indeed, Africa, termed a ‘third world o f the third world’, returning 
to the “heart o f darkness” (Bayart, Ellis & B Hibou, 1999:116). It may be surmised 
that Nigeria has inherited a basket-case economy. However, in linking these problems, 
one should take cognizance o f the fact that “the wealth o f the European countries grew 
out o f the triangular transatlantic trade-slaves from Africa to America, raw materials 
and precious metals from America to Europe, merchandise and weapons from Europe 
to Africa” ( Moltmann, 2003: 23).
Mazrui (1980:70) notes that that Africa, although is the most endowed continent was 
experiencing the “pathology of technical backwardness”. The paradox about Africa is 
the more a country has vast wealth and natural resources the less the people have. The 
great paradox confronting the Nigerian state is that it is perhaps the most religious
7i<A ccessed on the 17'1' ol N ovem ber 2 0 0 7  at:
h t t p : / / w w w n Y f a m . o r p / c n / n e w s / 2 0 0 7 /p r 0 7 1 0 1 1  contro l  arms c ost  conf l ic t ,  afrjca
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state in the world and perhaps the most corrupt. It may be stated that an economic 
autopsy reveals that the systemic attitude o f corruption in N igeria’s leadership, and 
indeed in Africa, is a cause-effect emanating from the larceny and exploitative 
administration o f colonialism. Colonialism was used exploitatively for national 
glorification. Over a long period o f time the indigenes o f these colonial states 
witnessed their land being looted and exploited by the colonialists. This generated a 
passion for economic accumulation and a thirst for the economic pleasures which the 
colonialist enjoyed. Although, this was a factor which led to nationalism, it also laid 
foundations for self interest, greed, the privatization o f wealth and socialization of
79debt. The foundation o f the culture of prebendalism is best summed up by J. Mars 
(Coleman, 1963: 148): “The moral objection to stealing is largely confined to stealing 
from members o f the extended family, village or tribe. The moral obligation to 
support the extended family is held to condone theft from others.”
This mindset has laid the foundations for ambitious soldiers and rabble-rousing 
politicians to thrive on a prebendalistic culture of ‘stealing a slice of the national cake’ 
for self and their extended families. It seems particularly palpable that the point which 
emerges from this is that economic exploitation has left Nigeria within the fangs of 
economic hardship, deep-rooted poverty and deprivation within the international 
economic system. Therefore, one finds that prebendalism has reduced Nigeria’s 
opportunities o f being a partner in international institutions. With these 
insurmountable and recalcitrant socio-economic problems, Nigeria has been termed as
79 A contem porary exam ple o f this is noticed in the personage o f  Tafa Balogun, the former head o f  the Nigerian  
Police was arrested on April 4 , 2005 by the Econom ic and Financial Crimes Com m ission (EFCC) for the theft o f  
over N 17 billions o f  naira( $100 m illion). Balogun was sentenced to only six m onths in prison. H ow ever, he was 
given a grand reception after serving his sentence: General o f  Police, Alhaji Tafa Balogun, as he returned to his 
native Ila-Orangun, Osun State, in a blaze o f glory. From entry point into Ila-Orangun to Tafa Balogun’s house is 
just about half a kilom etre; hut it took about tw o hours to cover the distance. The crow d was sim ply aw esom e, all 
shouting OIu Omo, Olu Om o . .. (Child o f choice!)”-(77ic Tribune Newspaper, Sat. 19th Jan. 2008). See at: 
h ttp ://w w w .tr ih n n e .c tjm  n o / 19012 0 0 8 /m vriad.htm l. accessed on the 25th o f  Septem ber 2008.
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a fragile state and Low-Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) by the World Bank.80 
Compounding these problems, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has reported that the Human Development Index (HDI)81 for Nigeria as at 2008 is at 
448, which gives Nigeria the position o f 154th out o f 179 countries (75 million people 
live in poverty).
Officially, Nigeria exports two million barrels of crude oil a day, at the average price 
o f 60 US dollars per barrel, ($120 million). This accounts for at least 90% of N igeria’s 
foreign earnings and 40% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).82 Paradoxically, 
Nigeria is the largest producer of crude oil in Africa and the fifth largest in the world. 
Nigeria has earned about $122 billion from crude oil exports since 1986. Confronted 
with this paradoxical situation, the World Bank has rated Nigeria the second poorest 
state in the world. However, the ‘curse of oil syndrome’ is that the Nigerian people 
suffer from intense poverty (per capita income o f 3Op per person per day). One may 
agree in line with Collier & Hoeffler (2004) that the causation o f the high incidence of 
conflicts is that they offer financial rewards and a means o f survival for an identity 
group, who are aggrieved over economic hardship and social retardation.
At the core o f N igeria’s problems, like most African states, is its classification as a 
weak democratic and failed state.83 It is not surprising that Nigerian politics has been 
described as a ‘market’ (Ifeka, 2000: 452), or as the ‘economy o f plunder’ (Bayart, 
Ellis & Hibou, 1999:71). In Nigeria, wealth is considered a symbol of belonging and
8(1 h t t p : / / w w w . w o r l d b a n k . o r p / i e g / l i c u s / licus05 m ap .h tm l
81 The HDI measures living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by 
adult literacy and enrolm ent at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard o f  living 
(m easured by purchasing pow er parity, PPP, incom e). See
h ttp ://h d r .u n d p  o r g /e n /m e d ia /H D l 2008 EN cover.pdf, accessed on 16,h February, 2007.
82 The oil production has led to incessant conflicts in the N iger Delta Region o f  Nigeria
85 A ccording to the ‘Fund for P eace’ a research organization
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of acceptability in one’s community. In a country where production is low, with a high 
turnover in population (Malthus, 1960) and the operation o f a vibrant Dutch economic 
system, the consequences is the prebendalism o f economic resources and the retarded 
development o f socio-economic infrastructures, which has lead to protracted conflicts. 
Indeed, this profusion of socio-economic problems has contributed to the spate of 
ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria.84
Now, it bears emphasis to note that the economic dimension o f most ethnic conflicts 
in Nigeria has to do with the struggle for wealth. In a state where there is a depletion 
o f resources but an increase in populace, economic interests and conflicts definitely 
emerge (Malthus, 1960). Scholars have attributed ethnic and religious conflicts in 
Nigeria to the economic struggles brought by diversion o f resources meant for the 
public, black marketeering and scarcity of resources, amongst others. The true 
challenge o f this truism is whether it can be justifiable to say that there is a depletion 
o f resources in the face on an increase in populace, which by no means is culturally 
relative to known endowments of natural resources, but is rather idiosyncratic, feeding 
on a political arrangement to which the collective o f nationhood is as wise as ignorant 
and the rest of the world in awe of the ascendancy of wealth abused.
A further consequence of these extraordinary chains o f events is that the economic 
plunder o f Nigeria has pre-empted economic ethno-nationalism, whereby different 
group identities are struggling for scarce resources. Perhaps, an overall description of
84 As a result, Nigeria, despite its abundant human and material endow m ents, is not an attractive destination for 
Foreign D irect Investm ent (FDI), which is desperately required by state managers to turn-around the sta te’s 
com atose econom y for the better. The socio-econom ic state o f  Nigeria has deteriorated that the U nited States o f  
Am erica (U SA ), State Departm ent in a recent report84 predicted that Nigeria would extinct as a nation on account 
o f  its num erous religious and socio-political crises in the next fifteen years! Alarmist has this prediction m aybe, it 
reflects the seriousness and perception o f the Nigerian crisis by the international com m unity.
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economic nationalism has been defined as “demands for changes in the inter-national 
or interethnic distribution o f property or ownership o f the stock o f wealth located in 
the territory” (Breton, 1964:377).
5.5: R egional D ivide
Another and perhaps more serious division that has become the defining character of 
N igeria’s weak and fragile political system has to do with the colonial policy that 
promoted the partisan development between the north and south. The differences in 
regionalism are noted by the British officers posted to these regions, during its 
colonial history:
The officers o f the north were lean and, lanky and brown while those of 
the south were flabby and white. While those o f the north galloped on 
horseback...the ones in the south were carried along the bush paths, across 
crocodile-infested rivers by natives bearing hammocks.85
This division has in many ways given rise to a fierce dichotomy between the north and 
south. It would be unhistorical and misleading if I do not attribute this dichotomy to 
the concept o f invented tradition. The colonial policy o f the British was in tandem 
with the logic o f divide and rule mechanism of colonial rule in Nigeria. The failure by 
the Nigerian nationalists to form a united Nigerian front and common position against 
colonial autocracy especially in the march towards the state-nation’s independence 
was one o f the several direct fallouts between the north and the south.
It is against this background that Sanusi (2005) notes Lord Lugard’s comments that 
indirect rule was imposed on the north due to the “utter disrespect for British and
85 Kole O m otosho, in an article: Politics: Struggle betw een  king and kingmaker by W illiam  W allis in Financial 
T im es, Published: June 23 2008 17:47.
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native ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south.” In addition, the primary 
aims for integration o f northern and southern Nigeria were for economic reasons. It 
was a device to assist in the export of northern Nigerian commodities through the 
Atlantic Ocean (Awe, 1999:8). The strategy o f divide and rule could then be 
understood as a mechanism of exploiting northern Nigeria and keeping its people 
subservient.
At this point, one might conveniently turn to the first major manifestation o f the seeds 
o f political and social discords sown in Nigeria through the regions. Although Nigeria 
witnessed its first religious conflict in 1945 in Jos, Plateau State, the conflict I am 
about to concisely discuss sheds an illuminating critical chapter in the history o f 
religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. The genesis was when Anthony Enhaoro, of 
the AG, in March, 1953, on the floor of the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, 
moved a Motion for Self-Government by 1956. The Self-Government Motion failed 
due to the opposition o f Members of the House, representing the northern part o f the 
country. The north was not favourably disposed to independence at that particularly 
period for fear o f southern domination due to the socio-economic backwardness o f the 
north. Thanks to the fallout of the colonial policy o f divide and rule and differential 
development.
The north feared that they were still far behind the south in terms o f socio-economic 
development. For exercising their democratic right o f dissent, the northern Members 
o f the Federal House of Representatives were ridiculed and abused by the people of 
Lagos, which was the political base of the AG. The people o f Lagos, who were mainly 
AG supporters, viewed the members from the north as reactionary elements and
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colonial stooges. The northern payback time came in the form o f the Kano riots of 
1953, during an ill-timed and politically insensitive political tour o f delegates o f the 
AG to the north, soon after the Lagos incident to campaign for self-government. 
Surprisingly, the conflict, which was instigated by a perceived grievance towards the 
Yoruba (a divided blend o f Muslims and non-Muslims), turned towards the Igbo 
(mainly non-Muslims).86
Now an important observation is that, while the Kano riots o f 1953 were basically 
ethnocentric in nature, the religious divide between the two parts o f the country 
involved in this political altercation leans itself to the demarcation of place and space 
between religious identities. This is evident especially during the Kano riots as shown 
by the identity groups that took part in the riots and the issues that were canvassed. 
The riot was a religious inspired political conflict due to the religious divide between 
the Muslim in the north and the Christian in the south. In addition, the use of 
propaganda by party newspapers fuelled great suspicions o f both ethnic and religious 
identity groups. As noted by Diamond (1988:43), reports stating that “the Action 
Group (AG) would ban Islam in the north; the NPC would force it upon the south. The 
National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) would stack the entire 
bureaucracy with Ibos” were captions in the dailies.
Politically, it may be argued that the Nigerian political class, across ethnic and 
religious divides, has profitably exploited this dichotomy. Presently, the regional 
divide in Nigeria consists o f six geo-political zones: The north-east, north-west, north- 
central (Middle Belt), south-east, south-west and south-south. It is useful to note that
‘sr’The victim s o f  the riots w ere mainly the Igbos (N kem dirim , 1975). The conflict was centered in the out skirts o f  
Fagge and in Sabon Gari, where m ost Southerners resided in Kano.
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these divisions are not recognized by the Constitution but are useful for geo-political 
labeling.
5.6: R eligious D ivide
The foremost and greatest o f Nigeria’s problem lies in its religious division and, in 
some ways, its rejection o f a secularized Constitution by religious identities. Given 
this complexity, this rejection is not surprising, as Nigeria is primarily based on a 
primordial ideology o f a non-western society. N igeria’s increasing friction between 
secularization and its religious primordialism has been contentious throughout its 
troubled history. The deeper explanation for this mindset is provided by 
Juergensmeyer (1993), who notes that there is a perceived rivalry between religious 
nationalism and the secular state. Juergensmeyer views the world as undergoing a new 
ideological war, based on ‘orderliness within society.’ He further argues that religion 
is an emerging ideology of order due to the loss of faith in secular nationalism and that 
religious identification may have more attachment and sentiments than secular beliefs 
or ethno-nationalistic loyalties.
In this sense and in this sense alone, Juergensmeyer’s suggestion of religions’ new 
role is not surprising due to religions mystifying and karmic orientations to the 
individual and groups. This has provided religion with an overwhelming identity 
maker for the identity groups, for which they are ready to kill and or die for. 
Conventional thinking suggests that for the northern Nigerian Muslim, religion as 
their first and foremost identity has the potential to generate conflict due to the fact 
that it is located in a tense and competing inter-religious atmosphere. Juergensmeyer 
further argues that where a non-western nation attempts to indoctrinate religion as
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secular nationalism, such efforts are usually met with frustration and as such acts as a 
contributory factor to religious violence.
Given these perceptions, former Nigerian president, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 
overarching concern with Nigeria’s religious divide affirmed, not perhaps
unexpectedly, N igeria’s non-secular ideology when Sharia law was enacted in some 
states in northern Nigeria. He stated that:87
I allowed Sharia law to exist because we are not a secular state. We are a 
multi-religious state. That is what we call ourselves in our Constitution.
Given this observation, the un-hegemonic nature o f the Nigerian ruling classes 
coupled with the imperative need to control state power as a means o f instituting the 
organization of political patrimonies in consonance with the logic o f state
prebendalistic politics, continues to privilege the political and instrumental 
deployment o f religion and ethnicity. While religious crisis has a national character 
and spread in Nigeria, in terms of frequency, scales, ruthlessness and destruction, the 
northern part o f Nigeria arguably provides an intriguing precedent. Certainly, this may 
well be based on indisputable political and social grievances but one must not forget 
that the underlying crucial factor in establishing the casual patterns o f these conflicts 
is: The individual’s or group’s primordial identity.
But perhaps, most important is that if religion can act as a social glue between
different ethnic groups, then what are the factors that promote conflict between
different ethnic groups having different religious faiths or groups having similar
87 See Aliyu, Musa & Kwaru, Mustapha Isah "Nation N o t a Secular State - Obasanjo" Daily Trust (Abuja 
http :/ /w w w  nigeria.com/drfonim/DCForumIDl /  1091 .h tm l, accessed on the 30th o f  May 2008 . On Septem ber 
j 9 >i> 1 9 9 9  Zamfara State governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani Yarima introduced the Sharia law into the state. Thereafter 
11 other states follow ed suit.
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ethnic identities, but different religious faiths? What is easily observed from Chapter 
1, 2 and 3 is that religion, Islam the case in point, unites ethnic identities as well as 
builds boundaries between other faiths. Islam is a religion that provides a groups’ 
identity with a nationalistic spirit. Religious primordialism may create a tendency in 
the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on his religious beliefs and 
religious identity. This form of loyalty could be understood as an attempt at protecting 
one’s identity, which could be described as a collective imagination based on a sacred 
and primordial identity in a tense and competing inter-religious atmosphere.
Clearly, inter-religious division constitutes a major inhibiting factor to the nation- 
building projects and national development in Nigeria. Consequently, the northern 
part o f the country has unfortunately acquired, though not without justification, a kind 
o f notoriety for religious conflicts. The epithet, o f the 4zone o f  war and death’ 
reserved for northern Nigeria is as a consequence o f the several religious conflicts that 
has manifested in the region.
Although a full-scale religious war has not been experienced in Nigeria, the state has 
had more than its fair share of religious conflicts, resulting in the loss o f several lives 
and property worth several billion of dollars. It is worthwhile to suggest here that the 
basis o f the ongoing religious crises in contemporary Nigeria is deeply rooted in the 
country’s ontological and historical inheritance as a state.
In some measure, Nigeria has had its fair share o f violent conflicts since the period of 
colonial rule. The occurrences, dimensions and destructive consequences o f these 
conflicts have escalated since the attainment o f national independence on October 1,
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1960. While no part o f the nation has been spared the ugly incidence o f violent 
conflicts in one form or another, the northern part o f Nigeria has had more than its fair 
share o f these conflicts. Studies, officially and unofficially, into the immediate and 
remote causes o f a number of these violent uprisings in northern Nigeria have shown 
that they were latently religious in nature irrespective o f their overt manifestations. 
The challenge this poses for research is the need to understand the causal factors of 
religious violence in northern Nigeria, in terms o f the interception o f religion and 
ethnicity.
5.6.1: Explaining R eligious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria
Preceding the creation o f northern Nigeria were serious struggles by different 
fractions o f imperial capitalists (Shenton, 1986:11). The north, though often depicted 
as a homogenous political entity, is far from being so in composition. Northern 
Nigeria is made up of the Middle Belt Provinces comprising o f Kabba, Niger and 
Ilorin, and the Sudan Provinces made up o f Sokoto, Kano, Kastina, Bauchi, Bomu and 
Zaria.
More significant, as Weaver (1961:147) succinctly points out: “Nigeria is a nation by 
decree, and foreign decree at that. No such colony, territory or protectorate as Nigeria 
existed prior to 1898.” The reason for the above assertion is that Nigeria became a 
formal political existence in terms o f a distinct territorial order on December 31, 1899 
(Ayoade, 1973: 57). The formation o f the country was far from being a programmatic 
action o f the British colonial authority whose principal agenda was trade and not the 
construction o f a modem nation (Ballard, 1971; Ayoade, 1973).
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It is worthwhile to note Kirk-Greene’s (1967:6) observes that religious groupings are 
significant not only for their overall numbers but especially for their distribution. 
Looking at the northern region, we find in the far north an almost 100% Muslim 
population. To the south o f that, the Middle Belt88 has vigorous concentrations of 
Christianity among groups of resolute animists. In spite o f the heterogeneous 
composition of the northern demography, for political exigencies from the periods 
immediately following the introduction of partisan politics, the slogan ‘One North, 
One God, One Destiny’ has been the ideological rallying point o f the northern 
oligarchy. It is not surprising that the north is a tag which is synonymous to mean any 
individual who is Muslim and who can trace their origins to northern Nigeria (Maier, 
2000: 143-144). As mentioned earlier, religious groupings in the north are 
characterized by distinct residential areas, where non-Muslims reside, which are 
commonly known as Sabon Gari.
Now attention must be drawn to the fact that the interaction o f Islam with politics and 
society in northern Nigeria is highly dated. The legacies o f the transatlantic trade on 
core northern settlements like Kano and Katsina goes beyond mere commerce as it 
embraced the institutionalization of hegemonic power. With this in mind, Kenny 
(1996:338) notes that as far back as the middle fifteenth century, Islam had become a 
kingly religion in Hausa land as a result o f missionary activities o f Islamic clerics 
from all over western Sudan.
The above assertion finds concurrence with Shenton’s (1986:3) contention that the 
adoption o f Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was embraced by a
M ost inhabitants here are non-M uslims and attem pts to enforce Islam on them in the nineteenth century w ere  
not successful. H ow ever, its people w ere used as slaves within the Sokoto Caliphate and w ere also exported as 
slaves to N orth Africa during the Trans Saharan trade.
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significant section ot the urban common class people, who were engaged in commerce 
and other non-agricultural activities. The attractiveness o f Islam to these groups of 
urban dwellers according to Shenton (1986:3) was the amenability of Islam “to the 
increasing commoditization of everyday life in the city.” Islam, according to him, 
moved beyond the ordering o f man’s and nature’s relationship to embrace “the 
regulation o f man’s relationship with man.”
Conflicts in northern Nigeria is either incited by politicians and the elites, by using 
religion as a mobilizing tool, or by the grass-root people, when there is a perceived 
threat to religious identity. On the former perspective, Aguwa (1997) sheds some light 
in this regard when he notes that religious identity may use religious popularity as a 
mobilization tool by the government to acquire and retain power. In this circumstance 
in northern Nigeria, religion is used as a political tool tends to be the bane of religious 
conflicts in northern Nigeria. He argues that this has been a source o f concern for non- 
Muslims in Nigeria.
Clearly, the overwhelming evidence from an assemblage o f conflict in northern 
Nigeria goes on to suggest that they are primarily religious in nature. Religion has 
been at the forefront of most of these conflicts. It is a task to explore in greater detail 
the role o f Islam, which happens to be the main identity marker in northern Nigeria in 
the overall conflict. A combination o f factors, such as primordialism and political 
mobilization, affect the conflict profile in northern Nigeria. In this case study of 
northern Nigeria, this would appear to be the case. It is expedient to use those 
previous arguments to prepare a case here. Without a doubt, the years after 1980 are 
the most violent period in the history o f Nigeria, especially in the northern region. As
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outlined in the table below, it is easy to see that religious division in northern Nigeria 
is momentous, as most of the 56 major riots in northern Nigeria in some form or 
another, centered primarily on religion.
Table 5. 1: Major Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, 1945-2010
Location Date
Ethnic/ 
R eligious Group R eported Cause
Jos Crisis 1945
Hausa (Muslims) And The 
Igbo (Non-Muslims) Economic Grievance
Markurdi 1947




And The Igbo (Non- 
Muslims)
Political (Agitations Over Set-Date 
For Independence)
Tiv Riots
1960 Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) 
And Tiv (Non-Muslims)
Economic Grievance -  Unpopular 
Order Of Closure On The Yandev 
Market And Ambush Of The Bus 
Taking The Supporters O f The NPC 
To The Wukari Convention Of The 




(Muslims) And Tiv (Non- 
Muslims)











The Sect Against All Non- 
Muslims And Non 
Adherents (Muslims) To 
The Sect
Intra-Religious:
Islamic Fundamentalism And 
Economic Inequality & Poverty
223
Kano 1982 Muslims And Non- 
Muslims




Muslims Students (Izala 
Sect) And Non-Muslims
Grievance In Respect Of Non 




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims (Mainly 
Students))






Muslims And Non- 
Muslims (Mainly 
Students)
Grievance On Purported 






Muslims And Non- 
Muslims (Mainly 
Students)
Non-Muslim Student Won Student 
Union Election
Bauchi
Violence 1991 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Grievance: Buying Meat By A 




And The State Authorities
Opinion Poll By The Fun Times, 
Assertion On Islam And The Holy 
Prophet Muhammad In Respect Of 
Whether People Would Marry 
Prostitutes Who Repented And 
Become Non-Muslims
Kano Riot 1991
Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Planned Visit To The Ancient City 




Riots 1992 Hausa (Muslims) And 
Kafat (Non-Muslims)
Relocation O f The Zangon Kataf 
District Market, Hitherto Controlled 
By The Hausa
Jalingo Riots 1992 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Death Of A Muslim Student By A 
Non-Muslim Over Disputes About 
Water Being Used By The Muslims 
Students For Ablution.
Funtua Riot 1993 Kalakato (Maitatsine Sect) And The Police Retaliatory Attack On Police for Arresting Suspect Kalakato Members
Plateau State 1994 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Political Grievance Over 
Appointment Of A Muslim As A 




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Grievance Over The Refusal Of The 
Parents Of Young Girl Preventing 




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims Political Grievance
Ilorin Riots 1998 & 1999
Muslim Students And 
Non-Muslims Students
A Non-Muslim Place Of Worship 
Was Demolished By Muslims (1998) 
Muslim Elders Insisted That All 
Non-Muslim Places Of Worship Be 
Transferred From The Town (1999)
Kano Riot 1999
Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) 
And The Yoruba (Equal 
Division Between 
Muslims And Non- 
Muslims). Ethnic Conflict 
With Religious 
Undertones
A Retaliatory Riot Emanating From 














Muslims And Non- 
Muslims





Hausa (Muslims) And 
Atyap (Non-Muslims) 
And Non Indigenous Non- 
Muslims
Implementation Of Sharia Law
Damboa Riots 2000 Hausa (Muslims) And Non-Muslims
Residence Of A Pastor Used As 
Non-Muslim Place Of Worship An 




2001 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Muslim Militants Attacked And 
Destroyed A Bible School
Kaduna
Tension 2001 Muslims And Non- Muslims




Hausa (Muslims) And 
Indigenous Non-Muslims
The Beating By Some Muslims Of A 
Non-Muslim Lady That Passed 
Through The Road Barricade In 
Front Of A Mosque Close To Her 






2001 Hausa (Muslims) And 
Igbo & Yoruba Non- 
Muslims
Protests Against America’s Attack 
On Afghanistan
Kaduna Riot 2001
Hausa (Muslims) And 
Igbo & Yoruba Non- 
Muslims
Suspected Arson Attack On Non- 





2001 Fulani Muslims And Tiv Non Muslims
Ownership To Land & Grievance 





2001 Non-Muslims (Ethnic Conflict








Conflict) Land & Ownership Rights
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Jos 2002 Hausa Muslims And 
Indigenous Non-Muslims
Political Grievance: Party Elections
Kaduna Riot 2002 Hausa (Muslims) And Igbo & Yoruba Non- 
Muslims
Planned Hosting Of The Miss World 
Beauty Pageant In Nigeria
Kano 2004
Hausa (Muslims) And 
Igbo & Yoruba Non- 
Muslims
Reaction To The Yelwa/Shendam 
Crisis In Plateau State Where Many 
Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) Were Killed
Plateau Crisis 2004
Hausa (Muslims) And 
Tarok (Indigenous) Non- 
Muslims
Land & Ownership Rights
Bomo Danish 
Cartoon’ Riots 2006
Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Reaction To A Cartoon Caricature Of 
Prophet Muhammad Drawn By A 
Danish Cartoonist
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Kano State 2007 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Drawing A Caricature Of Prophet 




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims




Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Cartoon Of The Prophet Muhammad 






2008 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Muslim Candidate Lost Election To 
Non-Muslim
Bauchi 2009
Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Broken Down Vehicle Impeding 




The Sect Against All Non- 
Muslims And Non 







2009 The Sect Against Security Forces Intra-Sect Division
Jos Riots 2010 Muslims And Non- Muslims
Building Of A Mosque In A Non- 
Muslim Area Of The City
Jos Riots 
(Shen Village) 2010
Muslims And Non- 
Muslims
Reprisal For The Killings Of Four 
Muslim Herdsmen
Table 5.1 above and Chart 5.1 below illustrates that religion is mainly the bane of 
conflicts in northern Nigeria. Hence, as explained in Chapter 1 and 3, since Islam is 
primordially the existing essence of all Muslims in northern Nigeria, it is not 
surprising then that it has the potential to segregate members o f other faiths. It should 
be noted that the imagined collective identity o f Islam has the capacity to hold every 
Muslim individual within its control. The point o f course and a vital question to be 
posed here is why has northern Nigerian not had any significant ethnic/communal 
conflicts between different ethnic groups professing the same religious identity
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(Islam )? It may be fair to imagine for the sake o f  argum ent that that in those instances, 
where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity or a seem ingly 
sim ilar culture, but not in a common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe. 
This showcases the peace dynamics o f Islam within a multi-cultural state, as ethnic 
antagonism  and the fetters o f ethnic boundaries are in many ways eliminated amongst 
adherents o f  the Islamic faith.
At this point, it is pertinent to mention that there is little or none existent statistical 
data on the num ber o f deaths on these conflicts. W hilst the data from later years have 
improved, data from the early years have been unavailable. M ost o f the data collated 
on deaths are usually overblown estimates by newspapers, speculations by NGOs and 
underestim ated data by the governm ent which leaves us with factually inaccurate data 
and vast empirical gaps.
C h art 5.1: M ajo r C onflicts in N o rth e rn  N igeria, 1945-2010










□ Muslims vs Non- 
Muslims
si Islamic Fundamentalists  
vs Sta te  Authorities
□  Islamic Fundamentalists  
vs Muslims/Non-  
Muslims
□ Non-Muslims vs Non 
Muslims (Ethnic 
Conflict)
■  Muslims vs Muslims  
(Ethnic Conflict)
In considering the implications o f the table and chart above, it will readily be seen that 
Islamic fundam entalism  to an extraneous degree threatens the unifying umbrella
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provided by Islam. Notable militant fundamentalism is observed in the Boko Haram 
Jihad (2009), Maitasine Riots (1980), and the Maitasine-Funtua Riot (1993).89 If  one 
assumes but does not concede that there is a stain on Islam in northern Nigeria due to 
the activities o f militant Islam, it is suggested that there is a gap between scriptural 
Islam that is what it preaches and what its followers may practice.
.7: Profiling Major Conflicts in Northern Nigeria
We turn next to review key conflicts in northern Nigeria and in some aspects how
Muslim and non-Muslims identities are interwoven in violence. The striking question 
this section intends to answer is: What is the basis o f violence in northern Nigeria? 
Ikime (1985) traces the inter-linkage between ethnicity and religion in Nigeria. In 
doing so he notes that among the varied ethnic groups in Nigeria, religion was 
interwoven with governance for the preservation of political order, stability of 
government and the endorsement of a moral code in the pre-colonial era. This 
observation finds concurrence in Falola’s (1998:1-2) assertion that “religion and 
politics have been bedfellows throughout Nigerian history.”
As the foregoing argument suggests, from time immemorial, people define themselves 
religiously amongst many other convenient identity profiles, given the polytheist 
religious orientation of Africans, religious identities and factors were never a basis for 
communal disputes in Nigeria until the colonial era. Indeed, the colonial authority in
89 An intra-religious conflict within the paradigm o f northern Nigeria consists o f co-religionists conflicting with  
each other under the umbrella o f a com m on religious group. Recently new  Muslim groups have been founded in 
northern Nigeria. These groups have heen founded mainly on ideology founded in Saudi Arabia. These new  Muslim  
groups have sought to challenge the existing status quo o f  the powerful Islamic Northern hegem ony. H ow ever, 
these confrontations are regarded as trivial as these groups are small in number and do not have sufficient 
m em bership to fom ent rivalry within the Islamic North. Am ong these groups tw o have gained large follow ing and 
have produced intra-religious conflicts; the Izalatul-Bid’a wa Iqamat al Sunna, the Shi’ite and the Maitatsine. An 
im portant observation in sectarian brotherhoods and the orthodox brotherhoods is that despite their differences, 
they all regard religion (Islam) as their primordial identity and aspire to establish Islam as political machinery in 
northern Nigeria.
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Nigeria not only imposed the non-Muslim ideology o f its society on the political order 
and structures o f the nascent nation, they equally used their peculiar educational 
ideology and the non-Muslim missionaries to the maximum advantage for the 
consolidation o f imperial rule in Nigeria. In Nigeria, colonialism engendered a 
condition under which ethnic divisions are conterminous with religious divides and, 
by extension, the framework of power and power struggle, rather paradoxically, is 
favourable to the North.
The field o f religious conflicts has come to be the defining character of the Nigerian 
state and politics since independence in 1960. The negative dimensions o f religious 
crises in Nigeria was aptly stated by Kukah (1993:9) when he suggests that “both 
Islam and Christianity are straddled across the Nigerian polity, each no longer 
knocking and pleading to be admitted, but seeking to take over the architectural design 
and construction o f the Nigerian polity.” The situation has become quite anarchic that, 
by 1980, according to the report on the Kano riots, the north had witnessed over 33 
religious conflicts (Falola, 1998:5). It is clear that most conflicts in northern Nigeria 
are within the parameters of religion as a persistent variable. Yet, there are puzzles. 
What establishes this unrelenting social phenomenon? Is it possible to offer a cause- 
effect account o f ethno-religious violence in northern Nigeria whilst ignoring the 
primordial construction of religion to the individual? Can religion be separated from 
primordalism in northern Nigeria when examining ethnic and religious conflict in 
northern Nigeria? Is it possible to ignore the role o f the politicians and elites?
As may be apparent from the discussion above, the causal pattern for conflict in 
northern Nigeria amongst others is the blend of religious and ethnic identities. A
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common attribute of religion is that it is an identity frame for individual and collective 
differentiation, especially within the context o f the struggle over socially inadequate 
values. Religion simultaneously serves paradoxical functions o f empowerment of 
ethnic groups and co-religionists and the disempowerment o f those that do not belong 
to these identity frames. Now let us assess key conflicts within northern Nigeria, 
which illustrate the point of how Islam sets boundaries from those professing non- 
Islamic faiths, conflicts which may be considered as the most brutal and catastrophic 
in northern Nigeria.
5.7.1: Jos Crisis, 1945 & M arkurdi Crisis, 1947
The colonial period in Nigeria witnessed three major religious and ethno-political 
crises. The first was the Jos crisis o f 1945 involving the Hausa (Muslims) and the Igbo 
non-Muslims). The crisis was in some respects a blend of religious and economic 
variables. Due to the severity of this crisis, the Igbo had to relocate from their former 
residential location within Jos. The second colonial inter-religious crisis of note in 
Nigeria took place in Markurdi in 1947. The 1947 Markurdi crisis, involved the Hausa 
(Muslims) and the Tiv (mainly non-Muslims). This crisis was basically rooted in 
ethnic and political factors. The Tiv often perceived the Hausa as ‘strangers’ despite 
their control o f the traditional political power through the emirate system, a condition, 
the Tiv despised and resisted. The Hausa political domination of the Tiv in their own 
region was made possible through colonial rule that was favourably disposed to the 
Hausa-Fulani system of government. In other words, the Markurdi crisis of 1947 was 
a crisis for the consolidation of power by the Hausa and a counter-hegemonic struggle 
by the Tiv who were not too comfortable with their domination and oppression by a 
‘foreign’ power in their own land. But, what is observed here is that the varying
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religious identities provoked this conflict as there was a clear demarcation o f religious 
identities.
5.7.2: The G ideon M eriodere U rhobo Article, 1949
In practical terms, the first major religious schism in Northern Nigerian was that 
provoked by an article in Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe’s The African Pilot newspapers, on 
February 20, 1949. The article written by Gideon Meriodere Urhobo, the founder of 
G od’s Kingdom Society in Nigeria and a member o f the Zikist movement. Mr. 
Urhobo in a most unkind and provocative manner slandered both Islam and the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad. For him, Muhammad was not a true prophet, just as the Holy 
Q ur’an was not God’s book. He also caused provocation by alleging that Muhammad 
was a not a true prophet (Falola 1988:41). While, there was no violence associated 
with this incidence, there were reactions from Northern elite and the political 
establishment, including the Sultan. The political dimension to all of these is 
appreciated when one recalls that Islam was, and remains a primordial identity marker 
for Muslims, in northern Nigeria.
5.7.3: Kano Riots, 1953
The third major crisis before Nigeria’s independence was the Kano riots of 1953 
(discussed partially above). Though contained all the trappings of an ethnic crisis, the 
Kano riots of 15th-18th May, 1953 was essentially political (the conflict was centered 
in the out skirts o f Fagge and in Sabon Gari, where most Southerners reside in Kano). 
Nkemdirim, (1975:60) notes that cost of the riot left 36 people dead and 240 people 
wounded. As earlier noted the riots had its roots in the negative and uncomplimentary 
treatment melted out to Northern political leaders of the NPC, in Lagos on account of
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their objections to the Self-Government Motion in 1956, by the Sardauna o f Sokoto, 
moved on the floor of the House of Representatives, Lagos, by Chief Anthony 
Enahoro, a member of the Chief Obafemi Awolowo led AG, on the 31st o f March 
1953. The majority members of the NPC moved a motion to defer the debate until 
1956. This motion agitated members of the Action Group and thereafter labeled the 
Northern members of the House of Representatives as ‘traitors’ and ‘colonial stooges’ 
o f the British. In addition, the Northern legislators were jeered and rebuked as they 
left the House of Representatives.
At a later date, the AG under the leadership o f its Deputy Leader Chief Ladoke 
Akintola, went on a tour o f the North and visited Kano, the Northern crowd paid them 
back in their own coins, by retaliating the humiliation which their leaders experienced 
by the Lagos crowd. The riots started as an ethnic riot aimed at the Yoruba ethnic 
group. However, the victims of the riots were mainly the Igbos. The riots later took a 
religious dimension. Nkemdirim (1975:82) recorded the Northern rebels’ agitations: 
“the Ibos have killed all the Northerners in the Sabon G ari...we must kill the pagans 
before they kill us”. This illustrates the religious variable o f the conflict.
5.7.4: The Tiv Riots: 1960 & 1964
Anifowose (1982) is the most authoritative work on political violence in Tiviand.
These people known for their republican political tradition were predominantly non- 
Muslims. The irrepressible nature of the Tiv was demonstrated by their protracted 
resistance to British colonialism. They were one of the last groups of Nigerians 
pacified by the British colonialist, Anifowose, (1982:73). The Hausa, British colonial 
power, placed the administration of Tivland in the hand o f Hausa-Fulani political 
authority under the indirect rule system through the Native Authorities.
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The centralized power o f the Hausa-Fulani emirate system which formed the basis of 
the indirect rule ran contrary to the egalitarian politics o f the Tiv people. To engender 
an administrative structure where none hitherto existed, District Heads were created 
by the British authority. The District Heads became not only arbitrary, but oppressive 
and exploitative in administering the region.
The emergence and development of a political party in Tivland provided a veritable 
platform for the Tiv to challenge the continued domination o f the Hausa-Fulani 
oligarchy and secure the self-determination o f Tiv people. This expectedly pitched the 
Tiv people against the NPC controlled Northern Region Government. To complicate 
matters, the Tiv people under their umbrella political party, the UMBC, led by Joseph 
Tarka formed an alliance with the leading oppositional party to the NPC, the AG. 
Consequent on the radical posture of the Tiv people, the Northern Regional 
Government employed administrative, judicial and police powers of the Native 
Authority in the Tiv Division to intimidate, subjugate, control and oppress the people, 
Anifowose, (1982:97).
In addition, the use o f taxation as a political instrument against the Tiv people was 
instrumental to the emergence of the conflict. As Anifowose, (1982:97) notes, that 
arbitrary taxation, were weapons of victimization. Members of the opposition party 
complained o f arbitrary and heavy levies. The tax raid procedure made Tax Rate 
Clerks ‘terrors’ in the rural areas. In addition, opposition supporters were sometimes 
jailed for a period not less than six months.
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The immediate cause of the 1960 riots was the attempt to impose an unpopular order 
o f the closure on the Yandev Market established by a member o f the UMBC, first by 
Mr. Kumbul Akapi and later by the clan head, assisted by the Native authority police 
(Anifowose, 1982). Severe clashes between supporters of NPC and UMBC ensued. A 
further precipitant o f the riots was the ambush o f the bus taking the supporters o f the 
NPC to the Wukari Convention of the party in September, 1960, on account o f the 
persistent refusal o f the Native Authority to give the opposition permits for their 
political rallies. The death of a man as a result of gun shot by the Tiv Native 
Authority riot squad provoked serious riots which continued till October o f 1960 
Anifowose, (1982). The uprising left 30,000 houses burnt, £500,000 assessed on 
damaged properties, 45 people dead and about 5,000 people were captured and 
imprisoned (Nkemdirim, 1975:110).
The seed o f conflicts in an independent Nigeria started following the Federal elections 
in 1964. Nigeria was engulfed in civil unrests, notably the T iv’s riot 1964 contending 
against the inflated proportions of the 1963 national census, and attempts by the ruling 
NPC to curtail Tiv ethno-nationalism championed by the Northern Progressive Front 
(NPF) and enabling the Hausa/Fulani domination in Northern region of Nigeria. What 
is obvious is that the Tiv riots which were both political and economic in nature, being 
motivated by the need to redress injustice, oppression and achieve self-determination. 
However, one may suggest that the absence o f sharing a common religion, created an 
absence o f an overarching solidarity among people divided on ethnicity in the region.
5.7.5: M aitatsine Riots (1980, 1982, 1984 & 1985)
The Maitatsine riots that engulfed major cities in the Northern part o f Nigeria started
from Kano in December of 1980, and extended to Bulumkutu near Maiduguri, the
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capital o f Bomu state. The activities o f Maitatsine which spilled into Rigasa,90in 
Kaduna State in October 1982, sailed to Jimeta-Yola91 between February and March 
1984, before finally berthing at Gombe92 by April, 1985, was a religious phenomenon 
o f unparallel dimension in Nigerian history, both in terms o f style, followings, 
zealotry and military-like execution. As argued in chapter 1, religious primordialism 
may create a tendency in the individual to place excessive emphasis and loyalty on his 
religious beliefs and religious identity.
An understanding o f the causes o f the riots cannot be separated from the unmasking of 
the central figure and motivating force o f the movement, in the person of 
Muhammadu Marwa, an ‘Islamic’ preacher and pseudo-Muslim prophet and citizen of 
Cameroon. Isichei (1987:195) quoting Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, noted that Maitatsine 
was “a trail of one-track minded Mallam versed only in the recitation of the Qur’an by 
heart, and not fully comprehending what it contained.” In shedding more light on this 
religious personage, Falola (1998:141) notes that “Marwa was an enigmatic character, 
whose image has become mysticized by both his followers and his enemies. He 
apparently had an impressive ability to travel far and wide, to evade security 
networks, and to mobilize thousands of people”. It is pertinent to note here that 
M aitatsine’s teachings were rejected by all the conventional Muslim groups in 
northern Nigeria.
90 Follow ing a police enquiry on the activities o f the fanatics, in the small village o f  Bulumkutu, the fanatics engaged  
and enraged in butchery resulting to 3 ,350  people being killed and the bodies m aimed (Isichei, 1987).
91 Fanatics w ho had fled the Bulumkutu riots relocated to Yola. H ow ever, they began their dreaded religious 
activities. After the usual police investigations, an assault on Yola central market and destroyed market stalls o f  
2 ,0 0 0  traders and 6 0 ,0 0 0  inhabitants o f Jimeta w ere left hom eless and about 1 ,000  people died (Isichei, 1987).
92 Follow ing a tip off, the police attem pted to arrest m em bers o f  the sect, in Pantami ward located in G om be. 
H ow ever, severe fighting broke out as sect m em bers w ere led by Yusufu Adamu, a disciple o f  Maitatsine. O ver  
100 people lost their lives in the encounter (Isichei, 1987).
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Marwa considered himself, a prophet o f God who had equal standings with the 
Prophet Muhammad. Maitatsine not only inspired his followers, who were mostly the 
wretched o f the society and lumpen-proletariat elements, he also assured these socially 
disempowered people of eternal life (Falola, 1998:141). His members were of 
different sexes and age groups, some o f whom were from neighbouring West African 
countries such as Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger.
Muhammadu Marwa was known to his followers as a reformer and to others as a 
fundamentalist. As noted by Riesebrodt (2000: 272):
Reformers claim to transform social institutions in order to realize the 
spirit o f the ancient community. The fundamentalists, on the other hand, 
claim to restore social institutions according to the letter and the law o f the 
ancient community with regard to the past, their approach can be called 
“mythical,” referring to a timeless, unchangeable, fixed eternal truth. With 
regard to the present and (near) future, their view is often eschatological
and chiliastic.
This explanation, clearly defines Marwa’s religious objectives and ideology. In
another dimension, Ischiel (1987:201) points out that most of Maitatsine’s followers
were poor and he calculatingly recruited young men, homeless and jobless, who had 
just arrived from the countryside. His claim to restore ‘order’ in public made the 
Maitatsine movement quite attractive to the jobless youths. Hickey (1984:235) 
observes that the urban Muslim poor were attracted to Maitatsine because of his 
condemnation of hypocrisy and affectation of the nouveau riche and his promise of 
salvation to God’s virtuous people. Hickey further notes that this attracted the 
almajirai (the young students o f the Koran). However, Hiskett (1987) argues that most 
o f M aitatsine’s followers were from the social and economic class o f the ‘ Yan-ci-
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rani. These were non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims who came from the rural villages to 
seek wealth in the urban towns of Hausa land.
Similarly, Hunwick (1992:154) tells us regarding the character o f the Maitatsine 
followers that they lacked economical and social influence, and therefore possessed a 
strong sense o f grievance against the state and the elites. Assumptions that economic 
deterioration, inflation, unemployment, mass poverty, maladministration and endemic 
corruption in the context of rapid national wealth from petrol-dollars, has been figured 
as being responsible for popular dissent at the root of the Maitatsine revolts (Hunwick 
1992: 154). This economic dimension to the radical deployment of Islam, by the 
underclass and the ruling class in the North is aptly captured by Kenny, (1996:361):
The political manipulation of religion is made easier by the economic 
depression of the country, beginning with the fall in oil prices in the early 
1980s. This has left the masses of unemployed youth who are mobilized by 
extremist leaders (the Kaduna Mafia) to riot; some youth caught in the Kaduna 
riot o f 1987 admitted being paid to join the riot.
An important factor contributing to the inflammatory spread o f the Maitatsine riots 
was the ‘alm ajiri’ system, whereby parents entrust their sons to an Islamic teacher, 
who often takes them from their homes. According to Falola (1997:138), the 
Maitatsine violence can be explained as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism, 
political decadence and economic troubles o f the 1970s. One could therefore agree 
that religion was used as a channel to protest the prevailing grievance of economic 
downturn, and the amass corruption by politicians, which was considered as threats to 
the sanctity o f Islamic tradition. Thus, “like Luther and Calvin in the sixteenth 
century Maitatsine sought to sweep away the accretions which, he believed, had 
polluted Islam in the new and materialistic Nigeria” (Hickey, 1984:254).
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Altogether, then, the actions of Muhammadu Marwa and his followers were clearly 
without regard to the laws of the land. In 1980 Kano, the commercial centre of 
northern Nigeria could justifiably be described as the epicenter of the Maitatsine 
criminal violence against Muslims and non-Muslims in the name o f Islam. The loss o f 
human lives were immeasurable, that it was alleged that the carnage made the 
abundance o f human bodies and or parts to be used as sacrificial charms (Hiskett, 
1987:216). Many police officers were killed in these confrontations. At least 4,000 
people died as a result of the uprising (Roy, 1994: 114).
While the violence was in some sense against state institutions and agencies, it is 
however, ironic that the Maitatsine had no concise political agenda. At best the sect 
was peopled by disgruntled elements. The Report o f the Tribunal o f Inquiry on Kano 
Disturbances 1981 noted that the fanatics (talakawas)  generally had a grudge against 
the privileged people of society.
From this discussion, it is safe to submit that the Maitatsine riots which started in 
Kano and spread to other parts of the north was a classical case o f relative deprivation 
based on socio-economic needs, especially, given the deteriorating economic 
conditions, corruption and the monumental mismanagement of the country by the 
NPN. But, what is most important to note here that, religious identity was the channel 
used to convey socio-economic grievance, through radicalizing the perceptions of 
Islam. One may speculate here that religion being central to the identity o f the grass- 
root people, had the potential to convey public grievances.
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5.7.6: Kano Riot, 1982
This crisis which lasted twelve days, took place between the 18th and 29th December, 
1982. The immediate cause of the crisis was the decision o f the Christ Anglican 
Church, Faggae, Kano to build a bigger place o f worship within the premises o f their 
former Church. Incidentally, the location of the new place o f worship was close to the 
fence o f a road that separated the place o f worships’ premises, and that o f the Faggae 
Central Mosque. Now, the proposed building o f non-Muslim place o f worship was 
seen as a threat to Islamic identity in the area. Despite the objections o f the Muslims 
to the building project, the foundation of the new non-Muslim place o f worship was 
laid by the visiting Archbishop Runcie of the Church o f England. Tensions mounted 
between Muslims and non-Muslims as a result o f these circumstances.
Furthermore, the attempt by Muslim fanatics to burn the non-Muslim place of worship 
was effectively frustrated by the police. However, the Muslim fanatics in frustration 
marched to Sabon-Gari area of the city and destroyed other non-Muslim places of 
worship. Eight non-Muslim places of worship were destroyed, with the recorded 
casualty figure o f as much as five thousand people. It is interesting to note that the 
non-Muslim place o f worship had been in this location for forty years before the 
Faggae Central Mosque was built.
Broadly speaking, one might be inclined to conclude, that a remote cause of the riot 
was the fear o f political intervention by non-Muslims in the affairs o f the nation, 
which at that time was under the control o f a Northern Muslim President, Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari, and a northern based political party, the NPN. The visit o f the 
Archbishop Runcie barely two months after a similar visit by Pope John Paul, on the
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invitation o f President Shehu Shagari, was perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as an 
indication of the dominance of non-Muslims.
In much clearer terms, the visits of the two non-Muslim leaders within two months, 
and the aggressive evangelisms o f winning converts by non-Muslims were some of 
the fatal stimulus that caused the crisis. This situation constituted a frontal attack on 
Islamic identity and also on the foundation of the feudalist oligarchy o f the Northern 
elites.
However, the most likely alternative explanation o f these findings is that, the crisis 
was as a result o f the perception that non-Muslims appeared to be taking a central 
place in the affairs o f the nation, and many Muslims were falling to the allure o f non- 
Muslim evangelism. Hence, it is not surprising that to the Muslims, there was a need 
to preserve its religious identity.
5.7.7: Kaduna Riot (Kafanchan), 1987
An appalling trend in northern Nigerian institutions o f higher learning is the siege of
religious riots between Muslims and non-Muslim students. It is important to note that
93these riots occur mainly in northern universities in Nigeria. However, the University
<JJ U n iversity  o f  Sokoto , Students Riots, 1986
The U niversity’s Students Union was in the process of' organizing a disco party and a beauty pageant in 
rem em brance o f Nana Asma’u (17 9 3 -1 8 6 4 ), the daughter o f the great Jihadist, Uthman dan Fodio. H ow ever, 
M uslim students, especially those belonging to the Izala sect w ent on rampage, attacked non-M uslim  students and 
caused destruction to the U niversity’s ’ properties. They w ere protesting that the usage o f  Nana Asma’u in a beauty 
contest, defied Islamic rites.
Kaduna P o lytechn ic Chapel Riots, 1988
M uslim s students on the 9 ,h o f  March 1988 rioted over the establishm ent o f  a Chapel for non-M uslim  students. The 
cause o f  the riot was due to the fact that the Chapel was to be constructed near the M osque. The crisis was fed 
upon by historical ethno-religious contestations betw een  the M uslims and non-M uslim s in Kaduna state. In 
addition, a non-M uslim  Chapel near a Mosque was consideied to be a m enace to M uslims.
Ahm adu B ello  U niversity, Zaria, R iots, 1988
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of Ibadan (southwest Nigeria), on the 5th of May 1986 witnessed clashes between 
Muslims and non-Muslims over the site o f the University Chapel. Closely connected 
to this explanation in respect of religious clashes in northern Nigerian tertiary 
institutions, is that Islam as a primordial identity is prevalent only in northern Nigeria. 
Although, they are usually skirmishes between students within the confines o f the 
institution, however, in most cases these conflicts extend to Muslims and non- 
Muslims outside the boundaries of the institutions, extending into nearby towns.
It is sufficient enough to assert that, no one would have thought that the decision of 
the Federation o f Christian Students (FCS), a non-Muslim organisation of the Federal 
College o f Education, Kafanchan to host weeklong activities to mark the end of its 
annual week from 6th March 1987, could result in blood-letting that followed on the 
heels o f this innocuous religious celebration. The first indication of crisis had to do 
with the objection o f the Muslim Students’ Society (MSS), to the FCS banner which 
proclaimed the campus ‘Jesus Campus’. Now, this banner was considered as a threat 
to the Muslims students’ identity. This was quickly resolved with the intervention of 
the college’s authority to which the matter was reported.
However, the immediate cause o f the riots was the allegation that Reverend Abubakar 
Bako, a non-Muslim convert from Islam who was the guest preacher on the occasion, 
misinterpreted the Holy Qur’an during this speech. This led to serious altercations 
between the Muslim and non-Muslim students on the campus, leading to the closure
Again, in June 1988 M uslim and non-M uslim students clashed over the Student Union elections. A non-M uslim  
student w on the Students Union election , which was violently refuted by Muslim students. In the brouhaha, 
students w ere injured and property destroyed. The University had to close dow n.
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of the school by the State Government. Unfortunately, despite this pre-emptive 
closure, the crisis still spread outside the campus to Kafanchan Township.
Given these premises, students were reported to have moved to town to mobilize 
support. Unfortunately, the crisis was fed upon by historical ethno-religious 
contestations between the indigenous Kafat (non-Muslim) population and their Hausa 
(Muslim) settlers who were perceived as ‘over-lords’. As Kukah (1993:185) picks the 
point that the crisis was a fallout of “many years o f degradation and humiliation.”
Nevertheless, the riots lasted three days, leading to the killing of many Hausa- 
Muslims and the destruction of mosques. Making reference to the Donli Committee 
on the crisis, Ibrahim (1989:67) noted that a total of 19 people were killed, 169 hotels 
and beer parlous destroyed. In addition to this, 152 private buildings, 152 churches, 5 
mosques and 95 vehicles were damaged (Ibrahim, 1991).
As a result, people, mostly of the Hausa-Muslim stock fled in droves to other safe 
parts o f the North. The backlash resulted in several inter-religious crises in places like 
Kaduna, Zaria town, Wusasa, Samaru, Funtua and Kastina. Sadly, the police could not 
prevent the mayhem that escalated throughout the town (Ibrahim, 1989:69). It is 
worthy to note that, even the Hausa-Fulani, who were non-Muslims, were not left out 
o f the violent attacks by Hausa-Fulani Muslims. In the words of Ibrahim (1989:68), 
Hausa-Fulani non-Muslims were “soughed for and executed”. Perhaps, this illustrates 
the notion that where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common ethnicity but 
not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.
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The conflict took an ugly turn, when Muslim students at the Bayero University, Kano, 
attacked their non-Muslim colleagues on account of the Kafanchan riots. The non- 
Muslim lecturers at Bayero University were also not spared in this violence by the 
Muslim students. The violence by Muslim students at Bayero University similarly 
spread into the city, leading to violent conflict between non-Muslims and Muslims. In 
Kano and Kaduna States, the government was forced on account o f the riots to close 
schools. And for 8 days, markets in Kaduna, Funtua, Zaria, and Kastina remained 
under lock and key (Falola, 1998:185).
Clearly, the underlining causes of the crisis, which had to do with grievances based on 
the age-long injustice and disempowerment of the people o f southern Kaduna (non- 
Muslims) by the Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) were not addressed.94 To President Ibrahim 
Babaginda, the military Head of State, the riots was viewed as: “the civilian 
equivalent of an attempted coup d ’etat organized against the Military Government and 
the Nigerian nation” (Hunwick, 1992:153). As stated above, the riots can be safely 
labeled as religiously motivated. In this light, the Federal Government, instead of 
allaying fears pertaining to imagined threats to primordial identities, went ahead to 
ban religious organizations in schools, with offenders liable to five years 
imprisonment, thus losing a very valuable opportunity to attack and correct the 
cankerworm at the root of the crisis. In truth however, it is fair to say that, religion 
provided the cannon for the conflagration of the riot, as it awakened the deep political, 
historical, ethnic and most of all the deeply religious differences between the Muslims 
and non-Muslims.
94 The indigenes o f  southern Kaduna w ere considered as political and religious m inorities
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More fundamentally, a clear confirmation o f the superficial treatment o f these riots 
was the outbreak of another Kafanchan riot on the 22nd o f May, 1999. This time over 
the installation o f Alhaji M. Mohammed as the new Emir of Jema’a by Colonel Umar 
Faruk Ahmed, the former military administrator of Kaduna state; an action which the 
people o f Southern Kaduna violently and vociferously contested. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, they (non-Muslims of southern Kaduna) demanded the discontinuity o f the 
rule by the Emirate; a position that was opposed by the Hausa-Muslims. In the 
aftermath o f the conflict, over 100 people were killed and properties worth several 
millions o f naira were destroyed.95
5.7.8: Bauchi V iolence, 1991
Between the 20th -  24th April, 1991, Bauchi played host to one o f the most gruesome
riots in recent Nigerian history. Unlike previous riots, there was no identifiable leader, 
nor was it championed by any particular sect. There were different versions o f the 
precipitants o f the riots, which started from confrontation at an abattoir in Tafawa 
Balewa, a town outside Bauchi.
Interestingly, the cause of this conflict is similar to Hindu and Muslim conflicts in 
India, where the cause of some conflicts relates to the ‘cow’ which is a sacred animal 
to the Hindus, but a delicacy to the Muslims (Kakar, 1996:44). In a similar sense, 
pork is an unholy and impure animal to Muslims, but it is commonly regarded as 
suitable for consumption by non-Muslims.
There are, admittedly, different speculations pertaining to the cause o f this conflict. 
One version states that, a Muslim who had brought meat from a non-Muslim butcher
95 Newswatch M agazine, June 14, 1999, p .28
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was refused his refund, when a fellow Muslim scolded him for buying from a non- 
Muslim. The other story was that a Muslim was informed that the non-Muslim butcher 
had sold him pork instead of beef (Falola, 1998:204). Another narrative is that the 
main cause of the conflict was the allegation by an unidentified leader o f the town that 
non-Muslims would be allowed to slaughter pigs and dogs at the local abattoir. It is 
probably impossible now, to discover the correct version o f what transpired. Whatever 
the true account was, these speculations sparked off the crisis, with non-Muslims and 
Muslims taking sides with their co-religionists. Unfortunately, adherents o f the two 
religions in the area were ethnically divided, hence the ethno-religious dimension of 
the crisis (Hausa-Fulani and the Sayawa). As was the case with other religious crisis, 
other parts o f the state replicated the crisis, thus, engendering a serious religious 
conflict. On April 20, the riot spread to Dass, with Muslims killing non-Muslims 
(Aguwa, 1997:339).
At a point in time, a vehicle conveying corpses from the fracas broke down and in the 
course o f transferring the dead bodies to another vehicle, the people who saw this 
incident spread the news of dead bodies of Muslims killed in the riots. Bauchi was 
subsequently engulfed in violence, following the rumoured arrival o f the dead bodies 
to the Specialist Hospital in Bauchi. Muslims from near-by villages came into Bauchi 
to assist in the destruction of their ‘enemies’.
Given the antecedence of the Nigerian police in similar crises, it was not surprising 
that the police were not only helpless, but also lost control in face of monumental 
anarchy. To control the raging crisis, the Federal Government sent in the army to quell 
the riot. In a way, even the army complicated the crisis, as many rioters were killed by
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the army. This occurred when a crowd formed part o f the entourage of the Emir of 
Bauchi to the Government House, on the mistaken belief by the army that they were 
about to attack the Emir. Clearly, this aggravated the anger of the Muslims, and it led 
to further attacks and violence. Consequently, the Muslims accused the police and the 
army o f bias for the non-Muslims.
In any event, while the crisis cannot be separated from its religious roots and other 
multiple causes. As Falola (1998:205) rightly notes that: “ ....economic decline in the 
country, religious divides and manipulation, and attempts by minorities to assert 
themselves” were factors that informed the violence. By the time the riot got to 
Bauchi city, it had moved beyond the original incident to encompass a general attack 
on southerners, mainly non-Muslims who were perceived to be dominating the 
economy o f Bauchi to the detriment of the indigenes (Muslims).
It is worth stressing at this point that, the facts on ground showed that the crisis apart 
from being religious was also interwoven with political manipulations. In drawing this 
connection and quoting a source, Imobighe (2003: 134) had this to say:
...the 1991 mayhem was precipitated by the woeful performance o f Hausa- 
Fulani candidates in the local government elections. Sensing that they had 
lost grip of power in the area, they decided to throw the town into confusion 
to create a situation of anarchy. The motive was to stop a Basayi man 
(Sayawa man) from heading the local government.
What matters here is whether this statement therefore, is one o f those little clues that 
seem to state that the chief principle o f northern Islamization and politics was 
essentially to unify, albeit by coercion, the non-Muslims Jiving in the north, to accept 
willy-nilly the sacrosanct ordination of the northern hegemony in the political entity
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called Nigeria. But, what one can understand from the events o f this riot, is that the 
Hausa-Fulani Muslims imagine that their national identity is threatened when an 
election is won or power is conceded to a non-Muslim.
5.7.9: Katsina Riot, 1991
This riot centered on a certain Malam Yakubu Yahaya, a Shi'ite preacher, and former, 
Arabic teacher at the Kastina Teachers’ College. Yahaya had a large base of 
supporters. In terms of his preaching and political disposition, Malam Yahaya could 
be said to be a religious puritan, and anti-state agent in orientation. “Yahaya believed 
he was sent by God to end injustice, oppression, and exploitation in Nigeria” (Falola, 
1998:195). He was against secular authorities, which he believed are inferior to divine 
authority. As Falola (1998: 195) points out, Malam Yakubu Yahaya deemed it right 
that the Nigerian government should be overthrown, if necessary by forceful means. It 
was therefore not surprising that, he was always at logger-heads with the state 
government.
The immediate cause o f the riot was the publication o f an opinion poll by the Fun 
Times; one o f the publications in the stable of the Federal Government owned Daily 
Times. The polls enquired whether people would marry prostitutes who repented and 
became non-Muslims. Malam Yakubu Yahaya, with his followers in throes, matched 
to the Katsina office of the Daily Times castigating the Federal Government, and the 
newspaper on account of the publication of the opinion poll. Another offending article
96 It is crucial to note that the Tiv (non-M uslim s) in Awe Local G overnm ent in Nasaravva state have been involved  
in a similar conflict with the Fulani. The T iv’s are settlers in the tow n, which is largely constituted by the Fulani 
ethnic group and other ethnics (M uslims). The T iv’s mainly had notions of'grievance pertaining to rights to land 
use and ownership and threats to life, which occurred systematically from D ec. 2000  - June 2001 . Com plaints to 
the Azara Traditional Council in connection with the perceived threats w ere not addressed by the Council or by the 
Police. Unfortunately, the Sarkin Azara, Alhaji Ibrahim Musa was assassinated by unknown people on the 1 2'1’ o f  
June 2001 This incident triggered reciprocation on suspicion that the Tivs w ere behind the said assassination. The 
crisis resulted in the butchery"of the Tiv people and displacing many from their hom es.
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in the magazine made reference to the Bible and Qur’an concerning prostitutes that 
changed to lead good lives (Falola, 1998:196-197). The most offensive o f the stories 
was the reference to the love affair of Prophet Muhammad to a prostitute that became 
his wife. This to Malam Yahaya and his followers desecrated Islam and the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad. For all these perceived irreverence to Islam, a religious 
motivated riot ensued and copies of the magazine were seized and burnt.
Predictably, one may argue that the crisis would have been better managed, but for the 
careless statement o f the State Governor, Colonel John Madaki, a non-Muslim, who 
threatened to kill Yahaya publicly, if he generated trouble again (Falola, 1998:197). 
Yahaya, subsequently denounced the Nigerian government and its laws, and pledged 
his allegiance solely to Allah. He canvassed for an Islamic government in the country, 
which would be institutionalized through a revolution. On account of this, Mu'allum 
Ibrahim Al-Zakzay, another Tzalla’ Islamic fundamentalist leader based in Zaria, who 
doubled as Yahaya’s leader, mobilized his members to storm Katsina. This posed 
serious security problems in the state. The stage was set for an epic confrontation with 
the state, and its security agencies with the arrival o f Al-Zakzay in Kastina for the 
planned protest march on 16th April, 1991, with about 2000 fundamentalists. He 
instructed Yahaya to proceed to the Central Mosque on Friday 19th April, 2001, to 
preach, in what turned out to be a major confrontation with the State enforcement 
agency.
At this point, Yahaya, supported by his people, carried out Al-Zakzay orders on the 
appointed day in spite o f heavy security mounted by the state. Expectedly, in their 
implacable frontal attack on the perceived notion o f religious nationalism, there were
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clashes between the supporters o f Yahaya and the police, resulting in heavy casualties. 
Three policemen were reported killed and eight injured, while twenty-nine civilians 
sustained injuries. Yahaya was subsequently arrested after surrendering himself to the 
police. He was tried by the Justice Rabiu Mohammed Danlami under the Civil 
Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Decree of 1987, found guilty and subsequently jailed.
Strictly speaking, the sects’ crucial position and contention were in respect o f the 
secularity of the Nigerian state, the desire to Islamize Nigeria and co-opt Muslims to 
affirm their allegiance solely to Allah, rather than the Nigerian state with its non- 
Muslim oriented laws. Clearly, this gave the riot a sort of religious construction. The 
state inefficiency, even when it pertains to matters bordering on its sanctity and 
continued existence, like other times, was highly palpable as events before and during 
this riots clearly showed. Additionally, Falola (1998:203) adds that the fact that the 
followers o f Yahaya’s sect lost their fear o f death, the police and the army could not 
find the capacity to avert the crisis.
5.7.10: Kano Riot, 14 October, 1991
The riot broke out on the 14th October, 1991. The immediate cause of this riot was the 
planned visit to the ancient city of Kano by Evangelist Reinhard Bonnke on the 
invitation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). An event which was 
accompanied by massive and unprecedented media hypes, to the chagrin and 
annoyance of the predominantly Muslim Kano people. To worsen the situation, the 
Race Course for which approval was denied to the Muslims for a similar activity 
months ago, was approved for the use o f non-Muslims for the Evangelist Bonnke 
crusade. Muslims, thus, insisted on the total cancellation o f the crusade. The
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aggressive campaign by the non-Muslims for the crusade, in spite of the Muslim 
opposition was also viewed as non-Muslims over-stepping their bounds and 
threatening Islamic identity.
In the ensuing riots that broke out on the 14th October, many non-Muslims were 
murdered in cold blood, properties destroyed, places o f worship, shops, vehicles and 
government properties burnt. The urban warfare was quite serious at the Sabon Gari 
area o f the city. According to Falola (1998: 212), official sources reported twelve 
deaths large numbers of injuries, the burning o f thirty-four houses, one non Muslim 
place o f worship, a mosque, forty-two shops, four hotels, fifteen cars, eight trucks, and 
nine motorcycles were set ablaze, and many public buildings damaged.
Beyond the immediate religious problems, the riot was a good case of political 
manipulation of religious sentiments to cause disaffection and crisis in northern 
Nigeria. It was this that informed Falola (1998:213) to note that scheming Kano 
politicians informed the less privileged people that the non-Muslims are their enemies. 
It hardly seems misleading, to suggest that the riots can be understood as not only 
against intolerance for unbelievers (non-Muslims), but also as perceived grievance in 
respect o f economic stagnation, youth unemployment, popular impoverishment and 
disempowerment within the context of the suffocating Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), being implemented by the Federal Government, and the struggle 
for power among the political class in the context o f the transitional politics at the 
time.
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5.7.11: Zangon-Kataf, Riots 1992 & 2001
The Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) community had lived in Zango-Kataf since the 17th 
century. To complicate matters within Zango-Kataf, the Hausa-Muslims were in 
control o f political power in the community. They were also largely regarded by the 
indigenous Katafs (non-Muslims) as settlers, impostors and oppressors. The Kataf 
were predominantly a non-Muslim ethnic group. These differences in identities gave 
rise to age-long grievances between these groups.
It is important to bear in mind that the Zango-Kataf riot was orchestrated by the 
misgivings over the relocation of the Zangon Kataf district market, hitherto controlled 
by the Hausa Muslims. The market relocation on the 6th of February, 1992, by the 
Chairman of the then newly created Zangon Kataf Local Government, was an 
implementation o f a 1988 resolution by the default Kachia Local Government for the 
reason o f space, lack o f public conveniences and accessibility. The possibility of 
increased revenue was also part of the considerations for the decision to relocate the 
market by the local government (Akinteye, Wuye & Ashafa, 1999b:223).
In expressing their displeasure and opposition to the relocation of the market, the 
Hausa-Fulani Muslims attacked Kataf non-Muslim women, who came to the market 
for business on the official opening date. Thereafter, Kataf men burdened with 
grievance counter-attacked the Hausa. The riots lasted from the 17th to the 18th o f May 
1992. Given the ethnic colouration of the crisis, despite the state government’s 
immediate institution o f a Judicial Commission of Enquiry to look into the crisis, the 
riot spread to Kaduna, Zaria, and other parts o f the state. Most o f the victims were 
Hausa-Muslims of Zangon Kataf. At least 1,536 Hausas were killed in Zangon Kataf.
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Most o f the houses in the town were razed to the ground and Hausa household 
property valued at N29, 173,850 destroyed (Mustapha, 2003). Subsequently, the 
Army had to be called in to quell the riot.
It is safe to assume that, though religious primordialism was an attribute to the 
conflict, the cause o f the crisis also forms along, political and socio-economic lines. 
While Zangon Kataf is to some extent a Hausa-Muslim community, the surrounding 
villages were Atyap (non-Muslims). There were about fifty autonomous villages in the 
area (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 224). However, there had been cases and complaints of 
political domination starting from the period of the indirect rule system. The division 
between the Hausa and ethnic Atyap was fractionalized on religious lines. This 
condition existed during colonial rule, when the Atyap were subjected to the rule of 
the Zaria Emirate Council who appointed District Heads for the area. Thus we have a 
situation whereby the commercial and political headquarters of the Atyap was under 
alien rule of the Hausa-Muslims, a condition that they resented.
Under the Emirate system, during colonial times, the indigenous Atyap were exploited 
by the emirate to provide revenue for the colonial authorities. This laid the foundation 
for grievances emanating from the Atyap identity group. As mentioned earlier, in 
terms o f religion, the Atyap were mainly non-Muslims. Their popular acceptance of 
being non-Muslims has been attributed to its utility as an escape from the exploitation 
and oppression by the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 227). 
Consequently, the Atyap sought every opportunity to assert their autonomy and 
rulership over their own affairs and territory. The crisis provided an opportunity for 
the ventilation of the age-long animosity against the Hausa-Muslims.
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It should be stressed that there was also a socio-economic dimension to the crisis. The 
Hausa were the economic and political elites of Zangon Kataf, despite their minority 
status. Above this, the Atyap suffered discrimination on their land. For instance, at the 
only hospital in Zango town, treatment for the Hausa was free but the Atyap had to 
pay before being treated (Akinteye et al, 1999b: 231). To compound the situation, the 
Hausa loathed the Atyap who they regarded as uncultured and non-religious people, 
hence the appellation 4Arna meaning infidels or unbelievers (Akinteye, et al, 1999b: 
231).
Unfortunately, the tardiness of the state government in handling the crisis was largely 
accountable for the escalation of the crisis. Even the imposition o f curfew by the state 
government did not prevent the riots and blood-letting. Not only were many lives lost, 
the violence spread to other parts of the state, such as Kaduna and Zaria. The army 
was called in belatedly to contain the riot. The fact that the State Governor, Alhaji 
Dabo Lere, was himself a Muslim/Hausa equally affected the efficiency of 
government in handling the crisis. In another dimension, Major General Lekwot and 
five others of the Zango-Kataf stock were sentenced to death by the Justice Benedict 
Okadigbo Tribunal for their roles in the conflict. However, there sentences were 
computed to life imprisonments.
It is crucial to note that, a re-enactment of the Zango-Kataf riots occurred on 7th April, 
2001, resulting in the death of 8 people, with 17 people injured following the creation 
o f 20 new chiefdoms and 62 new districts in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area. 
The crisis this time was between Bajju and Ikalu ethnic groups. The common 
grievance denominator of the two crises which remained unresolved was the struggle
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for economic-determination, fight against oppression and internal colonialism by the 
Hausa-Fulani in the area.
5.7.12: The Jalingo Riots, 1992
The death o f a Muslim student by an act o f a non-Muslim occurred over grievances 
pertaining to water being used by the Muslims students for ablution. Now, ablution is 
considered as a strong sacred characteristic o f the Islamic faith and identity. It is used 
as a cleansing ritual before praying.
One can conclude that as a result of this grievance, severe clashes broke out in 
Jalingo, the capital o f Taraba State between Muslims and non-Muslims. The mayhem 
resulted in the burning o f several non-Muslim places o f worship and mosques. The 
death toll as a result o f the riots was put at forty-two.
5.7.13: Funtua Riot, 1993
thThe Maitatsine-influenced riot occurred again in the town of Funtua on the 19 of 
January 1993. The riot occurred due to contentions between two Malams; one o f the 
Malams belonged to an Islamic sect known as the Kalakato (Maitatsine), and the other 
Malam was an orthodox Muslim. The Orthodox Malam disciplined an almajirai 
(Young disciple) for a disorderly act. This act o f discipline was reported to the 
Kalakato Malam, who then decided to launch a violent assault on the Malam and his 
household, thus precipitating a crisis which was reported to the police. The police 
visited the scene to arrest Kalakato members involved in the crisis. However, the 
fundamentalists resisted arrest and attacked the police. Thereafter, on the 22nd January 
the extremists went on rampage in Funtua, burning and looting government
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parastatals. People killed indiscriminately in the course of this violence, were about 
two hundred. Several police stations in Funtua were also raised down by the 
fundamentalists.
It is, essentially not easy to account for the causation o f this conflict. Both Islamic 
identities o f orthodox Islam and Islamic sects were competing in a tense religious 
atmosphere, and the breakdown of socio-economic relations within its community. 
Both were attempting to forestall any perceived deviation from the canon o f Islam. 
The conflict shows leans towards an intra-religious riot emanating from religious 
fundamentalism under the concept of preserving the prestige of Islamic identity.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the though the crisis is rooted in 
religious zealotry and fundamentalism, the sect’s doctrines and preaching were in 
many respects contrary to mainstream and popular Islamic theology. Paradoxically 
Muslims who were not members of the sect were not spared from their venous attacks. 
It is important to bear in mind that the threat to Islam here pertains to the purification 
o f Islam. This is not surprising, as noted by Ahmadu U. Jalingo (1980:24):
Muslim fundamentalists have not changed their position till today. 
Whenever and wherever compromises by Muslims appear to threaten the 
basic identity of society, they call for a reaffirmation o f the unchanging 
truth of Islam.
Yet, sometimes this reaffirmation may be characterized by intra-religious conflicts, on 
issues pertaining to adulterating the Islamic identity. This ideology may be seen to be 
consistent with Islamic tradition, for the reason that Uthman dan Fodio called for a 
Jihad in 1804, against Muslims he considered to be unorthodox and lukewarm.
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5.7.14: Jos, Plateau Riots, 1994 & 2002
As will be noticed, the election of a non-Muslim or Muslim in the volatile city o f Jos 
is a crucial variable in the causation of conflicts in the city. The appointment o f Alhaji 
Aminu Mato a Hausa-Muslim as the Caretaker o f a Local Government was met with 
opposition by a peaceful protest by other non-Muslim ethnic groups. Their grievance 
was based on the contention that the Caretaker was not an indigene of Plateau State. 
The peaceful protest later turned violent on the 12th o f April 1994, after Alhaji Aminu 
Mato was sworn into office. Clearly, perceived differences in religious faiths was a 
causation o f the riots.
Interestingly, another bout o f violence occurred in Jos in May, 2002 due to similar 
circumstances. This time the PDP election o f party officials, led to mass protests and 
the usual carnage that ensued between Muslims and non-Muslims. The conflict was 
related to the battle of supremacy in the Jos North local Government. The death toll
97was estimated to be 40.
5.7.15: Potiskum , Yobe State, 1994
On Sunday September 4, 1994, in Potiskum, Yobe State, Muslims burnt several non- 
Muslims places of worship to portray their grievance over the refusal of the parents of 
a young girl from allowing her conversion to Islam. The father o f the girl was also 
accused o f desecrating the Qur’an.
However, it is crucial to note that a further causation o f this inter-religious grievance 
in Potiskum is that the minority Bolewa ethnic group (Muslims) are the overlords of
y? The Guardian Newspaper, May 5th, 2002, p. 3
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the town. This position has been a source o f grievance to the Ngiim/Kara-Kara 
majority (non-Muslims). Clearly, this foundation can be traced to the British 
colonialists, who deemed it expedient for administrative purposes to situate the 
Ngiim/Kara-Kara under the Bolewa.
5.7.16: Tafawa Balewa Crises, 1995
To begin with, for the people of Tafawa Balewa, July 15, 1995, was another black day 
for its community. The Hausa-Fulani Muslims and their Sayawa non-Muslim 
neighbours made mince meat of one another, especially considering the fact that the 
wounds o f the 1991 religious crisis were just healing.98 The immediate cause of the 
crisis was the replacement of the Commissioner o f Education in the State, Mr. J. K. 
Manzo, a non-Muslim from the Sayawa ethnic stock, with Mr. Ibrahim Musa, a 
Hausa-Muslim. The Sayawa felt marginalized by the removal of their tribesman from 
government. Due to this grievance, Sayawa women mounted a road blockage to 
prevent the hosting o f the reception organized by the Hausa-Muslim community for 
Mr. Musa, leading to the cancellation of the ceremony.
Certainly, there was tension which led to conflict. Now, the causation that led to the 
conflict was the forced cancellation of the reception on account o f the Sayawa women 
road blockage, which was seen as an unpardonable affront on the part o f the Sayawa, 
by the Hausa Muslims, whose youths organized retaliation. Thus leading to the crisis 
in which several persons were killed, and property worth several millions o f naira 
were destroyed. Other ethnic groups, fractionalizing on religious divides, later got
98 The Tafawa-Balewa violence o f 1991 spilt over to the neighbouring tow ns.
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involved in the crisis and at the end of the day, over forty-four villages and hamlets 
became victims o f the crisis (Akinteye, et al, 1999a: 311).
As is evident, this crisis though fought along the Muslim -  non-Muslim divide, was 
also a case o f power struggle propelled by historical grievances, desire for self- 
determination, the control over local affairs and the struggle to terminate the regime of 
imposition and oppression the Sawaya experienced under the emirate system, which 
exploited the weakness of the non-Muslims (the Sawaya) for the reason that they were 
considered as a religious and political minority.
This conflict established Tafawa-Balewa as a volatile town. Thus, it was not 
surprising that on June 18th 2001, Muslims militants from Chad and Niger, attacked 
and destroyed a Bible school in Tafawa Balewa. This led to a bloody conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Local Government 
Areas o f Bauchi state.
5.7.17: Ilorin Riots, 1998 & 1999
Ilorin the capital o f Kwara state, whose indigenes are mainly from Yoruba ethnic 
stock, as noticed in chapter 1 are considered to be part o f the royal house o f the Fulani 
Caliphate, due to the Uthman dan Fodio conquest o f the town in the early 19th century. 
Religious riots between Muslims and non-Muslims were recorded in November 1998, 
when 20 non-Muslim students from the University o f Ilorin were assaulted and 
injured. In addition in December 1998, a non-Muslim place of worship was 
demolished by Muslims on the basis of land occupation. This gave rise to a gory 
conflict. Yet again, in 1999, Muslim elders insisted that all non-Muslim places of
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worship be transferred from the town. This led to another violent conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Furthermore, 50 non-Muslim places o f worship were 
destroyed by Ilorin Militant Youths."
5.7.18: Kano Ethnic Riot, Reprisal Killings o f  July 22 July 1999
It is perhaps best to begin with the riots between Yoruba and Hausa in Sagamu in 
Ijebu Remo, Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria, that broke out following the violation of 
the curfew imposed on women and non-indigenes as was the tradition during the Oro 
festival.100 Two Hausa prostitutes were caught during the Oro celebration as violators 
of the restriction order. These two Hausa women were killed by the Oro cultists. In 
retaliation, the Hausa Muslims raided and killed some Yoruba individuals. The 
Yorubas through the Oduaa Peoples Congress (OPC) clashed with the Hausa 
Muslims. The Sagamu riot in which the dreaded Yoruba militant organization, the 
OPC were involved, led to the death o f many Hausa-Muslim traders and the 
destruction of their properties worth several millions of naira.
Given the massive carnage occasioned by the riots, many Hausa-Muslims took the 
next available means of transportation and returned to the North, especially Kano. 
Those that returned to Kano fed their kith and kin with litanies of woes and sordid 
details o f brutality, inhumanity, indignity and killings meted out on the fleeing Hausa- 
Muslim population in the hands of the Yoruba in Sagamu. The 1999 Kano riot was 
therefore a retaliatory riot, centered on the perceived injustices against Muslims; to 
pay back the Yoruba in Kano what their kiths and kin in Sagamu did to the Hausa 
traders living in the town. Driven by these ideals, more than three hundred people lost
99 See G ovt D eploys attack on Churches in Ilorin: Guardian Tuesday D ecem ber 2 1 , 1 9 9 9 ,  p 3.
I(,,) A Yoruba traditional festival held at night which must not be witnessed by w om en
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their lives during the violence. Furthermore, 50 houses/shops and about 30 vehicles 
were burnt.101
More crucially, perhaps, it is important to bear in mind that, the lingering misgivings 
over the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections won by a Yoruba man, 
Chief M. K. O. Abiola, whose presidency was believed to be opposed by the Hausa 
establishment (thanks to the rapaciousness of the Babangida administration), also 
added to the venom of the riots especially given the OPC involvement who viewed it 
as a defense o f the Yoruba people and nation against Hausa-Fulani manipulation and 
control in Yoruba land. One may suggest that the riots emerged from the complexities 
associated with Babanginda’s annulment of Abiola’s election. In this sense, ethnic and 
political manipulations engendered by Babangida laid the foundation for ethnic rivalry 
between the two identity groups in Kano.
For reasons discussed later, and in the spirit of attempting to shed some light on the 
above-mentioned issues, it is pertinent to note that, these ethnic riots between the 
Hausa and Yoruba were the second o f its kind in northern Nigeria.102 Surprisingly, 
however, as a semblance of the 1953 riots, most of the targets o f this riot were not the 
Yoruba, but those from the Igbo ethnic group. Yet, in times of ethnic and religious 
conflict, it is suggested that Muslims seek to target only non-ethnics o f the faith.
It bears emphasis at this point, to note that while the return o f power to civil authority 
satisfied the requirements o f procedural legitimacy, the substantive contents of 
democratic legitimacy, that is, democratic dividends was still lacking months after the
11)1 Newswatch M againe, August 9 , 1999, p. 22.
102 The first riot occurred in Kano riot, 1953 as discussed above.
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return to civil rule. More specifically, months after the new government came into 
power the people’s optimistic expectations o f qualitative and quantitative 
improvements in their existential conditions were yet to be met. The many ethnic and 
religious riots all over the country were in a sense, a protest o f the unfulfilled 
expectations resulting from increased frustrations, and calculated attempts at arresting 
attentions o f the state to redress perceived imbalance, marginalization, injustices and 
other associated socio-economic and political problems that were interconnected to 
the Babangida and Abacha despotic regimes. More specifically, one may safely 
assume that, in northern Nigeria, these perceived grievances created a place and space 
for frustrations, which led to ethnic rivalry.
5.7.19: Kaduna 2000, Sharia Riot
In northern Nigeria Muslims have always advocated the introduction of the Sharia. 
This was a source of serious mud-slinging at the Constituent Assembly in 1978 and 
resurfaced during the Constitutional Debate in 1989. What is striking is that the 
struggle for and against the introduction o f Sharia in Nigeria, which, despite the 
emotional heat it often generates, has never led to violence until the incidence on 
February 21, 2000.
Soon after Nigeria returned to civilian rule, the Governor o f Zamfara State, Alhaji 
Yerima Ahmed, raised the idea of introducing the Islamic legal system. In spite of 
serious opposition nationwide and given the reluctance o f the Federal Government to 
test the constitutionality or otherwise of this action in the Courts, Sharia was 
introduced in Zamfara state. It was not surprising that the decision to introduce the 
Sharia in the largely cosmopolitan Kaduna State, with a large population of non-
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Muslims and southerners, engendered serious controversy and resentment. After the 
persistent demonstration in support of Sharia by several Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, which lasted over two weeks, the non-Muslims in Kaduna State, under the 
leadership o f the Christian Association o f Nigeria (CAN), also decided to organize a 
peaceful protest against the introduction o f the Sharia. Over 50,000 non-Muslims took 
part in the peaceful demonstration.103
In what followed, the central market areas and other place where non-Muslims and 
non-indigenes lived were destroyed, with five manufacturing firms closed.104 
Furthermore, about 1,200 people lost their lives105 and billions o f naira worth of 
properties were either looted or destroyed in the riots, thus, the riot was justly called 
the ‘biggest in the nation’s history.’106 As aptly noted by the then-President o f Nigeria,
1 07Olusegun Obasanjo: “What I found most astonishing was discovery that a majority
o f those who died in the disturbance were Nigerians who had lived all their lives in 
Kaduna, and could not truthfully call anywhere else their home.”
What was organized as a peaceful demonstration turned into an uncontrollable riot 
when the demonstrators were attacked by Muslims shouting ‘Sai Sharia ko Anki ko 
anso’, (Sharia, whether you like it or not). The rational for this sentiment could be 
found in the fact that Muslims had notions of a perceived threat towards concerted 
efforts by non-Muslims to prevent the implementation of a core tenet o f Islam. The 
preceding weight o f evidence points primarily to the assertion o f religious identity as 
the immediate cause o f these riots in terms of implementation and objectives. The
1(13 Newswatch, March, 2000:6 .
104 Sunday Tribune 10 February, 2002.
1(15 The D aily  Vanguard Thursday March 23 2006.
1(16 Newswatch, January 1, 2001 , p. 24.
107 Newswatch, March 13, 2000 , p. 23.
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tensions were motivated by religious sentiment. Inevitably tensions arise where 
religion is a contending issue in northern Nigeria.
5.7.20: Dam boa, Borno State Riot 2000
The background to this riot started on the 27th o f March, 2000, as a result o f religious 
meetings in the residence of a cleric of a non-Muslim faith, an action which was 
opposed to by the Muslim community.
According to Alhaji Lawan Kabu,108 the Chairman o f Damboa Local Government, the 
origin o f the crisis could be traced to the demand for the allocation o f land for the 
building o f a non-Muslim place of worship, which was not granted. With the 
persistent refusal to allocate land to build their place of worship, construction work for 
a non-Muslim place o f worship started on the private residential land o f the cleric of 
the non-Muslim place o f worship. The Chairman claimed that the construction work 
continued despite an injunction prohibiting such by the local government security 
committee, which was inclusive of non-Muslims and Muslims.
As a result o f these imagined threats, militant Muslims chanting ‘Allah Akbar’ 
demolished the new place of worship being constructed by the Living Faith Church on 
the private residence of the its religious leader. Furthermore, all the other non-Muslim 
places o f worship in Damboa were burnt. In this atmosphere, Muslims in this 
community were nursing grievances over the construction o f a non-Muslim place of 
worship which they imagined to be against Islamic necessities. It should be noted that 
the imagined collective identity of Islam has the capacity to hold every Muslim
n)8S e e  h t t p : / / w w w . w n r t . h y n e w s . r n m / n c w s - f e a t u r e s / c o m p a . s s - b o r n o . h t m l . Accessed o n  t h e  1 7 th  o f  J u n e  2008.
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individual within its control. In all, about twenty people were reported dead. 
Therefore, it would not be misleading to conclude, that the riots were solely on 
religious grounds.
5.7.21: Kaduna Tension, October 2001
The central discussion of this religious tension is to explicate the volatile and sensitive 
nature o f religion in Kaduna State. This skirmish resulted from the setting ablaze o f 
three non-Muslim places of worship at the Hayin Banki area o f Kaduna. According to 
the State Government, the cause of the fire was due to sparks from faulty electrical 
cables (Sani, 2007: 109). The Kaduna State Network o f Indigenous Pastors 
(KSNIPAN) argued that the position of the state government on the cause o f the fire 
in the two non-Muslims places of worship was mischievous. Given the fact that 
another non-Muslim place of worship at a different location in Kaduna, was just 
fortunate to escape from being set ablaze at the same time, the non-Muslims 
concluded that the arsonists were Muslim fanatics (Sani, 2007).
In analyzing the religious causation of this tension, it is suggested that the arson was a 
reaction o f the violent conflict and the unhealed religious divide emanating between 
non-Muslims and Muslims in Jos, in September, 2001 and the perceived identity 
threat imposed by non-Muslim places o f worship.
5.7.22: Jos, 2001 Riots
Given the conditions existing in Jos and other communities in Plateau State prior to 
the 2001 riots on the contentious issues o f settlers/indigenes dichotomy, it was 
obvious that Jos in particular and Plateau State in general was seating on a ‘keg of gun
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powder. It was therefore not a surprise that two seemingly unrelated events provided 
the ignition for the combustion that almost destroyed the whole o f Plateau State, and 
threatened the stability o f Nigeria as a state.
The source o f this conflict was the merciless beating by some Muslims o f a non- 
Muslim woman, who was alleged to have passed through the road barricade in front of 
a mosque close to her house in a locale o f Jos called Congo-Russia (mainly resided by 
non-Muslims), during the Muslim Friday Jumat service on 7th September, 2001. Her 
relatives and other non-Muslims at the scene o f the incident mobilized themselves for 
a revenge o f the maltreatment of the non-Muslim woman. Other people across 
religious lines soon joined in the skirmish, leading to a grave riot in the city, in which 
many lives and property were lost and destroyed. It might be critical to note that 
Congo-Russia, a slum area of Jos is known for its vast numbers o f locally brewed 
alcoholic public houses. This was a source o f grievance to the Muslims, whilst the 
mosque, situated in a non-Muslim residence was a source o f grievance to the non- 
M uslims.109
Notably, citizenship and citizenship rights, within the context of settlers-indigenes 
controversy formed the second leg of the conflict. The appointment of a certain Alhaji 
Mukhtar Usman, a Muslim-Hausa minority, by the Federal Government as the 
Chairman and Coordinator of the State’s National Poverty Eradication Programme 
(NAPEP), was met with the strong objections by the non-Muslim indigenes. This 
appointment provoked serious controversy, and ignited the age-old struggle for power 
between the indigenes and non-indigenes. At the centre o f the crisis was the Plateau
l(,1,For an interesting exploration of’ conflict in Plateau State, See Best, G. Shedrack, 2007. Conflict and Peace 
Building in Plateau State, Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
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Youth Council (PYC), representing the indigenes and Jasawa Development 
Association (JDA) championing the cause o f Muslims (Hausa-Fulani). While the 
Hausa-Fulani claimed to be indigenes and to have actually arrived Jos long before the 
present claimants, the PYC argued that the Hausa-Fulani are settlers, and impostors.
Now upon an examination of immediate triggers o f the conflict; provocative posters 
such as ‘The Devil has no parking space in Jos North’; ‘Trace your root before it is 
too late’ and ‘Go and teach Islamic Religious Knowledge, it is better’ were pasted 
around Jos town. These posters could be considered as an attack on the primordial 
identity o f Muslims within the state. Also, human excrete were dumped at the NAPEP 
Chairman’s house. Furthermore, there was a serious campaign that non-Muslims 
should not to vote for Muslims in the then to be held Jos North Local Government 
elections (Sani, 2007:158).
What is important to realize about this conflict as the various evidences tendered and 
argued before the Commission of Inquiry showed, that while religion provided the 
immediate causation for the crisis, other latent factors were present -  economic, 
political and ethnic factors, exemplified by age-old animosities, struggles and 
contentions over resources and power, especially within the context of the crisis and 
contradictions engendered by a failing state and a dependent and an underdeveloped 
economy. The power struggles in the context of the up-coming 2003 General 
elections, all over the country also played a major role in the conflicts. Reference was 
made in one o f the testimonies at the Tribunal on the unguarded statement by General 
Mohammadu Buhari, a former Head o f State, and a northern Presidential candidate
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that Muslims should not vote for non-Muslims during the 2003 General Elections’ 
was considered as a contributory factor in escalating the crisis.110
The political and ethnic dimensions of the crisis was attested to by the alleged
clandestine involvement of both the Bauchi State Governor, Alhaji M u’azu and the
former Police Commissioner of the State, Alhaji Mohammed Abubakar, who were
alleged by witnesses at the inquiry to have armed and incited Muslim fanatics during
the crisis to attack non-Muslims.111 The confessions o f mercenaries supposedly
recruited from both Niger Republic and Chad to prosecute the ‘Holy W ar’ against 
112non-Muslims also supported the position that the riots was premeditated and 
carefully executed by disgruntled politicians.
Furthermore, the Muslim practice of blocking roads for the Friday Jumat services has 
been a source o f complaints and misgiving before the riots on 7th September. A month 
earlier, on 8th August, 2001, the executives o f the Church o f Christ in Nigeria 
(COCIN) issued a communique asking for an end to road blocking during Friday
113
prayers sessions o f Muslims in a predominantly non-Muslim locale.
Ibrahim Itse114 leader of the Plateau Youth Forum (PYF) in a statement on the vested 
issue o f settlers versus indigenes in a poignant way revealed the causation o f the 
crisis. According to him: “It is funny and insulting that a Hausa-Fulani man from 
Bauchi, Kano, Kastina, etc who is looking for pasture and trade settles in Jos among
11(1 Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Com mission o f inquiry. See also a reaffirmation o f  accredited statem ents o f  
M ohammadu Buhari in The Guardian, Tuesday, September, 11, 2001 , p2.
111 The Punch Newspaper, N ovem ber, 16 2001, p .1.
112 The Punch Newspaper, N ovem ber 16 , 2001, p6.
[^ThisD ay Newspaper, Septem ber 9th, 2001 , p .4.
>]4ThisDay Newspaper, Septem ber 8 , 2001, p .4.
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indigenes o f Afizene, Anaquta and Borom only to wake up one day to lay claim to a 
place leased to them for peaceful co-existence.” 115
It is only possible to provide estimates o f the economic losses occasioned as a result 
o f the Jos 2001 riots. What is indisputable is that the state and the nation suffered 
greatly on account of the riots. According to the Miyetti Allah Cattle Association of 
Nigeria (MACBAN), in their testimony at the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission 
o f Inquiry into the Jos Riots, the Fulani lost 4,582 cows, 7,973 sheep and 13,152 
fowls, in addition to 1,176 houses, 29 motor vehicles, 32 bicycles, 6 motorcycles, 13 
water pumps, 17 mosques and agricultural products worth over N 336,913.116 On the 
first day o f the crisis alone, over 50 people were killed, with 500 people injured. 
Almost all the mosques within Jos city, with the exception of the Central Mosque 
were razed down.117 Many non-Muslims places o f worship and mosques were razed 
down. The Dimili spare parts market was razed down. About 22 trailers were burnt at 
Rukkubah Road Garage.118
Areas mostly affected by the riots were: Dago Dutse, Agwan Rogo, Agwan Madki 
and Congo-Russia. Medical facilities were grossly inadequate and seriously over­
stretched, leading to a situation whereby dead bodies littered the city, and people that 
would have been saved had medical been care promptly given them lost their lives. 
Some accounts have it that in all 600 hundred lives were lost.119 The Jos General
u s ThisDay Newspaper, Septem ber 8 , 2001 , p .4.
1 >6ThisDay Newspaper, Septem ber 9'1'' 2001 , p. 1.
i n The Punch newspaper, O ctober 9 lh, 2001 , p. 5.
Ils The Punch Newspaper, September 10 , 2001 , p . l .
119 The D a ily  Vanguard Newspaper, March 23rd, 2006.
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Hospital and the Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH) were stretched beyond 
their usual capacity.
As was tradition o f such riots in Nigeria, the incompetence o f the Nigerian Police was 
exposed, as the police proved incapable of containing the riots. Hence, President 
Olusegun Obasanjo promptly granted the request o f the acting Governor o f the State, 
and ordered the deployment of the Army to quell the Jos riots. Surprisingly, the rioters 
defied the military, and for three days in spite o f military presence, the riots were still 
raging on. Soldiers were mobilized from the 3rd Armoured Division o f the Nigerian 
Army, Jos, who mounted checkpoints and patrolled the city to no avail.
Apart from the appeal by the State Government and its functionaries for peace, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, who saw the Jos crisis as a national disgrace, called on 
religious and community leaders to manage their followers. Similarly, the Sultan o f 
Sokoto, and the spiritual leader of all Nigeria Muslims, Alhaji Ibrahim Muhammadu 
Maccido, the 19th Sultan of Sokoto, appealed for calm and peace between Muslims 
and non-Muslim. A former Head of State o f Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon (rtd), a 
non-Muslim, who is also from Plateau State also called for peaceful co-existence 
among the people of the area.
An important development in the aftermath of the conflict was the Justice Niki Tobi 
Judicial Commission o f Inquiry was set up by the government to find out the remote 
and immediate causes o f the September 7th-  14th, 2001, riots in Jos. The report o f the 
Committee was submitted a year after. The report o f the Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and Environs o f 2002 recommended that a
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conflict o f such magnitude may again appear in the future, if  the indigene/settler 
issues are not resolved.
5.7.23: Kano, 2001 Riots
The Kano 2001 riots, also known as Osama bin Laden riots, started as protests against 
America’s attack on Afghanistan. The protest was planned to be a peaceful way o f 
registering the dissatisfaction of the people of Kano against the attack by the USA on 
Afghanistan on the suspicion that the latter was hiding Osama bin Laden, the leader of 
the September 11, 2001, gruesome attack on the USA. During the riots that lasted 
between October 12 and 13, 2001, the death toll was estimated at 200.120 Furthermore, 
several non-Muslim places of worship and properties belonging mostly to non- 
Muslims and southerners were destroyed. It is worthy to note that religious tensions 
had been brewing in city since June of that year, when the Kano State Government 
demolished 17 non-Muslim places of worship.121
A striking question is what provokes such attacks targeted against non-Muslims in 
Kano, if  the perceived grievance is against a foreign state? As rightly observed by 
Christian Ochiama,122 Deputy Political Editor o f The Post Express: “Kano has a 
problem when it comes to matters of Islam. Its attachment to the doctrine can be very 
passionate. The average Kano indigene can kill in response to any perceived threat to 
the tenets o f that religion.”
120 The Nigerian Tribune, Monday IS O ctober, 2000 , p. 2.
121 See Religious Crisis Looms in Kano, The Post Express, Saturday, June 23, 2001 , p. 1.
122 Christian Ochiama, Sharia: Kano joins the Chorus, The Post, W ednesday, June 21, 2 008 , p. 9.
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It is certain that religion was the primary cause o f the Kano 2001 riots. However, 
other salient factors were decisive in the instigation o f the conflict. It is suggested that 
the elites were the violent entrepreneurs who capitalized on innocuous religious 
incidences to incite conflict amongst the people o f different faiths. This was 
particularly meaningful against the politics o f repositioning for the 2003 General 
Elections in the country.
5.7.24: The Tiv-Jukun Crisis, 2001
The Tiv and Jukun people have lived side each other for centuries in the Middle-Belt 
region o f Nigeria. These people may be described as sharing a seemingly similar 
cultural identity. The Tiv and Jukun consist mainly o f non-Muslims and a minority of 
Animists. The Tiv and Junkun reside mainly in the former Benue-Plateau State. It is 
important to stress that in the course of Nigeria’s political development, and the 
associated regional differentiations, in 1960 after independence, Nigeria consisted o f 3 
regions. This was later increased to 4 regions on the eve o f the Nigerian civil war in 
1966, and thereafter into 12 states in 1970. Different military administrations in later 
years further carved Nigeria, into 19 states in 1976 and subsequently into 36 states in 
1996. The result of this political action of state creation is rationalized as a mechanism 
o f bringing government closer to the people. However, it produced the balkanization 
o f the Tiv and Jukun people into different states (Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa). 
Quite simply, this division renders palpable, the perception that it was a causal factor 
in the ethnic conflict between these two similar cultural groups.
The centre o f this ethnic conflict has been Wukari in Taraba state. However, other 
states have experienced hostilities within the Tiv and Jukun communities. The
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geographical distribution of the groups is such that, while the Tivs, are the majority in 
Benue State, they are in the minority in Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states, whilst 
the Jukuns on the other hand are the majority in Taraba state.
What is particularly significant about the Tiv-Jukun crisis is that, it was rooted in 
indigene and settler issues.1-3 Given the fact that the Tiv are the minority ethnic group 
in Taraba and Nasarawa States, the Jukun claim that the Tiv are subject to the 
traditional authority of the Jukun traditional rulers (Aku Uka),124 as the Tiv’s are seen 
as settlers by the Jukun. This was disputed by the Tiv, who claim equal rights to the 
land and consequently refuse to recognize the authority o f the Aku Uka. Culturally, 
the Tiv do not recognize any one or institution as having traditional authority of 
rulership, although the Tivs have a common spiritual leader known as the Tor Tiv.123 
The Tor Tiv has his ancestral headquarters in Gboko in Benue state. It was this 
contradiction in ethnic loyalty that was at the root o f the protracted crisis, and sporadic 
outbreak o f violence for ten years, before the catastrophic conflict which lasted from 
1990-1993. Thus, the conflict has been rightly labeled as ‘N igeria’s longest civil w ar’ 
(Bagudu, 2003).
125 Similar ethnic conflict had been noted in Nasarawa state, betw een  the Bassa, the majority (non-M uslim s) and the 
Igbirra (M uslim s). Interestingly both ethnic groups live in the same Local G overnm ent Area; T oto  Local 
G overnm ent. Notably a destructive communal conflict occurred betw een  these groups in 1997, which left many 
dead, hundreds displaced and destroyed properties. Both ethnic groups are com peting for scare econom ic  
resources marginalisation, but mainly on religious division. Another conflict worthy o f  m ention based on ethnic 
loyalties is the 1 9 9 9 /2 0 0 0 , Kuteb-Jukun/Chamba Ethnic Conflict: These Ethnic groups live in Takum Local 
G overnm ent Taraba State. Their identity is based on ethnicity. Kutebs, (non-M uslim s allege that they are the 
entitled  to the stool o f  Takum. Chamba/Jukun, (non-M uslim s) grouping due to similarity in social status and an 
early introduction to w estern education have a stronger presence in the Federal and Slate G overnm ents. H ow ever, 
the Kutebs are m ore in population than the Chamba/Jukun grouping. The ethnic conflict relates to 
in d ig en e /se ttler  issues, local governm ent politics and boundary disputes in respect o f  a new  Local G overnm ent; 
Ussa. Another similar conflict is noted in Ikululand betw een  the Ikulu and Bajju non-M uslim  ethnic groups in 
Zangon Kataf, Kaduna state, especially in the communal crisis o f  7 ,h & 8 ,h 2001 . Furtherm ore, another clash 




It is instructive to note that the major crisis between these groups erupted in 2 0 0 1 ,126 
where the Tiv living in 200 villagers in the border towns o f Gbeji, Zakim-Bian, 
Vasase and Agbayiin between Benue and Taraba States were killed on the 22nd of 
October 2001 by soldiers, as a reprisal for the killing o f 19 soldiers, whose bodies 
were found on 12th October 2001.127 The reprisal killings took place in Tiv 
communities in Benue and Taraba states. It is striking to note that it has been 
speculated that, the soldiers acted in complicity with Jukuns in burning down most of 
the homes in these villages, due to the fact that N igeria’s Minister o f Defence, at that 
time; retired Lt-Gen Theophilus Danjuma was from the Jukun ethnic stock.
5.7.25: Kaduna Riot, Novem ber, 2002
Lets begin, by noting that against the background o f the highly pluralist composition 
o f the Kaduna, which doubles as the political capital o f the North, this particular riot 
confirms that, given the volatility of Kaduna, anything has the potential o f sparking 
inter-religious riots. The background to the riots was the planned hosting o f the Miss 
World Beauty Pageant in Nigeria, which eventually manifested into a parade o f shame 
in Kaduna. Islamic fundamentalists were vehemently against the hosting o f the 
Pageant, which they considered immoral and un-Islamic, anywhere in the country 
especially not Abuja, the nation’s Federal Capital Territory. As noted in Chapter 1, in 
an obvious act that displayed crass insensitivity to the religious identity o f Nigerian
126 The Tiv-Jukun people are non-M uslims. Their primordial identity lies in ethnicity as opposed to religion. Thus, 
one may argue that the solidarity provided by the com m unity o f  Islam am ong people divided by ethnic, linguistic 
and cultural differences, living within com m unities w ere non existent. It is observed that other people divided by 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, but professing Islam have the tendency not to experience severe conflict. 
T o list a few  ethnic groups living as such are the Gwari and N upc in N iger State; the Teda, Fulani and Kanuri in 
Bornu State; the Kanuri, kwanka, Paa, Scyawa and Warji in Bauchi State, the Eloyi, Gwandara, Gwari; Fulani, 
Hausa, Puku in Sokoto State. In these instances the people here are bound by the same religious identity provided 
by Islam.
127 Soldiers from the 232 Tanks Battalion Yola w ere sent by President Obasanjo to restore peace and order in the 
troubled com m unity. Unfortunately, Tiv militia ambushed the soldiers, killing 19 believing they w ere Jukun 
militia.
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Muslims, the ThisDay newspaper of 16th October 2002, published an article by Miss 
Isioma Daniel to the effect that Prophet Muhammad might have married one o f the 
contestants in the Miss World beauty contests. This publication was considered an 
attack on the religious identity of Muslims. Miss Daniel had set the city o f Kaduna 
ablaze by publicizing a disparaging remark towards Islam’s Holy Prophet.
Now quite clearly, as a result of the publication, ThisDay newspaper office in Kaduna 
was razed down by Muslim militants. Many non-Muslims were killed, while hotels 
and churches were also burnt. The riot also spread to Abuja and Bauchi, with similar 
effects. The police were unable to quell the riots as they were out numbered by the 
rioters. Eventually 250 people were killed, and 3,500 injured. A dusk to dawn curfew 
was imposed in Kaduna, with the army invited to contain the riot. As usual, military 
formations provided sanctuary for fleeing non-Muslims and southerners. The 
organizers of the Miss World Beauty Pageant were forced to relocate the hosting o f 
the Pageant to London. Nigerian investors involved directly or indirectly in the 
Pageant lost several millions of Naira, and the nation’s perception in the international 
community suffered greatly.
The analysis here is that while the riot transcends the immediate publication o f the 
offensive article by the ThisDay newspaper, the riot had serious political undertones. 
A fatwa, issued by the deputy governor of Zamfara State Government (a Sharia based 
state in northern Nigeria) called for the death of Isioma Daniel. If  this view is correct, 
then one may suggest that the edit provoked the carnage between Muslims and non- 
Muslims. It is easy to understand that the tone and substance o f this shows that, Islam
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can be politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict, when there is a 
perceived threat to its sacrosanct nature.
5.7.26: Kano Riot, 11th May, 2004
The immediate cause o f this riot was the perceived grievance based on the 
inefficiency and incompetence with which the Federal Government handled the 
Yelwa/Shendam crisis in Plateau state, where many Hausa-Fulani (Muslims) were 
killed. In order to register their misgivings about the situation, and in order to defend 
and protect their Islamic identity, under the notion o f ‘united we stand, divided we 
fall’, Sheikh Umar Kabo, the Chairman Kano State Sharia Commission, led thousands 
o f Muslims from the Umar Khattah Juma’at Mosque, Kano, to the Kano State 
Government House to register their displeasure. The Federal Government was given a 
seven-day ultimatum by the protesters within which to address the killings o f Muslims 
in Yelwa, Plateau State or Muslims would be forced to defend their faith and religious 
identity themselves.
More generally, as it happened so often in most mass actions o f this nature, the 
peaceful protest was hijacked by hoodlums. In the commotion and violence that 
attended the hijack of the protest, 100 non-Muslims and non-indigenes were killed.128
Although the State Governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Shekarau, viewed the crisis as being 
politically motivated, the riot could better be understood as socio-economic in 
orientation, especially when viewed against the background o f the active participants
128 The Guardian N ew spaper, Friday, May 14, 2004 , p. 27
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in the riots. According to Adamu Abuh:129 “Most of those responsible for the killings 
were the unemployed and youths under the influence o f alcohol. Some others are 
black-market dealers of petrol who are facing hard times owing to the deregulation 
policy o f government.” Even though, this may indeed be the causal-effect o f the riot, 
what should be understood is that the riots transmuted into a religious conflict. It then 
appears that the nature of Islam, and those professing it, especially when it is the main 
determinant o f identity, is that it generates conflict between different faiths, but not 
with different ethnic groups sharing the same faith (Islam) in times o f socio-economic 
grievance.
5.7.27: Plateau Crisis, 2004
It is worth mentioning that the origin of this particular crisis is related to the age-long 
and deep seated hatred between the Hausa-Fulani, Muslims and non Muslims over 
land ownership rights, and political power. Yet, it is clear that these animosities are 
due solely to the overwhelming differences in religious identities, which gave space 
for deeply rooted conflicts. Thus, the serious blood-letting in the wake o f the Jos riots 
o f 2001, has a central place as a precipitant of the riot that provoked the volatile 
Muslim-non-Muslim hostilities.
The riot broke out on the heels of the massacre of 48 Tarok non-Muslims in a place of 
worship by armed Hausa-Muslims, and the retaliatory killings o f many Muslims by 
Tarok non-Muslims. It is important to note that inter-religious crises in Plateau State 
have threatened the existence a stable government in the region. According to Thomas 
Kangnaan, Plateau State Administrator on Resettlement and Rehabilitation
VJ> The Guardian Newspaper, May 14, 2004:26
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Committee, 54,000 died (18,931 men, 17,397 women and 17,459 children in the riots 
since September 2001). In addition, 25,129 houses, 865 shops and 1326 cattle 
destroyed and killed respectively. A further social cost o f the crisis was the destruction 
o f primary and secondary schools valued at N130m (about £500.000).130
5.7.28: Borno ‘Danish Cartoon’ Riots: February, 2006
This riot showcased one o f the negative effects o f globalization. Paradoxically, the riot 
was triggered off by a cartoon caricature o f Prophet Muhammad drawn by a Danish 
cartoonist, in the Jyllands-Posten daily newspaper on the 30th o f September Sept. 
2005, and reprinted in several European newspapers.
The riots, which was carefully planned and executed, started from the Ramat Square, 
the venue o f a public lecture on Prophet Muhammad, organized under the auspices o f 
the Muslim Forum in Maiduguri. The immediate cause of the riot was the insistence 
that, a pick-pocket arrested by the police at the venue of the lecture must be lynched, 
rather than taken to the Police Station. This then, resulted into the throwing o f tear gas 
at the restless crowd by the police.
The mayhem resulted in hundreds being killed, while hundreds were wounded. Added 
to this, about 40 non-Muslim places o f worship were destroyed as well as several non- 
Muslim properties and homes.131 In addition, a Catholic Priest, Mike Gajere, o f the 
Bulumkutu, Maiduguri was slaughtered and burnt to ashes.132
1511 Thisday Newspaper, O ctober 7 ' 2004.
111 Thisday Newspaper, February 25th, 2006, p. 47 .
132 Tribune Newspaper, February 20 , 2006 , p . l .
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One must stress that, the role of the police was in no way less ignoble during this 
crisis than the previous ones discussed. The religious bias o f the state government 
seriously militated against its ability to control and contain the crisis. The State 
Governor lost the respect and confidence of the non-Muslims and non-indigenes as a 
result o f the crisis.
Now to complicate matters, militant Muslims in several Northern states133 took to the 
streets in protest against o f what they considered the denigration o f their religious 
identity and faith and the Holy Prophet by the Danish cartoon. A complexity about the 
protest is that it took place months after the publication of the cartoon and that objects 
o f attack were Nigerian non-Muslims and Southerners in the North, which were in no 
way related or connected with the source o f the Muslims annoyance. Apart from the 
burning o f the Danish flag and the cancellation o f contracts to a Danish firm, Nigerian 
non-Muslims living in the North were attacked, women raped, several people killed, 
their property looted and damaged, just as non-Muslim places of worship were set on 
fire. Expectedly, there were reprisal attacks in the Igbo town o f Onitsha, in Anambra 
State, which resulted to about 100 deaths.134 As a result o f the carnage 10,000 
Muslims had to seek shelter in the army barracks.
Understood in this frame, the riot emanated from both a perceived threat to the 
sanctity of Islam and a perceived justification in protecting their religious identity. 
Interestingly enough, as was commented in a national newspaper, the rioters consisted 
o f those “who don’t even know where Denmark is on the map, in fact some o f them
133 In the com m ercial tow ns o f  Kontagora and Potiskum witnessed severe riots. 2 non-M uslim s people w ere killed  
in Kontagora, whilst Potiskum witnessed 4 people killed and mass looting and burning o f  churches and residence o f  
non-M uslim s.
134 The Punch Newspaper, February 23rd, 2006 , p. 1.
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have not even seen a map in their lives, are instigated to get into the street and do the 
dirty job o f killing Christians.” 135 As a result supposed non-Muslim targets such as 
hotels and bars were burnt down. In addition, the number o f people killed was 
estimated to be 150 (Paden, 2008: 62). The looting and burning was carried out by 
ignorant youths. This perhaps informed the position o f a non-Muslim organization136 
in Bomo state to note that the attacks were premeditated.137 Furthermore, this may 
indicate the astonishing state of ignorance of the fanatics. This is evidenced when 
Maiduguri encountered the ‘Eclipse o f the Moon Conflict’, on the 10th January 2001, 
where a partial eclipse of the moon was regarded as a bad omen brought about by the 
presence o f sinners (non-Muslims). This perception caused carnage in the city, 
whereby non-Muslims were attacked.
In the present context and for the purpose o f explaining the genesis o f religious 
prejudice between non-Muslims and Muslims in Bomo state, it was alleged that for 15 
years the government refused to allocate land to non-Muslims to build places of 
worship, even when state resources were used to build Mosques for Muslims. 
Furthermore, it was alleged that non-Muslim pupils were denied the benefits o f their 
religious education in schools. This was coupled with the non-broadcasting of non- 
Muslims programmes on the State Radio and Television stations.138 This is not 
surprising as Islam in northern Nigeria, sets boundaries to members o f other faiths.
155 A yo O ritsejafor, Thisday Newspaper, February 2 8 ' \  2006
136 Christian Association o f Nigeria (C A N ).
137 Thisday Newspaper, February 25’\  2006, p .47 . According to Christian Association o f  Nigeria (C A N ), from  
Tuesday February, 14, 2006 , there was information of planned attacks on Christians.
138 Thisday Newspaper, February 25th, 2006:47
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5.7.29: Kano State, Tudun Wada Riots, September, 2007
Events on the 28th o f September 2007, in Tudun Wada, which is inhabited mainly by 
the Maguzawa, a non-Muslim ethnic minority in Kano state, led to religious and 
ethnic schisms. The riots were over allegations that a non-Muslim, a student o f a 
Government Secondary School, drew a caricature o f Prophet Muhammad on the walls 
o f the school. Another source claimed that the riot started, not due to the caricature of 
Prophet Muhammad but, due to non-Muslims preventing a non-M uslim’s conversion 
to Islam. Not content to simply turn a blind eye to these narratives, Muslims exploded 
with an aggregated violence in the town. In the fray, 12 non-Muslims were killed and 
all churches and businesses owed by non-Muslims were destroyed. The key point here 
is that the causation o f this riot could be understood as emanating from a perceived 
significant threat to Islamic identity, due to the sacrilege acts committed by a non- 
Muslim.
5.7.30: Bauchi State, Yana Town, 1st February 2008
Another perceived threat to Islamic identity occurred on the 1st o f February 2008, 
when infuriated Muslim youths in Yana, Shira Council Area, Bauchi state, rioted over 
a supposed blasphemy of the Holy Qur’an. A non-Muslim woman, Patience Yusuf, 
was accused of "desecrating" a Qur’an by allegedly refusing to marry a Muslim. In the 
fracas that followed, a rioter lost his life. The homes of non-Muslims were looted by 
the raging rioters, who also burnt a police station. In addition, 1,000 people were 
rendered homeless. What is important to realize is that the purported blasphemy was 
viewed as depicting Islam in a negative sense, which is considered as an affront to the 
primordial identity of Muslims in the region.
285
5.7.31: Kano Riots, Sumaila Riots 8th February, 2008
Students o f Government Secondary School Sumaila, in Sumaila Local Government 
Kano state, took law and order into their hands over the cartoon o f the Prophet 
Muhammad purported to have been drawn on the school wall on the 24th o f January 
2008, by a the non-Muslim students, from the indigenous Maguzawa ethnic group. 
The student in question was expelled from the school by the school authority, but was 
later reinstated to the school after two weeks. This infuriated the Muslim students in 
the school, who on Friday, 8th February, attempted to lynch the reinstated student, but 
for the safety provided for the student by a nearby Police Station, where the student 
took shelter. In the carnage that followed, 2 people and a non-Muslim policeman, Mr. 
Jibrin Garba, were killed by the rioters. In addition, 20 others were injured and the
139Police Station in Sumaila was set ablaze.
At this point, one cannot ignore the fact that religion was cause-effect o f this conflict. 
However, a deeper significant causality of the riot is attributable to the age long 
animosities o f the Hausa (Muslims) and Maguzawa (non-Muslims) ethnic groups. 
These ethnic groups had a history of socio-economic rivalry due to differences in 
religious faiths. This deep-rooted grievance emerges, when trivial issues or imagined 
perceived threats to religious identity arises. Yet, in a hypothetical construction, one 
may call attention to the fact that, if these communities were homogenous it terms of 
sharing a common religion (Islam), such age-long animosities may not have existed.
IJ9 In a Similar incident reported by The Punch Newspaper o f  Thursday, March 22, 2007  pupils at a secondary 
school in Gandu, G om be state, lynched a teacher named; O luw atoyin Olusesan, a Christian, w ho was an external 
exam iner at an Islamic Religious K nowledge exam at the Gandu G overnm ent Day Secondary School, She was 
alleged to have desecrated the Q ur’an. In another case, in N iger state, on the 28'1' o f  June 2 006 , despite being in 
police protection  and custody in the tow n o f lz o m , in Guarara Local G overnm ent a 14 year old girl was lynched by 
a m ob for possessing a letter containing statements about Muhammad and Christ.
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5.7.32: Jos Riots, November 2008
The Council elections in Jos, on Thursday, November 29, 2008, started peacefully. 
This serene electoral atmosphere soon became tense when a candidate of one o f the 
parties was assumed to be in the lead before the official publication o f the results. This 
assumption was later verified by the Plateau State Independent Election Commission 
(PLASIEC), who declared Timothy Buba, a non-Muslim of the People Democratic 
Party (PDP), as winner of the Council election in the Jos North Local Government 
Area. Buba defeated his opponent, Aminu Baba, a Muslim of the All Nigeria Peoples 
Party (ANPP), who emerged as the runner up. It would seem legitimate to assume that 
this led to an apparent disdain by Hausa-Muslims who were aggrieved by the fact that 
their ANPP party candidate had lost to Timothy Buba. Clearly, this condescension is 
connected to the fact that a Muslim lost the election. The immediate result o f this 
development led to protests and ultimately religious motivated violence, when the 
presumed winner was declared the successful candidate. The Muslim supporters of 
Aminu Baba rallied in groups, chanting Islamic war songs, burned and looted 
properties and killed non-Muslims. Riposte assaults from non-Muslim supporters of 
PDP then erupted.
The violence that followed left about 400 dead140 with houses, mosques and non- 
Muslim places o f worship set ablaze. It is worthy to note that the state was blamed for 
not providing adequate security during the elections.141 The riot has been said to be 
worse than the previous riots that had occurred in the city.
140 Nigerian City Counts its Dead After Days o f  Christian-Muslim Riots. Accessed on the 2n<l o f  D ecem ber, 2008 at 
h t t p - / /w w w  gnard ian .co .iik /w o r ld /20 0 8 / d ec /0 1  /niperia-christianitv-islam -jos-riots ,
141 The Nation Newspaper, Saturday, February 7, 2009, p. 2-3. ^
142 Plateau: Scores killed in council polls violence, accessed on the 2"‘ o f  D ecem ber, 2008 at
http. /  /n o w s dailvtrust.com  / index.php?option—com  content& task=view & id=  129& Item id= 1.
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It is worthy to note that a report of the riot submitted to the Prince Bola Ajibola Panel 
o f Inquiry, submitted that a former Minister of Information, Alhaji Ibrahim Dansuki 
Nakande, and a current member of the House o f Representatives, Samaila 
Mohammed, were among the elites who were architects o f the crisis.143 This is not 
unexpected, as noted from Smith’s (2000:795) observation:
O f course, it is not difficult to cite cases where ‘nationalism’ or ‘religion’, 
or a combination of both, have been used to whip up popular passions and 
foment bitter conflicts. But that is a very different proposition from the 
claim that religious or nationalist belief-systems are in and o f themselves 
irrational, violent, and destructive. Many religions are pacific in intent, and 
not a few nationalisms have sought to eschew Conflict....religion and 
nationalism may be used by elites and others both to underpin and to 
undermine political orders and global relations.
The division o f religion was the channel and manipulative mechanism used to 
generate divisions amongst the people as they were the most significant symbols of 
enemy values. It is easy to understand that the tone and substance of this tells us that 
Islam can be politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict when there is a 
perceived threat to its sacrosanct nature. In truth it is fair to say that religion provided 
the cannon for the conflagration of the riot as it awakened the deep political, 
historical, ethnic and, most of all, religious differences between the Muslims and non- 
Muslims.
5.7.33: Bauchi M ayhem , 21st February 2009
The contention here started when a broken down vehicle near a Juma’at Mosque 
diverted traffic bordering to a non-Muslim place o f worship. This situation generated
l4J The N ation Newspaper, W ednesday, February 25, 2009, p . l .
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perceived grievance by non-Muslims in respect o f escalating traffic on Fridays during 
the lum a’at service.
In the early hours o f the 21st of February, 2009, Muslims were woken up to witness a 
mosque on fire. It was perceived by Muslims, that non-Muslims who were aggrieved 
about the built-up traffic near their place of worship were responsible for this 
dastardly act. However, there was no credible evidence to confirm that non-Muslims 
were responsible for such a devastating deed. On the contrary, non-Muslims alleged 
that it was Muslims acting on instigations o f the elites, burnt down the place o f 
worship, in order to acquire justification to start a clash with non-Muslims. In this 
light, Governor Yuguda of Bauchi state noted that “the development has nothing to do
1 i iwith religion, but (was) politically motivated to achieve selfish interest.” Whatever 
is the precise causation of this riot, the governor notes that when Islam is used as a 
manipulative instrument, it tends to generate conflict.
Predictably, Muslims youths acting on an overriding perceived threat to their religion 
went on rampage killing non-Muslims and burning down properties belonging to non- 
Muslims. The Bauchi State chapter o f the Red Cross reported that the fracas claimed 
11 lives and leaving 5,000 people displaced.145
5.7.34: Boko Haram Jihad, July 25-30, 2009
An understanding of the causes of the riots cannot be separated from the unmasking of 
the central figure and motivating force o f this movement in the person o f Ustaz 
Muhammad Yusuf, an ‘Islamic’ preacher and leader o f the sect and famously known
144 The N ation Newspaper, W ednesday, February 25th, 2009 , p. 64.
145 The Tribune Newspaper, Tuesday, 24 February 24th, 2009, p. 4 .
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as the Nigerian Taliban leader. Muhammad Yusuf was bom on January 29, 1970, in 
the rural village o f Girgir in Yobe State. Yusuf started his journey as an Islamic 
scholar as a Tsangaya Qur’anic teacher. He was formerly a Shi'ite loyalist and later 
joined the Izalatul-Bid’a wa Iqamat al Sunna (Izala) movement. He eventually left the 
sect and joined the Shababul Islam. Shababul Islam was founded in 1995 in northern 
Nigerian by Abubakar Lawan. It was also known then as Ahlulsunna w al’jam a’ah 
hijralt and later acquired its new image Boko Haran in 2002, with Muhammad Y usuf 
becoming its leader. He thereafter changed most o f its ideology to fundamental 
doctrines. His main ideology centered on pervasive ignorance that western education 
is a sin and that the earth was made flat by God, in contrast to westernized theories of 
Darwin’s evolution. Thus, its ideology was centered on boko (western education) as 
haram (unlawful).
Now it is important to bear in mind that fundamentalist’ movements are centered on 
religious leadership. The leader from a choice o f explanation and arguments expresses 
his personal inclination, interpretations and judgments, which are determined by his 
social and educational background (Almond, Appleby & Sivan, 2003:119). However, 
the great paradox of this movement is that Muhammad Yusuf was a college dropout, 
but he has able to enlist a former State Commissioner into the sect. A greater absurdity 
is the fact that, although Yusuf loathed westernized education, he rode in the latest 
Lexus Jeep and had a personal physician.146 And, Muhammad Yusuf had a stronghold 
o f 540,000 followers. A significant characteristic o f his followership was its 
constitution of mainly the unemployed youths otherwise known as the talakawa and 
the almajirai (students Qur’anic schools). The immense paradox confronting Boko
1+6 See Saturday Punch, August 1 2009, p. 3.
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Haram was that each member had to contribute a levy o f N 1 daily. This amounted to 
a whooping N16 million a month (about £64,800). It must be re-emphasized that 
Muhammad Yusuf took advantage of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, which 
are prevalent in northern Nigeria.
The supposed Jihad started from Bauchi on July 25-30, 2009, and extended to Bomo, 
Yobe, Gombe, Kano States. Their main targets were the security forces, westernized 
establishments, non-Muslim places of worship (in Maiduguri, 20 Churches were razed 
whilst three pastors and one reverend were killed).147 They raided police stations and 
army barracks in an unprecedented fashion unknown in sectarian violence in Nigeria. 
A military tactic employed by Yusuf was the use o f civil populace as a shield from the 
reprisal attack by the police and the army.
The Guardian Newspapers148 reported that thousands of the residents had been made 
homeless in Maiduguri, the Bomo State capital. Moreover, the Red Cross alleged that 
780 people (including police and military personnel) were killed in days o f violence in 
Maiduguri alone, which suffered most o f the casualties. In addition, there were 3,500 
internally displaced persons.149 In Yobe State, the sect called its cell ‘Afghanistan’. In 
Bauchi State, in a place known as Fadama Madawas, the sect stockpiled its arms and 
ammunition. In Jalingo, Taraba State, a school was discovered to be the training 
ground for the fundamentalists. While in Kano, the state government demolished a 
mosque used by the militants as a centre for preaching its principles opposed to 
western civilization.
147 N orthern Govs M ove to Stem Religious Crises: The Guardian, August 4 ' \  2009 , p. 1.
l4Sh t t p : / / w w w .ngrguard iannew s.rom /ncw s/article01  / / in d c x n 2  htm l?pdatc=300709& ptitle=Fighting% 20rages 
■% 20death% 20toll% 20hits% 20300% 20in% 20Borno.
149 The N ation, August 3rd, 2009 , p. 2.
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It was reported that Boko Haram planned to raid Lagos and other states situated in 
south-west Nigeria. Thirty-eight members of the sect were arrested on their journey to 
Lagos.150 This establishes the fact that the sects were desirous of, not only 
destabilizing northern Nigeria, but also the entire polity. Strictly speaking, the sect’s 
crucial position and contention were in respect of the secularity o f the Nigerian state, 
the desire to Islamize Nigeria and co-opt Muslims to affirm their allegiance solely to 
Allah rather than the Nigerian state with its non-Muslim oriented laws. Clearly, this 
gave the riot a sort of religious construction. The state inefficiency, as usual, was 
highly palpable as events to be seen will show this to be the case.
It is argued that since Islam is, primordially speaking, the existing essence o f all 
Muslims in northern Nigeria, it is not surprising then that the sect had a large 
followership in the north. Religious identity was the channel used to convey socio­
economic grievance through radicalizing the perceptions o f Islam. It may be 
speculated here that religion, being central to the identity o f the grass-root people, had 
the potential to convey public grievances.
It is significant to mention that Muslim leaders and military personnel had warned the 
state authorities about Boko Haram, however, these early warning signs were 
ignored.151 The Guardian Newspapers' 52 tells us that the Minority Leader o f the 
House o f Representatives, Mohammed Ali Ndume, blamed the Federal Government 
for not acting on time to impede the militants, in spite of the earlier security 
information available to it. On July 14, 2009, 21 reports had been submitted on
150 See Saturday Punch, August 1, 2009 , p 1 3.
151 The Guardian Newspaper, August 2 , 2009
"Nigeria accused o f  ignoring sect warnings before w ave of killings.
'“ h t tp : / /w w w .n g r g u a r r l ia n n e w s .c o m /n e w s /a r t ic lc 0 1 /7 in d c x n 2  h trn l?p d atc= 300709& p .tjtle= F igh tin g% 20ragcs  
-% 2 0 d eath % 20to ll% 20h its% 20300% 20in % 20B orn o
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Muhammad Y usufs activities and members o f his group.153 Those warnings were 
reportedly ignored. The sect had some degree of popularity. This is evident by the act 
o f the Governor of Bomu State Modu Ali Sheriff, provided the sect with 80 
kilometres o f land.154 Moreover, all attempts by the State Security Service to lure the 
governor to revoke the plot of land granted to Yusuf were futile.155 Furthermore, 
Y usuf had previously been arrested in Maiduguri on November 13, 2008, on suspicion 
o f attempting to disrupt the peace and security o f the state. However, he was released 
on bail on January 20, 2009.156 Perhaps, more crucial is that a former Commissioner 
o f Religious Affairs, in Modu Ali Sheriffs cabinet, Alhaji Buji Foi,157 was the second 
in command in Boko Haram.
One may begin to speculate about the politicians’ awareness that Islam as a primordial 
marker and therefore a potent instrument have hijacked religion for political 
currencies. In furthering one’s suspicion o f the unseen powers behind the sect, a 
conspiracy theory alleges that Muhammad Yusuf was captured alive and handed over 
to the police, but later died in controversial circumstances in their custody. Clearly, 
there is a fair amount o f controversy concerning the circumstances o f Muhammad 
Y usufs death. Was his death imminent to veil those behind the sect? Who were his 
sponsors? How did the sect acquire sophisticated arms and ammunition? Why was the 
early warning security reports of the State Security Service (SSS) not acted upon? A 
national newspaper, The Vanguard newspaper, comments that “some very powerful 
sponsors of the Islamist, whose mindset was already beginning to work upside down, 
may not want him to expose them and, therefore, may have caused the police to take
153 See h t tp : / /w w w .th is d a y o n lin c .c o m /n v ie w .p h p ? id = 1 5 0 2 7 7 .
154 The N ation , W ednesday August Sth, 2009 , p. 1: Security Reports on Sect’s Leader indicts Governor.
155 Ibid.
156 The N ation , W ednesday August Sth, 2009 , p. 2: Security Reports on Sect’s leader indict Governor.
157 He was killed in the uprising and his body later taken to the State House.
293
him out.” 158 Moreover there was accusing fingers between the Commander o f the 
Military Operation, Colonel Ben Ahonotu, and the former Commissioner o f Police, 
Bomo State Command, Mr. Christopher Dega. The former claimed that Yusuf was 
given to the police alive whilst the latter claimed that the leader o f the sect died in a 
shoot-out with the police.
It hardly seems misleading to suggest that the riots can be understood as not only 
against intolerance for westernization but also as perceived grievance in respect of 
economic stagnation, youth unemployment, popular impoverishment and 
disempowerment. It is possible to speculate that the causal link is due to perceptions 
o f deprivation in terms o f socio-economic, psychological needs and resource control.
Notwithstanding these speculations, northern governors have unanimously condemned 
the acts o f the sect. Specifically, Governor Danjuma Goje o f Gombe State ordered the 
destruction of Y usufs home in the State when he came on a visit months before the 
sectarian clashes took place.159 Yet again, it is worthy to note that the governors of 
Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda, and Kano State, Ibrahim Shekarau, took cautionary 
measures by giving the security forces the direction to avert the insurgence o f the sect. 
It is important that what needs to be recognized here is that Boko Haram’s ideologies 
are not supported by the majority of northern Nigerian Muslims. The Jama’atu Nasril 
Islam (JNI), an umbrella for all Muslims in northern seeking to advance political, 
social and economic interests of co-religionists in northern Nigeria, has explicitly 
condemned the sect and the violence that ensued. Confirming the report, the Chairman 
o f the Moslem Council of Nigeria (MCN), Alhaji Inuwa Jauro Manu, said
l5S Killing o f  Boko Haram leader: Haram vs Haram: h ttp ://w w w .van gu ard n grxom /2P Q 9/08 /08 /k ilL in g .ro t’-boko-
haram -leadcr-haram -vs-haram /
See After Boko Haram, Tim e to M ove on: The Nation, M onday, August 10, 2009 p. 20
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emphatically that "sect called itself a religious organization, its actions and activities 
does not conform with Islam."160 In addition, the Northern Governor’s Forum (NGF), 
an umbrella body of the 19 state governors of northern Nigeria, agreed to enact 
legislation that would curb sectarian violence in the region.161
5.7.35: Bauchi Kala-Kato Sect Ramapage, D ecem ber 28, 2009
On the 28 o f December 2009, in Bauchi, Bauchi State, 38 people lost their lives 
(including four children, and two soldiers)162 after Islamic militants o f the Kala-Kato 
sect (a derivative o f Maitatsine) went on rampage. The causation o f this crisis started 
when Malam Badamasi, the sect’s leader started preaching and supporting violence 
and militant Islam for the reason that he could not find an adequate cure to an illness 
he had acquired. He was later advised by members o f his sect that his ailment was as a 
result o f a plot by some members of the sect to kill him. He was also advised to kill 
the plotters, so that he could be cured from the dreaded disease.163 These suspicions 
divided the sect and resulted in some members leaving the group. This led to Malam 
Badamasi’s preaching for his enemies to be killed. His neighbours’ reported his state 
o f mind and utterances to the security service. Soldiers were then employed to calm 
tension. However, the militants resisted the soldiers’ intervention and in the process 
killed a soldier.
In the aftermath, loyalists o f Badamasi and miscreants consisting children between the 
ages 10 and 15, with adult members of the sect took to the streets to take advantage o f
160htt p ; / / vvww.ngrguarcliannews.com /n ew s/artic leO l /  /in d exn 2  htm l?pdate=300709& ptitle=Fighting% 20ragcs 
% 70Heath% 20toll% 20hits% 20300% 20in% 20Borno
161 N orthern govs plan laws against sectarian violence: The Punch, Tuesday, August 4 , 2009 , p .2 .
— 'Bauchi Sect Leader Killed, 20 A rrested’, accessed on the 2 nd o f  January 2010  at: 
http: I I  independentngonline.com  /D a ily  Independent /A rtic le . aspx?id—_59_1 7
165 ‘Bauchi Crisis: 20 arrested, 38 confirmed dead - 4  killed in Zamfara mayhem - Security beefed up in Jos’, The 
Triune, accessed on the 2,ul o f January 2 0 1 0  at: http: /  /  w w w . tribune. com in g /  3,0 U 2 0 0 9 ./ new s /  new s T  htmj
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the chaos. It was gathered that the Kala-Kato leader with 34 members o f the sect 
weie killed in a shoot out with the police.165 Furthermore, 20 suspects, consisting of 
nine adults and 11 children, were arrested.166 Clearly, this riot showcased the sensitive 
nature o f  religion (Islam) in northern Nigeria. More crucially, it exhibits the illiteracy 
and potent level o f ignorance amongst the grass-root people.
5.7.36: Jos Riots, January 17-19, 2010
From January 17-19, 2010 a disturbing riot between Muslims and non-Muslims 
erupted in Jos, and spreading to nearby villages, notably in Kuru Karama, 30 
kilometers south o f the city o f Jos. There are different and varied causations o f this 
riot. One version claims that the riot started over the building o f a mosque in a non- 
Muslim area o f the city. Another alleges that it started over a minor clash over the 
reconstruction o f a damaged house of a Muslim, which was destroyed in the 
November 2008 riot in a non-Muslim part of Jos. However, a different perspective 
pertaining to the cause of this conflict alleges that text messages were circulated in the 
city o f Jos asserting that non-Muslims should not to buy food from Muslims because it 
was poisoned. Furthermore, another text message circulated in the city alleged that the 
state governor intended to poison water supply of M uslims.167 The other version was 
that a local football match started the conflict. Whatever the true account was, these 
speculations sparked off the crisis which was carried out by non-Muslim and Muslim 
youths armed with guns, bows and arrows, and machetes. But most crucially, this riot 
shows that it is usually difficult to ascertain the true causation o f religious conflicts in
[MThe Tribune: h ttp: / /  w w w  - tribune. com  . ng/3 0 1 2  2 0 0 9 / new s /  ne w s3 . html Sc 
‘Another Religious Riot Claims 38 Lives in Bauchi’, accessed on the 2ml of’January 2010: 
http: /  /  wwwf .thisdayonline.com /  nview.phpPid— 162955
l6Shffp- / /indepcndentngonline. com/Pail vIndepcndcnt/Article.aspx?id—5917
166 h ttp : //w w w .tr ib u n e .c o m .n g /3 0 12 2 0 0 9 /n e w s /new s3.htm l ^
167 See ‘Nigeria text m essages 'fuelled Jos riots'. Accessed on the 2 7 ' 1’ o f  January 2 0 1 0  at 
h ttp - //n e w s .h b c . c n . u k /  1 / h i / w o r l d / a f r i c a / 8 4 8 2 6 6 6 . stm
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northern Nigeria. What appears to matter most is that minor disputes tend to convey 
religious differences and transform them into deadly conflict.
Clearly, this riot showcased the serious deeply divided religious differences among 
indigenes and settlers as loss of life, obliteration of houses of worship and places of 
residence was quite rampant. This led to 17,000 people being displaced.168 Following 
this, the state government imposed a 24hour curfew
The death toll from this riot was estimated to be 492, whilst 364 out o f this figure 
were Muslims.169 Due to the destructive nature o f the riot, the military was called 
upon to contain violence.
5.7.37: Jos Massacre, Shen Village, March 7, 2010
iL
Flowing from the riots discussed above, on the 7 day of March, despite the curfew 
that had been in place since January, aggrieved Hausa-Fulani Muslims who came 
from surrounding villages slaughtered at least over 500 non-Muslims from the Berom 
ethnic group in Shen village of Jos South Local Government Area as a reprisal for the 
January killings of Muslims.170 Aside from Shen village, other victims came from near 
by villages of Dogo Na Hauwa, Ratsat and Zot.171
168 See ‘Nigeria - Mass funerals in Jos riots’. Accessed on the 27'1’ o f  January 2010 at:
http: /  /  n ew s.b b c.co .u k /1  /  h i/  w o r ld / atrica/ 8472992  .stm
169 See The Punch, 25 ,h Jan 2010 ‘Another 28 dead bodies found in Jos, as residents flee ’. Accessed on the 27th of  
January 2010 at: h ttp : //w w v v .p u n ch ng.com /Articl.aspx?theartic::=A rt201001253435535
17(1 See Nigeria ethnic violence 'leaves hundreds dead’ Accessed on the 27 th o f  March at: 
http: /  /  new s .bbc. co. u k / 1 /  hi /  w o r ld / africa /  8555018 .stm .
171 See Jos: 416  Victims Get Mass Burial. Accessed on the 27,h o f January 2010 at:
http: /  /  w w w .punchng.com  /  Articl.aspxPtheartic—Art 2010030931 51648
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The victims of this devastating act were mainly children, women and the elderly who 
could not run for safety. It was alleged by observers that the line o f attack o f Muslims 
was initiated by alarming the villagers by gun shots in the early hours of the morning, 
and as they tried to escape, the victims were trapped in fishing nets and animal traps 
before being put to death by machetes.172 It was alleged that 93 persons, mostly 
Fulani, were arrested in connection with the massacre. In addition, it was understood 
that 19 Fulani herdsmen and 74 other Muslims, made up of varied tribes were also 
arrested.
In an attempt to explain this violence, Dr. Abel Damina, the National Chairman o f the 
Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (youth wing) said that the violence showcased the 
determination o f the fundamentalists to Islamize Nigeria.173 In another dimension, the 
Acting Commissioner o f Police in Plateau State, Mr. Ikechukwu Aduba, alledged that 
confessional reports from some of those arrested admitted that prominent individuals 
were sponsors of the chaos.174
5.8: C onclusion
This chapter explored how Islam in northern Nigeria works as a counter-force in 
mainstream conflict and crucially notes that those professing Islam in northern Nigeria 
to a large extent have not been unregimented by the concept of different ethnicities. It
172 See Nigeria ethnic violence 'leaves hundreds dead' Accessed on the 27 ,h o f  March at: 
h ttp : //n e w s .b b c .c o .u k / 1 /  h i/w o r ld /a fr ic a /855 5018. stm
175 See Jos: 416  Victims Get Mass Burial. Accessed on the 27lh o f  January 2010 at: 
http :/ / w w w  .p n n ch n g .com /A rticl.aspx?thcartic=A rt20100 3093151648
174 Secjos: W e W ere Sponsored, Suspects Tell Police, Accessed on the 27 ,h o f  March at: h ttp ://d irec to ry -  
n ig e r ia .o r g /n e w s /2 0 1 0 /0 3  /1 1  /ios-w e-w cre-sp on sored -su sp ects-tell-p o lice/
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should hardly be necessary to add that the principle o f unity in northern Nigerian 
Muslims is, first and foremost, based on religion. Thus, northern Nigerian Islamic 
tradition is antagonistic to individuals who are non-Muslims.
In many ways, this chapter answered the question: Why is there is a reduced conflict 
potential, when individuals share one religion (Islam) but belong to different ethnic 
groups? The intricacy here shows that religion is the contending issue. Illustrating this 
argument, Frieder (2008: 620) notes that a scholar Musa Gaiya described Zamfara as 
the most peaceful Sharia State in Nigeria. He explains that the rationale behind this is 
that there are only a marginal number of non-Muslims living in the state. In this sense, 
perceived threats to Islamic identity would be at a minimal or in a non-existent state.
Thus far, the negative consequences of religious division are definitely negatively 
affecting the development of the nation, especially at this historical junction of the 
nation’s polity and growth, when the struggle against the forces of underdevelopment 
and globalization should otherwise be a top priority. It is sad that the nation continues 
to lose valuable man hours, destruction of its human and material resources and 
degradation of its environment in the senseless and unproductive religious riots, which 
it has been involved in long before Nigeria’s independence. The centrality o f peace, 
harmony and unity as a desideratum for individual progress and national development 
seems to be lost to the people.
A most discouraging aspect to the psyche of citizenry and the common man is the 
myriad of security implications of his socio-occupational mobility in the territorial 
franchise of his nation. How safe can an individual be except in his own religious
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enclave? This poses a major challenge to nation-building. Perhaps a greater challenge 
is in realizing how applicable the concept of equality is as provided in the 
Constitution. What measure of trust and assurances can be considered true by the 
organs o f security and administration in the country? And how can the culture of 
blood-letting be prevented from flowing on the altar o f deceit and political 
brigandage?
While reiterating the fact that conflicts are inevitable, they could be drastically 
reduced. The most remarkable and toughest task ahead is that they must be 
systematically managed to prevent any dysfunctional effects on society. Most 
cataclysms and conflicts in Nigeria have multi-causal origins. These conflicts have 
mainly been between the Muslim nationals against non-Muslim nationalities 
bordering on politics, socio-economic advantages and on ignorance or a tell-tales. 
However, from an Islamic point o f view, they are based on threats to religious identity 
or perceived affronts to Islamic nationalism, thereby making religious tolerance 
difficult or impossible to attain.
The next chapter focuses on the qualitative analyses o f the data collated from the field.
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CHAPTER 6
PUTTING THE CONFLICT IN CONTEXT: QUALITATIVE DISCUSSIONS
The individualistic truth that people are the only moving forces in 
history-in the sense that nothing happens behind their backs, that is, 
everything that happens, happens in and through their actions-must 
be retained.
Roy Bhaskar (1989: 81)175
6.1: Introduction: Empirical Analysis o f  Field W ork
Perhaps, the main problem in empirical research on religious variables in conflicts in 
northern Nigeria is the lack of adequate data. On the one hand, quantitative studies 
almost exclusively use religious demographics (whose reliability may be questioned), 
which cover only a small and possibly theoretically less interesting selection of 
relevant factors. On the other hand, case studies provide in-depth insights but are 
hardly comparable to other studies given a lack o f comparable research questions, 
concepts, indicators or operations and are perhaps not suitable for valid 
generalizations. The methodological focus of the pilot project on religion and conflict 
has therefore centered on the compilation of a database that collects as many relevant 
conflict-specific and religion-specific variables in northern Nigeria’s violent conflicts. 
The main crux in these analyses has been to compile data that allow generalizations 
beyond in-depth case studies and that extend beyond the almost exclusively 
demographic data used in quantitative studies. It is crucial to note that different sub­
categories as explanatory variables of data such as gender, marital status, and income
l7S Bhaskar, Roy, 1989. Reclaiming Reality. London: Verso.
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and how they impact the research findings are too many to include in the data 
analysis. See Appendix A for the quantitative data via the use o f Chi- Square (X 2) as 
a statistical tool to verify whether the study’s hypotheses are reliable with observed 
data.
It must be stressed that the use of semi structured interviews and FGDs were quite 
useful strands to address all the salient issues in the research questions. Adopting both 
stands produced comprehensive and key causal explanations in order to substantiate 
different levels o f investigations and to enquire into profound and intricate arguments 
o f this study. The use of these twin strands enhances observatory processes for 
searching for an explanation of the dynamics of religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.
I used the community as a reference point in gathering oral testimony via semi 
structured interviews and FGDs which greatly enhance the data in order to pin down 
key arguments. A review of literature indicates that grass root people (non-elites) have 
not been used to gather relevant facts that can explain religious conflicts in the region. 
The combination of both strands was used to collate archetypal evidence from 
individuals who have witnessed and partaken in religious conflicts in the location o f 
study. The semi structured interviews and the FGDs were held from January -  April 
2009. The FGD in Kano was held on the 30th o f February 2009; the FGD in Kaduna 
was held on the 4th of April 2009 whilst the FGD in Jos was held on the 24th of 
January 2009.
The focus of this chapter analyses qualitative data collated from the field. To 
complement the quantitative statistical analysis o f the responses from the
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questionnaire, descriptive analyses principles were applied for the analysis of the 
data from the semi-structured Interviews and FGDs. These responses were recorded 
in both field notes and on tapes. This effort was informed by the research questions 
and the variables involved in the research. For clarity purposes, some o f the 
questions during the interviews and FGDs were interwoven around:
• What is your ethnic identity?
• What is your religious identity?
• Does the recitation of the Shahada promote peace in times o f conflicts?
• Do you think you have been fully assimilated in your place o f residence?
• During riots, do you think Muslim target non-Muslims?
• Does religion cause conflicts here (Kano, Kaduna and Jos)?
• What are the other causes o f conflicts in the north?
6.2: Pilot Study
Before undertaking this field study, from the 1st o f June 2008 -  30th of August 20 0 8 ,1 
conducted a pilot study in Kano, Kaduna and Jos. I was desirous of ascertaining how 
co-religionists target members of other faiths, in order to establish what mechanism 
identifies a Muslim from a non-Muslim. I was aware that conflicts in the region are 
usually ignited without any formalities. During a pilot study, I discovered that co­
religionists target members of other faiths mainly by dress codes. When in doubt of 
the individual’s religious identity, I discovered that during riots, if, for instance, 
Muslims encounter an individual(s) they believe are non-Muslim but such an 
individual(s) recites verses from the Qur’an, usually the Shahada (the Shahada is the 
recitation in the belief that there is only one God and that Muhammad is his Prophet:
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La ilaha ilia al-Lah, Muhammadun rasulu l-Lah), such individual(s) will be out of 
jeopardy of losing life or limb.
6.3: Target Setting
It is important to note that the Igbos, rather than the Yoruba, are usually selective 
targets during religious conflicts in northern Nigeria, especially in Kano. This 
observation is in accordance with the arguments in Chapter 5 (that Muslims tend to 
target non-Muslims during crises) and with my findings in the field. Horowitz 
(2002) explains this phenomenon. He tells us that the reason for the ethnic 
antagonism between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbos as opposed to the Yorubas’ is 
due to perceived political and economical grievances, especially with the perceived 
fear o f being dominated by the Igbo (the Igbos out-number the Yoruba). One cannot 
totally reject Horowitz’s reasoning. However, I find that a more adequate 
explanation for this lies in religious identity. As explained in Chapter 1, the Yorubas 
have an equal proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims, unlike the Igbo who have a 
clear and overwhelming non-Muslim population. This social reality has been 
explained in Chapter 1. The primordial identity of the northern Nigerian Muslims is 
based on religion and it is clear at this point that this identity mark may be 
incompatible with the Igbos.
The general recognition of the above was collated from the field. The overwhelming 
majority o f Hausa-Muslims respondents in Kano reiterated this assumption. A few 
narratives describing this are illustrated by a Muslim I met Kano in Sabon Gari on the 
27th o f January 2009. His locale was run down and could be described as a desolate 
slum. He had lived there almost all his life and he, among others, was of the opinion
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that religious conflicts were the most volatile because people were ready to die for a 
religious cause. In Sabon Gari, on the 29th of January 2009 with a few well-placed 
questions, a young Muslim clad in the typical jalabiyya and looking fairly unkempt 
(reminiscent o f persons who spend their days in poverty at Q ur’anic schools) lamented 
the general view of Muslim respondents, “Christians are normally problem.” This 
view is also expressed graphically by a Hausa-Muslim, a civil servant, whom I came 
across in the suburbs of Kano City on the 20th of February 2009. After he wondered 
about how he would react to this question, he told us that “we can call the Yorubas our 
friend, because we interact with them more than the Igbos. They are very simple. 
Yorubas they are very simple and they are very cordial so most of the time they attack 
the Igbos." In another emphatic narration, an academic, at the Bayero University, 
Kano on the 19th of February 2009, with whom I had three hours o f exhaustive 
interactions, stressed that “an average migrant living in Kano identifies the non- 
Muslims as Igbos, and not the Yoruba or any other ethnic group.” Beyond these 
narratives I was able to corroborate the analyses in Chapter 1, where I theorized about 
the primordial identity o f religion.
The analysis is further highlighted from semi-structured interviews, documented from 
Muslims in Kaduna, who assume that the Yoruba non-Muslims in Kaduna City are 
targets during riots. Furthermore, it was observed that the bane of conflicts in Jos is 
mainly emphasized by religious differences. All together these findings may explain 
why religion is a central variable in conflicts in northern Nigeria. These observations 
point to the fact that most conflicts arise in northern Nigeria when an individual 
belongs to a non-Islamic faith. Further, it illustrates that although ethnic boundaries 
create conditions for conflict, however, in northern Nigeria, Islamic identity is a
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credible factor for engendering unity amongst Muslims o f different ethnic groups. 
Since these patterns have a certain consistency, let me consider how Muslims 
specifically target non-Muslims in times of conflict.
At this point it is useful to mention that during inter-religious violence, women are 
also victims. Although they do not actively participate in the crises, if  they are found 
by a divergent group, they would be in jeopardy of losing life or limb. During the field 
work I did not come across any victim of such violence. However, it is noticed in 
chapter 5 that women have been victims of religious conflicts. However, the 
observation of Eugenia Date-Bah & Martha Walsh (2001) noting that the impact o f 
conflict differs from men and women -  women are faced with greater burdens during 
conflict when men are at ‘war’ and are not given adequate attention. Thus, women 
should be regarded as ‘active’ victims rather than ‘passive’ victims.
6.4: The Dress Code Dem on
I observed that a majority of northern Muslims are usually dressed in long flowing 
gowns {jalabiyya), whilst women are either veiled or wear head scarves. Non- 
Muslims usually wear ethnic dressing or westernized clothing styles. I, however, 
observed that although this may not be necessary conclusive of a religious identity 
for Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, in Kaduna it was discovered that some 
traditional rulers who are non-Muslim wear similar attire as the Muslims. In 
addition, a few respondents whom I interviewed in Tundun wada Market, between 
the 3rd -  29h of March 2009, in Kaduna were of the view that dress does not indicate 
a religious identity.
306
Notwithstanding these contentions, it was frequently gathered that dressing may 
earmark an individual’s religious identity during religious riots; therefore, it has the 
potential o f revealing the religious identity of an individual. One o f such opinion is 
echoed by a non-Muslim participant in the FGDs in Kaduna: “I was a victim ... I 
was staying somewhere around here and when it happened my neighbour gave me 
something to wear and that was what I actually used that saved me to the Barracks.” 
His voice was more o f an imperative warning to heed his advice on import rather 
than just trying to give us a piece of his mind. Another participant in FGD in 
Kaduna, an Igbo man responding to this issue, also narrated his experience. 
Ironically it centered on non-Muslims targeting Muslims:
I want to share my experience. During the 2001 riots there is this former 
President Babangida’s bodyguard. He was in the vehicle because he put on 
jeans and shirt so when they ask him what is your name he say I am John 
that is how he escaped because it was a Christian dominated area but if 
they have been him with Kaftan and a long cap nobody would ask you 
question, they would just shoot you. The dressing actually identifies.
In the neighborhoods of Sabon Gari, which is distinctively different from Kano City 
with its old buildings and untidy surroundings but with a presence of 
commercialized activities, on the 3rd of February 2009, I came across a Yoruba 
woman selling Yoruba ethnic food in Sabon Gari, Kano. The respondent, who was 
unaccustomed to being subject to enquiries of this nature, attempted to tell us the 
difference between targets of religious conflicts and dressing codes as an element of 
identification. She narrated that “they {Muslims) target you once you are not one of 
them ... whether you are a Muslim or not.” She also stated that “the way you dress 
here in times of conflict would determine whether you will live or die.” Exploring 
the essence o f the dress code further, I randomly discovered from respondents in
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Kano that dressing is a symbol of differentiation between the non-Muslims and 
Muslims in times o f conflict.
Unfortunately, I was not able to interview individuals from the Igbo group in Sabon 
Gari, Kano. Individuals from the Igbo ethnic group, who mainly reside here, were 
tense. They were suspicious and hostile and this was perhaps an allusion o f their 
plight during conflicts. One of such people stood staring, glaringly as if  searching 
for an answer or how to begin. He never did.
In Jos, most respondents I interviewed between the 5th -  18th of January 2009 agreed 
that dressing is generally considered to have a religious significance. I was able to 
identify such hidden assumptions during the interview sessions. On one occasion, I 
met an unemployed non-Muslim man who was prospecting for a shop space close to 
the Central Bank Office, who remarked that it easy to recognize a Hausa-Muslim by 
the mode o f dressing. In another situation in the southern part o f Jos, a non-Muslim, 
semi-skilled worker I met at the only motor garage in that area reaffirmed the 
common stance that dress is a religious fundamental.
It was also randomly gathered in Kaduna in interviews held between 3rd o f March -  
29thth of March 2009, that dressing was a primordial indicator o f the 
individual/group as it differentiates an individual and a group from the other just as 
nationality, language and race and most crucially a determinant in conflict.
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6.5: Shahada: The Cry for War or Peace
The essence o f this recitation reveals that individuals share an Islamic identity. 
During religious conflicts the Islamic identity promotes peace as it acts as a safety 
mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises. This assumption is supported by 
majority o f northern Muslims I interviewed. A respondent in Kano, whom I 
interviewed on the 16th of February 2009, who cut a clear impression o f a Muslim 
scholar by his mode of dressing including the turban and a rich thrust of beard, made 
it clear with a sense of pride that the Shahada “promotes peace in the sense that 
Muslims are inspired in the sense that they are to abide by the rules of Islam.” A 
cordial-looking Muslim textile trader, with about 25 year’s residency in Kano, 
whom I interviewed on the 17th of February 2009, said that “anybody who recites 
the Shahada must not be killed by any other Muslim, during riots, if  he does that, it 
would be a sin.” Yet, another Muslim textile trader in Kano market, whom I met on 
the 26th of February 2009, and who spoke wanly with a nasal voice, was of the 
opinion that it promotes peace and that the individual’s ethnic identity was not in 
question once the Shahada was recited -  ethnic identity did not matter, only his 
religious identity. The above opinions could be taken to suggest a general 
estimation. A participant at the Kaduna FGD, whose simple candor in speaking to us 
betrayed some depth and awe, narrated a livid experience:
I was passing through an Islamic school on governor road and the first thing 
I would see is that the whole student come out to block the road, I started 
reciting the one, before I got to the point I don’t know, I had gotten to the
bush... I think it will go a long way in saving your life.
Most of the respondents noted that the recitation of the Shahada promotes peace in 
times o f conflict, and thus acts as a basis of an overarching solidarity and unity
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amongst different ethnic groups. Recalling a few o f such views, in the thick o f the 
Kano textile market, on the 13th of February 2009, clusters of people trafficking the 
market area seemed to pause differently at various spots. Upon enquiry, it was 
revealed that a Muslim cleric had just finished teaching on certain torah and people 
were dispersing to their shops while acknowledging greetings form older disciples. I 
chanced upon this cleric who believes that conflicts in the ancient city are due to 
competitions for worldly possessions and not based on religious issues and that 
anyone that recites the Shahada becomes your brother. I recalled that on the 8th of 
January 2009 ,1 had come across a similar voice in Jos. A Hausa-Muslim community 
leader said, reaffirming the general opinion of Muslim respondents:
Ordinarily, if  he is chasing a non-Muslim, if he says that he should be 
allowed. Islam had provided an avenue for him to take arms against his 
fellow human being. If there is such a problem and shouted (the Shahada) 
then he should be allowed to go.
On the 11th o f January 2009, in a serene part o f Jos, I attended a non-Muslim place 
o f worship. My intention was to meet with the Chairman of Youth Christian 
Association o f Nigeria, Jos Plateau. The neighbourhoods here were quite different 
from the other places I had visited, such as Rikkos, Angwan Rogo and Congo 
Russia. The Chairman perhaps gave the loudest exclamation o f these voices: “In 
terms of conflicts like this that is what you have to say if you have to survive even if 
you are not a Muslim.”
I discerned that Muslims I had encountered in Kano were protective of their 
religious identity. They did not want Islam to be linked with conflict. Consequently, 
a few stated that conflicts leaned towards ethnicity not religion. However, they still
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affirmed that during riots the recitation o f the Shahada promoted peace. An 
interesting narrative link from a Muslim participant from the Kaduna FGD is 
extracted to better understand the crucial role of the recitation as a mechanism of 
reducing conflict:
I have seen a situation in Kabala where they stopped somebody they ask 
him, to make the sign of the cross and he was saying the name o f the father, 
the mother and the son he couldn’t understand despite that he has the idea.
As I speak w ith'you I know how make the recitation both in Islam and 
Christianity, why because for my protection.
He was willing not just to state his experience but to emphasize, with pride, that not 
only was it necessary to be able to identify with his religion (Islam) but also to 
identify with the equivalent recital of non-Muslims, just in case a Muslim was being 
attacked by a non-Muslim.
Generally, in Jos the recitation of the Shahada was viewed rather differently. To 
non-Muslims it is regarded as a call to arms. This is probably because of the 
preponderance of the large number of non-Muslims whose direct and reported 
experiences have shown that the recitation o f the Shahada means a lot more than a 
means o f identifying the ‘we’ and ‘us’ divide. Their notion may result from a 
functional interpretation of the use of the Shahada. In order to explain this 
phenomenon, I will illustrate one of my findings. I met a young Igbo trader on the 
13th of January 2009, who had just set up a new kitchenware shop by the Rayfield 
settlement junction and he expressed similar views of non-Muslims: “They use it to 
alert people that something is happening. ” A Muslim participant in the Jos FGD 
told us that the slogan, Allahu Akbar, is used to scare non-Muslims in times of 
conflict. Despite the varied interpretations of the Shahada, it was widely gathered
that Muslim respondents generally thought that when the Shahada was recited, was a 
mechanism of showing Muslim identity -  therefore, it could be used to act as a 
mechanism to save lives.
The interviews in Kaduna also revealed the use of the Shahada as a mark o f a religious 
identity during conflict. In the words of a Kataf, non Muslim from Kaduna who I 
interviewed on the 2nd of April 2009:
It is not everybody that know the Muslim Shahada. They usually say 
aillahaillalah Mohammadu Bosulullahi, but the Christian way is 
different. If you cannot say the Shahada, they will kill you. But if  you 
say it they will not kill you
Paradoxically, another important issue that emerged during the interviews was that 
the recitation of a non-Muslim’s sacred slogan may reduce conflict. On the 21st of 
January 20 0 9 ,1 met a middle-aged Muslim Yoruba man whose family had migrated 
to Jos over thirty years ago and even considered his family to be more or less 
indigenes of the state by virtue of the births of his children. He did not wish to 
narrate his experience about conflicts because he told us that he did not want to 
recall these miserable events. After some persuasion and some empathy on my part, 
with the look of grim resignation he graphically narrates the Jos 2008 riots:
I had to follow the fence to get to my house to pick my child. As I was 
about to get out my child I was caught. They poured petrol on me they 
wanted to light matches. Very fortunate for me, you know as a Yoruba 
man, can’t differentiate between Muslim and Christian. So the first thing 
one said to me was ‘In the name of the Father, the Son, then I shouted, 
‘and the Holy Spirit.’ That is what saved me. If for example, when they 
said in the name of the Father, the Son and I couldn’t say the last one 
word, I couldn’t say the last statement, I would have been killed.
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This narration shows that the religious identity, as opposed to the ethnicity of an 
individual is crucial during conflict in northern Nigeria. But in balancing these 
narratives, the line between the call for peace or arms, there is another diversion: 
Ignorance. Illustrating the levels of illiteracy and deprivation in the north, a participant 
in the FGD in Kano, whose look bore marked resignation and helplessness as the topic 
o f the discourse wore on, narrated an incident where a man was about to be attacked 
whilst reciting the Shahada. One of the would-be attackers, a Muslim, in order to 
determine the primordial identity of the individual enquired from his co-religionist 
whether he was reciting it properly. These narrative links seem to provide us with the 
understanding that in those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by 
common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe. 
Further the recitation of the Shahada showcases that the northern Nigerian Muslim has 
a strong primordial attachment to religion. The recitation further illustrates that the 
primordial identity in religion may set boundaries to those professing other faiths.
6.6: Primordial Identities
It is significant to mention that during the FGDs all the people who claimed to be 
Muslims were robed typically in the Muslim fashion o f long flowing robes, caps and 
often times carried the rosary conspicuously. This was not the same with the others, 
even though they possibly had cultural affinities to the north or had been resident 
there for years and possibly shared the same religious identity. Predictably most of 
the northern Muslim respondents I interviewed conceptualized their identity as 
being Muslim. They also viewed other non-northern Muslims as brothers. However, 
there were critical views by a few non-Muslim southern respondents who viewed 
ethnicity as the identity of Hausa-Fulani Muslims. A non-Muslim religious leader,
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whom I met on 10th of April 2009, outside a Church in Tundun Wada in Kaduna, 
sheds some light here:
The Muslim from the core north, believe on Islam whether Hausa-Fulani 
or whatever. Muslims in the south, east and west even apart from the 
practice of religion, also believes in ethnicity. Yoruba man is a Muslim 
and his brother is a Christian he cannot fight his brother but in the north 
it would be different, the word Islam covers every other thing.
The overwhelming marker of a religious identity, as stated through the stem words 
o f a Hausa-Muslim whom I interviewed on the 5th of February 2009, from Kano 
dressed in a jabila and sporting a grey beard, is useful in demonstrating that Islam 
has overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create solidarity among 
seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria. He explained:
Every Muslim is a brother to other Muslim. No difference there is no 
variation. The hadith did not specify that whether you belong to any ethnic 
group or you are only restricted to that ethnic group....if you are a younger 
brother to someone, if you are the same father the same mother with him but 
you are practicing different religion. My closeness is stronger to those who 
we come under the same religion than him.
This except strongly indicates the cultural bond of Muslims in northern Nigeria, as the 
variant o f Islam practiced in northern Nigeria bridges the gap between individuals 
divided on ethnicity in the region. Similarly, a non-Muslim cleric from Kaduna whom 
I interviewed on the 7th of April 2009 also echoed the opinions o f northern Muslims: 
“Muslims to Muslims, whether Yoruba, Igbo or any other tribe, we are one.” Against 
this question, most non-Muslims in Jos were of the opinion that northern Muslims 
viewed themselves first and foremost as Muslims. However in Kano, although most 
non-Muslims believed that northern Muslims considered religion more important than 
ethnicity, a strong perception of non-Muslims was that they viewed themselves as
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Hausa. This may not be surprising, as most o f the Hausa live in Kano City, whilst 
most o f the non-Muslims live in Sabon Gari, revealing a convergence o f religion and 
ethnicity. Further, ethnicity and religion play dominant roles in the individual’s 
primordial identity
In conceptualizing identities in northern Nigeria, it was frequently observed that 
Muslims from the region considered themselves equal with Muslims from all ethnic 
groups within northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general. Illustrating such views, a 
Muslim trader in Kano Market, who I interviewed in his shed where he sold kola- 
nuts in bags, told us that “Muslims are one nation anywhere in the world the 
problem we are having here in the north is lack of education.”176 However, a few 
non-Muslims conceived that Hausa Muslims attacked Muslims from other ethnic 
origins.
There were dissenting views from some participants in the FGD in Kano that the 
fluency in Hausa language was more important than a religious identity in times of 
conflict. The presentation of this issue led to a discussion aimed at substantiating 
different levels of opinions and to enquire into profound and intricate conceptions the 
general and prominent voice that religion matters not language. During one such 
debate, a participant in the FGD in Kaduna perceived that “the Muslims in the north 
don’t see themselves as Muslims as a whole, they do not see the Yorubas as Muslims 
until you are Hausa, that is the reason why you attack them. It is a tool the politicians 
use but it is because the religious bodies have made it so. The first thing they start 
doing is burning of Churches and Mosques, why is it like that?” From his narration, it
176 Interviewed on the 3rri of  February 2009.
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can be filtered that religion is the significant cause o f conflicts in the region because 
non-Muslim places of worship or mosques are destroyed by these competing 
identities.
Another intriguing question presented to the participants in the FGD reflecting the 
hypothesis was: In a conflict situation, do people consider themselves first as 
Muslims, or whether you are Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo or in conflict situation do they 
consider themselves first as Hausa person or Yoruba person? The Hausa lady 
reflecting the general view of the participants in the FGD in Kano who was 
comparatively educated, libertine and outspoken said:
As for me, it depends on the society one comes from. If it is from the 
South you find out that in a family you have Muslims, Christians and 
traditional worshippers. So one would consider the ethnicity first before 
the religion. But, if you come to the north you find out that 99.9% of the 
people are Muslims so they would consider the religion first before the 
ethnic.
Another crucial comment by a participant, whilst agreeing with the Hausa-Muslim 
lady, noted that identities matter in time of conflicts. Referencing the Jos conflict, 
the participant noted in cognizance that Islam facilitates a source for communal 
unity amongst Muslims:
The first and foremost they refer to religion a Muslim are not going to 
kill a Yoruba man that is a Muslim, an Igbo man that is a Muslim and 
not going to kill a Birom man who is a Muslim but any other tribe, 
whether Igbo that is a Christian is an enemy.
Sitting behind an academic desk of a tertiary institution, this academician spoke with 
a finality that pronounced the stark reality that the issue of discourse was beyond the
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logic o f research or a re-ordering of normative values. In a descriptive 
commiseration, this non-Muslim academic illustrated the religious division in the 
north and greater primordial emphasis on Islam as an identity marker:
I would be staying with you as a brother, and the next thing you attack 
me, forgetting that for years we have lived peacefully with one another 
and I didn’t know that all these while you’ve been having something 
against me and you are aware and you wouldn’t tell me...
The above narrative, which echoes the general sense o f Muslims towards non­
members o f the faith, not only demonstrates that Muslims are likely to place 
excessive emphasis and loyalty on religious beliefs and religious identity but also the 
volatile state o f religion in northern Nigeria.
6.7: In B rotherhood We Stand, D ivided We Live
All the towns visited, except Jos (for the reason that it has a majority non-Muslims 
populace), had a settlement area christened Sabon Gari, which I gathered was the 
loci of visitors and strangers who were allowed residency but ‘separated’ on grounds 
o f non-indigeneship and rights appropriation, the Islamic faith and ethnic identity. 
Through the incidence of increased migration, these areas have assumed dense 
population markers which have brought them into closer and borderless integration 
with the main town or city itself. The provision o f public and social infrastructure 
has also watered down the affectations of these settlements. Nevertheless, since 
these areas still have that nomenclature, the trappings o f their necessities are not lost 
but also make them marked target areas in the event of conflict.
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On issues about living in different areas such as Sabon Gari in Kano, I discovered 
that one of the chief reasons was to eliminate inconsistent practices with the Islamic 
religion. Revealing that Islam in the North takes preference before other shared 
features. It was discovered that all the three locations surveyed had religious distinct 
settlements based on religious grounds other than ethnicity. The segregation of 
residences for non-Muslims (Sabon Gari) is part and parcel o f the history of Kano 
and other core Muslim states in northern Nigeria. The self differential structure was 
established to allow the practice of religious freedom among non-Muslims. In Jos I 
found many areas were strongly demarcated on religious grounds, unlike in Kano 
that had one major area: Sabon Gari. Furthermore, religious demarcation in 
residential areas was more prevalent in Jos than in Kano and Kaduna.
It is instructive to note that due to the sensitivity of religious identity, most o f the 
Muslims interviewed in Jos had sentiments of not being fully assimilated as 
indigenes. A useful insight that provided a clear picture to us (myself & research 
assistants) was discovered during the FGD in Jos that the indigenes do not want 
settlers partaking in political roles due to the fact that they are Muslims. However, I 
noted that this problem would not be apparent if the settlers were non-Muslims. 
Interestingly, some non-indigenes, who were Muslims, perceived that they were 
assimilated due to the delineated areas for Muslims and non-Muslims.
A Muslim cleric, whom I spoke to at his Qur’anic School on the 6th of February 
2009 in the midst of his disciples in Kano, affirmed intolerance to non-Muslims and 
showcased his most ardent support for the rationale of the strangers quarters (Sabon 
Gari) by saying: “O f course, they do know all of us in Kano city are Muslims. We
can t live with Christians, the reason is because o f our religion. Bells are ringing at 
odd times of the day, we cannot tolerate tha t...” He also affirms that “Muslims are 
Umma. Umma means a community of Muslims. You know the prophet salAllahu 
alayi wasallam whether you come from the west, or north or the south, once you are 
a Muslim and you gather together, you should forget your ethnic differences.” In 
concurrence with these views, it was observed that in Kano most southern non- 
Muslims are aggrieved as they are underprivileged and not assimilated in Kano.
The social construction of segregated living in Kaduna State is more pronounced in 
the southern part o f Kaduna which is dominated by in the region of 90% of 
Christians while the northern part is dominated by nearly 90% of Muslims. Kaduna, 
the capital of Kaduna State, is further divided along religious lines. A participant in 
the FGD in Kaduna rightly notes that “When you are Igbo, Hausa or Yoruba in as 
much as you go to Church, you would move towards the south o f Kaduna while the 
Muslims move towards the north.” Another participant from Kaduna believed that 
the only solution to religious crisis in Kaduna and in northern Nigeria is by 
segregation of Muslims and non-Muslims because in twenty years the crisis will still 
be prevalent. The language here indicates that that religion is a crucial factor in 
northern Nigeria. There remains a strong divisional line between Muslims and non- 
Muslims. Non-Muslims may not feel welcome in living amongst Muslims; 
therefore, it is highly unlikely that Muslims would feel unwelcome in northern 
Nigeria. This is perhaps exemplified by a Hausa-Muslim student, whom I met in 
Kano, on the 7th of February 2009, who is an indigene of Katsina State, and asserts 
that he was assimilated into Kano because he was Muslim.
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It seems amazing that a few respondents, who are Muslims from other ethnic groups 
in southern Nigeria, do not feel assimilated in Kano although they were accepted by 
Muslims in Kano. Perhaps, this explains the notion that other ethnic groups in the 
south consider ethnicity as their main identity marker other than religion.
6.8: Behind R eligious Identities
Against the cultural developments of the 3 locations, vis-a-vis religious inclinations 
and tolerance, Kaduna enjoys the greater patronage of the elite north and city 
dwellers and had acquired, by dint of socio-cultural exposition, a level o f tolerance 
that permitted the mutual co-existence of tribes and religion. Jos, on the other hand, 
had an amalgam of non-Hausa cultures which fostered cultural integration, religious 
tolerance and peaceful co-existence among the settlers. It was sufficient that the 
presence o f the English from colonial times had impacted positively on the cultural 
psyche such that there was a preponderance of non-Muslims as against Muslims. 
The people were more disposed to a tribal or ethnic identity.
In both Kaduna and Jos, before the Fourth Republic (May, 1999), all were living as 
sisters and brothers, politics tagged along with religious crisis. In Kaduna, a 
participant displaying a keen sense of contemporary political history of the country 
and unraveled the internalized opinions of the group. “The politicians have found 
out that religion is a potent instrument. It is an instrument o f capturing power.” 
Balancing these arguments, I began to speculate about the politicization o f religion 
in northern Nigeria. I discovered that some participants and respondents revealed 
that although religion was the domineering variable of these riots, ethnicity and 
political interest were attached with religious identity especially when there is a
320
convergence in religious and ethnic identities. In the words o f a participant in the 
FGD in Kaduna: “It could be political, it could be ethnic but at the end o f the day it 
turns out to be religious.”
In the course of the interactive exchange, I asked a striking question: When most of 
these conflicts arise, you find out that usually there are divisions like Muslim and 
non-Muslims: why does religious divide come when there are political problems? 
The second Hausa Muslim lady in the FGD in Kano revealed an answer that all 
participants agreed with: “I think it has been created by Colonial masters.” The 
center piece o f this narration provides us with one o f the theoretical notions of 
invented tradition. My curiosity was aroused again in the FGD in Jos, where the 
only lady, who was perhaps the most proactive participant in the FGD, said: “If they 
(Muslims) are not allowed to participate, how can we say the amalgamation o f 1914 
was properly done, that is where we have the problem.” This opinion was agreed 
upon by other participants.
A large number of respondents in Jos concluded that Plateau State is made up o f an 
army o f dysfunctional unemployed, unemployable, uneducated and confused 
population. And that a large number of people were and still are being indoctrinated 
into a form of Islam that is anti-peace and pro-war. In terms o f experience, the Jos 
participants in the FGD assisted in the reconstruction of social events, connoting that 
the crisis in Jos is religious but it relates to the Hausa-Fulani Muslims who are denied 
indigene-ship and the settlers (non-Muslims). Insights into the study of Islam and 
conflicts were gathered in Jos. The participants in the FGD in Jos agreed that politics 
were interwoven with religion. They unanimously agreed that the elites and politicians
321
have hijacked religion for political currencies, as explored in Chapter 3. Furthermore, 
illiteracy and poverty were discovered to be sources that make politicians/elites to use 
religion as a hegemonic political tool and as an instrument for political power.
In Jos, my concern was to explore the indigene/settler issues. I noticed that the 
conflicts are purely ethno-religious -  the Muslim Hausa-Fulani vs. non-Muslims, the 
Indigenes. The source of these conflicts was deeply rooted in indigene/settler issues 
and grievances with religion as a vehicle for illustrating these perceived grievances 
and threats. A Hausa-Muslim, whom I spoke to on the 19th o f January 2009, who is 
head o f a local market and in conformity with the views of other Hausa Muslims, 
said that “Jos indigenes do feel that they don’t want anybody that does not belong to 
their own clan or ethnic group to pick up power in Jos north.” In attempting to 
depick the sharp division on religious grounds, the Chairman o f the Youth Christian 
Association of Nigeria & National Secretary of Religious Council, Plateau State 
said:177 “We believe that the Muslims have many Islamic agenda just as the 
Christian too have. The Muslims want to Islamize the world and the Christians too 
want to convert the world for Jesus and that is the problem that we have.” He also 
noted that the conflicts were more religious than ethnic.
Most o f the Muslims interviewed in Jos perceived they were victims o f religious 
conflicts. Their relative deprivation was centered on deprivation o f aspirations, as 
noted by a Muslim Cleric:178 “If  you are Muslim you will not get chairmanship, you 
are not allowed to contest. Someone contested and we thought that that person will
1/7 Interviewed on the 1 O'1’ ol January 2009.
I7S Interviewed on the 19lh o f  January 2009.
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win the election.” Another Hausa-Muslim leader179 said that they (Muslims) were 
not given the opportunity to participate in the political process. In this sense, the 
Hausa-Fulani also perceive that there is the loss in community or political 
participation (decrement deprivation). It was observed that Jos was once a vibrant 
tourist city blessed with a temperate climate, eco-culture and a libertine populace 
who lived with a tranquil understanding that each others’ rights. However, since the 
inception o f the Fourth Republic in 1999, a moment o f change occurred, the once 
tranquil urban town has been a ghost o f its former self. This clearly illustrates a 
perceived progressive deprivation on the part o f the Hausa-Muslims since there is a 
decline in political attainment.
During the expose of conflicts in northern Nigeria, in the FGD in Kaduna there were 
murmurs and contentions o f who did what, when and where. This FGD gave a clear 
picture o f the state o f socio-political decay and that this was attended by socio­
economic ills (e.g. lack of job opportunities, contempt for religion and extreme level 
o f fanaticism.) It was subtly revealed and by a participant in the Kaduna FGD and 
accepted by the group that unemployment and ignorance are not sufficient excuses for 
incessant conflicts in the state, as other northern states experiencing similar lack of 
amenities do not experience such crises. However, it was generally noted that other 
northern states had a minimal number o f non-Muslims residing in the state.
The disturbing dimension of conflicts was revealed in the Jos FGD. The group 
generally identified that the sources of conflict are in politics but later wore the toga of 
religion. This explains the tendency of Islam, as our case in point to feed into religious
]T) Interviewed on the 19th of  January 2009.
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crisis for personal and group interests. Clearly, it was political grievances led to 
religious conflicts. A participant and a respondent noted that it was the burning of 
mosques and non-Muslim places of worship and not electoral offices or political 
party’s property that led to his conclusion.
On the level o f an individual experience, a participant in the Kaduna FGD who was 
born and bred in the Kaduna and had witnessed the riots in 1992, 2000 and 2002, 
was o f the opinion that it was strictly a religious affair. He narrated a personal 
experience:
I have seen a church where they were telling the people not to have 
anything to do with the Muslims similarly an Imam close to my house said 
whenever he sees me with his son, he called me an ‘am a’ (infidel) that his 
son has nothing in common with me.
This narration, which was a general perception o f the group, is an indication o f 
religious intolerance that was explored in Chapter 5.
The FGD in Kano provided a representative view-point illustrating that the religious 
link being that Hausa-Fulani Muslims cannot be detached from Islam, and further 
illustrating that Islam is intolerant to other religions. A Fulani lady, one o f the two 
ladies in the FGD, expressed a perceived notion shared by the group that the conflicts 
were religious but were political in nature. Another interesting comment which was 
noted by the respondents and participants was that religion was regarded as a “moving 
force as politicians and elites, who are aware that most Nigerians are deeply 
religious.” Most of the participants and respondents in the study locations had a shared 
notion that politics and a religious factor or ethnic factor cannot be separated. It is
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easy to understand that the tone and substance o f this indicates that Islam can be 
politically hijacked and manipulated to generate conflict when there is a perceived 
threat to its sacrosanct nature. Particularly, an interesting observation by a respondent 
in Jos is that the types of weaponry used during religious conflicts were not within the 
economic reach o f the common man.
In Jos, majority of respondents agreed that both the elite and religious leaders have a 
role to play in conflicts in Plateau State. A non-Muslim indigene was interviewed on 
the 8th o f January 2009, in his retail provision store not far from the NASCO junction 
in Jos. He said that due to the political environment, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims have 
grievances o f being dominated by non-Muslims. He also said that due to 
unemployment and poverty, the elites and politicians conscript the youth as 
machineries o f violence. It was gathered that the youth voluntarily enrolled to partake 
actively in inter-religious conflict. However, they observed that a factor responsible 
for this was that the youths came from extremely poor backgrounds. In addition, since 
the violence was instigated in their areas of residence, it became necessary to become 
part o f the conflict for self-protection and the human instinct to survive. These views 
show not only the preference for a religious primordial identity but also the leverage 
which is attendant to it.
The media in northern Nigeria and Nigeria in general is owned by both public and 
private sectors. However, the majority of media houses are owned by the private 
sector. It is not surprising then that there are elements of religious bias in reporting 
religious conflicts in the region. By interacting with focus groups, an underlining issue 
was brought to the table. One of the participants in the FGD in Jos pointed out that the
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media should be fair and objective in their report because the non-Muslim media 
report one thing while the Muslim-owned media report another event. Attempts to 
explain this crucial observation is found in the report o f The Guardian Newspaper, 
made two headlines on the Kano disturbances on May 12, 2004 and May 13, 2004, 
which had two stories on the front page. The news report o f May 13 was titled, “They 
entered our house and stabbed my husband’s elder brother until he died” and was 
deliberately couched to arouse sentiments.
The Businessday o f May 13, 2004, was one o f the first newspapers to insinuate that 
the governor supported the riot in a caption: Obasanjo Meets Muslim Leaders Over 
Kano Riots: Governor’s Speech May Have Triggered Killings. This report was unlike 
the Vanguard report of May 13, 2004, titled: Curfew in Kano as 10 die protesting 
Yelwa killings. This article stated, among other things, that: “Governor Shekarau also 
urged them to emulate Prophet Muhammad and allow peace to reign in the state, and 
promise to personally deliver their letter to the authorities.”
A crucial observation from the data is that I found that illiteracy and ill-education 
were channels through which religious conflicts are executed. The FGD in Kano 
identified illiteracy and the lack of education as focal points in the causation of 
conflicts in the state and in northern Nigeria in general. However, a striking 
observation from a participant noted that illiterates are not skilled enough to 
strategically implement these conflicts and, as such, “there are literate elements 
organizing these riots.” Beyond the politicians and elites that were identified other 
causes of conflicts in the north include greed, poverty and unemployment.
326
6.9: Conclusion
From the above qualitative analysis one can conclude that Islam promotes unity in 
diversity in northern Nigeria (Kaduna, Kano and Plateau State), contrary to popular 
notions o f disunity. But one must not ignore the fact that religious violence is 
appalling. The social and economic problems this violence threatens to cause are 
rampant. It hinders nation building, stigmatizes Nigeria and stunts the development of 
the north.
From the semi-structured interviews and FGDs, I was able to understand and 
appreciate the dynamics of Islam in northern Nigeria. I was able to understand what 
conditions exist to destabilize peace within the context of Islam in northern Nigeria. 
More precisely and most importantly, I observed that the variant o f Islam unites and 
divides in equal measures -  it is conflict-ridden when individuals do not belong to the 
Islamic faith. Within the views, comments and findings, the following deductions are 
submitted which align with the acceptance of the Alternative Hypotheses in the 
statistical analysis found in Appendix A of this study:
• Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people in northern Nigerian 
divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts as a safety 
mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.
• Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the capacity to create 
solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.
• In those instances, where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common 
ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.
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• Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, tends to generate 
conflicts in northern Nigeria.
• The more politicized Islam is, the greater the tendency it has to feed into 
religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for 
personal and group interests.
The next chapter offers recommendations on inter-religious conflicts in northern 
Nigeria in particular and, by extension, in Nigeria in general.
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CHAPTER 7
CONFLICT REGULATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA- 
POLICY PROPOSITIONS
Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats away its 
vital unity. Hate destroys a man's sense of values and his objectivity. It 
causes him to describe the beautiful as ugly and the ugly as beautiful, and
to confuse the true with the false and the false with the true the chain
reaction o f evil-hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars-must be 
broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss o f annihilation.
Martin Luther King Jr (1963)180
7.1: Introduction: Policy Im plications
Clearly, it has been seen that religious conflicts have become endemic in Nigeria to 
such an extent that they have threatened the fabric of its existence, especially in 
northern Nigeria. The findings of this study have significant implications for religious 
conflicts in northern Nigeria. Most crucial is that religion as the main identity marker 
for Muslims in northern Nigeria is a crucial factor for this phenomenon. It may be 
argued that it is difficult to resolve religious conflicts because the foundation o f a 
religious conviction is sacrosanct and its ethos is not human oriented but of a divine 
calling to the individual (Faris, 1935:209). However, all religions have a vast amount 
o f sacred literature devoted to peace not violence. Peace and conflict theorists have 
suggested various methods of achieving peace, however, for every society, a different
1X11 A Season lo r  N o n - V io le n c e - O a k la n d  - F am ous  Q u o t e s  f ro m  M a r t in  L u t h e r  King ,  Jr.  Accessed o n  the  3rd o f  
M a r c h ,  201 1 at:  h t t p : / / \ v \ v \ v . s n v o a k l a n d . o r g /k in g /k in g c iu o te s .h tm l
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approach to peace and conflict regulation is required. In seeking adequate resolutions, 
one must note that “you cannot solve problems with the same level of thinking that 
existed when the problems were created.” 181
To understand how Islam acts as a counter force for inter-religious harmony, 
reflections o f the past pave the way for insights into the prevailing problems of 
ethnicity and religion in a multi-cultural society, such as northern Nigeria. The 
rationale for this suggestion is found in the words o f Friedman (1992: 853): “The past 
is always practiced in the present, not because the past imposes itself, but because 
subjects in the present fashion the past in the practice of their social identity.” This 
perception supports the use of an ontological analysis applied in this study.
In order to understand the past it is pertinent to pose three questions based on Hidemi 
Suganami’s explanation of the causes of war and conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham & 
Woodhouse, 1999:97):
(1) What conditions must be present for religious conflicts to occur in northern 
Nigeria?
(2) Under what sort o f circumstances do religious conflicts occur most frequently in 
northern Nigeria?
(3) How did this particular religious conflict come about?
The key to understanding these questions have, in many ways, been explored 
thoroughly in the previous chapters. This study clearly indicates that religion (Islam) 
as a primordial identity marker, as examined in Chapter 1, is a crucial condition for
1X1 A ccessed  on  the  1 7 'h day o f  July 2 0 0 0 9  at: A lb e r t  E i n s t e i n - h t t p V / c r e a t i n g m i n d s . o r g / c j u o t e s / p r o b l e m . s . h t m .
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the existence for religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. As explored in Chapter 3 and 
5, perceived threats to Islamic identity, the use o f Islam for ethnic and political 
manipulations and the politicization o f Islam for achieving political and economic 
currencies tend to generate conflicts that are instigated by Muslims. In addition, the 
varied factors influencing religious conflicts have been explained in Chapter 2.
In seeking conflict resolutions for these conflicts, questions fashioned by Miall et al. 
(1999) are useful in preventing violent conflicts: Can religious conflicts be prevented 
by removing its necessary antecedent causations? Can the incidence o f religious 
conflicts be reduced by controlling the circumstances under which they arise? How 
can this particular religious conflict be prevented from becoming violent?
The recommendations of this chapter are based upon the data collated from the field 
work and analyzed in the previous chapter. The propositions are aimed not at entirely 
resolving inter-faith conflicts, but at finding meaningful mechanisms to curtail conflict 
and controlling the circumstances under which they arise in northern Nigeria or in a 
similar society where Islam is a strong identity marker. In addressing these 
propositions, it is crucial to note that conflict exists only with individuals or groups 
that have some relationship or ties with each other.
In understanding the relationship or ties amongst people, Avruch (1998) suggests that 
observing the cultures or traditions of the groups at conflict with each other is 
pertinent in seeking resolutions for peace. However one must bear in mind that in 
understanding the cultures of the groups at conflict, it is essential to identify with the 
grass-root people. As pointed out earlier on, the grass-root people are both the
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channels o f instigating violent behaviour and the victims o f the consequences o f the 
conflict. Indeed, as Paden (2005:29) rightly pointed out the “first step in conflict 
resolution and mediation is to analyze the nature and dynamics of the grassroots 
conflicts, then to assess the human resources available for conflict mitigation, 
including the capacity of traditional civic cultures to adapt to new conflict 
challenges.” In seeking conflict resolutions, it is vital to explore what these 
relationship or ties are. It is crucial to reinstate that the characteristic of conflicts and 
its various strategies at resolving them differs from one culture to the other. Fry & 
Brooks (1997), noting that human conflict and conflict resolution are structural 
phenomena, suggest that the intricate details of cultural and divergent interests among 
individuals must be observed and considered to seek conflict resolution. Conflict 
resolution must take into account the cultural construction o f society. It is in order, 
therefore to raise the following policy propositions.
7.2: D ecentralizing the Federal System
It is a serious and great challenge for a state such as Nigeria to embrace so many 
nations, diverse ethnicities, cultures and religious affiliations with multi-dimensional 
interest. A centralized federalist government may find it difficult to cope with the 
pressures from these diverse groups. The inelegant and centric nature o f Nigeria’s 
federal structure is a primary precipitant o f the numerous religious crises in the nation; 
therefore, there is a categorical imperative to structurally reorder the Nigerian 
federalism, such that powers are meaningfully devolved to the sub-national units of 
the federation. The present federalist arrangement in Nigeria, by the very negation of 
extant federalist principles that manifest in over-centralization and monopolization of 
power, is conterminous with divisive conflicts. This system has chronically
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underfunded the governance at the local level. To this end, the component 
nationalities of the state should enter into a renegotiation of binding social contracts 
between themselves and the Nigerian state, thereby restructuring opportunity for the 
grass-roots people to ensure equal representation among different zones in Nigeria. It 
is contended that in decentralizing the federal structure, wealth would be centralized 
to other tiers of governance and would grant equal participation in governance, which 
is seemingly denied to the local governments. It is also suggested that a decentralized 
federal structure would engender the establishment o f networks in various local 
governments to observe and provide feedback mechanisms to the state and central 
governments in the event of crises.
The findings of this study show that it is possible and necessary to eliminate the 
practice o f differential citizenship for an all-inclusive, non-discriminative Nigerian 
citizenship. In most parts of northern Nigeria the practice of self differential structures 
such as Sabon Gari, are prevalent where non-Muslims seek societal protection. 
Nigerians, irrespective of tribe, ethnic origins, religion or gender, must be made to feel 
at home and be allowed to own property, marry and contest for elections anywhere 
and at anytime in the Nigerian federation. The above is non-realizable if rule of law, 
equity, justice and constitutionalism are not given the pride of place as ordering 
principles of state action. This reform would eliminate the conflicting issues of settlers 
versus indigenes, which is a precursor to religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. With 
this in mind, the former Nigeria leader, President Obasanjo (Alubo, 2004: 146) said:
Many citizens are threatened and denied their God-given and 
constitutionally guaranteed right to live and earn their living anywhere 
in our nation by such monstrosities as ‘non-indigene’, ‘stranger’,
‘native’ or ‘settler’ constructions which create huge barriers between
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our people. Very often, the irony is lost to our people that every 
Nigerian is both an ‘indigene’ and a ‘settler’ and we pay a huge price 
when we ignore this fact... it exposes all of us and all our primordial 
loyalties to the evils which it generates... it militates against the 
imperative of the integration of our national economy which demands 
that men and capital must be allowed to move freely and grow 
wherever they choose.
7.3: D istribution o f  Resources
The economic paradox about Nigeria is that the more the country has in vast wealth 
and natural resources, the less the people have. In many ways, most o f the problems at 
the root o f religious crises in Nigeria are due to the abject poverty of the people and 
the nation’s poverty profile, which makes it malleable in the hands o f ethnic and 
religious entrepreneurs. The northern part of Nigeria consists of two nations: The rich 
and the poor. It is likened to Disraeli’s (1869) depiction o f the rich and the poor as two 
separate nations in his acclaimed novel 'Sybil. ’ This division has given rise to a 
generation o f unemployed miscreants, unemployed youth such as the talakawa and the 
almajirai. In northern Nigeria, the roots of religious clashes could be traced to class 
struggles and resource control (noted in chapter 2 & 5). In social terms, the lack o f 
economic independence for the young generation leads to denial of economic welfare 
such as housing and the lack of access to justice. This leads to the lack o f education, 
producing disadvantaged adults, which leads to the tendency to commit crimes.
Consequently, the empowerment of the grass-root citizens and its institutions would
go a long way in reducing, if not totally eliminating, the scepter o f religious conflicts.
Perhaps the truth then is that “wealth and population are not, indeed, absolute signs of
prosperity in a state; they are only so in relation to each other. Wealth is a blessing
when it spreads comfort over all classes” (Sismondi: 1815). It is strongly
recom mended that there should be a restructuring on the imbalance in revenue sharing
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formular used in the polity. Presently, the Federal Government takes 55% of the 
revenue allocation, whilst the remainder is shared between 36 states and 744 local 
governments.
7.4: G ood G overnance & A ccountability
Corruption and mismanagement o f public funds is a debilitating crisis faced by the 
Nigerian state. As a result of this, the state has failed in its responsibility to its 
citizens. Given the rising scale of unemployment, generalized impoverishment, 
diseases, poverty and other social malaise that the state is unable to do anything about, 
the grass-root people are left with no other option but to resort to their different 
religious cocoons. The incompetence of the state and its functionaries fuels the 
religionization o f politics and religionization of ethnicity in northern Nigeria. There is 
a need for a more accountable government that will deal with corruption, nepotism 
and empower local government. Deliberate attempts must be put in place to make the 
state functional, responsive, responsible, transparent and accountable to the citizenry. 
Programs that would ensure the empowerment o f the people and qualitatively improve 
their quality o f lives should be put in place. It has been observed from profiling 
conflicts in chapter 5 that poverty is a sine qua non for conflict. In this sense it has the 
tendency to create grievance among people in a tense political system.
An important lesson to learn from history is that “peace is not an absence of war, it is 
a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice” (Baruch 
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 1670).182 In reality, structural injustices, 
religious preferences, tribalism, nepotism, domination of one tribe, culture or religion
182 A ccessed  on  th e  1 1'1’ o f  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 6  at: h t t p : / / w w w .a m e r i c a . g o v / s t / b an g la d es h- 
e n<d i s h / 2 0 0  5 /  l a n u a r v /  200501  2 S 0 1 371 j . X O n U o p U B L C h Z N o n M I ^ A h s edah jnab  J i t m l
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over others are what, when put together, result in conflict, especially when leaders are 
not sensitive to transparency and accountability in public office.
Data collated from the field shows that over 65% of the respondents in the field study 
emphasized the need for good governance through fairness. Most o f them complained 
of injustices on the part o f the state government favouring one region o f the state over 
the other because of their religious affiliation, where schools, hospitals and 
infrastructures are situated in one section and not evenly distributed.
The overall analysis o f this study shows that the realities of religious conflicts in 
northern Nigeria are alarming and require very urgent, apt and continued attention. As 
we have seen in Chapter 4, religious conflict in the north is primarily caused by the 
elite struggling for space and control and scrambling for the allocation o f scarce 
resources. The field study shows that the major factor that has been facilitating this 
conflict is the issue o f illiteracy among the dominant segments of the population. 
Equally critical is the issue of economic deprivation, which is a product of 
prebendalistic policies. The best way out of this social problem is by the evolution of 
dynamic policies that will address the issue of education, poverty and social relations 
within the micro and macro levels of society.
For the grass-roots people, unaccountability and appalling governance has led to 
poverty and the lack of economic resources for the unemployed is a source of 
religious conflicts. As previously noticed in chapter 5, the uneducated and 
unemployed youth are the usual channel for religious violence. These youth see
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conflict as an opportunity to acquire income, plundering carried out for prospects of 
changing their deprived predicaments.
Political leaders in Nigeria should note that the polity is a pluralistic society and hence 
they should not involve the government in any issues that are likely to generate 
religious controversy. This does not mean that government and religious groups 
should not interact at all. Both have the responsibility to maintain harmony in society. 
The government is to cater for the welfare o f the people and to provide for the 
economic and social needs of the people. In the process of doing this, it should 
cooperate and work in harmony with religious bodies. Religious bodies may also 
come to the aid of the state in educational, health or other social matters. Religious 
groups and government should be not rivals but rather they should work together for 
the progress, peace and unity of the country. Government and religion are not to be 
regarded as mutually exclusive in their different functions.
7.5: Bridging the R eligious D ivide
The findings of this study show that there is a dire need for bridging religious division 
in northern Nigeria. It is important to listen to Abu-Nimer’s (2001) advice that 
religion can provide social, moral and spiritual resources to the peace-building 
processes. The accommodation for other faiths within the realm of Islam is 
problematic because some Muslims view such tolerance as sacrilegious. This is not 
surprising, as we have seen that Islam sets boundaries to non-members of the faith. 
Such Muslims should be made to understand that Islam accommodates a plurality of 
cultures and religious faiths. There is a need for educating citizens through the local 
government at the grass-root level o f Islam s hospitality of other cultures. Cognizance
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should be taken to the Holy Qur’an 5:48 which states: “Unto every one o f you We 
have appointed a law and way of life. And if Allah had so willed, He could surely 
have made you all one single community; but in order to test you by means o f what he 
has given you. Vie then, with one another in doing good works” Similarly, the Qur’an 
49; 13 states that “O mankind, surely We have created you from a male and female, 
and made you nations and tribes that you may know each other.” This verse illustrates 
Islam’s recognition o f diverse cultures, which encapsulates ethnic and religious 
diversity. A method o f disseminating this message is through a ‘voice o f authority’ 
such as the Imans o f all Islamic brotherhoods, Imams o f mosques and reputable 
Islamic scholars.
The ‘voice o f authority’ is usually the spokesmen for the religion’s ideology and has 
the religious legitimacy and independent power to divert religious conflict. An 
illustration o f the pragmatic utility of a ‘voice o f authority’ is observed in a study by 
Lewis, Bratton, Alemika & Smith (2001:29-30). They discovered that when Nigerians 
were asked to identify persons whom they would approach if they had a problem, 
most Nigerians said they would meet a religious leader, influential person and 
traditional ruler in order of preference.
Religious leaders have a great capacity to act as peace mediators. Such a ‘voice of 
authority’ can provide a delegation of mediators for resolving and intervening in 
conflicts. Abdalla (2000-2001) has perceptively argued that Islamic conflict 
intervention should be construed on the foundation that Islam is historically based on 
messages of justice, freedom and equality as opposed its misinterpretation o f being 
repressive. He argues that Islam has procedures for conflict resolution and can adopt
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strategies to resolving conflicts according to the conflict the intensity or stage of the 
conflict. Arguing along similar lines, Gopin (1997:19) provides two useful 
instructions to religious peace mediators. He advises that both the conflict potentials 
o f religion must not be ignored whilst emphasizing religions’ ability to generate 
conflict resolution. Also, he advises that religion must be understood as consisting o f a 
complex social phenomena that can generate and resolve conflicts.
Added to that, community-based organizations and community leaders can act as 
mechanism for peace and conflict resolution. They can also use their strength 
constructively to create awareness and understanding o f non-religionists. Religious 
conflicts in northern Nigeria are often rooted in ignorance, prejudice, 
misunderstanding, contradictions, injustices and a lack of tolerance and love. 
Education should hinge on the need to understand other religions and cultures, 
avoiding religious bigotry. In a persuasive analysis Abu-Nimer, (2001:690) 
emphasizes that educating participants (religious leaders and teachers) should be 
within the conceptualization that different conflict resolution theories are identical 
with the ideals endorsed by religion. On the issue o f re-schooling, civil education 
centered on nation building should be imbibed in Nigerians through all levels of 
education. This learning would sensitize the next generation of Nigerians to have 
sentiments of state building as opposed to the nation building.
7.6: Interactive Conflict R esolution & Early W arning Systems
In resolving religious conflicts, the use of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) is 
useful as it entails small group discussions between principal actors, community 
members and unofficial members to analyze the dynamics of a particular conflict in
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order to prevent it from occurring in the future. This discussion is facilitated by a 
moderator. The use o f ICR can have a dual effect, as the moderator can also act as 
skilled mediator and third-party intervener by developing peaceful settlements o f the 
parties. It is crucial that the conflicting parties must accept the intervention of a 
mediator (Zartman, 1989).
The use o f ICR is quite similar to that of FGDs. As seen in Chapter 4, the use o f FGDs 
enabled participants to find resolutions, establish trust and confidence amongst each 
other but, most important, to analyze conflict. In analyzing the dynamics o f conflicts, 
Ojiji (2004) identifies five stages of conflict as:
7. Pre-conflict Stage -  this is usually characterized by hearsay/suspicion.
2. Confrontation Stage -  the full conflict starts here.
3. Crises Stage -  the height o f the conflict.
4. Outcome Stage -  the aftermath is characterized by end of the violent aggression.
5. Post Conflict Stage -  the end of the violence.
The ICR could act as a problem solving-workshop, a training forum and as a grass- 
root approach in seeking peace (Fisher, 1997). Through the use of ICR, the voice of 
authorities can air their views about the conflict and transfer such views to the 
community and tiers o f government. Most importantly, the ICR could facilitate 
reconciliation, forgiveness and a better understanding o f the causation of the conflict 
amongst the community. It is recommended that the ICR could be utilized in 
providing information on causal or the dynamics of the conflict (what went wrong), 
which can identify risk factors through analyzing the five stages of the conflict for 
early warning systems and the skills to predict the type o f conflict to prevent.
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Chart 6.1: Stages of Conflict
CONFRONTATION
STAGE CRISES STAGE
Furthermore, a useful model for predicting instability in order to prevent patterns of 
conflicts is provided by Scarborough (1998). She explains that it is necessary to 
determine ‘why’ and ‘how’ the conflict occurs. She also contends that such 
information can be used to predict early warning signs of conflicts in societies. As 
observed in Chapter 5, religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State tends to occur after 
political elections. This information could be used as sufficient data for critical role 
players, such as the tiers of government and religious leaders, to forecast tension and 
conflict during elections.
Another view is the application of early warning systems via intelligence reports in 
crisis regions, in order to anticipate conflicts in the region. Establishing networks in 
various communities to observe and provide feedback mechanisms to the government 
or peace negotiators can facilitate this thought. Thus, more recourse should be left to 
religious leaders, traditional leaders and those closely connected to the grass root 
people. However, there needs to be an educational agenda to put this in place. This 
can be achieved by investing in the people by providing educational programmes for 
the grass root people on early warning systems.
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Most importantly, it gives such role players timed intervention to act decisively in 
taking measures to prevent conflict, especially at the pre-conflict stage. These reports 
are useful as feedback mechanisms for policy makers at the local government level 
and for developing cooperation between the grass-roots people, the local government 
and state governments. From this perspective, change does not occur from the top to 
the bottom but from the bottom to the top. Empowering the grass-roots people builds 
networks between community organizations and the tiers o f government for 
information management and feedback mechanisms to identity the potential of 
conflict.
Flowing from chapter 5 it is readily observed that the police are ineffective in 
preventing/curtailing religious violence once it has commenced. It is strongly 
recommended that the police in conflict prone areas are skilled on conflict prevention 
mechanisms based on an understanding of ‘why’ and ‘how’ the conflict occurs. This 
requires close networking with the grass-root people and creating networks with 
community and religious leaders. These networks can provide constructive assistance 
on how violent incidents occur. Most importantly, early warning signals can be 
adequately conveyed to security personnel to deescalate violence.
An important observation pertaining to religious conflicts is the current inability of 
non-government organizations to enforce peace. What is necessary is for local 
governments to establish an Office of Interfaith Affairs for feedback mechanisms 
from the grass-roots for assessing early warning signs.
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7.7: Politics o f Inclusion
More concerted efforts are needed to incorporate Muslims and non-Muslims into 
understanding each others’ faiths. The misleading notion o f equating western values 
with Christianity needs to be detached from the sentiments o f Muslims. In addition, 
the conceived notions o f imposing Arab-Islamic cultures on non- Muslims should be 
addressed. These attempts at including Muslims and non-Muslims in inter-faith 
dialogues and cooperating together have yielded some dividends (see below). 
However, the process must be continuous and should be emulated by all tiers of 
governance, especially the local governments.
As a result o f the disintegrative forces created by the violence described above, some 
state governments, individuals and groups have made some attempts at fostering peace 
at the grass-roots and local levels. In 2002, every local government in Kaduna State 
was mandated by the state governor to create a dialogue forum between various 
religious leaders and traditional rulers within their domain. At the state level, a 
Committee on Religious Harmony was put in place. On his part, the Diocese of 
Kaduna has created a ‘Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations’, 
whose aim is to teach the religion of Islam for the sake of knowledge and peaceful co­
existence between the adherents of the two faiths (Muslims and non-Muslims) and to 
assist Muslims in the discovery of the missing ‘Christ’ in the Qur'an. Some other state 
governments in the northern parts of the country have created similar reconciliation 
committees to enlighten the people and leadership. Similar gestures should be 
emulated by other northern states according to their required structures.
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At the national or federal level, the following bodies have been set up for the purpose 
o f cooperation and reconciliation: ‘Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution’ in the 
presidency (IPCR), the ‘Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NTREC)’ and the ‘Institute 
for Development, Justice and Peace.’ The Anglican Church also has a well-staffed 
department dealing with inter-faith and ecumenical matters.
A number o f international organizations are also involved in the process of 
reconciliation, particularly the International Center for Reconciliation at Coventry 
Cathedral. In 2001, a peace pact was signed by the leadership of the Christian and 
Muslim communities in Kaduna city facilitated by Coventry Cathedral in the United 
Kingdom. Both the Christian and the Muslim communities have been involved in this 
peace process.
One must commend and applaud the Nigerian government and some international 
organizations for the establishing some of the above-mentioned bodies. The federal 
government should, on behalf of these bodies, establish sufficient networks of these 
organizations in states while the states should establish such networks in their local 
governments, for feedback mechanisms and to establish areas of weakness and 
vulnerability in interfaith relationships.
7.8: O bjective Reporting By the M edia
This study reveals that many non-Muslims regard Islam as a religion that promotes 
violence, terrorism and war. Several media outlets, such as particular TV stations, 
radio stations, newspapers and magazines, are influenced by their investors or owners 
who have certain political agendas. Other media outlets are simply after the ‘big story’
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in order to make more profit. Others are simply ‘followers’ who only gather news 
from other sources, re-package it and try to sell it again purely as a sensational news.
In reporting religious conflicts, the media have usually reported conflicts with a blend 
o f preconceived notions along their religious and ethnic pre-conceived notions instead 
o f providing objective and informed analyses. The media should use its resource to 
curtail conflicts by promoting interfaith programmes and revealing areas o f interfaith 
harmony. The effective role of the media in preventing conflicts could be used in 
preventing retaliatory conflicts such as the Kano ethnic riot and reprisal killings of 
July 22, 1999 and the reprisal attacks in the Igbo town o f Onitsha in Anambra State, 
emanating from the Bomo ‘Danish Cartoon’ riots in February 2006.
7.9: Suggestions for Further Research
In the words of Mahatma Gandhi:183 “The golden rule of conduct ... is mutual 
toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall always see Truth in 
fragment and from different angles of vision. Even amongst the most conscientious 
persons, there will be room enough for honest differences of opinion. The only 
possible rule o f conduct in any civilized society is, therefore, mutual toleration.” In 
order overcome the culture of intolerance and violent religious conflicts in northern 
Nigeria, some o f the following pre-emptive and preventive measures are imperative:
I. The development o f the national peace policy being fashioned out by the IPCR to 
serve as the benchmark for peace building and conflict resolution in Nigeria.
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II. The establishment o f peace education for all citizens in primary, secondary and 
tertiary education.
III. To establish and develop peace culture as a social norm in northern Nigeria.
IV. The development and establishment of an effective way to eliminate the bias 
patronage o f religion at all levels of government.
V. Governments should train and deploy ‘Peace Ambassadors’ from religious and 
ethnic groups and send them out as change agents to all nooks and crannies o f the 
country to facilitate and promote peace.
VI. Establish an elaborate Early Warning and Early Response mechanism on violent 
conflict along the model of Interactive Conflict Resolution.
VII. Where there is justification, states should establish either Ministries or Councils 
for Peace and Conflict Resolution to provide institutional platforms for the 
operationalization o f peace-building initiatives of governments. Furthermore, local 
governments could set up Peace and Conflict Resolution committees.
VIII. Nigerian governments should institute incentives for peace workers and 
sanctions against violence in communities, schools and general society.
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IX. Leaders and public officials who promote non-violent conflict resolution and 
peaceful co-existence should be publicly commended and also given awards to serve 
as incentives to peacemakers and workers.
X. To examine how to ban the use o f media, audio/video cassettes or the activities of 
solo and mobile preachers who provoke or openly denigrate other religions or ethnic 
groups.
7.10: C onclusion
In order to find resourceful recommendations, the evidence in the quantitative and 
qualitative were used in finding out what happened ‘yesterday’, in order to find 
solutions for today and tomorrow. These recommendations are needed to contribute to 
knowledge and search into how Islam has a uniting capacity, and exploring how Islam 
works as a counter force in mainstream conflict. It is important reiterate that the 
verification of the study was assessed at the grass roots, because in religious conflicts, 
the grass roots people are used as machineries for escalating and implementing 
conflicts. The grass roots people are also the first victims o f such conflicts. Collating 
data at these levels rendered a good account of the outstanding problems associated 
with these conflicts. The relevance this research is that it shifts focus on the 
experiences o f people involved in religious conflict. It shows how people react and 
respond to people from other religious backgrounds. Furthermore, it would provide 
access to information to other scholars.
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FINAL REFECTIONS
It must be emphasized that implicit in the above observation, this thesis attempts to 
point a searchlight in understanding religions complexity, unresolved issues, 
phenomenal nature of religion and mystified perceptions of Islam in northern Nigeria. 
Furthermore, it attempts to apply pragmatic resolutions to the critical problems of 
religious conflicts in the region. Clearly, then the main objective o f this study is to 
make a contribution to the literature in peace and conflict studies and analysis: 
religious conflict, the role of Islam in northern Nigeria and its political system. Most 
crucially it attempts to do this by linking these areas with the primordialism of 
religion.
The role o f religion in conflicts in northern Nigeria has been a neglected area of 
research, at least in terms o f a general empirical assessment. The compiled database 
on religious factors in conflicts in northern Nigeria reveals that religion plays a role in 
conflict more frequently than is usually assumed. Using Chi-square statistics 
(appendices) and qualitative comparison, it is apparent that there is sufficient evidence 
that links religious primordialism to conflict. While the de-escalation o f conflict 
(outcome stage) through the use of religion is more common at the descriptive level, 
most of the religious variables that proved to be significant are negatively related to 
peace, mainly in respect o f conflict termination (post-conflict stage). The effects of 
religion on conflict duration are almost absent and they are inconsistent when it 
pertains to the intensity of conflict.
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The study notes that the strongest relationships are returned when testing for religious 
identities, which overlaps with other identity markers. A further finding suggests a 
strong support for the hypotheses that the mobilization o f religion in conflict depends 
on several characteristics of various religious dimensions. The abuse o f religion in 
conflict is particularly likely when religious and other boundaries run parallel, when 
religion differentiates the conflicting parties and when stronger connections exist 
between religious identities and political actors. At first sight, the most astonishing 
finding refers to the positive relationship between the pro-peace use o f religion and 
ongoing conflict. This must be interpreted in terms of a sequential direction of 
causation, where violence stimulates religious actors to stage peace initiatives and not 
vice versa. At the same time, peace efforts seem to generally have a limited impact 
once violence has broken out.
In the foregoing I have attempted to present a broad and methodical account of 
religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. My attempts at rendering a concise analysis, 
account and recommendations are not exhaustive and conclusive. However I am 
confident that I have developed a methodical analysis and explanation of the research 
problems and thrown insights to practical solutions to limit religious conflicts.
My understanding of the primordialism of religion in society plays a significant role in 
religious conflicts in northern Nigeria and in similar societies. The momentous nature 
o f religious primordialism reveals that it is nationalistic in orientation among northern 
Nigerian Muslims regardless of differences in cultural affiliations. My undertaking of 
this thesis has been by observation. I have also propounded a bottom-to-top approach 
in my intellectual analysis of the propositions and hypothesis.
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Popular notions of Islam are that it is a religion that is divisive in nature, it is 
considered to create group division which leads to segregation and violence. In 
addition scholars have emphatically and powerfully argued that ethnic boundaries are 
the most important dimension that explains social conflict. However, on the contrary 
the conclusion in this study shows that Islam in northern Nigeria has a cultural 
component. It is a product of historical determinism. It acts as a glue to unite people 
marred by ethnic, linguistic and cultural markers. Crucially, the data gathered 
overwhelmingly suggests that Islam in northern Nigeria acts a double edged sword 
Islam in northern Nigeria -  it unites and divides in equal measures. It is divisive when 
individuals are not part of the community of Islam; it is a counter force for inter­
religious harmony -  it is a source for peace and conflict. Thus, it is unique and 
different from other societies that are why what is true o f northern Nigeria cannot be 
true in other societies.
Furthermore, the study strong observes that Islam has provided political unity, 
motivated ethno-nationalism, promoted nation-building and united people. It has 
provided contentions within the social class structure in the north. It is unfortunate that 
the beneficiaries of the Islamization of politics in northern Nigeria are the elites, who 
deploy Islam in their power contests. The concept of Islam din wa-dawla (Islam is 
both religion and state) in northern Nigeria is a divine aspiration and a hegemonic 
political tool and that has been used by politicians as an instrument for political power 
and as a fog for conflict.
This study explores a realist conception on Islam in northern Nigeria. It examines the 
existence of a peculiar characteristic of a people that brings about a commonality,
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grouping, bondness, connectedness and primordial ties of Islam in the region. The 
existence of these peculiar characteristics exists and acts independent o f our 
knowledge about them. Thus, “society is not created by the conscious decisions of 
individual people, but pre-exists them and moulds their mental life” (T. Benton & I. 
Craib, 2001:127). This study explains that Islam in northern Nigeria is connected to a 
common history, which is the foundation of a common identity. There is a logical 
dependence of how things are as opposed to how things ought to be. At this point it is 
important to note that when making a comparative assessment of Islam in northern 
Nigeria, it has a different structure to other religions in Nigeria such as Christianity. I 
realize that Christianity does not allow the comfort zone that Islam applies during 
inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Christianity does not succeed in preventing individuals 
from different ethnic groups from losing life or limb. In the context o f Islam in 
northern Nigeria, Islam promotes inter-ethnic peace amongst adherents of its faith. 
Thus, yet again I reflect that primordialism best explains Islam in northern Nigeria. 
The conclusion I have come up in this study is that Islam in northern Nigeria has a 
strong cultural component -  it is unique and different from other societies that are 
what is true o f northern Nigeria can not be true in other societies.
This study is independent of our knowledge of the world or what actually exists in 
religious conflicts in Nigeria. In answering the research questions and the analyses 
provided in this study, I do affirm that this is the best explanation that can be provided 
to explain the causal relations within the dynamics o f conflict and Islam. However, 
knowledge, being created by man, is subject to fallibility, as man is an imperfect 
being.
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The findings of this thesis did not come in to existence as a result o f this study. In 
Bastian terminology, the outcome of my explanation o f the theory is an index o f w hat 
I do not produce, as it exists and will exist independent o f my findings. How ever, my 
findings provide new insights on religious conflicts in northern Nigeria, which could 
act as an arbiter in managing or limiting inter-religious conflicts in the region. In 
addition, it could serve as a point of reference for other multi-ethnic and religious 





D em ographic Data D istribution of Respondents 
Table 1 (a): Sex D istribution of Respondents
Joss Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Male 66 71 59 196 65
Female 34 29 41 104 35
Total 100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terpre tation : Table 1 (a) above and Graph 1 (a) below and show that 65% o f the 
respondents are male while 35% are female.
G raph 1 (a) Sex Distribution of Respondents
□  F /m ale 
3 5 %
B  Male 
6 5 %
■  M ale  
□  F /m a le
Table 1 (b): Age Distribution of Respondents
Joss Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Below 18 19 21 24 64 21
Between 18-25 41 39 42 122 41
26-35 22 24 21 67 22
36-50 11 10 8 29 10
Above 50 7 6 5 18 6
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
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In terpre tation : Table 1 (b) above and Graph 1 (b) below reveal that 21% o f  the 
respondents fall below the age o f 18; 41% between 18 to 25; 22% between 26 to 30; 
10% between 36 to 50; while 6% o f the respondents are above 50 years.
1 (b):Age Distribution of Respondents
b
■ below the age of 18
□ between 18 to 25 
B between 26 to 30
□ between 36 to 50 
oa above 50 years
□  between 18 to 2 5 
41%
□  between 36 to 50 
10%
between 26 to 30 
22%
0  above 50 years 
6%
Table 1 (c): M arital Status D istribution of Respondents
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Married 31 33 29 93 31
Single 59 58 61 178 59
Divorce 8 9 7 24 8
W idowed 2 - 3 5 2
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terpre tation : Table 1 (c) above and Graph 1(c) below reveal that 31% o f the 
respondents are married; 59% are single; 8% are divorced; while 2% o f the 
respondents are widowed.
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Table 1 (d): Educational Qualification D istribution of Respondents
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
SSCE 57 52 54 163 54
OND/NCE 16 21 18 55 18
B.SC./HND 17 20 21 58 19
M .SC./M .A 9 7 4 20 7
M .PHIL/PH.D 1 - 3 4 1
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terpre tation : Table 1 (d) above and Graph 1 (d) below reveal that 54% o f the 
respondents are SSCE (or its equivalent) holders; 18% are OND/NCE holders; 19% 
are B.Sc/HND holders; 7% are M.Sc/M.A holders; while 1% o f the respondents are 
M .PHIL/P.HD holders.
D ivorced
□  W idow ed 
2%
□  Single 
59%
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Table 1 (e): Em ploym ent Status Distribution of Respondents
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Public sector 41 39 42 122 41
Private sector 22 20 17 59 20
Self Employed 33 38 35 106 35
Unemployed 4 3 6 13 4
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terp re ta tion : Table 1 (e) above and Graph 1 (e) below reveal that 41% o f the 
respondents are engaged in the public sector; 20% in private sector; 35% are self- 
employed; and 4% are unemployed.
Graph 1 (e): Employment Distribution of Respondents
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Table 1 (f): Ethnic/Cultural G roup Distribution of Respondents
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Hausa/Fulani 47 67 71 185 62
Yoruba 31 23 18 72 24
Igbos 18 7 6 31 10
Others 4 3 5 12 4
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terp re ta tion : Table 1 (f) above and Graph 1 (f) below show that 62% o f  the 
respondents are Hausa/Fulani; 24% are Yoruba; 10% are Igbos; while 4% belongs to 
other m inor ethnic groups.
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Table 1 (g): Religious G roup Distribution of Respondents
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Christians 34 33 27 94 31
M uslims 62 67 69 198 66
Traditional 4 - 4 8 3
Other - - - — —
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terp re ta tion : Table 1 (g) above and Graph 1 (g) below reveal that 31% o f  the 
respondents are Christians; 66% are M uslims; 3% are traditional worshippers while 
none belong to other religious groups.
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G ra p h  1 (g): Religious G ro u p  D istribution o f  Respondents
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Table 1 (h): N um ber of Years Spent in the Study Locations
Jos Kano K aduna Total Percentage
Less than 11 13 9 33 11
1 yr
1 -  5 30 28 26 84 28
years
6 - 1 0 39 36 40 115 38
years
1 1 - 1 5 6 9 10 25 8
years 
16 -  20 9 10 10 29 10
years
21 -  25 3 2 4 9 3
years
26 -  30 1 _ 1 2 1
years
M ore than 1 . 1 1
30
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terpre tation : Table 1 (h) above and Graph 1 (h) below show that 11% o f the 
respondents have spent less than 1 year in their present state; 28% between 1 to 5 
years; 38% between 6 to 10 years; 8% between 11 to 5 years; 10% between 16 to 20 
years; 3% 21 to 25 years; 1% between 26 to 30 years; while 1% o f the respondents are 
more than 30 years.
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G raph 1 (h): N um ber of Years Spent in State
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Table 1 (i): N um ber of Years Spent in O ther States (Outside Study Locations)
Jos Kano K aduna Total Perce
ntage




51 21 42 114 38
1 -  5 
years
19 18 9 46 15
6 - 1 0
years





100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
In terpretation : Table 1 (i) above and Graph 1 (i) below show that 42% o f the 
respondents have not resided in any other local government; 38% have spent less than 
1 year; 15% between 1 to 5 years; 4% between 6 to 10 years; while 1% o f the 
respondents have spent above 10 years.
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G raph  1 (i): Number of Years Spent in O ther States
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Table l( j)  Annual Salary Distribution of Respondents





17 12 18 58 19.3
N30,000-
N40,000
23 28 26 82 27.3
N40,000-
N50,000
25 25 35 69 23.0
N50,000 and 
above
35 35 21 91 30.3
100 100 100 300 100
Source: Field Survey, 2009
Interpretation: Table 1 (j) above and Graph l(j) below show that 19.3% earn an 
annual salary range between N20, 000 to N30, 000; 27.3% between N30, 000 to N40, 
000; 23% between N40, 000 to N50, 000; while 30.3% earn above N50, 000
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G raph 1 (j): Annual Salary Distribution of Respondents
■  Above NSO, 000  
30%
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■  N 2 0 ,  0 0 0  to  N 3 0 ,  0 0 0
■  N 3 0 ,  0 0 0  to  N 4 0 ,  0 0 0
■  N 4 0 ,  0 0 0  to  N 5 0 ,  0 0 0
■  A b o v e  N 5 0 ,  0 0 0
■  N30, 000 to 
N40, 000
23%
■  M o r e  th a n  1 0  yrs
■  N40, 000 to N50, 
000
23%
S e c t io n  2 
Q uestionnaire Items
Since colonial times Nigeria has been divided between a Muslim north and a non- 
M uslim south. Nigeria is also the largest country in the world with an even division o f 
M uslims and non-M uslims. This division became more crucial after the country’s 
independence in 1960, especially with the emergence o f  religious tension between 
M uslims and non-M uslims. With this in mind, the sample questionnaires were formed 
to be inconclusive o f the cultural patterns and diversity o f its people from or living in 
northern Nigeria.
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2 (a): The Solidarity among People in Northern Nigeria
Question Strongly
Agree
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Disagree
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1 Islam facilitates an 
overarching solidarity 
among people in 
northern Nigerian 
divided by ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural 
differences.
179 60 87 29 12 4 16 5 6 2
2 Islam legitimizes and 
even calls for violence 
against non-believers 176 59 93 31 11 4 13 4 7 2
3 Perceived threats to 
Islamic identities can 
strengthen internal 
group solidarities and 
foster group 
association.
182 61 85 28 14 5 8 3 11 4
4 Ignorance and poverty 
triggers religious 
conflict in northern 
Nigeria. 211 70 67 22 9 3 7 2 6 2
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Source: Field Survey, 2009 







No. % No % No % No % No %
5 Islam has an 
overarching trans­
ethnic identity and the 
capacity to create 
solidarity among 
seemingly similar 
cultural groups in 
Nigeria.
188 63 57 19 21 7 29 10 5 2
6 The intensity of Islamic 
identity determines the 
potential for 
mobilization in conflict.
201 67 197 32 2 1 0 0 0 0
7 The political elites and 
people in government 
who do not do what 
they are supposed to are 
the very ones 
responsible for religious 
conflict in northern
176 59 89 30 5 2 16 5 14 4
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Nigeria.
Islam does not approve 
of conflicts neither does 
it support unnecessary 
killings but it is the 
selfish interest of the 
people concerned.
223 74 39 13 21
Source: Field Survey, 2009
2 (c): The Relationship between Ethnic Groups and Religion in Northern Nigeria
Question Strongly
Agree
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Disagree
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
9 Where people in northern 
Nigeria are bound by 
common ethnicity but not 
common religion (i.e. 
Islam) the conflict is very 
severe.
I l l 37 97 32 42 14 24 8 26 9
10 Most of the conflicts in 
northern Nigeria are 
religious as opposed to 
ethnic.
87 29 172 57 6 2 23 8 12 4
11 The philosophy behind 
the creation of Islam was 
and still is to maintain
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peaceful co-existence. 188 63 101 34 0 0 11 4 0 0
12 Islam, even though it has 
contributed positively to 
the growth of the 
country, has also created 
a history of violence.
201 67 95 32 4 1 0 0 0 0
Source: Field Survey, 2009
2 (d): Ethnic and Political Manipulations
Question Strongly
Agree
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Disagree
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
13 Religion, when used for 
ethnic and political 
manipulations, tends to 
generate conflicts in 
northern Nigeria.
117 39 172 57 11 4 0 0 0 0
14 Islam provides 
framework for 
mobilizing and sustaining 
popular zeal and fosters 
conflict.
181 60 81 27 8 3 13 4 17 6
15 Islam gave northern 
Nigeria useful connection 
with the Islamic world 
with which they
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exchanged articles of 
trade and knowledge and 
political relationship.
101 34 59 20 47 16 52 17 41 14
16 Islam also acted as a 
unifying cultural force 
and administrative 
system of government. 89 30 171 57 9 3 19 6 12 4
Source: Field Survey, 2009
2 (e): The Politicization of Islam
Question Strongly
Agree
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Disagree
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
17 The more politicized 
Islam is, the more the 
tendency it has to feed 
into religious crisis 
provoked by political 
elites seeking political 
capital for personal and 
group interests.
182 61 85 28 14 5 8 3 11 4
18 The northern states have 
increasingly become a 
hotbed for religious and 
ethnic crises as a result of 
the implementation of the
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Sharia. 176 59 89 30 5 2 16 5 14 4
19 Islamic brotherhood was 
directly opposed to ethnic 
sentiments with the 
introduction of partisan 
politics to northern 
Nigeria.
87 29 172 57 6 2 23 8 12 4
20 Political leaders in 
Nigeria in particular 
should not involve the 
government in any issues 
that are likely to generate 
religious controversy.
188 63 57 19 21 7 29 10 5 2
Source: Field Survey, 2009
Section 3 
Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis stated earlier in this chapter is tested in this section, using the Chi- 
Square (X 2) as a statistical tool. A table of frequency is constructed first to enable the 
computation o f the expected frequency.
3 (1): Hypothesis One: On the Solidarity among People in Northern Nigeria
Null Hypothesis (Ho): Islam does not facilitate an overarching solidarity among 
people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences.
Thus, it does not act as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times o f  crises.
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Alternative Hypothesis (HI): Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among 
people in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. 
Thus, it acts as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times o f crises.
Responses Oi Ei Oi-Ei (O i-Ei)2 (O i-Ei)2
Ei
Strongly Agree 179 100 79 6241 62.41
Agree 87 100 -13 169 1.69
Undecided 12 100 -88 7744 77.44
Disagree 16 100 -84 7056 70.56
Strongly
Disagree
6 100 -94 8836 88.36
Total 300 300.46
Source: Field Survey, 2009
1. X2 C = 300.46
2. The Degree of freedom:
3. V= n-I ; 5-1=4
4. D f (V=4; a  =0.05
5. X 2 T =9.488
Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X2) (300.46) is greater than Chi-Square 
tabulated (X2 )T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that Islam facilitates an overarching solidarity among people 
in northern Nigerian divided by ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, it acts 
as a safety mechanism to deflate conflicts in times of crises.
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3 (2): Hypothesis Two: On the Trans-Ethnic Identity among Cultural Group in 
Nigeria
Null Hypothesis (Ho): Islam does not have an overarching trans-ethnic identity and 
the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.
Alternative Hypothesis (HI): Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity and the 
capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in Nigeria.




188 100 88 7744 77.44
Agree 57 100 43 1849 18.49
Undecided 21 100 79 6241 62.41
Disagree 29 100 71 5041 50.41
Strongly
Disagree
5 100 95 9025 90.25
Total 300 299.00
Source: Fie d Survey, 2009
1.X2 C = 299.00
2. The Degree o f freedom:
3. V= n-I ; 5-1=4
4. D f (V=4; a  =0.05
5 . X 2 T =9.488
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Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X2) (299.00) is greater than Chi-Square 
tabulated (X2 )T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative 
hypothesis and therefore conclude that Islam has an overarching trans-ethnic identity 
and the capacity to create solidarity among seemingly similar cultural groups in 
Nigeria.
3 (3): Hypothesis Three: On the Relationship between Ethnic Groups and 
Religion in Northern Nigeria
Null Hypothesis (HO): Where people in northern Nigeria are not bound by common 
ethnicity but common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.
Alternative Hypothesis (HI): Where people in northern Nigeria are bound by 
common ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam), the conflict is very severe.




111 100 11 121 1.21
Agree 97 100 -3 9 0.09
Undecided 42 100 -58 3364 33.64
Disagree 24 100 76 5776 57.76
Strongly
Disagree
26 100 74 5476 54.76
Total 300 147.46
Source: Field Survey, 2009
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1.X2 C =  147.46
2. The Degree o f freedom:
3. V= n-I ; 5-1=4
4. D f (V=4; a  =0.05
5 . X 2 T =9.488
Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X2) ( 147.46) is greater than Chi-Square 
tabulated (X2 )T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that where people in northern Nigeria are bound by common 
ethnicity but not common religion (i.e. Islam) the conflict is very severe.
3 (4): Hypothesis Four: On Ethnic and Political Manipulation
Null Hypothesis (HO): Religion, when used for ethnic and political manipulations, 
tends not to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.
Alternative Hypothesis (HI): Religion, when used for ethnic and political 
manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria




117 100 17 289 2.89
Agree 172 100 72 5184 51.84
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Undecided 11 100 -89 7921 79.21
Disagree 0 100 -100 10000 100.00
Strongly
Disagree
0 100 -100 10000 100.00
Total 300 333.94
Source: Field Survey, 2009
1 . X2 C = 333.94
2. The Degree o f freedom:
3. V= n-I ; 5-1=4
4. D f (V=4; a  =0.05
5 . X 2 T =9.488
Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X2) (333.94) is greater than Chi-Square 
tabulated (X2) T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that religion, when used for ethnic and political 
manipulations, tends to generate conflicts in northern Nigeria.
3 (5): Hypothesis Five: On the Politicization of Islam in northern Nigeria
Null Hypothesis (HO): The less politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it has to 
feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for 
personal and group interests in northern Nigeria.
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Alternative Hypothesis (HI): The more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency 
it has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital 
for personal and group interests.





182 100 82 6724 67.24
Agree 85 100 -25 625 6.25
Undecided 14 100 -86 7396 73.96
Disagree 8 100 -92 8464 84.64
Strongly
Disagree
11 100 -89 7921 79.21
Total 300 311.30
Source: Field Survey, 2009
1. X2 C = 311.30
2. The Degree o f freedom:
3. V= n-I ; 5-1=4
4. D f (V=4; a  =0.05
5 . X 2 T =9.488
Decision rule: Since Chi-Square calculated (X2) (311.30 ) is greater than Chi-Square 
tabulated (X2 )T (9.488), I reject the Null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the Alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that the more politicized Islam is the greater the tendency it
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has to feed into religious crisis provoked by political elites seeking political capital for 
personal and group interests in northern Nigeria.
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